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INTRODUCTION
The contemporary
be said to have started

era of "serious" theorization of the nation and nationalism can

in the early 1980s.

In 1983, Benedict

Anderson published

Imagined Communities and Ernest Gellner published Nations and Nationalism both of
,

which not only became immensely

studied, but also

marked a point

at

which the idea of

theorizing the nation entered the mainstream academy as a worthy focal project. In that

same

year, Eric

Hobsbawm and

Terence Ranger also published The Invention of

Tradition, the influential forerunner of Hobsbawm's later Nations

1780 [1992], Yes, there were "important"
Deutsche's, and especially Hroch's
possibility

of arriving

at

—

and Nationalism Since

theories long before, such as Kedourie's,

as well as Seton-Watson's rejection of the

a final coherent theory of the nation

— but these

did not inspire

the formation of a "field" of study, with conferences, anthologies, journals, and important

personages, as well as a unified academic framework into which divergent theories and
the conceptual frames and political agendas grounding

Though some even today bemoan
[see, for instance, Chatteijee, 1993a:

more accurately

the paucity of theoretical

1

xi]

them could be

,

fit

and managed.

work on

the nation

John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith much

represent the situation in the preface to the anthology Nationalism [1994]

they edited. There they apologize for the "highly selective" nature of their text
includes excepts from roughly 40 different authors

nationalism"

is

volume, but of diversity as

from

the academic "field [of] nations and

"so vast" and "expanding at an exponential rate" that anything

a highly selective representation

fields,

--

is

not possible.

well. Theories

- which

The vastness

is

more than

not merely a matter of

have been advanced from a wide range of

history, to political science, to economics, to literary studies, to cultural

a work is referenced
'Page references will be given in brackets throughout the dissertation. The first time
by the year of
followed
appear,
will
author(s)
the
of
name(s)
in a series of references to the same work, the
ot this information is given in
publication for the edition cited and the referenced page number(s). If some
cases in which references appear to
the narrative, then only what is not given will appear in brackets. In
he
referenced,
more than one work by an author or authors, the year will distinguish which publication is
in
number(s)
page
referenced
the
just
contain
will
series
the
subsequent references to this work within
other works have been referenced, the initial
brackets. When a work is re-introduced after another work or
form.
reference of the series will again be in the full

1

studies, to anthropology, to philosophy, to sociology,

of perspectives

:

and so

forth,

and from a wide range

Marxist, liberal, postmodern, republican, cosmopolitan,
industrial,

feminist, and so forth. [Hutchinson and Smith, 1994: v]

But, things might not be as they appear. For, even as Hutchinson
and Smith
indicate the vastness of the field, they find

more

vast,

speaking,

meaning
level to

such that

little

sits

we have

its

object

--

nationalist

phenomena — much

only just begun to organize and approach

Relatively

it.

has been written on the nation. And, perhaps a more complicated

behind the words of the ever-incisive Chatterjee. Perhaps his measure of the

which the nation

theorization but the

is

"untheorized"

is

number of distinct and

not the volume of pages devoted to

penetrating ideas regarding the nation that

inhabit the pages.

The
amount

issue, then, is not

that has

why

so

little

has been written, but

been written has told us so

why

the

immense

little.

Chatterjee offers significant help almost immediately, by emphasizing the

presence in the dominant theories of nationalism of the workings of new-colonial forces,
conceptual frames, and agendas [Chatterjee, 1993b:

1

-

35]. This recognition of the

political (and economic, military, etc.) context and role of theories of the nation and

nationalism

is crucial.

Anderson recognizes

that the ideologies

of liberalism and Marxism had produced

inadequate theories of the nation/nationalism [Anderson, 1992:

"Ptolemaic effort[s]" to produce

liberal or

4].

He

rejects the

Marxist theories of the nation that resolve

through extravagant twists, turns, allowances, exceptions,

etc.

—

the limiting conceptual

frame accompanying either ideology with the readily observable phenomena
quite often and in significant

ways

calls instead for a "reorientation

starting point

from ideology

to

at

-

that

seemed

odds with the conceptual frames themselves. He

of perspective

in ... a

Copernican

phenomena. He attempts

in his

spirit" that

own work

to

would

shift

produce such

a theory, though the entanglements of ideology (particularly post-colonial colonialist)

2

proved much more

difficult to

break out of than he has anticipated.

of the problem and his attempt put him

in a separate class

Still,

his recognition

from the pure ideologues who

yet dominate the field.

His

failure, perhaps, results

political nature

forget that

from

of academic theorization

Anderson

is

his failure to appreciate the fundamentally
itself,

though he wrote

an Orientalist himself - and Foucault.

after Said

It is

-

let

us not

not just a matter of

dismissing "incorrect" theories that are the result of inadequate thought and adherence
to
prejudice. Contrary to the claims of Socrates and Plato, this type of error does not

produce bad (oppressive)

politics, but rather is the latter's

oppressive politics are not merely represented
functioning in academia
politics,

economics,

What

is

is

in

symptom. And these forms of

academia: their presence and

fundamentally linked with their presence and functioning in

militaries, etc.

more, these forms themselves are interwoven

form and development of actual

in

complex ways with the

nations, nationalisms, and states. Inaccurate theories are

not merely so, but the inaccuracy has concrete effects and causes. Understanding the
nation

is

even part

not simply a matter of getting beyond such theories, for they are tied up with,
of, the object

of study, in both their direct and indirect

effects.

Not only

are the

theories taken as bases, legitimation, and justifications by national and anti-national
forces, but they are also resisted

and reacted against

in their concrete forms.

Far from floating above their objects of study, on a wholly distinct plane of
existence, as

Anderson assumes,

theorists of the nation are mired in their objects.

just a matter of adjusting theories to reflect a

new

not

perspective on "independent data."

This requires political as well as intellectual transformation.
latter

It is

We

might even say

that the

depends on the former.

The naive but dominant concept of academic
scholars study social or natural

theorizing

phenomena and develop

that expert, objective

theories, speculations,

models by disinterested analyses of them. The scholar pursues

3

is

truth,

and

only limited by

his/her ability

and by any features of the phenomenon under study

inherently difficult.

research

—

As more and more

new

subtle, as

analysis
for further

(in social sciences

and

information systems; in physical sciences, better instruments
of data

gathering and processing), the

may mean

make

becoming bases

--

and as the methods and technologies of study improve

liberal arts, better

this

studies are produced

that

that they

phenomena

are understood better and better.

become more complex,

the questions asked

more

Of course,

difficult

aspects appear (gender-based social analysis, subatomic particles,

and

etc.).

But, improvements are made.

A sophisticated scholar — one with a deep sensitivity to and understanding of
social

and

political issues

2

-

recognizes the naivete of this concept. Scholars do not exist

outside a world of social, political, and economic forces, but are subject to and agents of

them

much

as

as

anyone

else.

Yet, the pretension

still

work of others,

nature of the

Some

predominates.

as a

means of asserting

scholars recognize the
their

own purity.

Julien Benda, in

The Treason of the Intellectuals [1928], commits the error of believing

was pure and
fascism.

that the

oblivious to the fact that the Western

Academy was

academy

communism, and

unsullied by worldly agendas until the rise of nationalism,

He seems

compromised

for

much of its

history an ideological mouthpiece for and indeed subsection of one of the most powerful
social formations yet

many

years,

known —

the Catholic Church.

Even

Plato

worked

for a king for

and Aristotle tutored a conqueror. The academy has always been

fundamentally compromised by complicity with the forces that be. That Benda claims
otherwise

is

a master-stroke of mystification in the service of ideology.

The necessity of interest on
to

be opposed and minimized as

which the

possibility of deep

the part of the

far as possible.

meaning

in the

academy

On

is

not a disease, an intrusion

the contrary,

academy

inheres.

it is

the very thing in

For, with the danger of

This goes for the physical scientists, too -- especially those involved in military technology,
pharmaceuticals, oil geology, etc., but development of this point is beyond the scope of this work and

2

expertise.

4

my

academic complicity
this potential

has been,

Indeed, most likely
or

oppression comes the potential of academic opposition
to

in

at

at certain

And

it.

times and in certain places, courageously
pursued.

every university everywhere,

at

some point some

scholar has been

is resisting.

The

consumed
simply

great danger

as if

it

that interested scholarship is systematically
presented as

is

were disinterested as

true, or the

,

and

claims made, the facts presented were

if the

simple attempt to achieve the

truth,

however

elusive.

The

greater the

pretensions to "objectivity," the greater should be one's wariness.
Yet, these are honest pretensions. That

pursuing

is,

There are three types of "honest"

truth.

the scholar truly believes that he/she
intellectual errors: mistakes

lapses of thought or lack of thoroughness, errors determined by limits

due

is

to

on the available

information and processing, and errors based on the limits of the theorist's conceptual

frame or ideology. This

dissertation.

ways

its

more

insidious for being honest.

the last type of error that will be the focus of the

It is

examine

last error is all the

I

will treat

it

in both

its

political

and

first

two chapters of this

intellectual aspects

-

that

is, I

will

ideological grounding and political consequences, while also analyzing the

that ideology limits conceptual possibilities

and produces inaccurate analyses and

models.

At the same time
too

much has been

capitalized

that theories

written on the nation, rather than not

on the monopoly

legitimate theorizing. Eric
historians,

who

of the nation have proliferated out of control

rights of

enough

Hobsbawm need

not waste his time with "nationalist"

self-evidently cannot and should not be taken seriously, because they

[Hobsbawm, 1992:

literature,"

— theorists have

academia on determining what constitutes

cannot be agents in the process of understanding the nation, but
itself

— that

1

at best part

of the object

1-12]. This exclusion, adopted widely throughout "the

completes the general consolidation of academic control over what

believed about the nation and nationalism

—

is

said and

a control that itself depends on a continuing

5

significant (but not total,

interested and

by the

economic forces and

The

which would be

resisted

by both the power-hungry

truly principled) reflection within

power

parties in

in the

result is profound: the "actual

academia of the

self-

political

and

wider world.

phenomena" of the nation and nationalism

have been displaced by an over-abundance of theories about them
which leaves no room
for

them even

as these theories obscure

substituted. This

is

them and an academic "hot-house" formation

not a once-and-for-all

displaces the actual phenomena.

theorizing of them, as well as to

shift,

but a continuing process that endlessly

The nation and nationalism themselves,

some

extent in their actual forms, have

academically generated. Theorists from Liah Greenfeld

Anderson
is

to

in

academic

become

John Breuilly

to

Hobsbawm

to

are fond of stressing intellectuals as the well-springs of nationalisms; the irony

that they

--

disinterested scholars

nation and nationalism "ar e" for us.

Greenfeld

is

—

— are implicated just as much
As

I

will discuss

is

more

in

what the

with regard to

not a monolith, not a "big individual" without deep-

running internal currents and tensions. This

Within

— particularly

not

from a tautology.

this is far

Fortunately, academia

my writing.

if

it,

there

is

is

the seat of my

hope and the condition of

always the possibility of genuine approaches to the nation.

After a tradition of challenges to the colonialist roots and tendencies of academia

culminating in Said's Orientalism [1979], the Western academy performed the
retreat

of allowing some voices from the colonized and post-colonized world

occasionally other voices

come

tactical

into

And

it.

up, usually from outside the dominant groups in the

United States and Western Europe. Resistance does break through, as the successes of
feminism(s) in academia over the past three decades

attest.

Thus, that Anderson's naively presumed direct return
possible does not

nation

it

is

mean

possible

—

engaging the theories

that

no worthwhile approach

is

to the

available.

phenomena

To understand

and necessary, both politically and philosophically
that predominate.

As should be

6

clear by

is

now,

-

not
the

to begin

this is not just a

by

matter of prudent scholarly method, that

is,

of learning what has been said of the

"objectified" subject matter before venturing one's

paying academic

tolls

on the way

their theorists almost uniformly

are part of the object
liberating as

much

itself,

part creator

Rather, the theories themselves, even as

and part prison guard.

I

enter with the intent of

I

The only "freedom" one has

have already

stated,

I

adopt a

necessary in order to engage the theories/theorists themselves

on which they claim
will

their objects,

the possibility of learning from these theories, and building

this is not a voluntary choice.

it

a matter of

is it

presume a perspective above and beyond

which one approaches them. As

cases

Nor

opinion.

as understanding.

Though one has
them,

to legitimacy.

own

become

to

at

is

the attitude with

critical attitude.

is,

In

some

—

--

in

sense, this

even

means beginning with

the nation and nationalism not as

is,

term that has been/is being conceptualized, analyzed, theorized, defined. This
suggest that the nation

emphasize

most

the theories produced.

empirical facts (or widespread delusions), but as an "object" of theory, that

(1) to

is

exposure and analysis of the conceptual

frames and political/intellectual agendas that have a powerful influence on
generative role in

This

a level as deep as the one

engage the nation. Given the nature of these theories,

ideological critique, that

on

is

unreal apart from

is

not to

construction in theory, but rather in order

of the "nation" (or "nationalism")

is

not an

of this or that national movement or nation (or

state),

that the "construction"

activity limited to ideologues

its

simply as a

extends quite fully to theorists

who

but

theorize the nation from positions external to a

nation/nationalism (ostensibly "objective" positions), (2) to emphasize also that academic
theorization of the nation has
in the

form of an academic

become

so extensive, comprehensive, and institutionalized

"field" that

it is

no longer possible

perceive or conceptualize nations without mediation through
3

broad array of theories, and (3)
3

This

is

for

even "nationalists"

at least

some

to

part of the

to avoid misleading initial references to the nation

form

not to say that these theories are not dependent to a surprising and unacknowledged degree on the
work of "nationalists" themselves. Nor is it to suggest that this engagement is necessarily

theoretical
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that

would

belie the theoretical complexity that will
emerge: because "the literature"

does not provide a conceptual framework adequate
concepts in their actual complexity and richness,
critique to develop such a

even

in the literature

(if conflicting).

in the field

a difficult process, because the

is

have been elevated

to the status

Fortunately, this type of challenge

of nation-theorization. 4 Again,

and attendant

must work through the process of

framework myself. This

concepts/frames developed

assumptions

I

to theorizing the nation

of

not without precedent,

is

this process is not

simply about

dispensing with compromised conceptual frames, in favor of direct
apprehension of pure
data.

Exploring the objectification of the nation
passive nature of the object. This "object"
back. In these pages,

it

will use

my

is

is

not,

not passive:

voice, though

I

of course, an assertion of the
it

is

always already talking

have no pretense to being a

spokesperson for nationalism generally, or even a specific nation. But, as "theory" has

become

object, so does "the object"

become

the agent of theory.

At the Risk of Marginalizing Mvself
This said,

it

is

important that

I

writing on the nation, in other words,

attempt to be clear about

my

agenda. In

my own

November

1992,

1

reasons for
attended the

National Association for Armenian Studies and Research's annual membership meeting.

A retired Harvard Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations professor,
Frye, delivered the keynote address.
that

is,

He

Richard Nelson

stressed the importance of Armenian Studies,

of studying Armenian culture and history. His own specialty was medieval Near

Eastern languages.

He ended

his talk

by condemning the "foolish ethnic

between Armenians and Azeris and Turks

that

conflict" (to paraphrase)

was then reaching

a crescendo in

passive or has been so historically. That "nationalists" must engage the academic field of what
call nationalism studies does not mean that they cannot take a critical attitude toward it.
4
Especially the work of Chatterjee and Hroch.
,

8

we might

Karabakh.

hope

that

It

He

dismissed

it

all

as irrational and needlessly destructive,
and expressed the

more reasonable people
did not occur to him

be more than simple

--

in

each group would prevail and end the
bloodshed.

a scholar

irrationality.

It

- that the

nationalism he was dismissing might

did not occur to

him - a

historian

understand the causes of the "foolish bloodshed." From his
chair
qualified to judge
I

and dismiss

it

was angered by

recognized

it

that

struggle,

man had

and

movements.

full

Armenian

agreement. The audience seemed oblivious

delegitimized an Armenian national struggle against groups

had a long, genocidal history of oppressing Armenians. That Frye, from

comfortable chair

at

Harvard, where no one ever challenged his right to

values, or belief system,

I

saw

fit

to

judge negatively such a struggle was

Ajmenian audience embraced

predictable; that his

thought a great deal after that about

sentiment against national movements

predominant
the

Armenian

the unexpected reaction of his predominantly

audience. There was loud applause and
to the fact that this

in

Western

political,

which

I

why

through

own

this

this externally

I

home,

at the least

disturbing.

concluded that the

of small and oppressed nations

are

complex

-

social causes behind this

will explore in general terms below, in

agency

exist,

judgment was deeply
had happened.

his

academic, and press circles had penetrated even into

concept of "identity." But the basic features are
given up their

his

- particularly

American Armenian community. There

penetration,

felt

it.

his self-righteous rejection of

much worse was

try to

Harvard, he

as typical of the reactions of Western academics to national

it

What made

at

- to

in self-conception,

clear:

my

at least

consideration of the

some Armenians had

and were instead perceiving themselves

produced sentiment.

This was in part a function of "Armenian Studies"

itself.

Through

the

development of Armenian Studies, Armenia and Armenians had become an object of
study.

Through

methods

to

its

practice, scholars

had become used

Armenia, and Armenians adopted as

9

to

applying other ideas and

their goal the study

of things Armenian.

In the process, they

worthless and
study.

to

have forgotten

worst oppressive,

at

Through

seem

it,

academic menu,

consumed

lose influence even over

Through

an object of study

at the

pleasure of those

what they are as

this process,

is at

best

not coupled with active agency in the process
of

it is

Armenian become just one more item on

things

to be

if

that being

who have

the multi-cultural

agency. Armenians

objects.

"agency" has been more and more reduced to the

importation of concepts developed without reference to Armenians, for application
to
things

Armenian

5

The

.

Armenian "essence";

Even

objects.

it is,

in cases

productive, the use

issue

is

not that the concepts are "external" to

rather, that their use

where the concepts

is still

damaging

if

some presumed

imposes the passivity of Armenian

are interesting and their application

they are imported without an understanding of the

context from which they are coming and into which they are being thrust, and the power
relations

are that

between

these.

much more

With negative concepts of nationalism such as

Frye's, the effects

devastating.

My reaction to Frye's remarks and their reception by his audience has become this
dissertation.

It is

groups engaging

motivated by the need to restore
in national struggle a

their nation that is not tainted

sensitivity to the history

engaging nationalism

and

to

Armenians and other oppressed

frame of reference through which to understand

by simplistic antinational-ism developed without the

political realities

of the oppressed

at the

same time

in all its complexity.

My perspective is

"Armenian," but

my

intention

history and politics from the general academy, reserving

"Armenian"

— while

least

theorists, justified

Armenian presence within

by some

sort

is

not to bracket off Armenian

them

for analysis

of cultural relativism.

the general theoretical

complex

It is

by properly

about creating an

that is applied to

Armenian

as

well as other nationalisms.

5
For instance, Ronald Suny uncritically adopts in full measure Benedict Anderson's problematic concept of
the nation as the basis of his description of contemporary diasporan Armenia [Suny, 1993],
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This does not mean simply "getting into the club,"
that
legitimate.

It is

are their actions

is,

being included as

about calling others to account for the effects of their
theories

—

on Armenians (and

others).

these effects clear and challenging them.

- which

about analyzing them, about making

It is

about affecting those in the "club."

It is

Such a challenge cannot help but transcend Armenian

issues.

There

is

no way

to

bracket off the effects of the dominant complex of theories of the
nation and nationalism

on Armenia from
foremost,

their effects

my own work has

on other marginalized and oppressed groups.

and

First

been greatly influenced by the work of others, engaged

in

other struggles. Further, the issues of different groups correspond and interlock,
and the
theories themselves reverberate throughout the world.

antinational-ism as
it

and

who

all

This

it

benefit from

is

Armenians

affects

a proper

It is

it.

to theorize the nation

Armenian agency -

dishes

--

it.

It

My

hope

My

ultimate goal

universally relevant and at the
perspective. This

ghettoize

it

is

neither

affects all subjected to

and nationalism in general.

It

is

means

to the

and

world

-

that this study will resonate with the

is to

them

as their ideas

it

is

and

create a theory of the nation that

to universalize

as a derivative type: rather,

engage the

besides rugs and ethnic

same time Armenian, without pretension

meant

to

participating in the world,

struggles of others on the margins, and prove as useful to

experiences have to me.

it

to escape ghetto-ization,

means giving something

that has a use globally.

take up the issue of

take up the issue as

is to

nation and nationalism throughout the world.
contributing to

To

Armenian experience

meant

to bring

it

is

to a universal

as a model, nor to

into play as

an active

participant in an unfolding philosophical, political, and historical (narrative).

This "globalization" of Armenian struggle carries with

it

the obvious

responsibility of not replicating the imperial attitude of those at the core of the Western

academy.

It

means challenging what should be

challenged, and objectifying that which

objectifies, but not reinforcing the objectification of the subjugated.
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Such an agency must

appreciate the specific forms of their marginality even where

Armenia s.

It

must

For those

attain

agency without oppressing

who would,

with

Hobsbawm,

use

6
.

my

honesty about

positioning and agenda as justification for marginalizing
"nationalist" with a limited perspective

"Armenian" perspective

is

will actually prove

I

my work

limits

is

I

my own

political

as that of a

stress that

my

no more inherently narrow than the Marxism of Hobsbawm

would hope

minoritarian perspective

my work

and range of concerns,

himself, the liberalism of Kedourie, Breuilly, and too

of Greenfeld. Indeed,

does not coincide with

it

many

that the self-reflective

others; or the

way

will

I

"Americanism"

approach the nation

superior to such theorists, at least on this count. Having a

not a limit, but the possibility of seeing beyond the default

of the majority.

Structural Synopsis

The

dissertation

is

divided into three chapters. In the

first, I

critique theories of

the nation that might be called "anti-national." These theories attempt to delegitimize the

nation politically and even metaphysically, generally through imposition of a reductive

concept and in the service with a competing

engage theories

that attempt to regulate

political agenda.

In the second chapter,

I

and exploit the actual phenomena of nations and

nationalism through imposition of a constrictive and ideologically tainted concept, again
in line with

some type of social/political agenda. As

conceptual framework that grounds a

fuller,

part of these critiques,

I

develop a

more comprehensive grasp of the complexity

of the nation and attendant terms, both as concepts and as determinate social formations.
In the process of critique, specific parts of a final theory emerge,
in the third chapter. This chapter transcends the critique form:

it

which
is

I

develop in

full

structured around the

various conceptual issues that a comprehensive, adequate theory of the nation must work
through.
b

In contrast to the

"Franco-Universalism" that rose during the French Revolution and became a justification

for Napoleon's conquests.
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CHAPTER

1

ANTINATIONAL-ISM
In the past decade in Eastern
fallen

and nationalism has

Europe and the Soviet Union, "communism" has

risen as a central political force replacing

it

—

both as a force

legitimating existing newly formed states and their boundaries,
and one opposing them.

With

this fall

and

rise,

discussion of the "nation" and "nationalism" has pervaded
public

discourse, including the popular press, academia, and government
policy discussions.

Two

prevailing tendencies have emerged in this discourse. First, "progressive"

political theorists in

been so significant
past

1

academia have extended the

in

Marxist and other progressive political analysis and theory of the

50 years. The thrust of this form of antinational-ism has been

movement
political

to consider national

a retrogressive form of politics, one that detracts from genuine social and

development and

is

given to violence and oppression.

The second tendency has been
in

tradition of antinational-ism 1 that has

to valorize the interstate order, as institutionalized

recognized nation-state boundaries, in the face of what

force of re- and newly emergent nationalism.

is

considered the disruptive

The "resurgence" of (separatist and

irredentism) nationalism threatens to undermine the post-Cold

emerged, which

is

War order that has

seen as the proper culmination of liberal-capitalist historical

development.

These tendencies

differ significantly.

"Progressive" theories are the intellectual

base of left-oriented advocates and agents for social change. "Progressive" attitudes

toward the nation, which show up

in the so-called "liberal" press, the rhetoric

of left-

leaning political organizations, and so forth, seem to originate in the academy, and

expand out

into the

Western Europe.

Opposition

to

more general

On

(well educated)

left circles in

the United States and

the other hand, liberal-statist attitudes toward the nation do not

anything "national," as differentiated from "anti-nationalism," that

"nationalism,” taken

in its

negative sense.
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is,

opposition to

seem

to originate within the

policy

-

in diplomatic

reflected in the

movements

and military

academy, but

camps

in the

companion of advanced

state

system

to consolidate the current status

attitudes,

of course, are

popular xenophobic

industrial

development.

in principle,

quo

while

state order.

quo

liberal-statist policy

These policy makers are

the broad range of those involved in "First World"
governmental and quasi-

govemmental
If

found

These

that "progressive" theorists agitate against
the status

and often against the

makers seek

drawn from

is

circles, for instance.

their real bases are

that appear a constant

Another difference
state order,

academy, but more within the realm of
"realpolitik" public

activities, as well as the elites

of many "Second" and "Third World"

one considers these two tendencies generally, then, they appear as two

in opposition to

"nationalism"

is

each other. Indeed, within the rhetoric of the

is

"communism,"

political

"left" side,

another face of all the other "isms" through which the essence of the

liberal-statist "right" manifests itself; while, within the rhetoric

"nationalism"

states.

of liberal-statism,

the latest "foreign threat" that has "us" in danger, replacing

the heretofore ultimate threat from the "left." "Nationalism," like

communism, feminism, (/non-Christian )

"religious fundamentalism,"

and so

forth, is yet

another irrational disrupter of the ultimate rational organization of society that has been

achieved or shortly will be.
Yet, these two tendencies have
separatist struggles as retrogressive,

much

in

common. Both

see current national

undermining positive social development. One

portrays the current proliferation of national struggles and nationalisms as the re-

emergence of social forces

that should

have been superseded

in the dialectical

development of history, and the other as the resurgence of irrational

--

even

"evil"

—

forces that have risen to undermine the rational development of history toward the best

possible

2

human

(liberal

2

)

society.

Liberal in the original sense of the term, that

Locke and

is,

within the atomic-individualist, rights-based tradition of

Mill.
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Indeed, more than sharing a similar perception
of separatist nationalisms, these

two "opponents"

actually

complement each

against truly progressive national struggle

government

is

other, functioning together as a unified
front

3
.

A

separatist

movement opposing

a state

generally not embraced by progressive forces in
opposition to that

government, but

on the contrary, often actively excluded from the ranks of

is,

"legitimate" oppositional groups.

What

is

more, each side has great efficacy

instance, so powerful

is

the

first

side that

in its anti-national activities.

Armenians

in

For

Karabakh are frequently

portrayed in the left-leaning "alternative press" as misguided or even xenophobic
"aggressors"

who

seek dominance over land that should be shared as the hallowed ground

of a multinational

state.

So powerful

of national and individual survival

Turks

-

is

community"

Armenians fighting a war

in the face of nationalist oppression

fully within the Turkish tradition

the "world

the second side that

by the Azeri

of antiArmenian-ism and genocide1

-

appear to

as nationalist insurgents against a benign state power, as the

willful disrupters of a peaceful order.

Whatever the merits of the principles

explicitly

invoked in the rhetoric, each

discourse actually functions to allow oppressor to appear as liberator, and progressive
political

movement

discourses

become

to

all

appear as regressive and oppressive. What
the

more potent because they

Armenians, Kurds, Palestinians, and many others

are in sync

is

in fact the

Within the debate as framed, between progressive and
is

As

— they

have caught

mere show of opposition.

liberal-statist political forces, the

locked out. Indeed, the exclusion of national struggle under

circumstances appears the precondition of the contemporary

3

more, these two

in a crossfire that appears to be a

serious debate between rival political agendas, but

non-state nation

is

well as, certainly, against nationalisms

in

political

all

"dichotomy"

the negative sense.

“Beginning in 1915, and under cover of World War 1, the Ottoman Turkish government planned and then
executed the genocide of its Armenian subjects. Over million of the 2 million Armenians were killed,
and most of the rest scattered about the world. To this day, the Turkish government denies that this
genocide occurred.
1
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present in industrially advanced countries. For
those in separatist struggles, neither a

progressive

nor a

Though

liberal-statist"

agenda

a valid option.

is

these discourses do not share a complete

monopoly

position in academia,

they are prevalent and immensely influential. They even
tend to influence interpretations

of theories that are not

in

themselves "antinational-ist": for instance, quite often
Benedict

Anderson's "imagined communities," which are genuine social formations
constructed

through materially influenced ideal processes, become nationalist delusions
without basis
in fact.

Marxist Antinational-ism
Eric

Hobsbawm's Nations and Nationalism Since

Reality [1992]

is

an explicitly "anti-national" work.

1

789:

Hobsbawm

Programme, Myth,
of

initiates his analysis

the nation and nationalism by claiming that "nationalists" are inherently deluded [10].

then develops a case showing (1) that the nation

is

not a genuine social formation, but

rather a constructed or forced delusion or imposition and (2) throughout

book by celebrating
influence in the

more and more oppressive and

the indications that nationalism

coming

to

Hobsbawm,

rather, in the first instance

is

in decline,

Is

it

justified? That

is,

He

concludes his

and will wane

on the

in

historical facts

he

does Hobsbawm's analysis

used to guide the

the nation

is

not an organic social formation, but

an ideal object of a "nationalism,"

with the establishment of a
is

200 year

it?

According

goal

destructive one.

years. This sentiment appears based

presents and his analysis of them.

support

its

from an originally revolutionary, socially progressive

history, nationalism has mutated
political ideology, to a

He

state

that

is,

corresponding to a given nation as

political aspirations

movement

a political

its

goal [9

is,

-

10].

This

of inhabitants of a geographical region or

existing state around the interests of the purveyors of the national idea, "governments and

ruling classes" [89], Thus, nations were/are "constructed essentially from above" [10].
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Even where

a political state

proposed nation. The nation

is

is

achieved, however,

it

will not correspond to the

a fiction that imposes a reductively unifying
concept on a

diverse social reality of differentiated, distinct classes and
other diversities [see, for
instance, 91
distinct

-

92]. This concept has often

which make an
72],

traditions created or manipulated

-

"imagined"

ideal,

173].

his analysis
-

fit

by eliminating socially

—

not real

To understand

— community

social reality,

real

by governments and ruling

These symbols become the icons of a "patriotism"

also 172

[126

to

groups through deportation or genocide [156]. The nation appears

symbols and

the

been made

only in

elites,

appear concretely present [71

-

that is a "civic religion" [85; see

Hobsbawm

routinely turns to class, as in

of the apparent "nationalism" of working-class soldiers during World War

I

130],

Certainly

Hobsbawm's contention

actual social relations

is

that nations are constructions misrepresenting

not unfounded, and through

it,

he makes an important

contribution to the study of nations and issues a warning especially important for those

engaged

in national struggle.

Some

"nations," as conceived by a nationalism and even as

constructed in the actual social world, are essentially misconstruals or deformations of
social reality precisely in the

cases does not

mean

that

it is

manner Hobsbawm
true in

all.

Not

all,

describes. But, that this

true in

is

some

nor even most, social formations labeled

"nations" can be reduced to such top-down manipulative constructions.

Reynaldo Clemena
Philippines,

model.

to

shows

[1979],

is

a powerful counterexample to

that the driving force in Philippine anti-colonial national

1910 was the peasantry. The

the anti-colonial nationalist

have rewritten

elite

Hobsbawm's

movements

segments of Philippine society resisted

movements, which eventually destabilized the Spanish

government which withdrew
elites

stunning analysis of popular movements in the

Pasyon and Revolution

Ileto

from 1840

Ileto's

in 1898.

In later, post-American occupation Philippines, the

their role in history, to present

of the Philippines.
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themselves as the original liberators

Things are

not, then, as they

would appear

to

Hobsbawm.

In the case of the

Philippines, rather than imposing a nation on the
peasants, the elites ultimately

appropriated the nation that the peasants had created. The

elites certainly

misconstrued

history, but they did so in order to capture a nation
produced through the efforts of others,

not to create one. Frantz Fanon, in The Wretched
of the Earth [1963], analyses this

tendency to theft among colonized
Consciousness,

he

elites.

alerts readers to the

In the chapter "The Pitfalls of National

phenomenon of the

A

"national bourgeoisie."

national bourgeoisie consists of elements of the colonized elite that served and
supported
the colonizing

back

power and who would

seize control of the liberated colony

into a subservient, neo-colonial relationship with a

gain of the

elites.

elite sold the

This

is

precisely

what happened

new

or the former ruler

in 1900,

it

collaborated actively at least until 1986. Fanon's "national bourgeoisie"
its

--

it

for the

in the Philippines, as the controlling

country out to the United States, which re-colonized

nationalist, but rather sacrifices the nation for

and bring

own

petty interests.

is

and then

anything but

Hobsbawm

misinterprets or misrepresents national bourgeoisies as the universally necessary cores of
nationalist

Fanon

movements,

highlight,

rather than anti- or a-national usurpers. In such cases as Ileto and

Hobsbawm

himself is often duped by the

elites, into

believing that they

produced nations, rather than stealing them.

Hobsbawm's

failure to recognize in

he reflects on anything

what

is

there.

It is

like the

dynamics presented by

Ileto is not a

the result of a limited and limiting conceptual

impossible for him to see what
are

any of the multitude of "national movements"

is

simple failure to see

framework

that

makes

it

there in any comprehensive or penetrating way. There

two main aspects of this limited framework.
(1) Implicit in

Hobsbawm's misreading

is

the assumption that peasants and

workers are mere passive receptors of bourgeois ideology, without
agency. Or, more precisely,

when

intellectual or political

peasants and workers take up a socialist agenda, they
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are agents, but

agency

is

when

much more complex, and obscured by Hobsbawm's

The means
point.

and

they take up a nationalist one, they are passive
dupes. The reality of

Philippine peasants

employed

The peasants transformed Catholic

festivals, earlier

relatively gross analysis.

in their struggle is instructive

this

organizational structures, songs and prayers,

imposed on them by the colonizing Spanish,

organizations, songs, and theater.

on

Through

into revolutionary

these, they operated against the Spanish

and

presented their liberatory message to other peasants in terms accessible to them. The
underclasses of Philippine society were anything but passive, and the object of their
oppositional agency was not merely Spanish, but also

same Philippine

elite that later

In

many

cases,

it

was

the

sold out the peasants that buttressed the imposition of

Spanish customs on them. Challenging

this

assumption of passivity on the part of

"Orientals," the colonized, or the underclasses

movements, not

elite.

is

essential for the dignity

of their

political

mention

to

an accurate understanding of their complexities and

Though Hobsbawm

at

length emphasizes the importance of analyzing and taking

to

innovations.

seriously the "assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people,"

against the "official ideologies of states and movements" [10

only

when such

are in line with his political agenda. This

show of popular agency

in the

form of the

activities

but in actuality denying this agency and retaining

mechanism of data

selection and exclusion.

it

is

- 1
1],

he seems

a crafty

to

do so

way of allowing

the

and thoughts of "ordinary people,"
through exercise of the scholarly

Denying a fully representative presence of

the "assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people" in scholarly

work

is

manipulation that exploits some and represses others. Indeed, one might

activity "totalitarian scholarship," that

scholar-dictator.

What

is

is,

call this

the suppression of any views not in line with the

perhaps most interesting

is

that

Hobsbawm

claims to be

representing the real views of the masses, while using his deformation of their views for
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his

own agenda -

exactly as he claims "nationalist" leaders claim
falsely to speak in the

name of the people
(2)

to

Of course,

into question

advance their

own

agendas.

the existence ot peasant-driven, popular nationalisms
does not call

Hobsbawm's deeper assumption,

of social progress. The implication
the abolition of class true liberation.

peasant movement, despite

its

ultimately a class movement.

is

that class-tension is the

that only class oppression

Hobsbawm's response

is

true oppression

to Ileto

confirm

Hobsbawm

Though

Ileto disproves a

key

to

major tenet of Hobsbawm's

same

to

it.

appears that any

is

the

Why?

simple, though not obvious. Rather than being observable on the

level with nation, class is the very conceptual

approaches the nation. In Hobsbawm's work, class
should be analyzed as the nation
social formations.

it

understanding nation, that class

fundamental social formation, nation secondary
is

that the

regarding his focal claim that nationalisms are elite-driven will

this foundation, that class is the

The answer

might be

and

outward appearance as anti-colonial nationalism, was

theory, he appears to confirm the foundation of that theory. Indeed,

challenge to

one true dynamic

Case analysis

is.

Rather,

it

is

framework through which Hobsbawm
is

not a social formation that can and

the grounding assumption of analysis of

after case analysis

of nations are in terms of elites and

masses, ruling classes (interchanged with "governments"), peasants, and/or workers, with
"aristocracy," the "big bourgeoisie," and the "petty bourgeoisie" often thrown into the

mix

[for a

in analysis

comprehensive example, see 116-117].
of nations and nationalisms

necessary one. The problem

fundamentally) that

is

is

—

It is

not that such terms have no role

they have a very important, useful,

that they are granted an actuality

unsubstantiated by analysis and argument

and

and legitimacy (and

—

while other key social

formations, such as "language group," "ethnicity," and "religion," are challenged to

demonstrate their actuality and legitimacy, and probed and analyzed endlessly.

These

latter are generally

revealed as inadequate terms for explaining nationalism.

For instance, even where language and ethnic groups are not purely the conceptual
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constructs of nationalism (and that

is

not often for

Hobsbawm), shared language

or

ethnicity alone does not indicate necessarily any
type of shared political consciousness or

necessary social positioning [62, 64
active social force

-

is

-

On

65],

employed without

-

the contrary, "class consciousness"

definition or defense

-

and juxtaposed

as an

to the

terms "ethnic" and "national" consciousness that are examined
extensively throughout the

book [88

-

89],

Ultimately, the unreality that

Hobsbawm

finds at the heart of nations

is

the

conclusion of a tautology. If all genuine social groupings are to be explained in
terms of
classes and their dynamics, then such groupings as the nation, the concept of
which

class-based, are revealed to be false formations. This tautology emerges as

is

not

Hobsbawm

traces through his version of the history of the "nation," examining the various self-

concepts used

at

various times and places to define the nation. These range from the

"popular-revolutionary" concept of membership in a "body politic" [18ff.], which implied
either a collective cohesion or a shared relationship (loyalty) to a territorial state, to later

concepts of identity based on perception of sharing a

Hobsbawm

history, religion, etc. [5 Iff]

social reality,

which

is at

tests these

As

least,

—

particularly those

between

the various concepts of the nation fail to correspond with

his perception of the social realities involved,

At the

language, ethnicity,

concepts against his perception of

base a function of class dynamics

ruling elites and the masses.

false.

common

Hobsbawm

determines the concepts to be

such things as linguistic identity are not sufficient to produce concrete

unity or subjective commitment, and other forces are required. At the most, a concept of
national identity or unity
artificially

imposed by

is

elite

directly against the interests of

manipulation and force.

But, exposing the tautology

tautology

is

assisted at at least

of class. For example,
late

some members, and must be

is

some

Hobsbawm

not disproving

its

premise/conclusion. The

points by problematic data that supports the primacy

show

tries to

that, as the

masses entered

politics in the

1800s, class became as important an element of national movements as nationalism.
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The implication

is

that

even misguided nationalisms tended toward true liberation

form of class revolution. He

cites a

number of national movements

organizations were the main vehicles.

The

limits

in

which

of my historical expertise

commenting on only one such movement. Hobsbawm

points out that the

socialist

in fact

it is

liberation of all

possible to argue that the

ARF

was

as

much

Hobsbawm

counterbalance to nationalism: the

ARF

is

though for the past 50 years

possible to claim that

all

Armenian

It

to say that the socialism itself was

it

is

not

Indeed, though one

socialists before they

liberation that

its

has been by and large

ARF members are committed socialists.

and so socialism as a vehicle toward a general

was

it

since "nationalist” at

has been a very contentious issue, and

could argue that the founders of the party were

seems more accurate

as

incorrect to present this as a

was then and has been

this

is true,

a vehicle for the general

core, fighting against subjugation and genocide of Armenians.
socialist,

to

Armenian

Ottoman and Russian subjects (including Turks and Russians)

of Armenians. At the same time,

me

restricts

Revolutionary Federation was affiliated to the Socialist International
[125], This

and

in the

were

nationalists,

would include Armenians,

mediated through nationalism.

revolutionaries tended to see economic oppression of Armenians as one aspect

of a more general oppression

that included political factors as well, while at the

same

time economic oppression of Armenians motivated commitment to ending economic
oppression beyond the Armenian nation.

Hobsbawm's claims

What

that the socialist aspect

is

perhaps more damaging to

ARF

of such parties as the

manifested the

"peaking" of class consciousness through the mystifying haze of nationalism.
contrary,

it

is

incontrovertibly clear that nationalism

was

On

as indispensable to the

the

ARF

as

socialism (if not more so): the Hunchak Party, an Armenian Nationalist/Marxist party

formed

in the 1880s,

emphasized Marxism over nationalism;

it

was

effectively defunct

before 1900.

He

it

also claims that

communism

superseded nationalism

nationalisms in communist states such as the Soviet Union
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--

--

especially minority

and kept

in

check the

destructive forces nationalism [180], In point of fact, the
very existence of the Soviet

Union depended
in the 1920s.

in part

During

on the manipulation and exacerbation of ethnic tensions by

this period, Stalin

of the Soviet revolutionary

state forced

undermined minority resistance

Stalin

to consolidation

on them by placing portions of national minorities

under the jurisdiction of hostile local majorities, thereby making the
former dependent on
central Soviet authority. This in turn restricted the resistance of other
portions of hostage

national minorities,

who

could not act without undermining the safety of some of their

own. Hobsbawm even goes so

far as to

minimize the significance of Official Soviet

anti-

Semitism, which deeply undermines his claim [180-181],
I

could go on for some time challenging Hobsbawm's historical data, assumption,

and analysis

in this

piecemeal fashion. 5

One could

follow other historians in presenting

other "facts" selected to support one's point, to the exclusion of other facts, in the manner
criticized

by John Breuilly [1994], Problematizing some of his

historical analysis is not,

however, a general refutation of Hobsbawm's methodology, conceptual frame, and
theory.
in

5

The findings of Miroslav Hroch,

in the Social Preconditions

Europe [1985], suggest such a general challenge. Hroch analyzes

As one

instance that further exemplifies the problematic nature of

of National Revival
the composition of

much of Hobsbawm's

historical

one could evaluate Hobsbawm's 1990 claim the commitment of most Armenians support transfer
of Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan to Armenia in principle, but the support would crumble as soon as
the issue demanded concrete specifics [177] against subsequent historical events that contradict it. At the
risk of compromising my "objectivity" as a scholar with an example that appears to express national pride,
200,000 Karabakh Armenians with 15,000 troops chose to fight against
I point out the following.
overwhelming odds — the Azeri population of 7 million supporting an army much larger and better
equipped than the Armenian one — and continued to fight despite heavy losses. A majority of Armenians
in the Republic endured intensive deprivation of basic human needs (food, water, heat) for more than six
years willingly (my direct interviews indicate) rather than give up Karabakh, while their popular
commitment forced the Armenian government to maintain support against the narrow interests of its
leaders and their oft-stated preferences. Finally, Armenians around the world gave large amounts of
money and other humanitarian aid, as well as direct labor, to alleviate the suffering in Armenia and
Karabakh. Some even fought in the Karabakh army. In every meaning of "concrete," from risk of life, to
material deprivation, to unsolicited material sacrifice, a majority of Armenians followed through on the
analysis,

commitment Hobsbawm labeled merely "general."
As another, one could challenge the selective

analysis behind such conclusions as that, in the
absence of contemporary xenophobic nationalism by majority language speakers or the perception of it by
extremist nationalist minority groups [see 170 - 173], linguistic oppression in the pre-contemporary world
was not an issue [1 Off.]. He offers such evidence as the fact "that a standard work on socialism in
Belgium in 1903 did not even refer to the Flemish [language] question," the implication being that
"language caused so little trouble," that is, was so unimportant to people [117]. Obviously, there could
have been and probably were other reasons for a socialist text privileging class (as Hobsbawm) to ignore
language issues.
Even within the limits of my historical knowledge, such examples go on and on.
1
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19th Century national

movements

their social composition.

class or social group

First, for

in various

sufficient to signify that such a group
it

is

in

terms of

each of the nine national movements researched,
"no

had a stable place

movement," and thus

North and East European regions

in the structure

of patriotic communities,

had a fixed and necessary share

in the national

impossible to "establish a definite rank order for the
importance

of the groups" [Hroch, 1985: 129], In other words, the
proportions of different classes

and groups within movements decreased, increased, or fluctuated
as the movements
developed.
there

More than

no evidence

is

this,

no groups across movements displayed the same

that national

or that class or group, which

movements tended

to attract or repel

One would have expected

trends, so

members from

movements were

if the

this

in line

with the interests of some politically conscious members and not others. The
possibility
that

some members could have been duped

that these

movements were vanguards containing

At the same time, and
the strongest

summary

or manipulated

component

in fairness,

it is

in every national

not supported by the fact

politically conscious individuals.

necessary to point out that

group

description of 'intelligentsia,'" that

is

.

.

is, "all

.

was
those

the group

who

we

lived

"it is

clear that

refer to under the

from

their

intellectual labor" (teachers, etc.), as well as all those with high school educations [129],

But

this

does not indicate

elite origins,

or even specific class origins: the "intelligensia"

could include members from a range, from
peasants.

What

is

elite

landowners, to clergy, to teachers, to

more, in some cases the segment of the intelligentsia that became

active in a national

movement was

representative of the social composition of the

intelligentsia as a whole, while in others "the social origin of the patriots

was

diametrically opposed to the social origin of the intelligentsia as a whole" [157

This suggests that

in

some cases being from

a national movement, while in others

some segments of the

it

was

intelligentsia joined a

segments.
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the intelligentsia

coincidental, as

movement

was a key

much

-

158].

factor in joining

higher percentages of

than the percentages from other

Finally,

some movements

consisted of activists from predominantly peasant

origin (Lithuania, Estonia, Belorussia),
class

some were

(Norway, Finland), and others were

led

led

by the

intelligentsia

by members from urban middle classes

(Bohemia, Flemish movement) or craftsmen and traders (Slovakia)

movement was 90

Lithuania’s national

to

what One would expect from

analysis.

Thus, according

movements

to Flroch, national

middle-class based, or peasant-based, not just because

composition of individual movements
identifiable with

-

Indeed,

[157],

percent peasant [156], Overall, the composition

and leadership of movements varied, contrary

Hobsbawm's

and middle

any one

explicit or veiled

-

is

class.

This

is

is

generally

are not consistently elite-based,
it

varies

mixed

by movement, but the

as well, that

is,

consistent with the possibility that "class interest"

not the determining factor in nation-formation.

consciousness, class interest, and the objective
social structuring around class, etc.)

not easily

may have

realities

Though

class

of class (economic pressures,

important roles in nation-formation, an

understanding of the nation cannot be through class alone.

Hobsbawm might
foundational

is

due

origins, national

to

its

counter-argue that the fact that class does not appear to be

being mystified by nationalism. Even

movements consisted of elites manipulating

as Ileto shows, peasant-based anti-colonial

was always about

What

if,

class.

"masses,"

how

for

result

or,

liberation"

is.

class too fundamental,
If

one

one probes the constituent

comprise the substratum of his concept of social

something interesting happens. The underclasses of Eastern Europe tend

formed as the

members —

which "national

Hobsbawm makes

fundamental his own concept

et al that

lower-class

irresolvable debate threatens.

instead of claiming that

instead questions just
"elites,"

An

movements

at their cross-class

to

reality,

have been

of conquest by other ethnic or language groups. The black slave

underclass of the United States and elsewhere was formed by domination of one racial

group by another. Indeed, social and class distinctions among the dominated race were
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to

a great extent leveled within Africa, and
completely leveled

from Africa. Other examples of conquest determining
a

Ottomans

some

West Asia, Europeans throughout Asia and

in

structures produced

events and forces, in

by conquest have faded as the

many

among

those people removed

class structure abound: the

Africa,
result

and so

forth.

While

of subsequent historical

cases the structures have persisted strongly. Indeed,
in the

case of South and Central America, class corresponds quite
closely to degrees of skin
color, with lighter skin

meaning higher

This, of course,

class.

is

directly traced to the

Spanish and Portuguese conquests, the domination of the indigenous
populations, and the
importations of African slaves. The societies have internalized the colonialism
into their

own

class structures,

Even
to society,

which have proven quite

in societies

and for whose

rigid

and tenacious.

such as India, in which pre-colonial castes were rigid and central
cultural products (at least the ancient ones)

perversely self-interested but acknowledged respect, even the most
significant status

Indians

-

Through

Indians.

elite

of Indians

lost

and objective power through colonization, while even the most lowly

white in Britain or
all

Europeans had a

down and

even more so

- coming

to India

had a

legal

the process of colonization, this tended

white British up. Indian

class white British higher to climb.

The

elites

relative

and social

more and more

simply had further to

changes

status

in Britain

fall,

made

to

above

push

and lower

possible the

eventual rise of the lower classes. In India as other colonized societies, internal class
divisions were maintained, but the entire structure

downward
and

pressure, or shifted

political power/status.

This

is

downward

was

either

compressed by the

intact, relative to pre-colonial

economic,

In Britain and other colonizing societies, the reverse

social,

was

true.

not to discount the percentage of those in each whose status/power/wealth

increased or decreased more dramatically, due to manipulating the colonial system or

being impacted fortuitously or adversely by

Even
(nobility vs.

in

it.

Western Europe, the origins of social

commons, with

classes, at least in the feudal period

the priesthood and the crafts guilds as buffers [to absorb
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overflow ol conquerors, or malcontents of
commoners?]), tended

to

conquests by different cultural or linguistic groups
from different

territories.

Norman conquest of England, producing
States, class formation

was

be based on

Witness the

the core of the English nobility. In
the United

originally through conquest (of Africa and
North America,

though the natives proved impossible

to exploit directly

[Ackermann, 1995] and the

colonizers turned to land and resource theft coupled
with deportation and genocide), and

then through importation of waves of "non-white" immigrant
labor pools, though the

complexities of capitalism and liberal-statism has tended
to acquire higher status,

the

allow some immigrant groups

to

and has also allowed some percentage of individuals from even

most low-status groups

to rise as a pressure release

and co-optation strategy

for

maintaining the general status quo.

Even
on

the

economic

of Jews

rise

in

Europe can be traced

to Christian restrictions

certain financial activities, and the rise of the (obviously white) Scottish after

annexation by England was due to the complex developments and exigencies of the

expanding British empire, as
Outside of Europe, the
populations

—

rise

were due

Tom Naim

shows

in

The Break-up of Britain [1981],

of certain conquered peoples

to similar factors.

and especially Armenians under Ottoman

-

or at least segments of their

For instance, the
rule

was due

rise

of some Greeks, Jews,

to their focus

on

finance, trade,

and artisan production, which were devalued under the Ottoman code, which emphasized
military and political activity.
trade,

The

rise

became dramatic

as capitalism

and production the central guarantors of military and

way around

finance,

power, not the other

as previously.

Thus,

racial, territorial, linguistic, cultural (especially

the like), religious, and other differences were/are in

formation, rather than the other

households

political

made

way

through "orientalism" and

many, many cases the

basis of class-

around. Increasingly, as single mothers tend to head

in industrial as well as agrarian societies,
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gender has come

to

determine class

more

directly

history

is

6
.

much

material

"Class"

is

just as constructed a social formation as
"nation," though

longer and more pervasive, and

its

construction has tended to be in

terms rather than "legalistic" or "conceptual" terms.
(But even

might be more a

its

this materiality

result than a cause.)

Of course,

Hobsbawm might

a Marxist such as

society/era are products of the dominant

mode of production,

and other such categories. One might then point out
the world in the late medieval and

counter that classes in a

modem

era and

without reference to nations

that the "net class"

Armenians

in the

of Jews around

Ottoman Empire

consisted of a direct tension between economic levels and legal/social status.

Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice

is

a nice illustration, where the wealthy Shylock

discriminated against in court. But, even

does not determine which people

if

one grants

in a society will

feudal or caste societies, class-status

is

be

this point, the

fit

into

which

is

mode of production
Now,

classes.

almost entirely hereditary, and one

is

in

compelled to

look toward the origins of a particular social system, as described above. In slave or
plantation societies, the classes have their root in racial differentiations and are produced
initially

(as the

through conquest and colonization, though they

US

slave society

was forced

to

when

may

reproduce self-sufficiently

slave shipments were banned) or through

perpetual conquest. In later industrial societies, both displacement of rural agricultural

workers and population migrations (immigration) have produced underclasses.
Thus, the

which

class.

In the

have been used
traditional

being used

and

—

mode of production

modem

itself is not able to

modem heterosexual
it

is

who

fits in

era and before, such things as language, ethnicity, and race

for this process of differention,

though

determine exactly

and now, with the dissolution of

family structures, more and more gender

quite possible to argue that prostitution has been a

gendered class differentiation and

that in exploitative domestic relations

is

also

means of

wives and

The fact that Hobsbawm does not at any point consider the issue of gender in his "deconstruction" of
national unities makes his "class-centrism" all the more significant. However, in the interest of giving
gender the central focus it requires in an account of the nation, I reserve fuller discussion of the issue until
development of my own theory.
6
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mothers have already constituted an exploited
status.

Only

abstractly does

classes concretely,

who

is

in

class

mode of production
which

below husbands/fathers/sons

determine class structure; to determine

class, requires appeal to other factors.

even the nature of exploitation, class-tensions, and struggle
determined these other

where the choice

factors,

up with the choice of whom

the possibility that the very colonial
its

own mode)

might

itself

is

What

is

more,

often influenced or even

such as national tensions. This

to exploit is tied

in

true of colonialism,

is

to exploit.

mode of production (which

This suggests

deserves recognition as

be contemporary with the development of imperial racism.

This result could have been anticipated, given the almost labored point that Marx
really took

no account of anything but economic

of class-tension as
industrial

relations

when formulating

historical driving force. This is not to say that

economic

relations, ideology,

and so

forth,

were clearly

Marx' analysis of
brilliant,

ground-breaking, and crucial to an understanding of oppression in the

even many Marxists admit now

that

it

his concept

complex,

modem world.

But

does not take proper account of such things as

gender and nationality. The classical Marxist theory of class was formulated by analysis

of an abstraction of the actual world,
or ignored entirely. For instance,
abstracted world,

The

it

in

which non-economic

Marx does

let

them through

or

in focusing

Germany, but even

—

in his

urgency of such things as nationalism has made acknowledgment of
for a century struggled to account

the Ptolemaic contortions highlighted by Anderson.

have been justified

all

alone enmity.

them even by Marxists inescapable, and Marxists have
for

were de-emphasized

not engage the nation at

was not even worthy of notice,

historical

factors

then, as

on the most

salient features 19th

Bakunin reminded us above,

Marx may

well

Century industrial Britain

the analysis

had

its limits.

Indeed, this very concept of class, far from being an ahistorical description of the various
historized iterations of class structures,

when pushed, even

is itself

the abstraction leads

historical

beyond
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bounded. As

the economic.

I

have shown,

The foregoing

is

not intended to suggest that class

nation, gender, etc. Rather,

complexly

factors are

-

against the Cartesian

interrelated

Marxism of Hobsbawm -

and mutually presupposing, and

be established as the foundation of all others. There
explore the implications of this

This

is

also not

meant

important:

it is,

instance,

seems plausible

it

if

often in

later, in

Chapter

different

is

no

"historian's stone."

I

will

is

not

from those presented by Hobsbawm. For
of colonization was in part

constitutive of the nations produced through anti-colonial national

more, though one cannot reduce colonization

to a purely

economic exploitation

delegitimate these resistant national

none of them can

of class in nation-formation

to argue that the experience

relations purely to class, certainly

that

these

all

3.

to suggest that the role

ways

any less foundational than

is

movements and

movements. What

is

economic system and colonial
is

a central aspect. This

the nations they are based

is

not to

on and

produced, to suggest that they are ultimately reactive. For they cannot be explained

simply

in

terms of colonization, and did not happen in a vacuum without

national elements present. Yet, resistance to colonization

forms they took and the intensity of their
theorists as

Anderson and Gellner

was a key

structural relations.

The

at least proto-

factor in the specific

failure

of such

to consider class in their analyses results in

deep

problems.

This

is

true

even

in

such cases as that of the Armenians, whose distinct language

and culture can be traced back two millennia, and sense of self-identity probably back
the

Armenian

state's

conversion to Christianity in 301, which sharply differentiated

from neighboring regions and peoples, and

led to

war with

Persia.

A

to

it

genuine "Armenian

nation" that went beyond simply shared characteristics such as language and territory, to
relational

bonds and subjective recognition, was not present

until the

process of

revolutionary activity against the brutal oppression faced by Armenians that reached a
crisis point in the

second half of the 19th Century, due

economic subjugation/exploitation of the

in large part to the intense

vast majority of Armenians,
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who were

peasants.

Indeed, without colonialism as a general experience,

contemporary general concept of the "nation"

itself

it

is

very possible that the

might be significantly

less political

and contested, and much more ethno-linguistic and ethno-cultural.
And, of course,
colonialism was/is just as important

more so

not

if

in the nation- formation

of colonizing

groups.

To argue

against

Not

centric viewpoint.

Hobsbawm-type

at all.

Nor

consideration of the nation. This

is it

is

class-essentialism

to argue against the

is

not to argue for a national-

importance of class in a

not simply to acknowledge the inescapable.

inconceivable that a genuine sense of national community could not be
within the national community

worthy object of care and

itself.

sacrifice, if

worthy? To exalt one's "nation"

mean

at

is

For, what

one does not see the people

empty

socialist, at least

who comprise

abstract gesture

base a commitment to the well-being of others of the nation.

when

Who

ancient battles and dynasties, piles of rock and expanses of grassy ground,

people today are suffering? Indeed, even outrage

seems

the point of considering "the nation" a

is

a hypocritical

It

at past

it

as so

does not

cares about

when

actual

oppressions are illegitimate

without as strong a commitment against the suffering of people today

— which can be

prevented. Indeed, without this commitment, the value of the nation devolves into what

does for the

member with such

a lack, rather than what that

member does of it —

in

it

its

concrete form of people.

More than
"unreal."

this,

Hobsbawm's

"construction" in

all

impositions. After

not a matter of determining that nations are "real" rather than

it is

distinction itself

is

suspect: one can find elements of

nations, but that does not

all,

which does not mean

the

that

same can be
it

is

mean

said of the

that they are

mere

fictions or

Marxian concept of the

proletariat,

not a real formation. Workers from a wide range of

circumstances and with greatly varying immediate needs and concerns were unified
First International.

As Bakunin pointed

such as Germany imposed their

out, the

own agendas on
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members from highly

in the

industrial societies

the organization as a whole, to the

detriment of members from less developed or
agrarian societies, such as Russia. Yet,
the
fact

of tensions and unequal power relations within the
International and within the

"working class" more generally does not mean

working

Lack of homogeneity,

class.

differentials

was no legitimate concept of the

internal structural complexity, or

does not necessarily imply unreality.

frame forces the would-be nationalist

to

even power

Accepting Hobsbawm's grounding

choose between nation and class (and to exclude

gender, sexuality, race, and so forth). This
course, merely national socialism 7 carries

To

that there

is

its

perhaps

its

own risks,

most insidious implication. Of
as well.

return to the issue raised at the beginning of this section: does

analysis of the nation and nationalism justify his anti-national attitude?
analysis suggests

is that,

rather than being supported

antinational-ism generates the analysis.

Hobsbawm's

Though

by Hobsbawm's

Hobsbawm's

What my

analysis, his

there are valuable elements of

critique of the nation, these elements are ideologically tainted

and must be

refined through the type of counter-critique that has been offered.

Enlightened Antinational-ism and the Colonial Service
Elie Kedourie develops his theory of nationalism in Nationalism [1966].

originally published three decades before

important for two reasons.
nation,

which

contemporary

raises issues

liberal

central place in

Omar

First, this

Hobsbawm's,

work

is

and develops arguments

that

fact,

Dahbour's [1996] introduction
I

work remains

a comprehensive liberal-statist theory of the

approaches to the nation. In

Philosophical Forum, as

in 1960, the

Though

will discuss in Chapter 2.

to a surprising degree with non-liberal theorists

who

have remained central

to

Kedourie occupies an explicit and

to the

Winter 1996

-

97

Second, Kedourie's work overlaps
adopt an antinational-ist position.

not to suggest that the Nazi system was "socialist" in any commonly accepted meaning of the term,
even within German borders. It was, rather, a capitalist system in which the central government exerted
extensive control over business interests, or, perhaps more accurately, business interests chose with some
degree of autonomy and in economic as well as political self-interest to coordinate activities with the
central government, and to mediate activities through the Nazi ideology.
7

This

is
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Thom

such as Martin

and Hobsbawm. Writing

in 1995,

Thom

for instance replicates

Kedourie's linking of nationalism generally with
a strain of German nationalism resulting
in

Nazism, and follows Kedourie

intellectual roots

Hobsbawm

to a significant if

unacknowledged degree

of nationalism, which he also follows Kedourie

in tracing the

in privileging.

follows Kedourie in raising the difficulty of ethnic and
linguistic intermixture

for territorial nationalism.

For Kedourie, nationalism

humanity

is

summarized

characteristics

common

to all

members and

(2) "the only legitimate type

national self-government" [Kedourie, 1966:

Nationalism as
philosophers,

further

and

we have

who reworked

Though
fit it

essentials as

it

it

was developed primarily by post-Kantian German

aspects of Kant's philosophy in the aftermath of the French

own

political circumstances,

it

has remained the same in

all

has been spread to every comer of the world.

individual, and

it.

was justified
in

Revolution asserted that

this

solely

by the extent

was not enough,

could change the government
in a state

in

8

it.

that

which

it

as the caretaker of the

fulfilled this role. [10]

The

even a good caretaker

[12] This could

mean

not legitimate

is

that the population of a

fundamental ways, as in France, or a minority of

could separate from

the United States [15].

moment

to

the well-being of

exchange for the benefits of security and well-being. The

unless the people taken care of choose

people discontent

maximize

The enlightened government was seen

Obedience was expected

8

is

other theorists, such as the Italian Mazzini, elaborated the doctrine

to their

those gathered within

became

of government

9],

Prior to the French Revolution, the state existed to

state

two-part doctrine: (1)

naturally divided into nations," each determined by a unique
set of

is

Revolution.

in a simple,

it,

as

had the 13 British Colonies

origin of political

power had become

that

relevant.

By

France had directly linked the fact that the
human needs of much of
the population. As they appear to have seen it, if a government was not of the people, then it would almost
never be for them - even if it had the resources to be. In the rare event that it did fulfill its role as
caretaker, this was by its whim, which could be changed whimsically.
I

set aside for the

that the revolutionaries in

government was not popular with

its

failure to adequately take care of the basic
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the revolutionary logic, only states formed or supported
by the will of the people
states deriving "their sovereignty

The nation

- were

from the nation"

was a body of people

at this point

responsible through their legislature" [15],
other bonds or commonalities than that;

it

It

to

-

only

legitimate [16].

whom

a

government was

did not require that the people have any

was defined purely

in

terms of citizenship in a

state.

To

explain the transformation of this simple political doctrine into full-fledged

nationalism, Kedourie traces a strain of philosophy that had

its

origins in the

work of

Kant.
In the second half of the

8th Century, Kant produced a theory of morality that

1

did not rely on external forces, nor the

counted as people, anyway

- had

in

whimsy of individual

them a

and thoughts. They need only recognize
life.

The

"universal moral law"

accord with
individual

Not even

it

--

those

who

"categorical imperative" toward

good actions

authority and act in accord with

it

was within each

individual,

for a

and he/she could act

moral

in

despite inevitable external constraints or circumstances. In that sense, the

was

free,

had "autonomy," and

the external "will of God"

To be good

its

choice. People

requires choosing the

was

this

was

the sense that mattered, [see 22

-

23]

"the ground of the categorical imperative" [24].

good without any

external constraint, as the individual

"will itself legislates for itself [24].

Kedourie explains

that Fichte, in

an effort

to

remove

the issue of "things-in-

themselves" that he saw as a debilitating weakness of Kant's formulation of his
philosophical insight, developed his
the producer of reality either the

own

version of Kantianism. Instead of choosing as

unknowable "things-in-themselves" of which we have

only sensations, not knowledge, or the atomic individual subject, he chose a compromise.

The

seat of reality

Thus, he avoided

is

at

the intellect, but not an individual intellect;

once the skepticism inherent
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in a

it

is

a universal intellect.

view of reality based on ultimately

unknowable noumena, as well

as the subjectivism inherent in
individual constitution of

reality.

For Fichte, as for Schelling and other post-Kantians,
the individual became but
part of an organic, universal whole, and pure
illusion outside consideration of the
whole
[37].

Rights were no longer individual, but of the whole,
with the individual merely

Freedom meant partaking

partaking.

in

freedom of the whole, not being

whole; indeed, "complete freedom [meant]
this

is

total

from the

absorption in the whole" [38], "From

metaphysics the post-Kantians deduced a theory of the

not the product of a contract

free

among autonomous

state" [38],

individuals;

it is

The proper

state

logically prior to the

individual.

It

humanity

might seem reasonable
[51].

to

conclude that such a

Fichte

saw

should contain

in

of

Perpetual Peace, for a world

in balanced, continually easing tension as the optimal

arrangement

the level of tension as constant, arguing that the struggle for

crucial to the positive

the struggle

all

Indeed, Fichte's concept of universal reason suggests that this "state"

should be a universal one. But Kant had already argued,

of many states

state

development of humanity. For him, a

was thereby revealed

to represent the greatest

Of course,

dominance was

achieving dominance in

as the carrier of the highest "culture" at

development of humanity

dominance was maintained

state

to that point,

[53].

its

time, that

is,

and for as long as

[54].

such an on-going struggle for dominance could result in erasure of

subject cultures. Herder complicated the picture by emphasizing diversity. For Herder,
the proper telos of world history

of creatures which Nature or

was

the achievement of "a

God can

harmony of possible

varieties

bring forth" [57], apparently in both time and place.

Yes, there was the struggle Fichte claimed, but what was eliminated should not be
belittled as inferior

duty in the

human

—

it

was

part of an ever-emerging whole. This suggested a positive

social world:

to contribute to realization

person or group had a positive duty

to

develop
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its

of the

telos,

each particular

unique self as fully as possible.

By

mix or merge with another

implication, to

.

.

becomes a

theory,

natural division of the

[unique] character, which

The nation

(culture)

individuality
race,

was seen

arrangement was seen as one

to best

in

develop

itself in its

which each nation has

nation,

endowed by God with

citizens must, as a duty, preserve pure

its

more than one nation were

human

was immoral. "A

its

own

"unnatural, oppressive, and finally

its

state.

and the best

this

own

and inviolable"

state,

own

on

[58],

political

States containing

doomed

to

decay" [58

-

59].

According

to Kedourie, the last step in consolidating the

concept of nationalism

was emphasis on language. For Herder and Schleiermacher, language was
individual.

Language was

and events he came across

bom
;

"as

man tried to

the key to the

express his feelings towards the things

language was originally the combination of things and events

with the emotions which they arouse in man"

[62].

Words and

linguistic structures

the pure, direct result of the encounter of human consciousness with the world.
abstract terms

were

later

developed, they

still

had a basis

were

Even

as

in the originating "substratum

of

sensual impressions and reactions" [63]. They were simply farther removed from the
originating encounters.

Naturally, different groups went through different experiences and lived under
different circumstances. This left
in different languages,

complex and

its

strong imprint on their languages, initially resulting

and then increasing the differentiation as languages became more

abstracted. Thus, language

became

the expression not simply of a universal

encounter with the external world, but of the encounter by a particular group
circumstances and through a specific sequence of experiences (that
history).

Language expressed group

For each individual, there
identity [63].

As

-

64 and

it

with a specific

identity. [63]

one and only one language

the marker of group membership,

determining nationality, and so
state [63

is

is,

in particular

became

it

became

that expresses his/her

the key criterion for

the true criterion of the legitimacy of a political

68].
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Comparison of languages - based on which
and closer

became

a

to the sensual

and emotive substratum

way of establishing

the struggle described above.

was an

are

that

is

more

pure, without admixture,

the essence of group identity

-

the superiority/inferiority of different
nations, in line with

The German-speaking Fichte found

original language, unlike French or English,

that

German, of course,

which were composite, derived

languages [66]. Indeed, only groups speaking original languages
were considered "true"
nations [67],

For Kedourie, the implications of the wide-spread dissemination of
such a theory
in 19th

Century Europe are

bloody

conflict.

a complete redrawing of the

clear:

map of Europe,

through

Linguistic minorities fought for independence, while existing states

attempted to annex areas outside their borders where their languages were spoken
if

-

even

only by a minority of residents.

Once

the linguistic criterion

was

established, racial ("ethnic," in current

terminology), cultural, and even religious criteria could be linked with ease [73]. For the

German language was

Nazis, the

the "outward sign" of German racial identity because

formation expressed the essence of the race

[71],

This prevented any claims that Jews

could be considered "German" simply by knowing and using the language

never understand

it

truly,

because

it

its

- they

could

did not resonate with their racial essence [72].

Ultimately, "in nationalist doctrine, language, race, culture, and sometimes even
religion,"

[73].

came

to "constitute different aspects

entity, the nation"

"Nation" became the logical ground of these other terms.

Kedourie

According
result

of the same primordial

rejects nationalism thus formulated

to him, prior to the rise

on a variety of grounds.

of nationalism, the

interstate order in

(1)

Europe was the

of "accidents, wars, or dynastic arrangements, and [was] regulated by the play of

conflicts

and

alliances,

of friendships and antagonisms which

somehow managed

produce a balance of power." Thus, though there was no ideology guiding
activity, as after nationalism, the

good sense of rational agents pursuing
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to

political

their

own

best

interests tended

toward the balancing of power and the avoidance of mutually
destructive

war, and a general stability that was not fundamentally disturbed
even by surface
disruptions. [15] This practical ordering

where

was mirrored within

the

more advanced

states,

arrangements were meant to maximize the well-being of the subjects and

political

minimize conflict and suffering [10

-

11].

Nationalism undercut the practical logic of

these arrangements, introducing into politics rigid principles and ideologies that
paid

heed

to social realities or consequences, but drove forward

on uncompromising, almost

monomaniacal, paths. Violence was the inevitable product of this [70 and
nationalism

is

fundamentally violent, in

rejection of compromise

its

little

126]. Indeed,

and the balancing of

conflicting agendas and claims.
(2) Nationalism

with the

realities

of recognized

produced a

politics

of actual history and

actualities.

of fantasy and idealism, not politics that deals

societies,

norms and

-

50]

became philosophical, depending thenceforth on metaphysics

principles.

political principles

realistic solutions in the face

Activities are carried out in order to realize the perfect state,

not to deal with the actual state of affairs. [47
(3) Politics

and offers

The

result

was

that intellectuals

become

for

its

the well-spring of

and movements. Yet, ultimately, the "kings" learned

to

"tame

philosophy to their use," to hide their interests and real-politicking beneath the patina of
"high philosophical words." Mass propaganda and "an ideological style of politics" was

bom.

[50] Real-political

hidden by appeal
false pretexts.

to

The

maneuvering and narrow

[1

1

to

be hypocritically

to

idealized synchrony of individual and general will

supremacy of this or

political entity

came

high-sounding principles, which allowed them

the violence necessary to impose
justify the

interests

it

[47].

be advanced under

came

to mystify

All sorts of academic schemes were hatched to

that nation, to legitimate

it

as the heir to

some

(which was misconstmed as a national precursor), or even

8 ff. ]
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earlier

to create

it

(4)

The one-nation,

inhabited by

one-state principle was/is impossible to
implement in areas

more than one

nationality

even exterminations [70 and

1

shared language, culture, ethnicity,
criteria

on which

that

is,

without great conflict, deportations, and

18ff.].

(5) Finally, nationalism was/is

good

-

founded on the ultimately dubious reasoning

etc.,

even where they

exist, are

that

necessary or even

to base political arrangements.

These criticisms flow reasonably from Kedourie's analysis of nationalism. Their
truth or falsity, then,
that

grounds them.
First,

suspect.

He

depends entirely on the

And

this analysis is

truth or falsity

of the analysis of nationalism

deeply problematic.

Kedourie's selection of the authors of the "doctrine" of nationalism
focuses on only two theorists, Fichte and Herder, while including

is

many

supporting references to just two others, Schelling and Schleiermacher, and dropping

one-time references of little importance to a few more. This

sampling of the thousands of theorists

who have

is

an extremely narrow

written on the nation, from inside and

outside national movements, from within and without the academy.
these theorists shared a very specific (or restricted) temporal

More than

and spatial

this, all

of

location, early

19th Century Germany.

Even

if

one grants

—

which

doctrine produced by Fichte et

I

do not

etc.,

that early nationalism

al, it is difficult

conceptions and concrete forms of the

economics,

—

was

the narrow

to believe that; while the basic

state, the subject,

communication, space, mobility,

changed dramatically during the 19th and 20th Centuries; the "doctrine"

of nationalism remained fixed and finished:

if the

passage of time

itself

did not result in

changes, the significant mutations in related concepts and social forms surely would have.

And, what of the thousands

Woodrow
result

to theorize the nation,

such as Ernest Renan,

Wilson, and Frantz Fanon? In the 1880s, Renan conceived the nation as the

of a "daily plebiscite," by which a group

becoming self-aware of its coalescence

first

established a nation (presumably by

or relevance), and individuals thereafter
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confirmed or established

On this

their individual

model, the nation ceases

Though

membership

in the nation

to exist at the point that

in itself a highly subjective

it is

on an on-going

not willed by

and incomplete concept, as a reaction

primordialist view of the natural, even God-given
status of nations, this

its

basis.

members.

to a

was a powerful

corrective that greatly deepened the gradually
developing concept of the nation and the

attendant concept of nationalism. Indeed,

French Revolution

that

it

reintroduced and developed ideas from the

had been de-emphasized by the Germans.

Wilson also had a concept of the nation

American Revolution and not

that,

while limited to the legacy of the

particularly interesting in

its

own

light,

did have practical

influence and a role in the on-going conceptual development of
the nation.

along with

many

And Fanon,

other theorists in colonized regions, transformed the legacy of
national

struggle into one of the central features of anti-colonial liberation of 80
percent of the

globe

-

while simultaneously subjecting the "nation" and "nationalism" as given to

critical reconstruction

and problematization

been accomplished or even attempted

far

more penetrating and productive than had

in colonizing societies.

Rather than explore the theoretical richness and complexity that these references
but hint

at,

Kedourie

is

content with his narrow focus. For

it is

this focus that

to present as "nationalism-in-general" a specific strain of nationalism

aspect of a more general concept of the nation. This

strain,

—

even a mere

of course, culminates in

Nazism, an imperial nationalism of domination and genocide. Obscuring the
tenuous grounds of associating Nazism with

manipulate a reader's justified revulsion
antinational-ism

—

at

all

rather

nationalisms allows Kedourie to

Nazism

an antinational-ism with, as

allows him

I

into the service

shall argue, its

of a general

own

strong colonialist

basis and function.

This reduction in the complexity of nationalism's development

is

matched by

blindness to the internal complexity and tension present in any particular nationalism and
in "nationalism" in general.

Nationalisms in the
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real

world are generally complexes of

different

and competing "doctrines," national self-conceptions,
and

and not simply reducible
fraction (as

the

is

phenomenon of nationalism, where

individual specificity,

not so

of claims

-

except

Nazism) or external circumstances. This

general

all their

to a unitary set

much

become

even more true when considering

is

aspects and potentials within a general model
that

a unity as a complex of tensions and divergences.
is

merely a doctrine, that

beliefs or claims. (1) This ignores the inevitable effects

is,

on a "doctrine" when

it

a set of
is

put

and reshaped and deepened as the concrete circumstances and events of
its

implementation react

to

and act on

reflected back into the doctrine

applied to

forced by an extremist

the various concrete manifestations, in

Second, Kedourie assumes that nationalism

into practice,

when

intra-national forces,

many

it.

itself.

Significant differences in these circumstances are

Even assuming

that

it is

different circumstances, the ultimate result

is

a single doctrine that

is

a fragmentation of the

doctrine into distinct forms.
(2)

Of course,

the assumption of an original unified doctrine itself is suspect.

The

groups in significantly divergent circumstances and situations do not merely produce a

modifying reaction

to

theories themselves.

an externally developed theory: they often generate

Of course,

originality

is

never an absolute, but rather

distinct

relative.

Thus,

an early anti-colonial national movement might have taken the term "nation" and the
desire for a state from the externally held concept of the nation, but produced

of its concept of the nation and national concept
[refer to either/both books].

model might mask

Even

the

itself,

much

else

as Chatterjee stresses at length

outward appearance of derivation from a dominant

a profound divergence, as analyzed by Ileto [see previous section].

Further, apparently basic essentials of the narrow doctrine Kedourie proposes can drop
out.

For instance, within the complex of conceptions

that characterizes diasporan nations,

such as the Jewish and Armenian, the desire for statehood
while

it

is

opposed by

others.

What

results is a concept

is

held only by

some members,

of the nation remarkably

divergent from Kedourie's account. Indeed, the "unities" in language, religion, and
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territory that

Kedourie might claim compensate

for

such an exclusion are not there

in

either of these cases. For instance, relatively
significant linguistic, territorial, and

religious divergences cut through both

One might even

deeply.

unity, but

forces,

say that these nations are characterized not by

by fundamental internal diversity

(3)

that the

Armenian and Jewish communities

More than

way

directly at

some

overriding

odds with Herder's

Kedourie's analysis of nationalism depends on the
assumption

this,

it

logically

and historically precedes, as a self-contained

intellectual

(academic) product. Certainly, a more complex concept of "nationalism"
as a

form

required, one that

is

ideas.

of nationalism can be isolated from concrete material
circumstances and

idea

which

in a

surprisingly

is

more

between

ideas, circumstances,

Without

it,

there

is

no way

political

consistent with the complexities of the relationship

and actions,

to explain

that

is,

between the mental and material.

how Filipino

peasants could have been presented

with the same Catholicism as their Spanish overlords, but transform

it

by their practice,

without a doctrinal guide or explicit intention, into something quite different. The
peasants understood the passion of Christ as a metaphor for their

communicated

situation,

their revolutionary aspirations through passion plays; these

explained to them

and theory of their

—

by Spaniards or Filipinos

activities derived

idea that a doctrine alone, without
to the concrete realities in
realties,

own

can result

in

which

committed

it

at

is

— as

such.

from the actually

9

The

and

were not

explicit understanding

activities.

In simpler terms, the

the least significant resonances with and adaptations

"implemented" and

political

movements

is

at the

most origins within those

a stretch.

Kedourie's assumptions regarding social bonds are also problematic. For him, in
the pre-national era, the ideal

contract

among

essentially

was a society

as derivative of the individual,

autonomous individuals

9

in order to

maximize

formed by a

the well-being

stress that this is not meant to suggest an intellectual inferiority on the part of these peasants. Their
minds were certainly as a acute and active as Fichte's as he reworked Kant's theories. The issue is, rather,
of how their ideas, which were undoubtedly different from those of their colonizers, were developed. Ileto
shows that they developed not independently of their concrete situation, but as a response to it and by
I

intellectual activity within

it.
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of individuals

[12]. Nationalism,

through Fichte's and Spelling's promotion,
introduced

the ideal of the logical precedence of society,
with the individual as derivative: the

society

was seen

meaning outside
all

as an organic whole, with the individual
person as a

the whole. [37ff.] Kedourie

makes much of this,

mere

part without

stressing that, unless

individual wills were in sync with the general national
will, this ideal required the

coercion and even elimination of individuals of divergent

wills.

ascribing to nationalism an inherent violence toward even

This

is

the basis for

members of its own

nation,

and

part of the basis for insisting that nationalism increased
violence in the world.
Fichte's organic society, of course,

had

its

roots in Hellenic thought, Plato and

Aristotle especially. In another context, Kedourie states this ancient
Hellenic thought

not nationalist in
is

itself,

nor tied to

fully present in Hegel,

Greek nationalism

whose theory of the

also not nationalist [36].

The

relation to nationalism?

Were

ideal,

modem

first

if

how

is

can

this

be a negative purely in

not there non-national societies regulated by this political

such as the ancient Greek

members, through violence

The organic concept

Kedourie stresses emphatically was

state

question, then,

[77].

was

city-states, that

need

imposed the same conformity on

be, but not in the

name of nationalism?

Is

it

their

not the

organic concept of society, and not nationalism, that Kedourie should be criticizing as the

ground of such violence and oppression?

More
generally?

importantly,

is

"organicism" an accurate presentation of nationalism

The previously discussed narrowness of the

intellectual basis

of Kedourie's

concept of nationalism suggests that the organicism that Fichte and Schelling held as part

of their particular nationalist doctrine might have been no more than a
overall general concept,

which Kedourie elevated

to a generally present

strain in the

element of all

nationalisms.

Why?

Kedourie's selectivity here

grounded

is

which appears incapable of conceiving of any
other than the ancient organic one. That he

alternative to the liberal concept of society

fails to
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in his garden-variety liberalism,

point out that the organic concept of

society
telling.

is

a re-introduction of an ancient concept, and so
intellectually regressive,

He seems

only able to conceive of a non-liberal social form that

—

negation of liberalism

on

fixates

Schelling

theorists

s

and indeed what liberalism reacted against

who promoted

philosophy as a

it,

notably Fichte and Schelling.

really has existed/exists could contain or

beyond society

others, he

the strict

originally. Thus, he

He

accepts Fichte and

final statement, rather than as a reaction to a
century

of liberal atomic individualism. He does not even entertain the idea

social

is

have arisen as a reaction

to

Had he explored

individualism, including

its

-

and attempt

and more

that nationalism as

it

even have produced some other concept of the

as a big individual.

might have discovered some

is

the ideas of Renan, Fanon, or

including the possibility that nationalism could

to

move beyond

the limits of liberal atomic

simple negative, social organicism.

Kedourie's reduction of nationalism also reserves self-interest for liberal
individualism. Because such social/political forms as nationalism de-emphasize the
individual, individual self-interest
that the

form of self-interest

--

becomes an aspect of liberal individualism.

which one might characterize

liberal individualism is attractive in itself; rather,

Kedourie limits the potential of self-interest

as "petty"

by reserving

to the

narrow

—

not

It is

characteristic of

self-interest for liberalism,

liberal

form. Thus, he excludes

other forms of "self-interest" from consideration, forms that depend on strong social

bonds and/or a more complex concept of the

individual, as well as alternative possibilities

for individual agency, such as "desire" and "engagement" over

The ultimate cleverness of this

is to

"self-interest"

of some

This can even

mean misconstruing

these issues in

more depth

suggest

that,

sort exists, then political

in

mere liberaP" interest."

wherever something that appears

be

forms such as nationalism are excluded.

national social structures as liberal.

Chapter

to

I

will explore

3.

Other failings of this type abound, again dependent on highly selective inclusion
of historical

facts as well as

that the very theory

ungrounded

of nationalism

lent

it

historical speculations.

to fantasy
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First is Kedourie's

and idealization, because

it

claim

ignored

social realities in favor of speculation about

national order,

on

the other hand,

the benefits for

actual individuals,

all in

all,

It

was just

and was the

result

gritty

it

pre-

realities

and

of actual individuals engaging other

pursuit of their actual interests.
its

social contract obscured social reality?

as speculative as a theory emphasizing social relations as in

fundamental;

The

tended toward rational political arrangements that

But, what if liberal individualism and
It

[85],

was based on consideration of the concrete

necessities of the relevant situations.

maximized

what could or should be

appeared more

realistic

only because

it

some way

claimed to deal with the

nitty-

of specific social relations among specific concrete individuals, rather than more

apparently abstract social forces and relations.

What

if this

emphasis on the individual

kept those involved from recognizing the impact of more general social forces and
relations.

The emphasis could —

intentionally or not

— have

prevented people from

recognizing their true interests, which are distinct from the childish urges of selfgratification

and -aggrandizement

any more grounded
fantasy, of a

core of this system.

at the

in social reality than nationalism?

Were

Were they not

most manipulative and dangerous kind? What

is

valorization of liberal individualism and the social contract as
calls nationalism

any

less fantasy

-

especially

when

these concepts then

more,

more

also political

is

Kedourie's

real than what he

of nationalism

his concept

own

itself is

a

(negative) idealization? Kedourie presents no argument to defend his privileging of the
limited social philosophy he promotes.

I

have already attempted

shortcomings of his understanding of the concept of society he

The

to reveal the

sets in opposition.

direct evidence Kedourie presents of the romantic fantasies

of nationalism

is

and idealizations

no more compelling. He analyzes selected anecdotes about the

romanticism of young nationalists

Kedourie presents

at

in

19th Century Europe.

length what he sees as the fundamentally romantic, fantastic world

of vanguard nationalists of 19th Century Europe, whose nationalism he claims
merely an escape from the drab

realities

of everyday
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life,

into a

to

be

realm of exciting intrigue

and conspiracy

[see especially 103]. Indeed, he reduces

who

various societies,

it

to a rebellion

of the young of

craved excitement and action, against tradition and

-

stability. [96

106] Nationalists acted "in the intoxication of a poetic dream" [103], Nationalism was
the "schoolboyish avocation[]" of "schoolboys"

- which turned

series and bloody [104],

Certainly, the kinds of intrigues and romantic actions were present in
political

movements of the

many

19th Century, including national ones, but were they dominant

or even widespread? Kedourie does not address or even acknowledge the undeniable

existence of very serious nationalists fighting against very carefully analyzed and

understood oppression, in pursuit of very rational

He
political

-

if difficult to attain

arrangements and balances. According

were represented

to

Kedourie, the best compromise was

minimum of violence and

and negotiators

in pre-19th

But, exactly whose interests

loss.

game of conflict and balance?

in this

that the political leaders

It is

first to

themselves, that

laugh

at

is, first

They would perhaps have

such an idea. Their arrangements were meant to benefit

as distinct individuals and second as an elite group of nobles and

rulers over against the non-elites.

of failed balances, resource losses,

system was the whole reason

It

was

etc.

the underclasses

The associated

who absorbed

were organized

The idea

subjects

exposed as fantasy when one

that societies

1

8th and 19th

in order to represent the interests

realizes that, prior to the 19th Century,

population was excluded from the "polity" covered by the
not, except

the consequences

exploitation and oppression of this

for being of the revolutions of the late

Centuries.
is

delusional naivete to pretend

Century Europe really represented

the best interests of the general populations of their states.

to

goals.

instead stresses the rationality of the pre-national interstate system of real-

generally reached, with the

been the

-

social contract,

of

most of a

and could

through the twists and turns of mystifying propaganda, be considered parties

any such contract and representation

in the international
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realm justified by appeal

to

it.

This also excludes mention of the fact that only powerful
states had any

agency

in

such negotiations. Indeed, most regions of the world were
not only excluded

from the negotiations and

Such
powerful

politics

For

states.

conflicts, but

would

then, presumably, appear rational only to the elites
of

others

all

were the exploited objects of them.

-

that

is,

the vast majority of

-

irrational, evaluated against their rational self-interests
Is

it

real

any wonder

that a political

the political process, for the

form

that

is,

by the

states

and

all in

weak

is

liberal criterion.

states,

embraced so seriously by so many? Were such people deluded about
balance of power state politics, or

would be

it

had the potential of greater inclusion

that at least

weak of powerful

human beings -

in

should be

the realities of

Kedourie?

Neither does Kedourie follow this "romanticism" into struggle. Does he really
believe that the tremendous sacrifices
-

made by many

fighting for national independence

not only deprivation, imprisonment, and death, but also ridicule and castigation

motivated by schoolboyish romanticism? Were there really

all that

--

-

were

many European-type

"schoolboys" available to most national movements, particularly of subject and colonized

groups? Hroch's above-discussed study suggests

comprehensive evidence of its own

not,

and Kedourie offers no

to the contrary. In

its

own

absence, Kedourie's

broad

generalizations based on analysis of a very restricted sample are themselves fantastic and
unrealistic,

and ring of manipulation.

Even Kedourie's own selected evidence
Heinrich von Kleist, a
disturbed young
reality,

play,

who

man

German playwright

in the early 19th

many

Battle as a romantic nationalist
,

were

later to

show

work of romantic
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presents

novels and losing touch with

He

presents Kleist'

work "strangely prophetic of the

for purposeless

the details Kedourie considers, however,

simplistically proto-fascist

He

Century, as a psychologically

eventually committed suicide in a romantic manner.

Hermann's

From

often less than compelling.

suffering from having read too

insatiable appetite the Nazis

[86].

is

it

and monstrous

atrocities"

seems anything but a

nationalism. First, the play includes a scene

in

which Germans disguised

Romans

as

are to burn and loot

anti-Roman sentiments. Kedourie assumes Kleist

seems odd
justifies

it

to celebrate nationalism

fabricated.

Were

it

to include this

him

fire,

and

is

to be deceptive,

to "'betray for a

his nationalism simplistic

upset because

moment

it

Legate

whom

up

stir

it

and the oppression

Roman

soldier

that

who

undermines his anti-Roman

the august cause of

Germany"'

and romantic, Kleist would have been unlikely

such a dilemma for his hero. Third, Hermann's wife Thusnelda,

Roman

villages to

approvingly, but

Second, the German hero Hermann learns of a

saved a German child from a
feelings and causes

by showing

German

she thought to be in love with her but

is

who

is

[86].

to

pose

upset with a

not, tricks

him

into a

garden, where she releases a bear on him. She watches with delirious pleasure as the bear

savagely

kills

him. Presenting the hero Hermann's wife as a would-be adulteress

one with desire

for a foreigner

does not want her

may

be

and enemy

sexist, but

it

is

— who

cruelly kills a

man

—

and

out of spite that he

hardly a positive characterization of German

nationalism. These three (of four) details that Kedourie assumes to be damning evidence

of Kleist' s romantic nationalism and

between romantic

to manifest the relationship

nationalism and Nazism, can just as easily be read as evidence of a thoughtful and
analysis of nationalism, which shows an understanding of

its

difficult realities

critical

and

tendencies.

Kedourie's focus on a few anecdotes about romantic idealism and conspiratorial
intrigue allows

him

to sidestep the real issue.

As much

as being cause to dismiss

nationalism, Kedourie's insistence on the romantic and even delusional basis of

nationalism allows him to avoid the difficult question of why so
participate in national

movements

if

many people would

they were simply romantic and irrational. Kedourie

claims that average people in pre-national states and empires were often not that bad off
before nationalism [see, for instance, 97, and Kedourie, 1970: 287 and 297]
as a rule

138

-

were not

better off after national revolutions [Kedourie, 1966:

139]. This claim

becomes more tenable
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for a reader

who

107

—
-

and almost

108 and

has absorbed Kedourie's

manipulative argument regarding the inherent romantic
idealism of nationalism. In
context, the lack of evidence supporting the claim

evidence presented by Kedourie appears

on

less noticed,

is

much more

this

and the one-sided

solid than otherwise, simply based

consistence with what has already be argued.

its

When

one challenges the assumptions, however, the weakness of
the

claims also become more apparent.

Kedourie appears

to

One must

then ask.

Were people

so well off before?

devalue participation in the political process as a good, and focuses

only on material quality of life and security. But, even in Europe, there
that people

historical

were materially reasonably well off prior

to the

is

no evidence

advent of nationalism. More

importantly, the social and economic changes concurrent with the rise of nationalism,

such as industrialization, increased the oppression of great segments of society
independently of nationalism. Kedourie does not even mention the other issues and
forces in play, in order to identify the specific changes that should be associated with

nationalism. Instead, in an exercise in scape-goating, he blames such suffering on

nationalism

— rather than on the

liberal

system that created these problems, the system he

vaunts.

This becomes especially telling

when one

repeatedly in Nationalism and elsewhere that

considers colonization.

life in

was no worse before nationalism than subsequently
138 ff ]

.

This

is

highly contestable,

.

when one

He

claims

the colonized 80 percent of the world
[see, for instance, 109ff., 117,

and

considers the draining of resources, the

exploitation of labor and slavery, and genocide that characterized colonization by

Europeans. Given the significant residual effects of colonization and the extreme
at

efforts

neo-colonization by former colonizers and other great powers after formal de-

colonization,

it is

difficult

fact, quite plausible, as

even

to see the "after" state

Fanon recognized,

of post-colonization

that the years

yet.

It is,

in

and even centuries of

colonization so "de-developed" and impoverished the colonies, and so negatively affected
their social fabric, that an

immediate or even
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relatively short-term recovery

is

extremely

unlikely.

It is

made impossible by

the continuing economic, military, and
political

domination by former colonizers and contemporary great powers.
The relevant

comparison might be between pre-colonial and colonial standards
of living and indeed
ability to survive; the

evidence in the Americas, Africa, and

much of Asia

is

unambiguously against Kedourie.

One element of Kedourie s
ungrounded

in historical realities.

before-and-after argument

He

is

argues unambiguously that the rise of nationalism

resulted in a dramatic rise of violence and conflict in the world.

though wars and conflicts had some role

was
[15].

self-limiting

On the

even more extreme and

He

states that,

in the pre-national order, the order

by

even
its

and tended toward balancing power and conflicting claims and

nature

interests

other hand, violence and terrorism increased with nationalism because

adherence to ideals and principles allows
essential to rational

little flexibility

compromise. Indeed, the

rigidity

of the form Kedourie considers

of nationalists adhering

to

principles results in what Kedourie sees as characteristic of nationalism, the fighting out

of rigid dialectics of increasing

ferocity.

"By

its

very nature, this

new

style [of politics]

ran to extremes" [18]. Self-righteousness justified ever greater crimes and terrorism, and

even the

interests that before

had been balanced became ever more adept

at clothing

themselves in the appearance of sacred principle.
Strangely, Kedourie, offers no systematic historical comparison showing that the

19th Century

was bloodier

or

more

objective look, he might have seen
centuries

—

but only

if

he looked

violent than previous centuries.

it

to

at the

be no more or

Had he

taken an

less than at least the previous three

egregious excesses of what Europeans did to those

outside Europe, the civilizations they destroyed, the people they genocided and enslaved.

The blood of such non-Europeans, however, appears
course, even in his
brutal reality.

nonetheless.

own

Of

world, his idealizations of the "balance of power" obscure a

The Thirty Year War was not
Such

not to figure in his calculations.

”limit[ed]

the result of nationalism, but

and controlled]
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.

.

.

breakdown^]"

was devastating

in the balance

of power

and European

More

than

interstate order

seem

this, the daily brutality

to

have been as devastating as any

of exploitation under the early modern and
feudal

social structures prior cannot be minimized,
except

idealizations

court

—

and fantasies about

by those who are taken

to kindly

the days of noblesse oblige and the grandeur
of the

by those, undoubtedly, who identify themselves with
kings and queens,

and knights, and Oxford
that often

was not used

clerics

-

rather than those

to stop their children

by the knights coming through
to

that followed.

have been better then than

who

tilled the soil to

ladies

produce food

from going hungry, those who were raped

their villages, etc.

later; for the rest,

Only

for the aristocrat

can

life

be said

whether lowly peasants, black slaves,

colonized labor, or dead Amerindians, things have,

at the least,

not gotten worse, and

nationalism certainly should not bear sole responsibility for any failure of
improvement.

Where genocidal

nationalisms did

make

things worse for

some groups,

their

own

nationalism was quite often the key to resistance and eventual survival and even triumph,
as in the cases of the Jews and Armenians.

What

is

more, the everyday violence necessary

to

keep the colonized

in line, the

slaves in the fields, the subjects obedient, seems to have vanished in Kedourie's

work —

while he reiterates that nationalist

the wills

of their subjects

state

to the national will.

governments

on violence

to

mold

Kedourie ignores the violence used by non-

nationalist, or anti-national, states to maintain
later,

relied

dominance over subject minorities and,

national movements, but registers quite fully the violence of the

latter.

Kedourie even presents non-nationalist uses of nationalism as purely
For instance, he makes much of the

fact that

Napoleon attempted

to exacerbate

exploit, for instance, anti-Habsburg feelings within minority groups to

Empire [93

-

nationalist.

weaken

and
the

95]. This, of course, precurses Stalin's use of ethnic tensions in

consolidating Soviet power.

Though Kedourie suggests

actually created the tensions that

would

that these activities

later erupt in nationalist conflict in

by Napoleon

Europe, he

neglects to recognize in Napoleon's activities the dark side of the real-political practices
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Kedourie himself vaunts.

If

true that

it is

created through Napoleon’s actions,
then

European nationalism was
it

must be recognized

at least in part

as an outgrowth of the

practical politics that Kedourie claims
tend to produce balance and reduce
violence.

only would this
direct cause

At

mean

a violent tendency for this form of
politics, but

it

Not

would make

it

the

of nationalism. Kedourie's entire opposition
would collapse.

this point in

my

analysis,

something interesting emerges. The often
inaccurate

generalizations Kedourie passes off as historical
analysis and the limited and one-sided
selection of supporting details does not appear to
generate his understanding of

nationalism, but are in fact generated by

This means that the "irrationality"

it.

(romanticism, idealism, fantasy, immaturity,

etc.) that

Kedourie finds

at the heart

of

nationalism he actually puts there himself. Following standard
liberal "rationalist"
practice,

social

Kedourie has projected

and

political preferences

conflicts with

them must be

"irrationality"

on

which he

that to

and prejudices he presumes

"irrational."

The

to

is

opposed. His

own

be "rational," and so what

specific points of the characterization of

nationalism as "irrational" follow.

An example

from The Chatham House Version and Other Middle-Eastern Studies

[1984], originally published in 1970, shows just

perspective
the

Middle

Armenian

is,

and the disturbing consequences

East, he focuses

on Armenians

political history in the

first

how deeply skewed
it

Ottoman Empire from
that

purest, perhaps the

and "the most

nationalism

—

that

is,

classical,"

the one that

community" [Kedourie, 1970:

generates. In discussing minorities in

and foremost, offering his analysis of

For him, the minority nationalisms

most

Kedourie's

developed

the

in the

pitiful

most harmed by

its

1

870s through World

Ottoman Empire were

among"

War

"the

the groups to take

nationalism

-

is

"the

I.

up

Armenian

287].

Kedourie's familiar themes are present. Armenian nationalism

is strictly

derivative of European, as nationalism spread "from western Europe through the Balkans,
the

Ottoman empire,

India, the far east

and Africa" [286].
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A

minority of Western

educated, elite "Enlightened" Armenians
were infected with nationalist aspirations
in the
1850s, 60s, and 70s. Their ideas were
fantasies: before them was no
recognizable

"Armenian

nation."

Armenians "had no cohesion, no sense of political
unity and they

were geographically scattered
important

still,

the

Nowhere were

they in a decisive majority

More

Armenian community was intimately intertwined with
other elements

of Ottoman society" [290]. The "Enlightened" ones
had

to create

such a nation, and

this

they did, through forcing nationalism on a
"defenseless" population [286]: nationalists

imposed the
constitute

will of the nation

they defined

--

on the population

This imposition allowed no compromise in

it.

this national

— which

movement were purged from

that

the population [291 and 296].
it

that

bad under the

Ottomans, before nationalism. Armenians had "a certain measure of internal

government" under the millet system and "took

Amasia

to

extremity: any opponents of

its

Predictably, Kedourie claims that Armenians did not have

Ottoman

was

self-

their place in the delicate balance

of

society" [287], Kedourie quotes with approval the words the mutassarif of

in 1893:

You [Armenians] pay

little tax; you are free from military service; you keep your
your language and your customs. Would [a European] Power coming in
our place give you the same liberties? Look at Russia, where the government has
shut up all your schools and is now considering the question of shutting up your
principal church at Etchmiadzin. [297]

religion,

Indeed, he argues, the "repression" that Armenians appeared to face under the Ottomans

was
the

in fact

manufactured by Armenian nationalists

Armenian people"
Finally,

nation-state

to join the

move

for

viable: the

had

lost

much

elsewhere.

It

Ottoman

state

Internally,

irrational.

an Armenian

Armenian community was geographically

lacked social cohesion and the range of classes necessary
Externally, the

convince the generality of

independence [296],

Armenian nationalism was purely

was not

in order "to

to a full social structure.

was much more powerful than

the

Armenian community.

territory in preceding years to national separatism in the

could crush a separatist Armenian movement
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scattered and

if

it

wanted

Balkans and
to,

and

it

was

It

certain to

want

separatists, this

What

to.

is

more,

would only serve

if

Russia provided the necessary support

to strengthen

Ottoman

resolve.

And

it

to

Armenian

was very

unlikely that Russia would do so.

Armenian
all

nationalists

were willing

to trade a decent situation for
a fight against

odds. Given their comfortable situation,
the low probability of success,
and the harsh

consequences of failure, nationalism was not
should have shown that nationalism was an
the nationalists
nationalists

were immune

were

irrationally

to

in the

Armenians’ rational

irrational,

Reason

interest.

even insane, "fantasy" [292], but

"sweet reasonableness" [291], Indeed, Armenian

obsessed with liberation [291],

Kedourie moralizes about the negative consequences of
embracing nationalism.

As Armenian

nationalism gained ground through the coercive efforts
of extremists,

Sultan Abdiilhamid

II

reacted strongly if understandably. Abdulhamid's logic

was

simple: "The Armenians were rebelling against their lord:
punishment should be meted

out to them

[297]. For Kedourie, especially in light of the role

Britain and France had
it

to

begun

to play in the

European powers such as

"Armenian Question,"

undermine Ottoman sovereignty and power,

this

as well as their use of

approach was rational,

if

unfortunate: "of course" Armenians were "bloodily suppressed" [295].

More

the bloody suppression

- Armenian

was ultimately

the responsibility of - caused by

than

this,

nationalism [289].
After the massacres of

demands
led to

for independence, for

more massacres

1

894

-

1

896, Armenian nationalists increased their

Kedourie

in the next

final

evidence of complete

two decades, but the

the

Ottomans put a stop

the

Armenian population of the Empire. But even

nationalists

to the agitation for the foreseeable future,

rationalizes as a direct reaction to

the

irrationality.

pushed on. Finally,
through genocide of

Armenian Genocide Kedourie

Armenian aggression, both a popular

an attack by Russian Armenian troops

in the
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This

revolt in

Russian army on the Turks [298].

Van and

It

an Armenian were to look only

he/she would recognize within

it

at this

treatment of the "Armenian Question,"

the standard fabrications and arguments
used by those

Turks and others who have subsequently attempted

main arguments,

in fact,

to

cover up the Genocide. Kedourie's

were the ones used by the Turks as they committed
the

Genocide. This seriously compromises Kedourie's treatment
of the Armenian Question.

What

is

more, his treatment of the Armenian case

theory, as
as a

its

model

(1) flows directly out

consistencies with the general theory indicate, and
(2)

for understanding

colonized peoples [286

-

of the general

explicitly intended

is

of all separatist nationalism among subjugated and

287]. This suggests profound problems with the theory. First,

in order to avoid admitting a counter-example to the general
theory, particularly as

relates to subjugated

and colonized peoples, Kedourie chooses

Kedourie's theoretical work

itself

it

to justify genocide.

emerges as an extreme form of politics, as bad as the

worst forms of nationalism. Second, Kedourie explicitly generalizes

this critique to all

such national movements.

Kedourie justifies oppression and genocide by flipping the relationship between
oppressor and oppressed. For him, the subjugated are the agents

who

generate the

negative results, not the dominator. In the Armenian case, he misconstrues the

oppression that led to nationalist resistance in the

first

place as a response to what he

represents as unjustified nationalist agitation and instigation. Kedourie blames the victim

By doing

for the crime.

so,

he transforms such actual historical incidents as the

defense of the Armenians of Van against the Turkish troops

who came

to

self-

massacre them

well into the execution of the Genocide, into a "revolt" against legitimate Ottoman
authority.

oppression

He

—

More

cites others purely

manufactured by the Turks as justifications

directly the reverse of Kedourie's claims about

than

which suggests

this,

for

Armenian "manufacture."

he focuses his analysis almost exclusively on Armenian activity,

that the agents driving the deadly dialectic to the

were Armenians. Indeed, where he discusses Ottoman
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Armenian Genocide

actions, such as massacres, or the

negative Ottoman attitude toward their
Armenian subjects, he presents these uniformly
as
reactions to aggressive

Armenian actions

[see especially

But the driving force behind the desire
oppression

itself.

European powers
after study

Even

for

,

to internal

and external

independent of Armenian

activity.

social,

Armenians had appealed

this

economic, and

political factors quite

itself

became a fundamental

fascist nationalism that resulted directly in the

"purification" of Turkey through elimination of the Armenians.

of Armenians
resistance,

intensified, quite independently of the

and culminated

in the

calls into question his

nationalism

is

an

Armenian Genocide.

them - embraced
suggests a

it,

and

much more

supported the Turkish

Of what

use

is

whole

-

or even mention

this

was

-

pan-

critique of "nationalism." In this instance,

plague because the Turkish Armenians

evil

The Turkish persecution

however convenient Armenian

Indeed, that Kedourie does not analyze or critique

Turkism

to

oppression increased during the 19th

AntiArmenian-ism

component of the emerging pan-Turkist,

297],

Ottomans' brutal treatment of them. As study

of the causes of the Genocide show,

Century due

-

Armenian autonomy was Ottoman

as early as the 17th Century,

to intervene against the

296

-

the cause of their destruction.

or

some

extremists

among

"Sweet reasonableness"

obvious critique of nationalism, as the force or ideology that led or
state in a

premeditated murder of more than one million subjects.

a critique of nationalism which

fails to call to

account one of its most

egregious manifestations?
In this case, the consequence of Kedourie's antinational-ism

support

—

of genocide, and of an extremist nationalism.

concerned about increasing violence and suffering

How could

in the 19th

is

denial

—

hence,

Kedourie, so

and 20th Centuries, take

such a position?

The answer

is

relatively simple.

As discussed above, Kedourie recognizes

that

pre-national political arrangements were arbitrary, and were not based on any guiding
principles, but rather

were the product of balancing external
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interests

among

states

and

competing
this is a

internal interests within each of
them.

system

that functions in the interest only

withtn states. Thus, Kedourie sides with
power

As was

also discussed, the upshot
of

of powerful

-

who

with

states

and the powerful

has power within any given

status quo.

The
status

status

quo

is

quo are superior

Kedourie's deity. Even older people

to

who produced

younger ones who seek change. Disruption of
status quo

power-arrangements, no matter that they are brutal and
exploitative, as
colonialism,

is

never justified. Anyone with thoughts about

arrangements could be changed
arrangements should look

Even where

the current

like

there are

—

in the future

—

is

how the

in the case

of

political

with alternative conceptions of what the

an idealist romantic, and a dangerous one

competing nationalisms, as

in the case

at that.

of the emergent

Turkish nationalism of the early 20th Century that led to the Genocide
versus resistant

Armenian nationalism, Kedourie
with state control already.

condemn both
celebrates the

nationalisms, but he

more powerful and

that this

was an extension
The

was

first

in theory

in

after

it

World War

which remains

its

it

power

[299

at length

-

about the virtues

300], Tie neglects to

that

in fact that

produced the Genocide.
the

leaders were heavily involved in the Genocide.

became

end of World

part of

I

on

movement were generated by

"republican" government sent

after the

the one in

weaker victim. Indeed, he

and practice of the nationalism

Republic of Armenia as soon as
protecting

is,

and foremost a nationalist movement, a movement

perpetrators of the Genocide, and

new

the

brutal nationalism, going

Turkey

that

at the very least expect Kedourie to

condemns only

principles of the "republican" nationalist

Indeed, the

more powerful,

One would, of course,

of the republican movement

mention

sides with the

War

I.

its

troops to invade the newly formed

clear that the Allies

had no intention of

Turkish forces conquered half of the Republic,

Turkey today.

The power Kedourie

sides with

is

generally imperial.

He

sides with pre-colonial

empires, such as the Ottoman, in which subjugated peoples took on the status of
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minorities within formal political and
informal cultural/linguistic relations
that were

discriminatory against them.

-

Of course, he

recognizes the waning power of such
empires

they were based on obsolete political models,
cumbersome bureaucracies, and so forth.

He

sides even

more

forcefully with colonial empires, particularly
the British,

which on

his presentation is the best possible political
arrangement for all concerned, even if the

colonized do not understand what

is

The only empires Kedourie
[Kedourie, 1966: 92ff.] and
colonization and conquest

Objectively, of course, there
either in terms

From

explicitly does not side with are Napoleon's

Hitler's.

home

to

best for them.

This

is

most

likely

because they brought

Europe, and directly threatened his sacred Britain.

is little

difference between these empires and the British,

of political form or violence and destructiveness of methods.

his imperial perspective, Kedourie

is

correct to

view nationalism as a

dangerous disrupter, as an agent of change. With Marxism, nationalism was the key form
of political challenge

Of course,
where

it

to the

European empires from the 19th Century

this perspective is

does not

exist,

instance, Kedourie

while

extremely limited.
it

hides the

much

It

finds violence

by the oppressed even

greater violence of the colonizers. For

makes much of a reported massacre of Assyrians

army of the newly independent

and balance, without recognizing

Britain, Iraq's

that "balance"

between a conquering/colonizing power and
to

its

former

lord.

side, (2)

greater

power subsequently

Mosul by

It

the

vaunts compromise

between unequal powers
victims

—

is

--

particularly

a nonsensical term.

end conflict are reached, they are generally

weaker

in

Iraq [138], but never mentions the centuries of violence

and massacre perpetrated by colonizing

where "agreements"

to decolonization.

(1) forced

Even

on the

completely unfavorable to the weaker power, and/or (3) ignored by the

Americans demonstrates

in

(as the history of the

US

treaties

with indigenous North

100s of cases).

Indeed, this perspective displaces

all

the

blame

that should be taken

colonialism, onto nationalism. For Kedourie, the bad effect of colonialism
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by European
is

not

genocide, exploitation, or de-humanization

-

colonized peoples [Kedourie, 1970:
299],

It is

natives by Jeffrey

wiped out
Kedourie
infection

Amherst and other colonial

large sections of the

.

.

not the small pox deliberately
given to

land-clearers, or the venereal
disease that

Hawaiian and American indigenous populations,

calls attention to, but nationalism

.

the dissemination of nationalism
to the

it is

,

which

is

to

him

eating up the fabric of settled society to leave

that

a "rash, a malady, an

it

weakened and defenseless

before ignorant and unscrupulous adventurers, for
further horror and atrocity" [286].

Kedourie excuses the horrors colonialism, and then blames
the colonizers for one
of the few things from Europe that had productive uses.
nationalism by the colonized both by presenting
critique),

and also by suggesting

it

to

European

is

ideas. This is the height

"orientals" are so incapable of creation or thought,

delegitimates the use of

as a disease (and through his general

that anti-colonial national

derivative of European nationalism. Nationalism

enslavement

He

movements were

strictly

not liberation, but further

of colonial arrogance, that the

and so socially and

retrograde, that even something bad like nationalism must have

politically

come from Europe.

Thus, he denies the colonized and subjugated positive agency: they cannot create
political

forms

that lead to productive change.

negative agency: they can

At the same time, he projects on

initiate violent political

movements

to

new
them a

that disrupt the very basis

of the global social order. "Sweet reasonableness" would expect more consistency here:
the

power

to disrupt

and reshape the

independence to affect the

What one

intellectual

has instead

blames colonizers not

is

there

"if there

for the evils

had

to

It

was

for

realm as well.

of colonization, but for

be European reforms,

Europe

He

failing to fulfill the full

Ottoman Empire, and by implication throughout Asia

was only one way by which

catastrophic.

would suggest a strong enough

Kedourie's insistence on the White Man's Burden.

colonial mission. At least in the

and Africa,

interstate order

if 'nations'

were going

to be built up,

these operations could prove beneficial and not

itself to

administer them and carry them through." But,
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Europe

failed to shoulder this burden; the
colonizers failed to exercise

"power and

influence with the [attendant] responsibility"
of helping the colonized societies
to develop

along the proper European model.

What
sovereignty

is

it

[3

1

6]

more, Kedourie blames the

grounded

rise

of nationalism and the principle of
state

for interfering with the colonizers
attempts to

complete their

mission [Kedourie, 1966: 134ff], Colonizers were
forced by anti-colonial national
struggles to recognize such interference as
"imperialistic and immoral" [Kedourie, 1970:

316]. Indeed, organizations such as the League of Nations
and the United Nations pushed

colonizers to relinquish their possessions, and so to turn
loose immature societies on the

world.

Even though

it

generally allowed a vestige of colonialism to remain for

some

time, through the form of "mandates" in which the colonizers
oversaw their colonies
transition to independence,

it

did not allow the colonizers enough leeway to do even this

adequately. This Kedourie attributes to the unreasonable distrust of the colonizers
to

pursue the best interests of their colonies. [Kedourie, 1966: 134ff] This was especially
insulting to Britain, "where there

was consciousness of [colonial]

responsibility [and]

scrupulousness and concern inculcated into generations of administrators," which became
finally "a firm tradition in the colonial service" [135]. Kedourie's fantastic idealization of

Britain and

its

colonial administrators here

nationalist fantasies he reports.
their

own

to

on a

level

of with the most extreme

people, not trusting genocidal exploiters to assist

victims after centuries of domination would be a reasonable minimum. The

irrationality that

wolves

To sane

is

Kedourie finds

is

similar to that

which keeps the shepherd from using

guard the sheep.

In this way, colonialism emerges as central to Kedourie's theory of nationalism.

Whether the

desire to counter-attack against the forces of anti-colonialism

present at the writing of this book

important benefit,

is

— was

not important.

—

still

quite

the motive for the general theory, or merely an

What

is is

the function of the theory as

first

and

foremost a delegitimating of the struggles of subjugated and colonized peoples, by
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reducing them simply to nationalism, and by
presenting nationalism as a negative

phenomenon.

Lib eral Progress and the Cosmopolitan Ideal

Though

representative ot liberalism in

its

philosophical underpinnings, Kedourie's

position does not exhaust the possible political agendas that
liberalism grounds.

Kedourie

might

call

is

a conservative liberal: his theory

is

based on the desire to return to what one

pure liberalism, the roots and foundations of

pre-national centralized states

-

liberal society, in the

form of

whether popular or ruled by "enlightened" despots

-

based on social contract theory and the autonomy of the individual.
Peter Alter, in Nationalism [1989], offers a different take. His journalistic

account of nationalism

is

less a theory,

and more an evaluation of different types of

nationalism against the teleology of progressive liberalism. While Kedourie sees
nationalism as the disrupter of a good pre-national social and political order, Alter sees
as a step or detour

on

the

Alter’s teleology

way

is

to the

impending post-national

it

order.

an updated version of 19th Century

liberal progressivism.

The

Enlightenment had freed the individual from external metaphysical constraints, and
individual reason had

toward actualizing

become

this

universal law. National self-determination

shift

of political legitimacy from an issue of power over

subjects to an issue of self-determination by citizens.
political legitimacy rested

of

part of the general

it.

step

metaphysical freedom in the political realm. The American and

French Revolutions began the

least the pretense

was a

more and more on

The

liberation

movement toward

From

free choice

the late 18th Century on,

by the people governed

—

or at

of "nations" from empires or absolutist rule was a

greater liberty.

10

10

This general framework is present in Hobsbawm, as well. However, in his work, it is driven by a Marxist
perspective driven toward a different telos. Still, and consistent with some Marxist positions, Hobsbawm
allows early, liberatory nationalism a certain legitimacy in 19th Century Europe. As with Alter, this
legitimacy soon fades.
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For Alter, the next level would be "multinational"

presumably

in contradistinction to

empires of conquest and colonization

nations living within them [Alter, 1989: 86],
potential

states that did not

Beyond

European Union, which has only been

from meaningful

organizations

—

realization, yet

oppress

this lay greater unions,

partially realized [122

and "Pan-" movements, such as Pan-Africanism, Pan-Arabism,
farther

-

-

etc.,

such as the

and 128

which

have produced supra-national joint

are

-

129]

much
and

efforts

such as the Arab League, the Organization of African Unity, the

Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Andean Pact, and the Organization
of
Eastern Caribbean States
state principle [151

-

—

that portend a future political order that transcends the nation-

152],

The general model of progress begins with

the destruction of old empires of

conquest and domination by national self-determination movements, which are then
integrated into larger and larger social and political structures that better and better

preserve individual and group liberty and well-being.

The

role of nationalism in advancing liberty in

fulfilled in the 19th Century,

War

and

its

role in Africa

IT Nationalism beyond this role

becomes

is

retrogressive [49]. In practice,

"nation"

interests

in the

decades

after

World

takes the form of "integral" nationalism, in

it

of their nation above

becomes an end

and Asia

obsolete and, if continued as intensively,

which the "nation" takes on the supreme value
promote the

Europe and the Americas was

all

for individuals,

others, internal

in itself, rather than a

means

to the

who

are enticed to

and external

[37ff.].

The

end of liberty.

Nationalism no longer has the task of securing the freedom of its members from
external oppression or of reforming the state structure of the nation into one that

expresses and preserves the self-determination and liberty of
place to go but against states outside

its

its

members, so

it

borders and minority groups within [49

has no
-

takes the form of irredentism, which seeks to extend the state territory to include
nationals (defined in linguistic, cultural, or historical terms) outside
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its

50],

It

all

present borders

—

regardless of their conditions or the
extent to which this will require
conquest of nonnationals

on

the

same lands

as well.

And/or

takes the form of "Russification,"
in which

it

a dominant nation within a state
attempts to force national minorities
to assimilate [see
3

1

].

As

Hobsbawm,

for

Alter holds that the struggles against
internal and external

enemies serves as a diversion from the
society, allowing those in

power

real social

to maintain

problems and tasks confronting a

without social change.

it

Alter stresses that the shift from "emancipatory
and 'legitimate' nationalism" to a
"conservative, indeed reactionary ideology"

not logically necessary. Yet,

is

undeniably widespread historical occurrence, and
matter

forms

how
it

liberatory. [50]

it is

at

that time,

nationalism

is

a potential of every nationalism, no

general discrediting on the Continent [27

its

Europeans have moved beyond nationalism

most now simply a

feeling’" [126] without the

power

consistent with

its

to

individual" have
is,

become

has fulfilled

it

its

in

former colonies,

emancipatory mission and

political

emancipation for the

rather marginal in these nationalisms [144], Nationalism, that

groups within the newly formed

become

a buttress against self-determination of minority

states [148ff.].

But, even if this were not so,

it

simply

is

political ideology in the post-colonial era [149],

that

in the political

supersession as a political force.

forms [147], "Social and

"nation-statism," has, in fact,

state

28

motivate violence and conflict. Such a residual

particularly in Africa and Asia, but there too
shift to integral

-

sense of national pride’" or a "'robust national

"’a

Nationalism continues, however, as an important force

has begun to

has been an

culminated in Europe in the two World Wars; the
extreme

took in the second occasioned

and 125]. Since
sense:

It

is

it

behind more generally. What

is

required

is

not up to the tasks that face

Modem

conditions have

it

left

as a central

the nation-

a shift to "supranational institutions"

might take over more and more of the functions currently performed by them. [124]
There are two main problems with

Alter's approach.

"supranational institutions" will guarantee political liberties
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First, his belief that

is

naive. In old empires of

conquest and colonial empires, there was
never a question of equality: within
the
imperial structure, the conqueror/colonizer
dominated.

Though Alter focuses on such

organizations as the European Union, the old
style model

not far from what he has in

is

mind: he takes Lord Acton's touting of
multi-nationalism as prophetic
"multinational" state

was Acton speaking of? The

British Empire,

[86], but

what

which he was

defending against national and anti-colonial
separation.

Perhaps

this is a bit unfair:

was defending. Even

if

what Alter has

in

all

Yugoslavia
the

is

different

from what Acton

one grants a clear distinction between imperial and
supranational,

however, the tendency of internal domination would
present in

mind

still

be an issue. The tendency

such supranational political structures. Certainly, what has
happened

in the past

European Union,

decade suggests

But even

this.

certain states have greater

in less

power than

is

to

extreme examples, such as

others,

and use

it

- this

is

perhaps the issue most discussed regarding the EU.

Most

likely, the

more power such supranational

repressive they will become.

One can even

unified

body

—

that

is,

the

more

see a hint of this with the increase in

importance of the United Nations. After the

more

structures have, the

fall

of the Soviet Union, the

UN became a

dichotomy of its dominant powers gave way

to a unity.

This unity allowed more decisive and sweeping actions than previously, making the
organization stronger. But, in becoming stronger,
limited set of political agendas, those of

its

it

has also

come

to serve a

more

leading members. Recent actions have

included giving legal clearance for a devastating war against a country that had acted
against the interests of the dominant powers.

The Gulf War

is

revealing.

Through

it,

one can see a

larger, ultimately global, supranational bodies.

geopolitics: the

Gulf War was simply the

result

The

likely future

of larger and

UN did not change the basic facts of

of a conflict of interests between a global

dominator and a regional one. What did change was the justification

for the

War.

It

was

a legal war against a country that had transgressed an international legal structure that
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was globally enforced.

In other words,

what was actually the same old power
struggle as

has always been present in the world,
was presented and perceived as a legal
action
against part of the "international community."
inside,

and

has

come

As with

state politics

depend on

to

differentials

among

two centuries

principle, not power.

states, this

interstate enmity; rather,

sincere their intentions at
control.

"external

enemy" had been moved

of power had been shellacked over with a
patina of legal and moral

politics

legitimacy.

The

is,

before, legitimacy in interstate politics

In a

world with such sizable power

of course, abused.

not a matter of eliminating

It is

powerful states have developed mechanisms that

some

level

-

— however

simply bring their enemies closer, for better

Supranational structures such as the

UN,

rather than increasing liberty, actually

undermine the self-determination of disparate groups, bringing them
under one
structure and under the legitimate

The second problem
Europe as opposed

to the

is

power of the most powerful groups within

that Alter divides

progress

made by

the former.

It

"decolonization" in formal political terms

is

domination of colonized peoples and
in

new forms

is

has been frequently and well argued that

only the

territories

that Europe's supersession

which Alter celebrates

as an indication of

this just as

-

step toward a genuine end to

first

"post-colonial" domination continues

-

has

in part

now been

based on competition

is

less frequently

-

of "nationalism" and conflict within

European maturity and world leadership
fully

-

has

on cheap non-

Turks, Kurds, and Vietnamese in Germany;

Algerian in France; Pakistani and Indian in Britain; and so

was once

What

much. For Europe as a whole depends

European labor imported "temporarily"

see the

fails to

analyzing the problems facing the

but along old lines and with familiar results.

commented upon

depended on

when

it.

into discrete parts, such as

once colonized parts of Asia and Africa. He then

continuing relationship between these parts,
latter or the

up the world

political

among Europeans

forth.

The nationalism

that

for colonial conquest [see 40],

focused entirely on producing a division of labor that reserves the benefits

of economic activity primarily for the Europeans.
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It is

cooperation, but cooperative

domination.

Any

decrease in intra-European national
conflict has been more than

matched by an increase
residual colonialist

in neo-fascist, neo-colonial
racism,

mass sentiment

old conflict between France and

to

which has been raised from

law and public policy. For instance, the
centuries-

Germany has been

replaced for each by conflict with the

groups supplying immigrant labor.
Alter does not recognize this because he does
not recognize the connections that
exist contemporaneously. This

depends on a temporal differention

that is the hallmark

of

progressive liberalism. Africa, Asia, and Latin America
are behind Europe and North

America

in

terms of an absolute scale of social and technological
development. Thus,

one finds that

European

in 1950, former colonies "still"

states

had previously [26]

—

had the relationship

to nationalism that

this "still" indicating the implicit

developmental

schema.
This temporal differentiation
different areas of the world.

is at

Though

the

Alter

is

same time a forced homogenization of the
careful to "bear in

mind" the differences

in

circumstances between Europe and the "Third World" [144], he finds nationalism in the
latter

tending toward what

it

became

As with

in the former, as discussed above.

Kedourie, this cuts off all possibility that the radically different societies and

circumstances in colonized regions has led and will lead to entirely

produced

in or envisioned

level,

conservative teleological dichotomy

—

or,

more

it

also assumes that the left-right, progressive-

at the

accurately,

core of Alter's work

when Europe

is

in

which looms so

large in the

method of domination. For

opposed

to colonialism.

Rather,

it

relevant
its

First, this split

minds of Europeans, has had

colonized or formerly colonized societies. At most,

different

is

removed from

conceptual isolation. Historical facts suggest otherwise.
politics,

possibilities not

by Europe.

At a more fundamental

Century Europe

new

liberal

little

beyond 19th

self-imposed

within European

meaning

for those

theory merely provided/s a

instance, liberal theory in the 19th Century

was not

justified colonialism not simply in the interest of the
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colonizer

-

the

more honest conservative justification but

As John

colonized.

(particularly

Stuart Mill put

On

in

it

Liberty those in colonized societies
,

China and India) could not be granted any

Europeans could, because

their societies

colonial rule by an advanced society

also in the interest of the

were

still

right

immature

was necessary

of self-determination, as
[Mill,

1977

:

9

.

io]-

to bring these societies to maturity.

Indeed, Mill, the paragon of liberal-progressive,
emancipatory thinking in 19th Century
Britain, served

many

years as a colonial administrator for the East
India

apparently extracting a nice profit for himself and the

Company

in

Company,

exchange

for "helping"

the natives.
In the 20th Century a similar role of liberal-progressives
in colonial and post,

colonial domination has continued.
Will

Be Done

liberal,

One

strain

of this has been well documented in Thy

[1995], in which Gerard Colby and Charlotte Dennett trace the use of

almost radical development techniques by missionary Charles Cameron

Townsend

to bring indigenous

groups in various Latin American countries into

line

with

the agendas of their governments and international business concerns, most notably
the

corporate empire of Nelson Rockefeller. These progressive methods allowed Townsend's

organization to gain the trust of and influence over various indigenous groups. They

were then led

easily into line. In

some

cases, with the idea that they

indigenous groups, the missionaries even actively assisted

governmental and corporate

Yoko Harumi
Townsend and

in their

were "helping"

genocide by

interests.

[1997] has

shown

that the progressive techniques pioneered

the liberal attitudes justifying their use were at the core of the

Corps and other Cold War-era
course, implicated in

CIA

US

Peace

development approaches. The Peace Corps was, of

activities,

and various

governmental programs functioned as adjuncts

liberal

to the

more, these techniques and attitudes have resurfaced
"participatory" development

US

by

methods and ideologies
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governmental and non-

US war

effort in

at the heart

Vietnam. What

is

of contemporary

that are currently billed as correcting

the past failures and

compromised nature of US-based

international

development

programs.

Even more innocuous

externally driven development efforts
have had oppressive

effects. Often, projects intended
to "help" native societies

have deeply destabilized or

destroyed indigenous economic and social
structures, with horribly negative
effects:

emotional and economic support networks
have been destroyed, young

masse

into prostitution, children

children forced to

move

go hungry, families broken

this, the

relative to

its

them

are for

now

own

—

its

very terminology of

"left"

and

"right"

in the

was

to a large extent

Cold War. The United States

practice of evaluating the political orientation of
movements

interests.

"Communists"

are against those interests,

and "democrats"

without regard to actual ideologies or effects on the native
societies

[Harumi, 1997]. This imposition of Euro-American

World" has ripped apart term from

imposed

and adults and

inhumane conditions.

imposed on the "Third World" by the major players
continues even

forced en

urban industrial centers to join growing ranks
of exploited

to

laborers working under hazardous and

Beyond

apart,

women

political

referent, foreclosing

agendas on the "Third

any meaningful use of this

political terminology.

Even

if

one brackets off this neo-colonial domination of political terminology and

the material facts of neo-colonial

dominance

relations,

and looks

at the

"Third World"

alone in order to isolate the native agency of various groups, the categories of
"progressive" and "conservative" do not have the consistent meaning that Alter assumes,
especially in reference to national movements. In

movements were grounded
liberal

many

cases, anti-colonial national

in a conservative appeal to the pre-colonial past. In others,

reforms have destabilized indigenous economic and social structures, and created

conditions of greater poverty and dependence on government assistance, while

same time eroding
that the

European

potential sources of political opposition.

political

More than

terminology and forms have been put
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to use

at the

this, to the

by agents

extent

in the

"Third World," they have been
removed from their context and mixed,
matched, and
rearranged into constellations of ideas
and political forms that do not look
like those
visible in Europe. For instance,
the very

name of Mexico's

long-ruling PRI appears

contradictory in European terms:
institutionalized revolution, that

is,

conservative

progressivism.

What

this

means

tor colonized

and oppressed peoples

in the

"Third World"

is

simple: the necessary link Alter assumes
between the terms and forms of

emancipation/hberation and liberal progressivism does
not hold regarding colonized and
formerly colonized areas. "Liberalism" has led
and can lead
as

One might

conservatism."

latter part

leftist, liberal political

of the 19th Century

in

radically different

More

its

way

form

around, as Alter assumes.
to a rightist, conservative

Europe says nothing about

oppressive) possibilities elsewhere and

and concrete forms

oppression just as directly

say that nationalism itself circumscribes
"left-right,"

progressive-conservative," rather than the other

nationalism went from a

to

at other

times

takes in these circumstances,

from what was produced

in 19th

-

its

this

which

To

one

in

some

in the

potential liberatory (or

depends on the theoretical

(as

argued above)

may

be

Century Europe.

generally, the foregoing refutes any claim that liberal-progressivism

emancipatory

say

is

universal sense. Liberal-progressivism does not advance the

general liberation of humankind.

As

a result, a determination of nationalism's

emancipatory potential cannot be made by evaluation against the claimed teleology of
liberal-progressivism.
It is,

ultimately, his liberal-progressive developmental

work. Indeed,

it

nationalism: he

nor that

it

is

is

this that

allows him

at

He

that drives Alter's

times to take a relatively temperate view of

not claiming that nationalism has

should be [124],

scheme

become

irrelevant [Alter, 1989:

126]

has only to demonstrate the trend of nationalism's

decreasing social/political appropriateness and progressiveness, and to project
into the future. Against this demonstrated trend, nationalism
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is

this trend

not simply present today,

It

is still

present [122, 123,

of history

-

is

order that
that

is

hanging on, despite forces

that are pressuring

relegating nationalism to a passive
or marginal role, and so

not a problem:

is

It is

it

is

its

out

residual

fine to grant a residual place for
nationalism in the

emerging, so long as

it is

world

a "'normal’, legitimate" or "moderate"
form [126],

not a central political motivator. In other
words, nationalism

is,

it

forces that will, presumably,
eventually succeed.

History

presence

etc.].

so long as

is fine,

does not interfere with the developmental
scheme that grounds Alter's work.

It

it

can be a

feature of personal identity, with formative
influence in terms of culture and language,
so

long as

is

it

not a basis for active political solidarity and
movement.

With the
from

its

self-satisfaction of a liberal

European convinced

that

Europe has learned

mistakes and has forged ahead toward a liberated,
well-balanced future, Alter has

nothing to fear from nationalism. This historical
inevitability allows Alter a

much more

balanced and measured representation of the nation and
nationalism than either

Hobsbawm

who

or Kedourie,

defensively

condemn

a political form that has actually

taken their trains of destiny on different tracks, carrying them further
and further from the
correct

route.

For Alter,

it

is at

worst the addition of a few extra stops on the way.

can even safely analyze different attitudes that have prevailed
nationalism, without begging questions about his
nationalism, but rather evaluating

embedded

in the

it

own

at different

attitude:

he

is

times regarding

not judging

against a given (liberal progressive) standard

very foundation of his guiding ideology.

Jonathan Ree,

in

"Cosmopolitanism and Nationality" [1996],

internationalist" transcendence of nationality. For him, the former

assumes the

latter:

after all, the

rejects

any

depends on and

term "international" can have no meaning without

reference to the "nation": internationalism preserves the basis of nationalism [167

He

He

-

170].

counters the obvious objection that "international" should properly be

understood as

" interstate"

and

concepts and

"state," as

(which

is

very different, given the difference between "nation"

realities)

by suggesting
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that the

confusion between these

terms
1996:

is

essential to

The

170],

them

in

what they mean

and so part of their nature [Ree,

in practice,

theorist should dismiss abstract
"terminological squeamishness,"

and

focus on analyzing the practical confusion
instead [170],

This "confusion," of course, recalls the
analyses of Kedourie and Hobsbawm.
Ree
follows them by asserting that inter/nationalism

is

the product of illusion.

He

categorizes

the core illusions as empirical and
conceptual, as well as "dialectical," or
illusions in

reasoning [170

-

171].

The empirical

the illusions that "nations" have

some

historical origins), biology (the nation

illusions

echo

Hobsbawm and

Kedourie: they are

basis in history (they claim to reach
back to pre-

the product of a "continuous chain of
racial

is

inheritance going back to a biologically pure past"),
geography (nationalism refers to a
territory that

was once

the exclusive possession of the nation), and
language/culture

(linguistic/cultural differences are essential markers

illusions can be

The

first

exposed by direct appeal
conceptual illusion

attachment to what
that the borders

is local,

is

of social groups) [171]. These

to facts in the relevant fields.

that nationalism derives

what one experiences

in one's

first

fail to

What

However,

is

to the range

set

of

more, specific

sets

is,

-

173]

defined through

as stressed above, nations exist only through differentiation

Finally, the "dialectical" illusion

is,

is

self-generating, that

from other nations: they are negatively defined, against other

[173]. That

Ree counters

extend to the borders of the nation, or cross over them. [172

illusion is that this or that nation

self-reference.

life.

of all, more than one such

attachments, which do not correspond with each other.

The second

everyday

natural, concrete

of one's "local" attachments have no necessary relationship

of the nation. Individuals generally have,

generally either

from a

is

that "our life

is

nations. [173]

nothing apart from our nation"

following Kedourie, the nationalist mentality holds the individual to be a

dependent, derivative part of the national whole. This
"natural," "political,"

is

the result of a conflation of the

and "subjective" realms: the personal

is

perceived as also national,

the given circumstances of one's birth are confused with the essence of one's subjectivity,
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and so

forth [173

-

175],

At the same time, the nation

itself

becomes

"subjective," as the

conflation runs in reverse: "national
identity" means not only the
enduring features of the

nation apart from historical accidents,
but also

its

This takes Ree beyond Kedourie: the
individual

"collective self-image" [175

is

-

176],

not a purely derivative part of the

whole, but affects the whole as well.

As with Hobsbawm, Kedourie, and

bloody history of violence and genocide. What
the destruction has

come

much through

as

Ree

Alter,

is

attributes to inter/nationalism a

worse, this

self-sacrifice

is

a history without

and altruism as destructive

malice. Self-righteousness has, indeed, allowed
for increased destruction. [167

To
in

the illusion of inter/nationality,

which individuals could

of such a form

is

live

the individual

guilt:

Ree counterpoises a

-

168]

future cosmopolitanism,

without essential reference to nationality
[178]. The ideal

who can move

freely

from one area

to another, associated

with no place more than any other, with no language more
than any other (except for the
trivial fact

of not knowing some) [177

subjectivity
illusions

is

s

178],

It is

freed from the political, to exist in

of intemationality behind

Ree

-

it,

for

a world in

itself,

which the individual

a world "which could put the

good" [178],

case against inter/nationalism and proposal of cosmopolitanism are

themselves compromised by empirical, conceptual, and dialectical
with Kedourie's, right
to

down

what he/she does not

to the classic liberal attribution

like.

Against

it,

errors.

It

shares

much

of delusion and irrationality

the critique of Kedourie stands, with the

following additions.
(1)

Where Kedourie

intellectual history,

painstakingly traces his concept back into

Ree appears

to pull

it

out of the air

—

German

with some very limited

obligatory allusions to Kant, a reference to Jeremy Bentham, analysis of a speech by

Bertrand Russell (an antinational-ist with a crude understanding of the phenomenon,
is

who

particularly irrelevant to a serious discussion of this or most other social or political

issues), a short discussion

of Erik Erikson, and
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little else.

He does

not survey current

theories about nationalism, nor does he
discuss any actual national

movements - though

he does claim to base his understanding on
observation of "nationalist practice." Out
of
these inadequate sources, he outlines a set of
positions and beliefs supposedly held by
nationalists generally, at the core

nationalism

is,

and essence of nationalism. This description of

quite simply, a straw man. Far from capturing
the complexity of the

concept(s) of the nation available in different contexts,

it

merely restates a

set

of trite

points.

(2)

Ree does attempt

to obviate

any counterclaims regarding the conceptual

complexity and richness of concepts of the nation and nationalisms,
by claiming
complexity

By

is

that

such

the function of confusion and the co-existence of contradictory
elements.

this conjuring trick,

he avoids having to

treat the actual

phenomena, instead

representing the complexity that contradicts his presumed concepts as intellectual
error

and delusion

move, he

-

"contradictions, fictions, and confusions" [170], In a typically "analytic"

flattens a potentially interesting

conceptually simple

unit.

His

own

complex of ideas and practices

illusion

is

to

into a

suppose that the world can be understood

through simple, unified concepts, and anything more complex must be

error:

he

fails to

entertain the possibility that a "confused," internally tense concept of the nation or

nationalism might correspond to social and metaphysical reality better than a simplistic
analytic liberalism

—

at least

a reality in

which

social engineering has not

accomplished

the simplistic analytic ideal. For instance, to the extent that what he labels "empirical
illusions" are present in specific national

movements and

nationalism, they are often

highly contested, and must be understood in this context of conflicting ideas.

More than

this,

Ree

restricts

nationalism to the merely conceptual level.

He

reserves the material realm for evaluative use against national self-concepts and

nationalism.

He

claims that he has extracted the elements of his concept of nationalism

out of "nationalist practice," but does not entertain the possibility that concepts of

nationalism themselves

- even

such limited ones as
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his, to the

extend they exist

in

practice

-

might be generated out of material

material reality. This
as

was

forces,

and not simply be ideas imposed
on

also an issue with Kedourie. Ree,
by insisting

mere concept, prejudices

his account against actuality.

Of course

a purely conceptual

account of nationalism appears illusory when
compared with observable
interrelation

of the concept with the material realm that

the concept itself has been obscured,

represented as less than

it

really

is,

and so the concept

which causes

it

on nationalism

facts; the

is

necessary and fundamental

is

"not

to

itself," that is, is

appear to be a false account of the

to

observable reality of nationalism.

Claiming

(3)

that the concepts

of nation and international are confused concepts

allows Ree to reject a distinction between nation and

state [170].

unwilling to try to sort out these and related concepts,
their

complexity deserves (see point

framework

is

adequately.

2, preceding).

It

let

He seems

unable or

alone probe them in the depth

might be

that his conceptual

simply too crude and limited to capture the concepts and their instantiations

He

then justifies this lack of comprehension by projecting

of study themselves. This one might

call

it

onto the objects

an epistemic tautology: the limits of his

conceptual frame he experiences as the limits of the object of conceptualization.
not, after all, be nationalists

(4)

The

first

who

are "simple-minded" [see 171

conceptual illusion follows

-

It

might

172].

Hobsbawm, while

the second

is

the

standard claim that nationalism defines the self in terms of the other, as an exclusion of or

defense against the other. As above, the
to the internal

first

contention cannot be refuted without appeal

complexity of national concepts and nations themselves. Across different

concepts of the same nation, the boundaries of the nation
state

with fixed borders

—

rarely coincide.

Some members have

that is projected onto the whole, while others exclude

or

who

include themselves.

themselves

U
I

so.

And

Some

are considered

so forth and so on.

will return to this point in

Chapter

11

- even

There

3.
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a very localized concept

members whom

members by

is

one associated with a

yet others include

others but do not consider

never a consistent concept held by

all

Who

are in the nation, and rarely are
concepts even shared by large subgroups.
Different

individuals often even understand
different things

when embracing

the

same

concept.

Indeed, single individuals might operate
with more than one concept of the
nation,

depending on the context, while the significance
of the nation varies from individual

to

individual and subgroup to subgroup, even
beyond the differences in the content of the

The human boundaries of an

concepts.

different positions in debates about

it

actual nation are then always fuzzy

might be

clear.

correspond to the fixed, unique boundary of the

imposed on those with
best, to the extent to

state

By

-

-

though the

their nature, they cannot

which, to the extent that

it

different concepts, exacerbates tensions within
the nation.

which nations determine

their

own

is

At

fixed borders in proposal or fact,

the borders are the product of compromise or the
agenda of a potentially opportunistic

dominant

strain

of nationalism (which

is

quite often selected through external forces and

manipulations).

These
is

a

facts

do not mean

that the "nation"

much more complex phenomenon

The conceptual
the nation,

error of nationalists

where there

more, actually delivers

are
less

I

a conceptual illusion, but rather that

-

the

it

than can be conceived within Ree's philosophy.

simply to perceive or conceive only one concept of

many; of course, Ree, from

whom

one has a right

same reductive concept, but without

and interaction with other concepts
Indeed,

is

is

the

that is often present in serious national

will argue in Chapter 3 that this internal tension

is

to expect

compromise
movements.

actually in part constitutive

of the nation, and an essential part of formation and on-going self-transformation of a
nation.

Regarding the second conceptual

would be well served by

illusion, Ree's pretension to

a re-reading of the Antinomies. His counter to the

universal nationalist claim to self-generation

antinomy, rather than to

Kantianism [168]

rise

above

it.

is

to state

Claiming

presumed

merely the other side of an

that the nation

is

defined simply through

negation of other nations requires a solid reference point somewhere, which Ree denies.
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He does

suggest that this reference point

international order" [173], that

is,

is itself

the illusion of "an imagined

the illusion that other nations exist. But this
begs the

question of how such an illusion (or conceptualization) can

As Ree himself stresses,

generated.

is

can be spontaneously

the international cannot be conceived without

reference to the national. Thus, even

he claims

itself

at the

the ground of the national

merely conceptual

is itself

level, the international that

grounded by the national. While he claims

as the very basis of his essay that the national and international are

two sides of the same

coin, "inseparable partners," and their antinomy should be superseded in favor of

cosmpolitanism [170 and 177], here he transgresses

this basis,

by privileging the

international over the national.

To avoid

the

messy

fact that "local attachments" provide

nation-generation, he simply rejects

them

as "national."

12

an internal source of

They must be converted

into

nationality through the operation of a nationalist self-conception. [171] But, could such a

self-conception occur in the absence of these "local attachments"? If not, then does that

not suggest a dialectical relationship between local attachments and the negation of what

might be called foreign attachments, or

external, distinct systems of local attachments?

My objection is not a defense of the claim to pure self-generation of nations.
Rather, to the extent that the nation can be understood through purely mental operations

of definition (see point

2,

above), the definition should be understood as both positive and

negative, with these elements dialectically related and in mutual presupposition.

This dialectic between positive and negative definition has been the general trend
historically.

For instance,

in anti-colonial national

movements, the impetus toward

nationalism was generally acknowledged by participants to be reaction against
oppression.

The

struggle, as described in Fanon’s

Wretched of the Earth [1963] and as

has been readily observable, was to create a positive definition of the community of
resistance to oppression, to balance the negative one.

12

In direct contrast to his equally arbitrary conflation
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What

of nation and

is

state.

important to recognize

is

that in

such national movements, both a negative
and positive self-definition has been

essential,

which

has, further, been recognized by various
participants

always by the same ones. This
debated within the movements

though not

one of the reasons why these issues have
been so hotly

is

-

-

further evidence that

it

is

inaccurate to privilege in

either direction.

Indeed, in the case of anti-colonial movements, the
issue of positive versus

negative self-definition

is

necessarily tied up with the very issue of liberation.

A

negative

definition against the colonizer was, in fact, definition
by the colonizer: the colonizer

defined the colonized by oppressing them. The colonized
then, understandably,

considered positive self-definition part of liberation.

It

was, like the other aspects of

liberation, not a given, but struggled for. This possibility of
self-definition, in fact,

have been one of the things
to so

many

The

at all.

cosmopolitanism

nationalist

form of liberation movement

attractive

from

Even

its

context. Indeed,

Ree

fails to

consider such power issues

among

issue enters Ree's analysis only as something to be superseded

-

of nations arranged
illusions

made

groups. Ree seems to fixate on this emphasis on positive self-definition,

without considering

groups

that

might

it is

itself

based on the "illusion" of imagined

in a hierarchy [173],

illusions with guns.

I

totality or

Of course, one might want

by

world system

to distinguish simple

will revisit this issue below.

in earlier anti-imperial national

movements, where pre-existing nations were

institutionalized or imagined prior to active nationalism, the experience of oppression has

been recognized as formative. For instance, though many Armenians would argue
strongly against privileging Turkish oppression of Armenians including most of all the

Genocide

any national

in

nature of the

which

itself

self-definition, others

Armenian nation

as

it

exists today.

view

it

There

as essential to understanding the

is

no one dominant position,

suggests the dialectical relationship between the two possibilities.

In the broader history of nationalism, the data simply do not line up

the "antinomy" or the other: even though

it
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might

on one

side of

in individual cases, these are offset

by

cases manifesting the opposite tendency, both
of which are offset by cases in which
both
are fully present.
(5)

As Kedourie, Ree

liberal individualism, again

sets a

bland anti-liberal organicism against his version
of

imposing his

own

conceptual limits onto his object. Ree

pushes the issue more deeply than Kedourie does, however.
Ree attributes the
organicism to an illusory identification of politics and subjectivity.
this position is

indicate to

It

seems strange

that

based on observation of nationalist practice: such observation
would

most observers

that

any identity between

political (unit)

and subjectivity was

highly unstable and variegated. Different individuals with different
concepts of the
political (unit)

and subjectivity might share some type of abstract conflation of them, but

these are likely different and in tension with one another. In practice, different

conceptions of the political (unit) collide with one another, and distinct individuals are in
relation to a concept of the political (unit) that
shifting, unstable area

which makes identifying with
between the

it

a very

political (unit)

political unit (nation) to

Ree does not

best a stable net result and at worst a

of continual contestation. Such a concept

from an individual's own concept (assuming

identity

is at

this to

complex

is,

of course,

be a relatively unitary concept),

issue.

The only way

to ensure a stable

and subjectivity such as Ree describes

one member.

distinct

is to

reduce the

13

get caught in a typical progressive liberal teleology. According to

him, the dialectical illusion transforms political relations into the "master-phenomenon of

human

existence" [176].

specific
[176].

form of social

is

that politics

is

essential to subjectivity,

This

is,

in fact,

which

is at

the core of

a historically conditioned illusion that can and should be shed, toward a

peaceful post-inter/national cosmopolitan future grounded

13

a

relation that predominates only within specific historical contexts

The presumption

nationalism,

A proper understanding of the subject reduces politics to

what "nations" often become

in

in fact not illusion.

The

ideal

"multicultural" (as distinct from multinational) states.

There, the social structure of the nation is suppressed, and the individual enters the greater society as an
individual. Thus, the nation is fragmented into the national concepts of each of these individuals. I will
take up the implications of this below.
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emancipation, his

liberal telos, is not political
liberation (as for Alter),

from politics. Progress

is

not measured in political terms

dependent on developing non-oppressive

which preserves the

logical priority

at all:

political structures.

it

is

liberation

Even

liberation
is

not

the social contract,

of the autonomous individual, links the
subject too

closely to politics.

But, what can an escape from the political
mean, in concrete terms? Ree offers a

model,

in the

form of Ben

a 12th Century Jewish merchant.

Jiju,

Ben

Jiju lived in various

places, including Aden, India, and Egypt, had a
daughter with an Indian

business partners with an Indian

man who

eventually

moved

to

woman, was

Aden. What

is

more, his

Indian daughter went off to Palermo to marry. Neither he nor
his family were "national"
(or the 12th Century equivalent, 14 tied to a locale or culture)
or "international," that

focally conscious of moving

among

different cultures or states [178].

No, they were not national or
and slaves. Ben

was

Jiju s

international

— they

mate he originally purchased as

were a combination of elites

his slave,

and his business partner

also his slave. His "multicultural" social and economic relations were relations
of

dominance; he moved among cultures

one might assume

to

One can

to

buy

slaves.

Even

have been out of simply business

a culture of economic

power he

carried with

his

moves

interest:

to various locations

his cosmopolitanism

see this type of "cosmopolitanism" today, in

men who

who

purchase mail-

travel the

world on

business (never leaving the corporate world, never really "being in" the places they

wealthy globetrotters,

etc.

The "cosmopolitans" of our age

workers, mail-order brides and

women on

was

him wherever he went.

order brides, the brides themselves, corporate "salary men"

the

is,

visit),

are also migrant and "guest"

entertainment visas, refugees,

etc.

—

as well as

employees of transnational corporations, development workers, missionaries, men on

"sex tours," trekkers in the Himalayas (often themselves on unofficial sex tours), those

14

Neither Ree nor

I

hold that nations and nationalism existed before the modern
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era.

with the educational resources and time to learn
new languages

15
,

and so

dominated and the dominators. They are those with
the wealth and power
political

native

experiences) from other parts of the world

would-be cosmopolitans from powerful

from

politics"

by being purchased

contemporary equivalents
Nationalism

is

societies to

from

anathema

their elite

it

do

so.

Nor, obviously,

away from

is

one "free

one's homeland, or

to elite cosmopolitans,

It

restricts their

power outside of their home

its

because

it

movements and
area.

It

their

also restricts the

exploited labor, and often explicitly challenges the dominance
is

not to say that nationalism in itself is a solution to the

issues of power and domination, nor that

nor even that

languages, or

.

relations underlying them. That

-

one part

16

particularly

movements of slaves and

new

to

despite the incessant attempts by

as a slave and taken

counterbalances their power and domination.
ability to benefit

~

crafts,

the

to transcend

arrangements and law, or their victims. One cannot
shed one's links

of the world simply by buying things (people, clothes
and

-

forth

it

succeeds consistently in

its

challenge to them

does not sometimes become a tool of power and domination. Certainly,

the existence of state borders and economic boundaries contributes to the exploitation of

immigrant or migrant laborers,

entertainers, etc. But, the state structure is not a direct

expression of nationalism, and national movements do have a potential against the
structure

and the power of cosmopolitanism.

"cosmopolitanism"
domination, which

is

My point here

to stress that

not a solution to these problems, but simply another form of

itself might

be aided by the

state system.

Perhaps Ree could have chosen a better example, but

merely

is

to obscure the reality

could counter-argue that

this

would have served

of domination and subordination beneath

this reality is a function

Perhaps Ree

of our politicized times, and will

disappear with the transcendence of politics. But,
15

it.

this

was

also reality in

Ben

Jiju's

R£e has obviously never tried to enroll in an English as a Second Language course in an urban US area,
nor has he had to figure out a way to pay for ESL courses or find time when working full-time, raising a
family, etc., to attend class and do assignments.
16
By Ree's definition, African slaves brought to the Western Hemisphere were "cosmopolitan."
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world.
that

It is

What

is

more,

it

will be reality

even

in a stateless, politics-less

Ree envisions. This makes simple transcendence
of politics

irrelevant to liberation.

not just the erasure of state borders and
"national prejudice" that

movement
power

world, of the sort

make cosmopolitan

possible, but also wealth. If one defines
politics broadly, to include issues
of

generally, then the cosmopolitan future cannot
ensure emancipation except

through direct address of power issues

-

economic,

social, gender,

and military, as well

as political.

Liberation cannot

mean

a simple escape;

Ree’s approach seems to be that,

if

it

requires struggle and social change.

one just pretends

that

power

relations are illusions,

they will go away. This childish approach can work for some
people, whose position of

dominance

move

(as citizens

of a powerful

state, as

wealthy, or so on) guarantee their ability to

around a world inhabited by people

freely

tied to locales or

moved about

through

it,

subjugation and exploitation. Indeed, their appearance of cosmopolitanism
depends
precisely

on dominance

to hide these

relations

and a structure guaranteeing them, as well as the

from themselves and

politics," that

is,

succumbed

an

to

others.

Only those who have power can "transcend

the constraints of power. But, then, they are the deluded ones,

who have

illusion.

If Ree's conception

of the autonomous individual in

its

proper, undeluded and

unconstrained

state, is the

cosmopolitan subjectivity, then essential (even central)

subjectivity

power, that

is,

not

mean

is

ability

politics broadly defined

that an individual really has

no

17
.

"Freedom from

political relations

politics"

does

with others, but rather that the

individual does not acknowledge those relations. In the case of the cosmopolitan

means simply freedom from

to that

elite, it

responsibility for one's domination over others.

17

This could also have been argued by appeal to the extensive literature on the social construction of
This literature, however, might be rejected by Rie and others who maintain belief in the myth
of the autonomous atomic individual subject.
subjectivity.
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Th e
Martin

Kedoune,

Thom

takes a less typical approach to
the nation than

Ree

Alter, or

Last of the Romans'?

Hobsbawm,

do. His highly sophisticated
Republics Nations,
,

and

Tribes

[1995] penetrates to the core of French political
theory during and after the Revolution,
as
well as subsequent

German

scholarship, demonstrating a deep

knowledge of a

comprehensive range of primary sources from and
secondary sources on the period.

Thom

argues that the French Revolution

ensuing "Terror"

- marked

republican free cities with

[Thom, 1995:

political force in 18th

its

to

by Rousseau as an

[5 -

at its

precisely, reaction to the

European

Rome,

him, the tradition of free

Century Europe

city,

more

origin in ancient Greece and

he reads the oeuvre of Rousseau as

of the free republican

or,

the beginning of a shift from a

According

131].

-

cities

to

tradition of

an era of "tribalism"

was

still

6 and 168ff., especially 183].

a strong

More than

this,

core a contemporary (mid- 18th Century) theory

taking Republican

Rome

as

its

model. This theory was posed

alternative to the ascendant centralized state

and

liberal capitalism.

[58ff.]

The key

feature of a free city

that

is,

and

57]. Indeed, in a free city, "the

is

that

it is

governed by the "citizens assembled,"

citizens as direct participants in the governing assembly [see, for instance,
46, 47,

Thom

"citizens assembled."
that the pre-imperial

Roman

city are, thus, "active."

evaporates in

its

government"

itself

can only be understood as the

finds supporting evidence of this identity in such facts as
"state"

had

virtually

Indeed, this activity

is

no bureaucracy. The citizens of a

the essence of their freedom,

free

which

absence (with the ascendance of oligarchy or dictatorship).

This marks the distinction between the "liberty of the ancients" and the "liberty of
the

modems." For

the ancients, liberty

public assembly, that

is,

in

was

directly proportional to direct participation in

government. For the modems,

liberty

became

inversely

proportional to government control over the individual: political liberty was freedom
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from external coercion by public
set

of rights

that guarantee "the

government"

Thom

In

[93],

liberty,

as grounded in a

modem

liberty:

to the general

his

hope

Enlightenment approach,

for the future

through the ascendance of the free city
model

the re-emergence

is

[7],

important to stress that this

is

not merely a communitarian approach.
At the

Thom's concept of the republic

is

that

It is

heart of

was seen

independence of citizens from the power
of the

an interesting challenge

sides with ancient over

of such

authority.'* Individual liberty

is

it

not dependent on a shared culture,

language, lineage, set of core values, or even
conception of community:

merely the shared commitment

to participate in

commitment, an individual simply ceases

an assembly. 19 In

to be a

fact,

it

requires

without that

member, without necessary

effects

on

the remainder of the republic.

Thom
it

defends the liberty of the ancients against the standard

liberal criticism that

required suppression of the individual for the good of the group,
and allowed liberty of

the

individual" only as a share in the liberty of the entire group; that

not the individual, was a "unit of liberty."
individual freedom

was not only codified

Thom
in

government. The essential difference from
that this guarantee

The

depended on

Roman

modem

civil law,

but guaranteed by the

individual liberty consisted in the fact

the participation of the individual in public assembly.

assembly

and guaranteed through

it.

The

it

through his [not her]

structure.

Thus, the "private," as a sphere away from public
latter,

only the society,

counters that an equivalent of modem

individual did not passively receive the liberty, but gained

activity within the legitimate

is,

shift to

modem

life,

liberty

was intimately

tied to the

came when people came

to

be "represented" in assembly, and the "private" became disjoint from the "public," such
that different people focused

on each realm. 20 Rights were determined by nature or by an

“Private coercion seems acceptable for the modern liberal.
as I will argue, Thom sneaks in a "given," in the form of the law or constitution given to the
assembly by the law-giver.
20
This is reminiscent of Ree, but for Thom the development of the distinction leads directly to the
production of the "nation," while for Ree, this distinction was the feature of a /^re-liberal era, the erosion of

“Though,

which leads

to nationalism.

83

imaginary "social contract”
guaranteed the rights

that, since

in perpetuity.

model became not how

it

was always already entered by

Indeed, the focus of concern
under the social contract

to perpetuate

it

(to

guarantee rights), but whether an
individual

could ultimately break his [not her]
commitment to
It is

this

the "nation":
[sic]

change

that

it.

provided an opening for the development
of the concept of

"once the liberty of the individual was no
longer guaranteed by his or her

being an active part of a sovereign assembly
... the danger arose that

thought to inhere in a more general, purportedly
ever-present

language or both"

[92].

language, land, culture,

became

etc.

Liberty

a matter of something

it

might be

attribute, a race or a

became a given, guaranteed through a

was no longer "guaranteed" through representation

beyond the government,

further and further

removed from

Kedourie, but with

Hobsbawm and

modem

it

One's liberty slipped from being guaranteed
even by an

imaginary act of entering the social contract:

it

all citizens,

the individual. 21

Alter

— the

as the

On Thom’s

nation

was

government

account

in part a

-

itself

,

became

contrary to

consequence of

liberalism.

Yet, this shift

was not

the only necessary ingredient.

depended also on the discovery of "tribes"

in

The emergence of the nation

North America. Popularized and

"analyzed" by a succession of ethnologists writing in the tradition 22 of the
"noble
savage," the "tribe" became a conceptual alternative to the citizens assembled
or the
latter's

devolution, representative liberalism.

tribal structures into their

Annals and Germania

own presumed

German

language and that gave language a

2

"tribe" [22 Iff.].

'Though,

if

power over

one

23

history,

[214], This back-reading

linguistic history that placed

of a

German romantic
by appeal

recalls Foucault or

such texts as Tacitus'

was combined with new

"discoveries" in

as a pure descendant from the Indo-European proto-

new

significance as encoding the "essential character"

This also freed Germans from the

the individual, reaching

to

thinkers back-read such

Roman

tradition that penetrated

even accept Hobsbawm's argument, government gained yet more

more deeply

into his/her

22

Rousseauian.
23
See the above treatment of Kedourie.
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life.

France and other areas of Europe: the Germanic
peoples did not develop due
influence of

Roman

civilization, but despite

pure tribe uncorrupted by
transfer of value

peoples"

shift

for politics

was driven by

structure of the free city model.

-

216],

It

represented a politically charged

city to the barbarian tribe,

was no longer

had become the primal Indo-European

The

struggling in ancient times to remain
a

it,

[212 and 215

from the ancient

The model

[1].

Rome

Rome

the free city of the

to the

Roman

Germanic

tradition;

it

tribe.

the failure of Revolutionary France to realize
the political

The Revolutionary

political structures

unleashed the Terror: the rule of assembled citizens became

Many

from

on the model of Republican Rome. Unfortunately, the

explicitly

to the

were based

"citizens assembled"

totalitarian

and homicidal.

within and without France saw this as the failure of extreme or direct
democracy.

In France,

more power was ceded

to traditional-style rulers, with

Germany, an

beneficiary, while in

alternative

unleashed the Terror within France

Some French
The German

intellectuals,

such as

alternative motivated

-

was sought

and without

Madame
mass

it

to the

in the

Napoleon

the ultimate

form of mass

politics that

form of Napoleon's armies.

de Stael, participated in the German reaction.

political participation without

widespread

political agency.

Thom's goal
dominant
explicit:

is to

political form,

expose the weak foundation of the

and of the concept of the nation

shift to the

itself.

nation as

His political agenda

is

he

from the conviction that before the age of nations there was an age of
and that after the age of nations there could be, if there is not a
pandemonium of 'ethnic cleansing' instead, a new age of cities, in which regional
assemblies, freed of the terminal claims of providence, could answer in all clarity
to the rightful demands of cosmopolis. [7]
write[s]
cities,

Thom's analysis marks a genuine
considered thus

far.

He

step

beyond the

limits

of the theorists

I

have

actually develops a novel political theory in relation to the

nation, rather than merely counterpoising the nation to a threadbare political alternative.

He

digs into history to excavate an interesting and contemporarily relevant trend in
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What

political form.

even more impressive

is

is

the fact that his theory is a
genuine

attempt to theorize the social group
that does not reduce
or a "logically contingent contract

conceived from a

The

limit

among autonomous

to either the "supra-individual"

it

individuals" that

becomes when

it

liberal perspective.

of his theory

is

that he, like each

of the other theorists

counterpoises the nation to a social/political
form valorized within his

means of rejecting

I

have discussed,

own

agenda, as a

the nation and establishing the
superiority of the valorized form. This

opposition turns on the distinct forms of group
represented by republic and nation

according to Thom. After rescuing the non-liberal
group from the standard
reduction to a big individual and posing in

assembled,"

Thom

for instance, 267].

The

distinction

is

to the "social," that

form

Thom

Thus,

nationalism, with

stead the concept of the "people

re-focuses the "supra-individual" critique fully onto
the nation [see,

from the civic
[8],

its

its

at

once

historically concrete:

is,

it

The

is

result

is

a

strict

was created

As

is

it is

exciting; as a treatment of

trite.

dichotomy between the concepts of nation and

merely ascriptive and so passive, while

ephemeral, existing only so long as those
29],

When participation

republic

is

dead.

The

and

a challenge to the liberal

nation becomes "tribal," while the purely "republican" becomes the
the nation

in the shift

rejects liberalism, with its negative individualism,

perceived "supra-individualism."

wanting and

it

the shift from city to nation as dominant political

reduction of all non-liberal groups to "supra-individuals,"
the nation,

liberal

who

in the city

participate in

it

it

is

on the other hand,

is

reaching into prehistory, connected to the present

The

Participation in

active.

do so

lessens or ends, the oligarchs and tyrants

nation,

city.

city.

The

city

is

[see, for instance,

move

in,

and the

perceived as eternal, with roots

- and future - by

an unbroken

continuity [see, for instance, 263].
Interestingly, liberalism drops out of

its

possibility as a third pole in a potential

"trichotomy." For Rousseau, liberal capitalism was the coming scourge of the 18th
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Century. The intellectual, technical,
and commercial "advances" of the
Enlightenment

were bringing ruin
It is

to

He embraced

humanity.

understandable that Thom,

and solution

to the rise

in

-

Thom

though

following Rousseau, would reject a
liberal analysis of

of nationalism. Both poles of city and
nation are

both privilege the public or group

framework

the republican city as an
alternative. [58]

in

a

way

not acceptable within a liberal
conceptual

does maintain a

In the republican city, the citizens

non-liberal:

liberal critique

of the nation.

have not entered a social contract

in

which they

trade liberty for security; they have not delegated
their sovereignty to an external
authority.

Rather, their society

the sovereign, that

is,

and group from what

in

decision-making. This requires a different concept of
individual

in

is

determined continually by their active participation

is

available in liberalism.

In the nation, political participation depends on historical
and cultural factors that

pre-empt any contract.

There

is

no "volition" or action on the part of nationals, even

the action of giving up sovereignty. Rather, history, blood,
language,

etc.,

determine the

bounds of sovereignty. Indeed, the concept of the nation challenged the Lockean
notion
that, in the

beginning,

all

the world

was

the state of nature [2], by claiming that even

"then" were the Germanic (and other) tribes, which have
Political activity

bounded by
is

always already occurs

this fact.

to the present.

world of tribe-nations, and

The proper foundation of the

its

possibilities are

state is the tribe-nation, for the latter

the reality of social structuring and so guarantees social cohesion for a state based on

Of course,
in

in a

come down

its

this social

cohesion

is

mediated through the concept of the tribe-nation,

specific aspects of language, blood ties, land, etc.

accustomed land and language
under the republican

city

.

.

.

As Thom

describes

replaced love of fellow citizens"

[6]

it,

"love of

predominant

model.

Unfortunately, even where

it

transcends the standard liberal one, Thom's concept

of the nation remains reductive and idealized. As Kedourie, he reduces nationalism
general to

German

it.

nationalism as

it

developed beginning
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in the early

19th Century.

in

The

Germans

created the concept and

More than

this, in

it

spread around the world, coming

to

us today.

a number of places, he specifically links this
development to Nazism

[see, for instance, 2 1 6,

219

-

220, and 226], Again as for Kedourie,

nationalism to have been Romantic, manifesting in
part the

Romanticism

down

The essence of this Romanticism

[see 10],

German

tribes, particularly as

German

virtue" [213

-

sees

German

from Enlightenment

shift

is

Thom

to

the idealization of ancient

described by Tacitus, resulting in a "cult of primitive

214],

He does go beyond

Kedourie's work in locating the basis of this "cult" in the

rise

of ethnological studies of Native North Americans [119]. This ethnological
approach

began

in the "noble savage" tradition,

which

might characterize as a "positive

I

orientalism," and stressed the natural virtue and spirit of freedom (manifested
as
resistance to European domination).

Thom

also modifies his concept of "tribe-nation" slightly, to produce the concept

of "word-nation." The "word-nation"

is

not grounded in blood, language, or territory, but

rather in a shared history, customs, and/or destiny. This allows
internal diversity that resists

acknowledgment of an

any easy assumption of tribal unity, while

allowing the customs and destiny to be a potential of all humankind. 24

at the

same time

Thom

takes

France as the model "word-nation," produced through the work of such thinkers as
Michelet. [8

-

9]

distinction to the

Thom

traces the

German

development of such a French self-concept

"tribe-nation" [230

allows a celebration of diversity that

between "word-nation" and

is

-

in contra-

240]. Just as the French concept of nation

ultimately reductive [9], so

"tribe-nation" merely the surface

is

his distinction

show of one: he emphasizes

that beneath the "word-nation" there lurks the "tribe-nation" [9],
It is

that

2

‘

1

I

possible to challenge Thom's reductive concept of the nation in

approached Kedourie's and Rae's. For instance,

Thom

is

very ambiguous regarding

this concept,

and

his

it is

much

possible to argue that

words could be interpreted
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way

Thom

to suggest that

unified in one grand nation — a pretension that justified Napoleon's conquests
nation form could be legitimately adopted by any group that embraced its principles.

humankind be

the

—

or that the

attacks nationalism in general as a particularly
virulent aspect or form of Romanticism

25
,

rather than properly focusing his attack onto
"Romantic nationalism" as a specific sub-

type ot nationalism, and reserving criticism based
on a rejection of Romanticism from
other types of nationalism.
I

will not reiterate the set of previously discussed
items here.

will

I

add only the

following. Rather than viewing Romantic conceptions
of the nation as pure constructions
that contradict observable social

of the nation

-- if

and

not Romanticism

political reality,

more generally —

comprehend and conceptualize emerging European
Romantics conceived of their own

mean

that

one has

one might view Romantic concepts
as preliminary

social

and

European attempts

political forms.

One can

take

more of a

materialist

approach, and see their "transcendence" as the product of material forces and

nationalism were

is strictly

first intellectual

constructions that were adopted as the bases for action;
reality, but rather

speculative argument transforms what

Thom views

impositions on

it.

My

as a delusional construction into a

preliminary engagement with a complex social and political
this, in the

interests,

an idealist on these matters: the "tribe-nation" and

they were not representations of social

More than

That

activity as transcending the earthly realm does not

to accept this self-delusion.

however obscured. Thom

to

reality.

context of the devolution of the French Revolution into the

imperialism of Napoleon, and of the devolution of British

liberal capitalism into

same. Romantic concepts of the nation might be part of a reaction

much

the

to these failed forms.

This reaction might have swung to a counter-balancing extreme, and so become as
limited and problematic as what they reacted to

—

as the rise of Nazism in

Germany

suggests. However, in the broader development of the nation form, these might have

been invaluable advances

in a

complex

dialectic.

I

have already commented on the

complexity that Renan introduces for any reduction of nationalism

25

to

Romanticism.

He does differentiate at one point between liberal and romantic nations
]; however, the distinction
between these forms is wholly relative to their role for states: the former grounds a liberal state (or is one),
while the latter grounds a nationalist state. Nationalism is always romantic.
[
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Renan's

"

What

Is

a Nation?"

[

990] poses an extreme problem for

1

the nation as a "daily plebiscite
set

1

'

of people, and cannot outlast

in

Morale

,

in

this

problem,

which he argues

Thom

focuses on La Reforme

Renan adopted

that

this

"aristocratic, militarist,

may be

true,

developed a very "French" and republican interpretation
of the nation

issue that

Thom

More

least,

Renan's

own

in

Renan

"What

also
a

Is

writings betray a complexity or ambivalence

on

the

denies.

than

nationalism" and

this,

even Fichte, who was central

whom

one might expect

to

to the

German

reaction to French

occupy a simple opposite pole

developed a

political theory deeply

while

same time echoing Romantic notions of "German

at the

of

the nation exists only through
being willed by a

and Germanist positions" [Thom, 1995: 253],
Though

Nation?": at the

his concept

this active willing, actually
fits the nation into the

republican city tradition. To avoid
Intellectuelle et

which

Thom:

imbued with

relative to

it,

the principles of the French Revolution,
history, language

and

culture" [see 261], That even in Fichte such counter-currents existed
suggests the

complexity inherent

in

any genuine attempt

to conceptualize the nation. Yet,

Thom

eliminates this complexity, and reduces the nation to a simple pole in a simple

dichotomy. One wonders

why Thom, who

throughout his text expends

much

effort

on

detailing the minutest complexities, subtlest distinctions, etc., of republican and

Enlightenment thought, approaches the nation so
generalizations of complex positions.

Thom's republican

city

model

lazily, often

presenting gross

26

is

just as idealized, but in a favorable direction.

Consider, for instance, his assumption of the active nature of the citizenry assembled,
versus the passive nature of the

members of a

participation in the assembly: in Republican

nation.

Rome, those

were excluded from substantive participation [83

meant
26

.

.

that the

Republican

Roman model had

Thom

to

-

84].

admits historical limits on

in the

Yet, for

lowest social classes

Thom,

this exclusion

be modified for use by "nineteenth-

For instance, on 266, he writes "The crucial step taken by Niebuhr, as by all advocates of the tribe-nation,
." He simply does not make such gross generalizations about republicans or Enlightenment liberals.
.
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century democrat[s]" [85],
Republican

Rome

remained a viable model, with

slight

modifications.

But these modifications do not address
the deeper shortcomings of
Thom's
concept of assembly.

It is

not a question of mere participation
in the assembly, but of the

conditions under which one participates.

By

calling for a flattening of the
hierarchical

formal structure of power that was the
rule of the
obviate questions of relative power

among

participants

among

Roman

the "people assembled."

allow them to "perform better" as orators and writers

mediated through books and mass media
that obtain outside

within

it.

Formal equality

[cf.

(in the

modem

assembly

power

economic

as

class, gender,

More

than

this, as

New England town meeting

can

concrete dynamics, cliques, tensions, and so forth that exist

or participated on a

formally equal set of individuals have great influence as well

who, no matter what they

It

irrelevant or

However,

misguided

their statements, will

--

different committees

among

a

again, there are those

who, no

have influence.

to characterize these issues as variations

on the "tyranny of

the liberal solution of certain guarantees of individual freedom

from social constraints are not an option

Thom

few

any one who

say, simply will not be heeded, while there are others

might be possible

the majority."

differentials

and social status 27 guarantee some

has attended a

how

Not

education and other resources

in

44]), but the concrete

participants will be listened to, and others will not be.

matter

equality.

of the assembly generally have determining power over
what happens

Such things

attest, the

does not

from different classes does not mean a more
substantive

only do participants from higher classes have
advantages
that

Thom

assembly,

for the non-liberal

focuses on the structure of decision-making

itself.

approach of Thom. Instead,

This

is

limited or structured by

a set of laws given by an external "law-giver." His [not her] externally guarantees his
objectivity, that

27

is,

that he will

produce laws as the basis for the assembly

In a non-national, multi-racial society, this

would include race
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as well.

that ensure a

balanced structure

be called "mob

mob

Thom

suggests the necessity for law itself in
preventing what might

without

rule":

it,

violence, as the Terror had

"popular sovereignty" could devolve into
brigandry and

shown [17-21],

The very notion of someone
law-giver

is itself

highly speculative.

instance, he counterpoises
[57],

It is,

actually functioning as an objective,
disinterested

it

Thom

directly to

rather, a real figure,

is

Adam

clear that this

is

not a symbolic figure; for

Smith's internalized "impartial spectator"

however extraordinary and paradigmatic. Thom

difficulty conceiving or accepting the possibility
of such a figure to the fact that

attributes

we

are

prisoners of the narrow limits of "our nationalist sensibilities."
[70]
I

human

would speculate

nature,

and

disinterested

bitter

modem

age with so-called "altruists" and

is

truly

of whether or not one's

determined by the nation-state concept. Indeed, even

belief that the law-givers of ancient republican cities were such paragons
of

disinterest
itself

experiences in the

function of realistic knowledge of

political personages, quite independently

conceptual framework

Thom’s

that, rather, hesitation is a

and objectivity

was based

is

questionable. Thom's belief

is

the historical testimonies produced by ancients.

this issue, scholastically

comprehensive though

it is,

it

concepts such as "nature," "wilderness," the "general will,"
object; this

becomes more

of Native Americans

in the

likely

when one

he does not rely on Rousseau

reporters

28

who

is

in abstract philosophical

etc.,

recalls Rousseau's

seems

—

is still

the fact that

itself to idealize

penchant

concept of the "noble savage." But, even

accuracy of both representations, there

and others

Thom's own work on

appears to idealize Rousseau's work.

Rousseau's conception of ancient republicanism, mired as

its

based on Rousseau's, which

Rousseau

if

—

to idealization

one assumes the

and

Thom where

bases his concept on the testimony of ancient chroniclers

wrote of the history of their

were disinterested and objective

own

is

too

societies or others.

much

to accept.

The idea

that these

Thus, Thom's account

in liberal states or even
which the assembly creates laws and the executive (sovereign) acts within

is

Interestingly, this reverses the executive-legislative structure typical

constitutional monarchies,

in

bounds of these laws.
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the

an idealization;

at least

might

it

in fact

be an idealization of an idealization
of an

idealization.

Even

if

one were

to grant the idealized notion

clear that a structure he [not she]

among

were

would

to introduce

it

is

not

forestall power-differentials

the assembled, or abuses of power by a
majority block. Yet, even if this were

possible, the presence of the law-giver
it

of the law-giver, however,

still

causes problems for Thom. Most importantly,

contradicts the activity-passivity dichotomy between
republican city and tribal nation.

For, in relation to an external law-giver, the people
assembled are passive.

even be defined by the law-giver,

in his regulation

assembly. This erodes the distinction that
political participation to

At one
Republican

point,

Rome

members of a

Thom

Thom

own

in the

stresses against the passive ascription of

allows himself to admit explicitly that Rousseau's concept of

and the general republican

city tradition

this idealization

critiques as the quintessence of bad faith (but
his

of inclusions and exclusions

tribe-nation.

argument, he of course must differentiate

on

They might

which

are

is

idealized [85],

To save

his

from the nationalist form he

emerging as dependent as much

negative idealization of nationalism). Indeed, he not only defends but lauds

Rousseau’s idealization as

at

once admitting "the

fragility

of willed

human

constructions,"

but only within the context of a guiding, even determinant republican commitment to
justice, that

is,

"rounded always by the sleep of the just"

includes corruption (properly resisted)
realistic

than one without.

At the same

time,

is still

29

A

is false.

reference to

US

As

I

Yet, an idealization that

an idealization, even

if

it

looks more

29

Thom's dichotomy between

other pole, as well. Thom's claim that the nation

grouping

[85].

is

city

a purely passive, ascriptive social

have mentioned, Renan challenges

popular culture might help

make

and nation erodes from the

this at the

this point for those familiar

conceptual level
with

it.

In the past

—

1

shows following the noble actions of card-board cops have been
somewhat replaced with down-and-dirty crime dramas in which the cops are not clearly the good guys, and
their actions do not really stop crime, and so forth. This shows focus on the nitty-gritty, the dirty and
ambiguous. Yet, they are every bit as idealized in their presentations of this as their predecessors were of
their own ideal. They are not less ideal, it is just that they have a different ideal, one that it is easier to pass
years, old-style police television

off as true.
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the nation requires an active assertion of
assertion of

membership

in

it.

On

existence by a set of people, through their

its

this reading, the nation is not ascribed
to a passive

group, but rather actively ascribed by individuals

in that

group

to themselves.

Concretely, the history of nations has included a significant
strain of active assertion of
national "identity" 30 through external struggle and internal
dynamic tension.

much

However

the content of these claims of identity confirms the
passivity of the nation, in form

they are active (assertions). Indeed, the very strain of "nationalism"
that maintains the
given, primordial nature of national identity itself is often contested
within the active

forging of a nation

The general

-

as suggested by Renan's above-mentioned ambivalence.

features of such an internally

complex concept of the nation

described at length above, in the sections on Kedourie and Ree.
here

is

many

that

What remains

nationalist claims of the givenness of national identity

understood in the context of denial of that

nations) continually face the frailty of their
the intellectual level: the

work so

far

be said

must be

assertion balances that of the assertion against the existence of the nation at
in

to

have

The extremity of the counter-

identity.

of nations has also been an age of genocide,

I

all.

The age

which smaller or weaker groups (including

own

examined

existences. This tendency exists even at
in this dissertation itself creates

a context

requiring active assertion by nations.
Interestingly,

example of a context

Thom
in

undermines his argument by inadvertently providing a clear

which group

manner he claims, but contested
According

to

Thom,

Chateaubriand arrived
find.

30

For want,

in

in

"proto-ethnological" approaches as Chateaubriand's.

North America with preconceived, abstract notions of what he

composed

Louisiana prior to his journey

at this point,

in the

both the material and the conceptual levels.

Indeed, he appears to have

Natchez Indians

have been considered "given"

the production of a tribal concept that could be imported into Europe

was accomplished through such

would

at

identity cannot

of a better term.
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the
to

first draft

America

of his epic on the

[133].

He was more

concerned with his "own secession" from
France than with the "plight of the
aboriginal
peoples" [134], and ultimately produced a series
of works that (perhaps unconsciously)

deformed "Native America"
support of his

own

into illustrating his

own world view and

into a conceptual

agenda. This account was not necessarily
pejorative, but rather

created an image of pure and brave people
oppressed by the invading Europeans.

celebrated their resistance to oppression and (natural)
love for liberty, but on his
terms, which included the Christianization of these
features [141].

even perceived democracy where there was extreme despotism

The

effects of

work such

as Chateaubriand's

Where

He

own

necessary, he

[138],

were only temporary, however.

Soon, more scientific ethnology came on the scene, to dispel the
"noble savage" myths.
In this regard,

Thom presents

of Chateaubriand. But

the

work of Volney, who countered

this science consisted as

the romantic approach

much of "rigorous

control of [native]

testimonies" [145] as of dispelling obvious myths by appeal to observable facts.

One of

Volney's goals was to eliminate "ventriloquism" from ethnological studies, in which the
scientist projected his [not her]

as

Thom

own

voice into the mouth of the native [146].

Of course,

points out, this meant excluding the agency of the object of study with respect to

the one studying: the native no longer could "gaze back" at the European ethnologist
[145].

The only way

to ensure this

was

to focus

on the externally observable

society, such as '"customs, mores, rites, religion and,

above

all,

etc.,

came

to

of a

languages,"' rather than

depending on the self-perceptions of those being studied [146]. Through
language, culture,

facts

this

approach,

be viewed as objective givens independent of the agency

of those associated with them.
Yet, in relation to their objects of study, these approaches converged. Whether

putting his or her

own words

ethnologist exercises

under study

Thom

is

into the

power over

and does. This

is

mouths of natives or shutting these mouths,

the native.
true also

The ethnologist determines what

of the "genuinely

the

the group

scientific ethnology" that

holds as having been realized since Chateaubriand and Volney [see 146], as has
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been exhaustively argued by Said

(in

Orientalism) and others.

present discussion to rehearse
these arguments again: that

whom

the concept of the "noble savage"

such a truly scientif.c ethnology
[146]

is

Thom

no, necessary for the

sees Rousseau, with

most associated, as the arguable
founder of

When Thom's dismissal

sufficient.-

is

I, is

apparent racism compromising the
ideologues '" cold

.

.

.

of the

ethnographic gaze,” which

blurred the distinction between animals
and "native peoples" as a function of
this

genuinely scientific viewpoint
[148],

is

added, Thom's position becomes
untenable, and

even repugnant.

Thom s

treatment of ethnology has two important
implications regarding the

purported passivity of "ethnic identity." 32
passivity

academic
result

is

externally imposed.

circles

It is

First, in the

case of oppressed groups, this

not the result of some grand intellectual
shift in the

of late 18th and early 19th Century France and
Germany;

rather, the

of on-going conquest, domination, subjugation,
colonization, and exploitation. The

ethnological silencing corresponds to a material pacification
as well

enslaved, genocided, and deported.
oppressor, and

it

The "law-giver"

if

sought to eliminate them from that territory
this elimination

“Thom's

natives were/are

groups was/is the

Europeans viewed Native Americans and other conquered or

colonized peoples as preliminary "givens" on their

34

for oppressed

-

was/is precisely his or her "laws" that eliminate/d liberty. 33

Second, even

He

it is,

-

—

own

or, in a

territory,

even as the Europeans

few exceptional

the native views of themselves and the Europeans

cases,

bemoaned

is likely to

have

naivete

cites with

is evident in his discussion of Eduard Norden's
study of ethnology in classical Antiquity.
approval Norden's argument that similarities among ancient ethnographic studies by
different

authors in different places suggests that there existed in Antiquity a consistent,
even scientific, tradition of
ethnography, rather than a set of random texts that should not be called a discipline.
These similarities
included "a particular style" and the treatment of "a given set of themes"; for instance,
'"migratory motifs"
were applied by Greek and Roman authors "to a range of different people," and even the same phrases —
such as a nation peculiar, pure and unique of its kind'" had been applied to a similar range of distinct
groups. Though this might represent an interesting intellectual development at the time, I would argue
that
it is evidence of an reduction of distinct societies to fit certain
universal pre-conceptions of the "Other,"
anticipating

modem

"Orientalism."

32

For want, at this point, of a better term.
“This, of course, directly contradicts the position of liberal progressives such as J. S. Mill, who held this
colonial law-giving as the condition of the future liberty of the colonized. [Mill, 1978: 9 - 10]
“Thom calls attention to the concern of the ideologues over the fact that "not a day passed without [a
native] society disappearing forever." Their concern, however, was not for societies destroyed or even
their individual members as human beings simpliciter, it was that there had as yet been no study of many
of
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been more complex.

I

am

not an expert on pre-Columbian
Native American self-

conceptions or cosmologies, but

I

would venture

complex understandings of themselves and

that native

groups

in general

their histories than the reductive,

ideologically-driven European reading of them
as "natural givens." At the

appears reasonable

had more

least,

it

to assert that they did not share
the Christian-liberal teleological

of history that makes claims about "primordial"
lineages relevant or desirable

view

in the first

place.

Regardless of the pre-Columbian self-conceptions
of various native societies,

what happened

after

Columbus

is clear.

Native groups did inhabit their lands before

Europeans invaded, and as soon as the Europeans came, the
native groups' very

ability to

continue existing on that land came into question. From
that point on, their survival as
physical beings and "identity" as social groups became a matter
of every day
contestation: bare existence required action. Thus, where
imperialist

passively secure through their primordial continuity
to

be passive

-

-

Germans could

feel

could take the action of "choosing"

such an option did not exist for subject and colonized peoples around
the

world. The perceived absence of such activity was purely a function of the
imperial gaze,

which just by perceiving could deny agency

to the subjugated or colonized.

This imperialism was certainly not simply a function of European nationalism,
either.

It

had causes

in the imperial status

Thom's own republican
his glorification

of "genuinely
For instance,

city tradition.

quo valorized by Kedourie, as well

Rousseau himself contributed, especially through

of the "noble savage." Though

scientific ethnology," Rousseau's

Thom makes much

which Rousseau was able

to

Thom
own

views him as the arguable founder

ethnological ventriloquism

is clear.

of Rousseau's tendency toward prosopopoeia, through

borrow the voice of a

relevant to the situation of his

as in

own

age and society

historical figure to

[60ff.J.

In

make comments

one instance,

Thom

quote's

these "tribal peoples," and valuable information would be lost if they died out. [149] In other words, as
Thom presents them, the ideologues were more concerned about the completeness of ethnographic
documentation than people. Whatever it might say about the ideologues this implicates Thom, who either
approves of this callousness or projects it onto the ideologues.
,
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Rousseau borrowing of "the voice of the
Amerindian,
[235],

It is

bad enough

write into the

has the

that

figure of universal humanity"

Rousseau puts the words he

mouth of an unnamed

is

not courageous

idealization of an actual

Amerindian say makes things

that

much

human

enough

to

group. But what he

worse:

You are announcing to me a God who was bom and who
died two thousand years
ago, at the other end of the world, in some small
town
Why did your God
cause the events which he wished to instruct me
by to happen so far from me? Is
it a crime to be ignorant of
what takes place at the antipodes?
I supposed to
a
e
h at
ther hemis P here there wa * a Hebrew people
and a town of
Je msflem? [23 5 .

.

.

Am

^°

Here, the

Amerindian

is

attempting to defend him-/herself from criticism that
his/her

people are pagans, by pleading ignorance of Christianity. One
can see readily an allusion
to

Dante

s

concern over the

fact that Aristotle

and other virtuous and wise pagans were

relegated to limbo simply because they lived in an age before
Christ; one has a

more

difficult

time connecting

this to

Native America. Perhaps these are words that a

Native American might have spoken, as

prosopopoeia

much

Thom

considers a necessary criterion for genuine

[60], but are they a legitimate representation of a general

Native American

stance toward Christianity or toward accusation and condescension by Europeans? The

imaginary speaker does not question the general framework of European evaluation of
Native Americans; he/she merely asks for a measure of good

Any

challenge to European evaluations

framework of colonial

is at

faith within that

framework.

a very surface level, and wholly within the

proselytizing.

Far more likely a statement would have been the actual words of an actual Native

American, William Apess, a Pequot:

Have you the folly to think that the white man, being one in fifteen or sixteen, are
the only beloved images of God? Assemble all nations together in your
imagination, and then let the whites be seated among them.
Now, suppose
these skins were put together, and each skin had its national crimes written upon it
— which skin do you think would have the greatest? I will ask one question more.
.

Can you charge

.

.

whole continent,
and children, and then depriving the remainder of
their lawful rights that nature and God require them to have? And to cap the
climax, rob another nation to till their grounds, and welter out their days under the
lash with hunger and fatigue ... I should look at all the skins, and I know that
when I cast my eye upon that white skin, and if I saw those crimes written upon it,
and murdering

the Indians with robbing a nation almost of their

their

women
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IshouW

enter

my

more honorable,
Here

protest against

[as

reproduced

it

in

immediately and cleave unto that which

Ackermann, 1995:

agency, of the sort that Rousseau does
not allow

is

cannot accept. For the republican

between

city

-

and of the

sort that

Thom

depends on a "wilderness" or area outside
of and

a spatial or temporal "zone of unconditioned
liberty between

cities,

is

vii]

cities,

a

wilderness across which a rapt lawgiver would
pass, or to which a despot would
be
expelled" [60], In the age of nations, no longer
was the "land" a margin, a beyond:

been incorporated

into the political structure of the territorial
state [60],

it

had

As

historiography became an ethnology of the past, a
continuous line of descent became
visible, there

were no longer empty or "wild" periods, across which
the law-giver moved

from ephemeral

city to

ephemeral

city [61].

For a time, America represented
the imagined heart of a

and 19th Centuries:
requires that the

against which

peoples,

who

new

city" [135]. This role

for the republican city

wilderness

cities

that wilderness, at

that existed

retreat

and

essential to a republic in the 18th

to function in a

modem context

two millennia ago almost everywhere, and

were exceptions, had

themselves had

model

was

once a Rousseauian

to

be replaced with the lands of colonized

be either cleared off physically or representationally, or

to

turned into a part of the wilderness (that

is,

into "savages").

In the 18th

and 19th

Centuries, the republican city model might have been able to ensure liberty for some, but
clearly at the cost of loss of liberty for others.

republican city depends as

much on

What

way of avoiding

recognition of

its

its

more,

it

that

Thom's

modern

it.

If

role in history

Thom's account of the nature of
is

accurate, then there

seems no

connection to colonization and genocide.

The age of nations overtook

this necessary wilderness,

possibility for the republican city in the 19th Century.

to a frontier, or to another world,
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and with

As Thom

obliteration of imagined lines of flight, whether to the

Rome,

seems

(imperial) ethnology as he claims the tribe-nation

does, in order to create the "wilderness" essential to
the republican city tradition and

is

it

the political

states, the

Mons

Sacer

in ancient

was followed not merely by

the creation

additi0n> by the c ° nsolidation
of

The perceived

of the French Revolution had
estranged modernity from the

failures

republican city tradition. At the same
time, America went from being
the external

wilderness necessary

to the ideals

of the republican

source of land for incorporation into
an expanding

went

into the land to escape

As

republic.

it

city, to

territorial state:

from the republic, but rather

lost its historical

as

it

was a bad development from

provided a

to bring the land into the

way

its

to the nation-state.

Through

in colonialism,

not at

very meaning of "republic" shifted.

Given the implication of the republican
clear that this

colonizers no longer

realm of idealization (Republican Rome)
and

wilderness (America), the republican city
model gave
this process, the

being a seemingly perpetual

new and

city

model

it

the perspective of the colonized

highly effective form for anti-colonial struggle

35
.

is

-

all

especially

Even

in the

Americas, where indigenous anti-colonial movements have
not enjoyed widespread
success, this might be due as

movements — due

much

to the failure

to the particularly effective

of the nation form to be instantiated by

form of high-volume, settler-based, land-

clearing colonialism pioneered by the United States
event, to
politics

some - namely,

of nation was

at

-

as to their adoption of it. In any

those inhabitants of "the wilderness"

worst no worse, and for many,

it

-

the transition to a

held the seeds of at least an

attempt or stage in overcoming subjugation/colonization. In a world of
cities, no such

hope could

persist; there

produced or enforced by
Interestingly,

would always be need of "the wilderness," and
intellectual

thus,

it

would be

and practical means.

Thom's historiographic methods themselves echo and

reinforce the

ethnological production of wilderness. His analysis assumes the "great man" theory of

The agents of Thom's

historical change.

and their writings. Rousseau,

^Indeed,

in

Chapter

3,

I

Madame

will discuss to

history are great

men

(and

at least

one woman)

de Stael, Chateaubriand, Volney, Fichte, and

what extent anti-colonial struggle created or advanced

form.
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the nation

others,

even Tacitus, drive

law of the law-giver, or

to

The "masses" have

history.

go against

[see, for instance,

i,

are the "people assembled,"
outside of

either to

obey a good book or

the

,7-18], Within the law, they

they are part of the wilderness. 16
Whatever

it,

is

not an agent of this idealist
concept of history becomes part
of the wilderness.
In this sense,

all

the

"unnamed" 1 ’ of history

are excluded from what constitutes
history for
the city. Michelet

simply a nationalist

is

framework of the age of nations
as the agents of history. Braudel

[9],

is

the masses, the groups, the
forces

Thom. They

exist only as absences

city, in the

relative to the city.

from

thus mistakenly sees groups and
the land

not even mentioned.

In contrast, Apess' words, above,
suggest the existence

agency outside the

-

a historian operating within the
conceptual

who

[see 61],

-

"wilderness"

-

of political and

historical

a "tribal" agency that takes a position

These words manifest the agency of national
assertion discussed

above.

The above discussion of Rousseau's use of prosopopoeia
has an
implication, as well.

have already considered the passivity inherent

I

additional

in the hierarchical

function of republican assemblies, but in Rousseau's
use of prosopopoeia one can glimpse

an even deeper

Thom makes much

level.

correlation between

it

and the age of cities

of passivity? Through

and achievements of a
figure to

it,

a proponent of

carving out

fall

new

on

their

the claims

own

-

[60].

some

historical figure to

make and defend

them stand or

of this "rhetorical device," suggesting a
Yet,

is

not use of this device the height

political position relies

back his/her claims

rather than asserting

-

and

them

on the authority

in fact relies

directly

and

on

that

letting

merit or that of their proponent. Instead of actively

positions in the contemporary political scene, the proponent imports an

agent as well as a political position from the past.

36

This, of course, suggests Thom's very concept of the "people assembled" renders them passive. To be
counted within the republic, an individual must defer to the rule of the law-giver. This, it would seem, is a
limit on the activity of the people assembled, and in fact makes it an extension of the law-giver's activity.
37
To borrow a concept from Jacques Ranciere's The Names of History [1994],

101

That the contemporary proponent
actively constructs the words
of the
figure

is

historical

not a defense; indeed, this
reveals the appearance of
passivity as manipulative,

akin what

is

called "passive aggression"
in popular psychology.

It is

similar to the tactic

of masking one's own intentionality
and responsibility behind a statement
such as "the
committee says," or the "group believes."
Thus, to the extent that

immune from

is

it

an active creation by a contemporary
agent (and thus

criticism as simple passivity

elsewhere), prosopopoeia

by adoption of a

political position

produced

a disingenuous, even manipulative
use of history.

is

It

creates a

basis for a contemporary political
formation by projecting a contemporary
political

position into the past;

The

it

presents the contemporary agenda as a
re-iteration of a past one.

fact that there is not a linear continuity
within the republican city tradition

becomes

irrelevant: the appeal to the past for a
foundation of the present accomplishes the
linkage.

This functions

at the level

of Thom's writing, as well. Thom's theory of the

republican city requires him to project his contemporary
agenda for the future into the
past, first to the

French Revolution, back through the Machiavellian era
and on

Republican Rome. To the extent
passive, to the extent that

and creative

Is this

it

construction of imaginary history grounds for rejecting Thom's model
and

what makes Thom's work

to creative history.

on the republican

interesting, despite his

own

For, he has produced something

contemporary world. More than
revealing the agenda that created

this,

it.

This point, of course, follows Nietzsche's

model? Not

city

oft

at all.

In fact,

it

expressed explicit opposition

new with
,

the imagined history

is

potential application in the

an

artifact

of the present,

This imagined history reveals contemporary desires

the intentionality of contemporary agents

iS

is

produces an "imagined tradition."

the individual production of republics
is

method

requires picking out and emphasizing strains (strong
reading)

it

interpretation,

that his historical analysis is "factual," his

to

On

38
.

the

Use and Disadvantages of History for
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Life.

,

Does

mean

this

necessarily. In fact,
is

I

that historical construction
in general is a

have not even

set the foundation for

good thing? Not

such an evaluation. The point

only that creative history reveals the
desires of contemporary agents
constructing

Whether these are

desires toward liberty or repression

a basis for such an analysis might
or comparison of

it

is

available).

determining what the historical "facts"
not

an immanent analysis of the constructed
history

There

is

no easy formula for determining

a positive or negative construction,
just as there

is

mean

another issue altogether, though

with the actual facts of referent period
(or alternative versions of the

period, if no definitive version

what

lie in

is

it.

no easy formula for

is

That these tasks are

are.

difficult,

however, does

that they cannot be accomplished.

There are

two types of bad construction.

at least

A simple example is denial

gain of the constructors.

consolidate the gains (in land, money,

etc.)

perpetrators from responsibility. This

is

would agree

it

is

a

bad form

39

call

it

suppression of facts for the

of genocide, which clearly serves to

made through

certainly a

One might

.

First,

the genocide and to free the

form of constructed

"falsification,” as

history,

opposed

and most

to

"construction" or "creation."

Second, there

The

"relevant" here

is

construction that relies on ignorance of relevant historical facts.

is crucial:

ignorance of historical facts that constrain contemporary

possibilities is not necessarily a

contemporary

bad thing

4

but

°;

when

these facts are relevant to the

situation, then ignorance is not productive or

even excusable. Consider

again the issue of denial of genocide. The fact that one's group committed a genocide and
gained, say, the land one lives on through

it

is

a relevant

a defense; and denial of the genocide due to ignorance

matter

how

unintentional.

crimes of his/her society

is

Of course,

is

fact.

Being ignorant of it

is

not

not a legitimate position, no

generally a person ignorant of the past (or present)

confronted in some

way with an

inkling of the truth. There

39

The denial itself might not be very simple, however. For instance,
manipulations of who acted when, as in Kedourie's, above.
40
Again, with Nietzsche.
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it

might operate through rather subtle

are at the very least assertions
by the victim group, or even
contemporary tensions.

It is

not simple ignorance that
allows the denial, but the
decision to remain ignorant, and
no.
listen to the truth or at least
test the accusations.

The accusations

are, quite simply, never
entertained as possibilities." Slavoj
Zizek describes such "willed
ignorance" as

unforgivable because

it

This enjoyment appears

"conveys a hidden dimension of
enjoyment" [Zizek. 1991:
2]
be the reward for leaving gaps

to

in one's

Both of these forms of falsification actually
affirm the
In the case
falsifier.

of simple cover-up, these

facts they appear to deny.

facts exist explicitly within the
consciousness

no question of the existence of one

is

mutually accepted by claimants and

falsifiers.

affirms the danger to the denier of what
But, again, there

construction

is

fully

no easy path

shadowed by

consequences. Even an
early 19th Century

is

its

is

German

tribalist

The

negative side, with

its

and relevance.

positive side of historical
its

potentially devastating

construction can turn negative. For instance, the

army of Napoleon

As

itself ultimately led to Hitler.

These reflections apply
this is the

its

political

Plato suggests in The Republic, a person capable of doing great good

capable of doing great harm. The same goes for intellectual

only

way

to save

between the presumed

Thom

from

his

historical honesty

own

critique.

is

also

tools.

to nationalist historical constructions as well.

nationalism. Either they are both to be

41

truth

A strong denial

double-edge that indicates the seriousness of historical construction,

potency.

to

of historical

counter to the Franco-Uni versalism represented by

the "ideals" of the Revolution and by the
this

being denied,

to the truth.

initially positive

set

Indeed, often an extreme, zealous

denial suggests the true facts themselves, by
simply negating them.

It is

of the

In the case of ignorant denial, the
facts exist as gaps or lacks within
the denier's

unconscious. In either case, there
facts

"symbolic universe."

He must

Granting

give up differentiating

of republicanism and falsification of

condemned

for historical construction, or both are

be recognized as in a complex relation with historical construction.

That does not mean that the truth will not eventually be admitted

do mean

— but only after has become
whom originally posed a danger.

irrelevant, through the passage of time or manipulation by those for
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I

it

it

complex:

i,

is

not jus. a matter of affirming
historical construction,
because that

accurate portrayal of

how

either

historical construction has

aspect

is at

the

minimum

form operates. Rather, just as the

city's

is

not an

aspect of

been revealed, so has the nation's
aspect of factual!, y. Th.s

a potential, and

its

absence

is

possible and problematic. But,

its

presence should not be asserted against
the aspect of historical
construction, as a way of

compensating for

it;

they exist together, as complements
or partners. Facts can, after

corroborate a bad construction, and a
construction can “spin-doctor” bad

facts.

One

all,

the

other hand, an interpretation or creative
use of historical facts can produce
productive,
liberatory

movements. For

under colonization

grounds positive

-

instance, the study of oppressed groups

"subaltern studies" and the like

political change.

It

-

and

their

subgroups

has produced a body of work that

proceeds by a creative interpretation of history
that

pushes beyond the limits of direct documentation
(which, of course, represents an

elite

perspective), toward a deep if speculative analysis
of non-elite groups and their historical
role

and agency. Indeed,

it is

exclusions from recorded

The general point

—

even forceful

this constructive history that challenges
oppressive

facts.

is

somewhat Kantian.

Historical "facts"

- however real

and

might be incomplete without a framework of interpretation. The

production of history

-

always a contemporary

act -- has

two components, the raw

material of facts and the form given them by the creative subject. In
practice, however,
the distinction between these metaphysical categories ("fact" and "frame")
blurred. Yet, the point stands: this dual-aspected nature of history

is

becomes

deeper than either

the republican city or tribal/national form.
It is

one thing

to argue that the relationship of the city to history

nation to history, and another to question

Thom

claims that

it

is

why

not for the republican

is

the

same

as the

this relationship is privileged in for either.

city, that

such a city must be understood as

an ephemeral phenomenon that exists only so long as an active general will exists among
its

people

-- if

the will

becomes a tyranny of the
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majority, or if the people neglect their

agency, that the republican city ends.
So long as

does not appeal

do

On

this.

exists

now

what has come down

is

important; without history,

it

reaction to French claims of a
less

inheritance of

its

Their link to the

from the

is

why

past, indeed,

to the past,

it

was

analogical.

as

Rome

its

It

emphasized continuity. But, as

authority of that past to buttress actions of the present.

on history just

much

is

is

so

of German nationalism was a

form of resonance with

not historical,

that

What

past.

The nation now

is

different:

than with the

was bom of the

I

the

political structures.

Rome. The Germans countered with an

one

it

from pre-history.

The form of heritage was

heritage.

political legacy in the

Romans was

-

exist.

that the primordialism

Roman

its

writing the history of this or that nation

intentional French resonance with an element of the past

relies

present, immediate

concerned with direct descent from Republican

identify" with Republican

form of link

is

precisely guaranteed by

is

to the present

does not

have already suggested

French were

it

a lineage, a continuity that links present
with past.

derivative of the nation peal. This

I

exists,

only the activity of the people
assembled can

it;

the other hand, the nation's present

is

The nation

to history to guarantee

it

desire to

entirely different

have also argued,

this

undeniably a reliance on the

The contemporary republican

city

as the nation, if in a different manner.

This should be clear from Thom's
the French Revolution and of Republican

text.

Fie reaches into the history

Rome

for a

model

surrounding

He

for the present.

painstakingly identifies a historical tradition of republican cities that persisted into the
18th Century. Indeed, he focuses

much

attention

on those "disciples of Rousseau" who

resisted the totalitarian developments in Revolutionary France and

subsequently labeled "the

last

of the Romans"

resonances with certain Republican

ephemeral

in

Romans

who were

[29], describing in detail their intentional

[25

-

29].

Individual republics

may

be

terms of their material existence, but as part of a tradition they persist from

ancient times to

modem. More

than

this, in

a
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modem

republic's reach

back into the past

for a

model and authority

an implicit claim to participation

is

in this tradition,

and thus of

"primordialism."

why

But,
city is

its

does the nation

unconcerned about

it?

stress continuity,

while

Thom

The above discussion of what

it

claims that the republican

means

"givenness" has already suggested an answer. The
issue here

about continued existence. Claims of identity through
time
continuity from primordial roots, as in the

German

of group structure that does not rely on a proven

Malinowski [Thom, 1995: 227
throughout

all history; in

flux of history, such that
cases, the assertion

concerns

its

this,

outside/above
I

nation
social

is

228]. In the

the second,
its

it

it

is

case, or of a

not about roots,

it is

take the form of

contemporary persistence

historical persistence, as in the case

first

of

case, the nation is claimed to exist

claimed to exist outside of history, beyond the

historical origins (perhaps recent) are irrelevant. In both

about the continued existence of the nation in the future, which

present "legitimacy," that

For

history.

is

-

may

is

for a nation to assert

is,

essential reality

beyond the

vicissitudes of

needs to have conquered history (be primordial) or exist

it.

have already discussed why a nation might make such claims: the existence of a
just as tenuous as that of a city. This cuts quite deeply: within the realities of

and

political history,

time seems to apply.

through time

—

Hume's deep problematization of belief in

A social

formation appears to persist in time

—

identity through

to

be "identical"

only through the mental activity of a perceiver, and counter-perceptions

are possible. Thus, at the

most fundamental

level, a nation

can be perceived not to have

continuity through time. Claims to a continuity beyond the immediate historical

circumstances or iteration of the nation are manifestations of a more general challenge
transience
generally.

--

to

transience itself being a widespread feature of social and political formations

While

specific republican cities

come

in

and out of existence, and

their

adherents find solace only in the persistence of the general republican tradition (the

resurgence of which

is

Thom's guiding hope),
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specific nations are

more

tenacious.

Thom s
it

is

(as

rejection of this tenacity as negative

is

not justified universally, though of
course

which the price of continuity

is

oppression within or without the nation

in cases in

Kedourie claims

oppression, even

is

always the

at the level

case).

It

can also be a liberatory challenge

to

of attempted genocide.

This tenacity has a constructive as well as a defensive

side.

The republican

city is

fully realized in the citizens assembled; before
or after this exists, the republic does not.

The republic cannot then be
telos.

Its

"end"

is

what

is

a

means of liberation. Thom

immediately present, not what

agrees: the republic

is

each

new

not a

envisioned as the product of a

long process. Indeed, the history of the republican city tradition
[see, for instance, 29]:

is

republic within the tradition

is

is

conceived as cyclical

merely a re-assertion of

the general from, not a development built on previous instantiations.

On the

other hand, the nation itself was/is a potential vehicle for political change.

It

does not require immediate actualization, but rather

it

to persist

continuity through time allows

through long periods of struggle, sometimes measured by the century. In

such a case, the teleological basis of the nation
allows the nation

itself to

as a vehicle for change, rather than a
this point,

my

that

Thom

asserts as a general feature

develop toward liberation, in original circumstances that do not

allow immediate liberation and which

At

its

focus

is

call for

a strong and substantive political structure

momentary confluence of political

agents.

an ideal form of the challenge to transience, an assertion

of continuity through time. In Chapter

3,

1

will

examine the workings of actual continuity

through time, as the product of both intentional actions and contingent forces, on both the
ideal

and material

component or

levels.

In this examination, the current focus will

as but one

tool.

This resilience of nations might have been a key factor

such things as the republican

and devolves

emerge

city

in their

ascendance, over

model. The existence of the republic

into oppressive political

forms

easily.

The

ideal

is

always tenuous,

of the republic must be

evaluated accompanied by this tendency, just as the nation form must be by the potential
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of its internal and external oppressiveness.
The very function of the "ideal"
relevant here: the ideal of the nation
contributes to

of the republican

city

is

instantiation as a genuine

not to say that the ideal of the republican
city as

is

each

resilience, while the rigid ideality

model makes the continuity of a concrete

republic difficult. That
it

its

in

Thom

presents

not laudable as a political form, perhaps even
more than the nation, in the realm of

is

abstract political principles. But

good

and

fortune,

history.

The

is

to say that realizing this ideal requires

much more

that a realized republican city tends to be
rigid in the face of

nation, for

in the struggle against

This

it

its faults,

has a great degree of flexibility, which becomes
crucial

domination (and

flexibility, in fact,

dynamic

is

generally minimized in oppressive nations).

allows the nation form to absorb positive features of the

republican form itself under the proper circumstances.

For a

political formation manifesting the republican city

flexibility or resilience, a fixed point is necessary.

through time that allows
constitution,

which

is

flexibility.

For the republican

to achieve

for the republic as fixation

fixed point grounds an identity
city

model,

it

must be the

on

its

political process. Fixation

origins and past

is

for the nation.

It

on

this is as

bad

reduces the republic

shade of itself, and introduces passivity in the form of appeal to a structural

adherence

in the place

of concrete political activity

of the city coincides with

that

42
.

In such cases, the passive identity

of Thom's concept of the tribe-nation.

This analysis extends to the issue of the "self-generation"
nations claim.

One form

is

Thom

claims that

primordialism: a nation has always existed, so

it is

product of historical forces prior or external to the nation. The other main form
social closure at the core of Malinowski's concept: the nation

42

such

the only constant, a set of laws or principles that underlies or

frames the free activity of participants in the

to a

The

model

This can become imperial, when members of the republic hold

this

is

not a
is

the

a self-perpetuating social

model up

for those outside the

republic. This justified Napoleon's expansionism, as well as the Franco-Universalism that has had a strong
presence in French academic and political circles since 1789. It is also a prevalent feature of 20th Century

"Americanism," the secular mission of bringing "American values" and the "American way of life"
people around the world — through military intervention, economic coercion, or the Peace Corps.
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to

structure;
city,

though

it

may have

on the other hand,

origin.

relies

But, this law-giver

on an external law-giver

comes

conceptual nullity for those
the

origins in history, these are irrelevant
in the present.

[59ff

it,

and thus has a

Is this

not a divine figure, an intervention
from

this point [71].

not a voice from beyond the grave?

Indeed,

is

not a figure such as Fabricius

What

is

more,

considered to be a truly great legislator, for there

is

no check on him/her: there

to

]

judge whether the laws or principles he/she

sets

down

this

law-giver must be

the legitimacy of a republic depends

Thom

on

no way

However much

the evaluable activity of the citizens,

that the law-giver has given

is

are good, because these laws or

principles are the condition and given structure of
any such discussion.

depend as well on faith

definite

across a gap or "wilderness" in time
and place, a

in the city.

beyond? Rousseau accepts

to create

The

it

appears to

good laws. 43

offers as an alternative to Rousseau’s acceptance of the
divine status of the

law-giver Vico's view, that the laws and political structures given
by the great legislator
are the results of a "slow crystallization of institutions and laws"
that began with the
earliest republics [71]. This,

tradition

is

cyclical, rather than progressive,

from nation and so a
his

argument runs

origin,

of course, requires abandoning the view that the republican

central tenet of

into

deep

which

is

a key point of differentiation of city

Thom. Whether Thom

difficulties.

What

is

Thom

city.

valorizes this externality as a counter to nationalist

pretensions to autochthony. Yet,

it is

this

same

externality that

undermine the active nature of the people assembled. Again,
runs into difficulties. The only solution

and

to

Rousseau or Vico,

more, whether divine or historical in

such laws and institutions are external to a given
Interestingly

sides with

is

to resist

I

showed above

in either direction,

an exclusive

move

in

one

to

Thom

direction,

recognize that the existence of the republic thus depends on internal and external

causes in a logical tension: the agency of the people assembled requires an external

foundation

at the

same time

that

it is

supposed
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to

embody pure autonomy.

This applies as well for such formations as the United States, whose laws and guiding principles were
imported from Republican Rome, British liberalism, etc.
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In the

above discussion of Ree,

external causation as

it

have already analyzed the issue of selfversus

I

concerns the nation. What resulted was
appreciation of the

complicated dialectical relationship between
internal and external forces

in the formation

and development of the nation.
Here, one can go further in understanding complexity
of this issue.

Rousseau both acknowledge, the Roman Republic had

As Thom and

different levels of participation in

the assembly, to the extreme of exclusion
[85], Thus, the issue of "citizenship"
settled through a graduated class system,

"out" of the Republic, and

how far

which determined who was

"in" different types

were excluded

[84].

"parsing" the Republic.

The

fact

The parsing

and who was

of "in"s were. This did not follow

the "natural" break of the city borders, of course: for instance,
tribes"

"in"

many from

of this complex regulation signals the
difficulties

Thom

was

the "urban
difficulties

of

points out for the nation [224ff.]

seem, thus, to be a specific form of a more general problem, one that affects republics
as
well.

The nation merely

represents a different approach to the issues raised, focusing on

such things as history and culture, rather than

Thom

cites

have tended

to rely

on a

class.
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While republics

stratified parsing, national parsing

a simplified form that focuses on differentiating

in the tradition

has tended toward

members from non-members. The

republican city tradition had historically apparently not been confronted with regulation

of bare membership
relations

among

which allows

to the extent that

those within

it

—

it

had been confronted with the issue of power

perhaps as a function of its "open" form of assembly,

for the operation of external hierarchies within

it.

Both imperial nations

and proto-national colonies, on the other hand, have been confronted with the "Other"
a fundamental issue of "Self."

One might even

see the

modem

parsing and the problems created by

produced by modern conditions.

it,

state, rather

than being the "cause" of social

as a response to the general parsing crisis

In both

its

republican and national forms
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Gender differentiation, of course, has a complex and important
examine this issue in detail as it regards nations in Chapter 3.

Ill

role in both

—

or their

forms of parsing.

I

will

as

overlap

-

the state might be

and regulate the pressures

viewed as a mechanism

that militate against

it.

to institutionalize a specific
parsing

The

industrial revolution

and

colonization and the suffering and conflict that
attended them drove population

migrations and movements

unprecedented

modem

-

from country

to city,

from one area

levels, challenging traditional social
structures

centralized state might have developed in part
as a

demographic distributions

in a

way

that

to another

-

to

and concepts of unity. The

means of parsing

the

new

allowed regulation of migrations and social

structures in line with the needs of new political,
economic, and military agendas.

A

flexible potential set of criteria for citizenship (including
property, ethnicity, gender,

mere

adulthood, etc.) could be tailored to meet these agendas, and
could be modified to

respond

to

changes

in the

agendas or the circumstances in which they operated (by

expanding the voting franchise,

etc.).

The implications of the foregoing general
dichotomy
political

Thom

analysis should

now be

clear:

the

claims to exist between city and nation actually exists within each. The

form of the nation as well as of the republican

city contains the paired potentials

of activity and passivity, of transience and continuity, and of primordiality and
contemporaneousness. Though
instantiations to avoid endless

exercise can only reveal

how

Thom

is

right to try to tie these

forms down

to specific

meandering through the vagaries of abstract models,

this

these potentials have been determined within a specific

context, such as late 18th and early 19th Century Europe: though the conclusions reached

may

inspire questions for further investigation over a

more general sample of nations

(and republics), the conclusions cannot be assumed to apply universally. Again, the
detailed implications of this set of complex internal dualities will be examined in Chapter
3; suffice

it

now,

in reference to

There remains a residual

abandoned

Thom,

to assert that this

issue.

As my

his concept of "tribal nation,"

complexity

exists.

treatment of Thom has progressed,

I

have

and discussed the "nation" generally. Yet,

concept of the tribe a limit on the nation that must be shed? That

112

is,

is

has the foregoing

the

Thom's concept of the

critique of

tribe-nation required a universal rejection
of the tribe in

connection with the nation?

According

to

Thom,

the tribalization of European politics

ethnological studies of tribal structures in North America.
large as inaccurate,

Thom

which begs the question of what the actual

was based on
exposes these by and

An

tribal structures were.

answer has no bearing on Thom's analysis of the German use of concepts
of "tribe," but
does bear on a discussion of what the term "tribe-nation" could actually
mean.

doubt true that Europeans reduced

development of the

tribal life to the

concept

Thom

It is

it

no

links to the

nation. But, does not rejection of the "tribe-nation"

on these grounds

actually reinforce the European reduction? Is the concept of "tribe-nation" potentially

much

fuller than

Thom

allows?

Pierre Clastres, in Society Against the State [1977], argues that pre- and post-

Columbian

tribal structures in the

were opaque
According

to analysis

to Clastres,

Americas offered a range of political

by Europeans hampered by a limited concept of political power.

European concepts of politics depend on the conception of power

manifested in the "command-obedience" relationship, that

absence of such relations among the Native American

more

"primitive"

—

that in

were actually alternatives

to coercive politics.

American

own work toward

such tribes complex

Even

tribes

coercion.

—

at least

The observed

those appearing

political relations existed,

if

one argues that there

is

[4]

which

a tendency

idealization of the non-coercive tendencies of Native

politics (for instance, he does not adequately explore the issue of men's

exercise of power over women), his detailed analysis
this

is,

has suggested to Europeans an absence of the political altogether.

However, Clastres argues

in Clastres

possibilities that

still

supports the conclusion that

non-coercive form of political power was significantly present.
This in turn suggests a complexity in the political form of the

present in the European representation of

it

tribe that

engaged by Thom. To the extent

European concept of the nation was disseminated around
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the world

is

not

that the

and assimilated

into

societies with tribal and

communal

heritages independent of Europe's, the presence in

these societies of richer concepts of tribal and

communal

politics

context for development of the concept of the nation beyond

might have provided a

European form. As the

its

constrained concept of the tribe associated with the European nation resonated
with non-

European concepts of the

tribe,

new

alternative national forms could have been produced.

Indeed, given the specific character of non-European tribal forms,

at least in the

Americas, these alternative national forms might contain tendencies immune
specific criticisms of the

European

tribe-nation.

Thom's

to

For instance, Clastres argues

that tribal

decision-making was decentralized, and the role of the chief was more of mediator
without power than keeper of order or law enforcer. Members were thus not "passive" in
the face of governmental authority, but rather quite active, to the point where the chief

had

to

assume a

instances, her

certain level of passivity in order for

— the

-37] In addition,

them

to

space to exercise his political functions

tribes in the

Amazon

rain forest

allow him

central to the

violence
I

European

among
would

tribe-nation,

tribes, quite the contrary

also argue that the

exploits in the Americas.

It

Muqaddimah of Ibn Khaldun
Though composed
sociology.

The

alternative to

of autochthony

in fact functioned to

in

of tribal

Thom

considers

reduce tensions and

of European nationalism, [see 38

latter,

in colonial

there

[1967], This

is

engagements

-

62]

in Africa,

Middle East,

the ever yet innovative and interesting

work

is

significant for a

second half of the 14th Century,

in the

at the level

19

European notion of tribes was not derivative only of

was rooted

and Asia as well. Regarding the

1977:

were not isolated from each other

to the assertion

and

some

or, in

at all. [see Clastres,

closed social systems, but had mechanisms of interchange even

members. This, of course, runs counter

-

it

is

number of reasons.

the foundation of

modem

analysis of the nature of tribes, and their relationships to cities, offers an

Thom

valuing of city over

form as pure and

that

is

tribe.

surprisingly relevant. Ibn

Though he

socially legitimate,

Khaldun

prefigures the later

and devalues the

114

in fact reverses

Thom's

German valuing of the

city as the seat

tribal

of decadence and

devolution, his tribal concept

is

also the driving force of the history of cities.
Cities are

the result of tribal evolution and activity. This, of
course, might be a function of the eras
in

which he wrote and focused, but even so

tribe.

More

importantly, Ibn Khaldun’s

it

work

traditions of powerful intellectual analyses

raises questions

is

about Thom's concept of

a key non-European example of

and conceptualizations of “tribal” forms

that

themselves have had a (usually unacknowledged) influence on European
theorists as well
as a significant role in the development of non-European concepts of social
formations.

The existence

especially of

Europe suggests one thing

more complex

further.

It is

a

tribes

and concepts of them

commonplace view

that nationalism originated

in

Europe, and

is

consistent with the position that the concept of the nation that

later

spread to the Americas, Africa, and Asia. Thom's general argument

Americas and disseminated

European

in Africa

tribe actually

drew on

their

own,

More than

reduced

this,

was mediated through European
partner in this process, not
is

from

its

non-European

part a regression

origins,

however,

from a non-

non-European forms of the "tribe-nation"

that

richer forms of social organization (tribe) are not simply derivative of

appears to have a generative role in

work

it

is at least in

European national forms. The non-European

his

"returned" to the

kind altogether. If one recognizes that the

then the "European creation" of the nation
social form.

was

and Asia was not merely an advance on non-

tribal forms, but different in

European concept of the

European

outside of

its

later

political

as that

this instance results in the

at the root

of the nation

non-European nation-forms. That
developments makes Europe

sole origin. That

a serious shortcoming that has

non-European world

forms

social

its

Thom

an equal

this possibility in

base in the same reductive approach to the

assumption that one has

fully

"nation" (or "tribe-nation") once one has considered
the possibility that
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at best

does not take up

which produced such a poor notion of the

Thom's own argument suggests

this evolution

its

tribe

—

which

understood the concept of

European form. Fortunately,

non-European social and

political

in

tribal

and national forms are both the origin and transcendence
of the European

tribe-

nation.

Concluding Caveats

My focus on the antinational-ist aspects of certain major critical analyses of the
nation and nationalism should not be taken to suggest that
critical reflection on nations

and nationalisms

movement

is

not an important and fruitful endeavor, nor that no facet
of national

in general or particular national

movements

is

problematic and deserving of

criticism. Indeed, a requisite for truly progressive national

analysis and -criticism. Indeed,

movements
to

in the past to

it

engage

abandonment of "national

was

in

movement

is

committed

self-

the general failure of successful national

such reflection and progressive development that led

liberation"

by the

left.

In the context of widespread critical appraisal and even dismissal of national

movement, however,

it is

important to expose the anti-national bias prevalent in accounts

of and policies toward contemporary national movements
positions the

same

literature is surfeit

level

with

of critique widely applied

and the ideologies grounding them.
extreme unbalance:

its

goal

is

It is

and nationalisms. The

reflection

on these

critical appraisals

an

is

themselves

My focus should be understood in this context of

shift a

reasonable amount to those negatively

it.

What should
nationalists"

to nations

not to remove the burden of self-reflection from those

supporting national struggle, but to

disposed toward

indeed, to apply to these

of nations and nationalisms, while there

critical appraisals

un-commented-upon absence of critical

—

also be evident to the reader

do not have a monopoly on

is

that

—

contrary to

Hobsbawm —

legitimate, "objective" scholarship

not that "nationalists" are objective, too. Rather, there

nationalist or non-nationalist positions that

makes them

nothing inherent

nation.

in

objective or biased. Within each

perspective, a range of levels of "objectivity" are possible.
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is

on the

"non-

The extreme,

fully biased

end

of the non-nationalist spectrum

is

antinational-ism,

which

is

as

compromised and

unobjective as the most extreme nationalism.
The contempt with which the specific
antinational-isms examined have castigated and
dismissed "nations" and "nationalism"

is

pure dramatic irony. The higher the horse, the easier
the indictment.
I

have certainly not exhausted the range or depth of
anti-nationalist theories nor of

their effects.

The preceding has been

a sampling of

some of the more

influential and/or

typical instances of antinational-ist theorizing. Within each
type suggested

Liberal, Progressive, Cosmopolitan, and Republican

—

there are variations.

focused on very specific texts in very precise ways in order

to

show

fully

--

I

Marxist,

have

how the

phenomenon under my study works.

Hobsbawm, Kedourie, and Thom

are leading representatives of their type, and

critiques of them tend to catch the basic issues in any other instance of a type.

same

time, regarding Kedourie’ s work, for instance, different components need not be

present in

some

At the

all

instances of anti-national liberal theorizing of the nation. For instance,

instances do not exhibit such a blatant orientalist and colonialist mentality, but

rather level

all states

without regard to former colonial

status.

This has

its

own

problems. Others do not invoke the intellectual history that Kedourie claims for the
nation. Yet, in terms of

its

basic liberal approach, key elements of the critique of

Kedourie’s work will apply.
Alter and Ree certainly are not key figures in the literature, but their respective

progressive and cosmopolitan accounts are fairly representative of this type of approach.
Indeed, the relative lack of profundity of their representations of their positions links

them

all that

more

closely with the popularly-held versions of the positions. Again, the

same caveat regarding

variation applies to these critiques as well.

There are also other types of antinational-ist approaches, such as psychoanalytic,
post-structural or post-modern, and capitalist or econocentric. Psychoanalytic approaches

portray nationalism as a contingent individual psychological abnormality or generality,
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based on

all sorts

social issues,

of desires, need, insecurities,

and

in effect eliminate the reality

etc.

These generally ignore

political

and

of the nation by simply focusing on
the

individual psyche in isolation. Capitalist or
econocentric approaches function quite
similarly to

economics

Hobsbawm’s, except
in the place

for substituting a focus

of class-struggle.

I

on the goals of capitalist

reserve one of the best examples of post-

structural antinational-ism, Etienne Balibar’s, for
treatment in Chapter 3.
there, a study

outweighing

of it

is

such a critique

is

quite a valuable aid in developing a

use in further developing
is

clear in Chapter 3,

my

more balanced

As

I

explain

theory,

critique of antinational-ism.

and can be considered a supplement

The

outline of

to the present

discussion.
It is

therefore unnecessary to continue with this treatment of antinational-ism.

general approach and methods should by
treated.

The reader

is

now be

clear,

My

and major examples suitably

thus prepared to engage variations of critiqued types, additional

types, and even newly-emergent types in a similar manner, exposing hidden assumptions

and ideological agendas as well as perceiving the
theories.
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significant

consequences of the

CHAPTER 2

ON THE PROPER CONTROL AND USE OF NATIONS AND
NATIONALISMS
Introduction

There are many theories and evaluations of the nation
and nationalism
explicitly negative or anti-national.

of theories discussed
approaches

in

Chapter

to the nation are

itself is

antinational-ist.

Unfortunately,

examined,

They approve of the nation only
approval

1.

These would seem an important balance

it

when many of these

becomes apparent

in certain

that are not

to the types

positive

that they are not simply that.

forms and for certain functions. Their

balanced against a threatened condemnation as vehement as any
Indeed, their engagement with nations and nationalisms

disciplining one, that manipulates nations and nationalisms even as

it

is

a powerful,

claims to analyze

their nature.

Industrial Nationality

Ernest Gellner’s influential account of the nation and nationalism [1983] holds

them

to originate in the Industrial Revolution, with

to the industrial age, agrarian societies

vertical strata (classes or castes)

had a rigidly

its

own

set division

divided peasant and artisan classes applied physical labor
to

of labor. Different

and horizontal divisions (different occupations and

regions) were rigidly fixed and distinct from each other [9

simple tools necessary

origin in Great Britain. Prior

farming

it.

-

The lower,

13].

to land

and

to

horizontally-

produce the

Their activities were specialized and their training

informal but all-consuming. Only primitive communication within each division was

necessary for
strata

was

its

economic and

social functioning [33].

Communication with

the higher

limited as well, and from the peasant and artisan end equally primitive. The

higher strata (clergy, clerics,

artists, nobility, financial, etc.)

might have been open or

closed, depending on the specific stratum, but in any case each

and buffered from interchange with other

strata [9
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-

10].

was highly

“High

culture”

specialized

was primarily

in

the hands of clerics

specialized, and
stable,

[1

1-12]. Communication within each stratum was
highly

communication among them more limited

and each division and stratum self-reproducing

[9

-

The

13].

society

(in the educational sense,

was
even

if,

as in the case of clerics, not in the biological
sense) [30-31],

By

“culture,” Gellner

knowledge general
on

culture, that

is,

means

first

and foremost a milieu of language and
specific

to those in the culture [see 12,

a shared

32

-38],

medium of linguistic exchange

Thus, communication depends
within a shared context of

meaning.

As
of the

Britain industrialized, the social structure changed dramatically
as a function

new mode of production.

changed, and sought work

communities were

in

Peasants were uprooted, as the labor needs of farming

urban industrial centers. Thus,

shattered. Industry required a

new

stable, self-reproducing

type of work force.

It

was no

longer tied to a particular place or specific job function, but had to be flexible enough to

meet the

flexible

and progressing (ever-changing) needs of emerging and technologically

evolving industries.

dominant

[24ff.]

What

is

more, efficiency, not tradition and

social value. [20ff] Thus, the best people for a given job

management - had

to

—

status,

became

the

whether labor or

be found. The social structure had to allow for vertical as well as

horizontal mobility.

Rational organization was the crucial companion of efficiency. The

of labor was complicated. Industrial activity required a labor pool

that

new

division

was not organized

according to received traditions, based on inherited statuses and functions, but rather on
the rationally perceived

demands of labor

organized rationally, according

to the

processes. Indeed, society itself had to be

needs of industry, not the dictates of a merely

historical, non-rational, obsolete tradition.

Individuals could no longer be conceived as

naturally peasants or nobles, as coopers or blacksmiths by lineage. Social structure itself

was recognized

as naturally indeterminate, such that, if the inefficient and non-rational

agrarian order were eliminated, the

demands of industrialization would produce
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the social

structure best fitted to
is,

Individuals had to be freed from such predetermined
roles, that

it.

mobile and interchangeable.

[20ff., 29ff.]

Interchangeability required that any worker or manager
could be, at least in
theory, trained for any function within the division of
labor, within a single industry as

well as in any industry [32, 35

and

less

-

36],

What

is

more, work

in industrial societies

an individual “manipulation of things” people in different divisions,

had

to

be able to communicate with each other clearly and efficiently, to coordinate

manufacturing and financial
uniform, “context-free”
general to

means
--

using

all

it)

activities [32

-

33],

Thus, industrialization required a

medium of communication,

[33

-

35].

that a given statement or

A “context-free”
message

is

or culture (language and knowledge

means of communication

understandable by any

or culture

member of the

culture

recognizing that some messages will require some additional specialized training, but

most

will not.

There was already the basis of such a
and educated
ideas,

strata.

and able

It

-

culture, in the

was a precise language

to evolve to

universal basic education,

35

less

in different

;

roles,

was

it

fit

to

became

Through

ideas.

the general culture of the industrial society [31

knowledges considered (through

reflection) to be the basis of learning to function in

instruction

most

was necessary,

this

was merely

shifts in industrial processes, retraining

-

32,

rational

roles in the society.

Though

in

the conveying of

information through the cultural media already established [see 27], What

though not always easy, with

clerics

communicate most information and

communicate new forms of information and

38], This education included a set of

most cases some additional

“high culture” of the

is

more,

was more

possible,

consisting only of the last-added element of job training, not training in the basic form of

communication and a general knowledge base of knowledge.

Such an educational system did evolve out of industrialization, but not
Education

former

-

directly.

the culture and methods as well as the actual universal dissemination of the

— was

a need that could only be organized and guaranteed by the most powerful

and comprehensive

The

state

learned,

institution

emerged with

a

immediately possible, the modern centralized

monopoly on

legitimate education.

and what credentials they received

mobility, [see 28
state

became

-

29] Thus, as culture

1

for their learning.

guarantor ot a disinterested, universally comparable

became

set

state [38],

It

regulated what people

The

state

was

the objective

of credentials, which aided

essential to the industrial society, the

crucial to culture.

Even before

Britain had advanced this far, other societies
joined in the Industrial

Revolution. In a similar fashion they, too, developed an
industrial division of labor

whose mobility and

efficiency required a universal culture for “context-free”

communication. Though Gellner never names Britain or the other early
nations, one can
speculate that he has in

(though their

mind such

early industrial states as France, the Netherlands

seemed more

industry

financial than mechanical),

United States. Gellner

is

clear that in

last case, the industrial societies that

all

but the

and possibly even the

not explicit about the exact evolution of these nations.

It is

developed did so within an

already existing state dominated by a high culture that became the universal culture. In
this context,

nationalism’

—

the desire to

political unit [1]

—

the state, that

the spread within

culture.

is,

make

one’s cultural unit congruent with one’s

probably did not drive state formation, but rather the nationalization of
it

of the formerly high,

now

desiredly universal

2

Gellner ultimately offers a number of different scenarios of industrialization
within given state structures (thought not nation- or even modern
multinational empire in which the dominant high culture
the

Habsburg Empire. This group’s control of the

groups finds themselves

at a

disadvantage

in

is

that

states).

of those

One
in

type

power —

is

a

as in

state supports its culture, but other

competing for jobs

in

an industrial (and

'As Gellner stresses, the industrial age replaced the state monopoly over violence with one over education.
Contrary to his rosy perception, however, the monopoly over education was added to, rather than
displacing the monopoly over violence.
2
0n this account, Scottish and even Welsh nationalism would not yet exist, but would be later constructions
potentially fracturing the British nation itself, on the model of the national fracturing of empires, below.
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financial)

medium

They have

in

which

a certain language

a choice: assimilate or separate.

the former,

some

the latter.

Those

a folk (not high) culture and at the

means
built

that

is

used that

Some

choose the

which

not their

individuals and
latter

same time pursue

for establishing their culture,

is

home

some groups choose

begin the process of transforming

their

own

state as the necessary

itself will foster a distinct industrial
society,

from scratch or from the remnants of the original

industrial society

on the separated,

nationalized territory. In such cases, a group’s culture
becomes noticed by
bars

members from

full

(upward) mobility within the dominant milieu. [97

Because members of the group can

What

choice.

is

assimilate, cultural difference

more, cultural difference might not be the only bar

mobility, but because

it

is

language.

such a salient feature,

it

to

it

-

because

it

98]

becomes a

upward

or lateral

might become the scapegoat for the

inevitable inequities of the earlier stages of industrial development. Their mitigation

might have occurred without separation of new
attributed to separation. [61

-

it

this scenario.

For instance, a minority might have

a literate high culture. In such a case, the culture

alternative to the

might be

62]

There are variations on
available to

nation-states, but this mitigation

dominant high

culture,

and assimilation

is

recognized as a viable

is

presumably

less

of an option.

Separation allows this high culture to become the milieu supporting industrialization,

with a state to guarantee

who

it.

in a culture-conscious

Of course,

is

might not be the perception of nationalists,

world might focus on the

industrial implications, [see 61

power

this

-

62]

It

fate

of their culture more than the

might also be the case

not dominant economically, that

is, its

culture

is

not the

such a case, the dominant power might construct and assert
the prevalent one(s).

One can

before such a situation arises.

that the

its

political

medium of industry.

own

It

In

high culture against

also speculate that the minority might choose to split

away

will be in the previous situation otherwise, with the

relevant options. This last situation in which nationalism arises
least a

dominant

is

that

of a diaspora, or

at

minority diffused over a state’s territory [lOlff.]. As a diasporan or non-territorial
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minority,

it

will be free to take

up crucial

industrial functions within a society.

Its

nationalism comes usually as a response to the emergence of
nationalism(s) of the
politically but not industrially powerful majority(ies) in
the state(s) in

which

the diaspora

or diffused minority operates (these catalysts following the preceding
model).

African and other colonies

adoption of the colonizing culture

fall into

is

a different situation altogether.

It is

not that

not possible or even accomplished by segments

(usually elite) of the colonized population. However, race

is

used as an additional

separator that invalidates this assimilation: the colonized are barred from the colonizing
society by color.

As

a result of their frustration, they galvanize popular discontent based

on the more general exclusion,
3

state.

to unify a given administrative unit in a desire for

Interestingly, the culture that this state

colonizer’s.

The administrative

is

to support is often constructed out

is,

and so forth

-

83]

[see 88

-

89].

in

Gellner makes clear that

it

not a universally applicable model: nations need not develop within every context

of industrialization, and every potential nation

might develop
Further,
are

state’s. [81

of course, a rough schematic of Gellner’s overall presentation, which

industrialization, state formation,

is

new

an admitted simplification that factors out many other forces that play a role

itself is

also

of the

unit is generally not mono-cultural. Jealousies and other

factors prevent selection of a native folk or high culture as the

This

own

its

which

—

—

situation within

need not become one, and perhaps one

specific nations develop,

formed out of (which

which

in ten or less

a nationalism

do [44

-

48].

and which particular pre-existing material they

cultural elements, etc.),

is

historically contingent [48

-

49],

Beyond

these basic provisions, Gellner actually qualifies and clarifies extensively, trying

to shore

up his general theory,

more varied and complex

in

its

great abstraction, against comparison with a

socio-political reality.

It

would be possible

of his specific points and the qualifications he employs

to challenge

to anticipate criticisms, but

in Imagined
Gellner’s account of anti-colonial nationalism is strikingly similar to Anderson’s
Nationalisms.
and
Nations
Gellner’s
year
as
same
in
the
published
Communities, originally
3
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much
many

my

object here

not to nit-pick on the details of his
theory.

is

fundamental

am

I

concerned with more

issues.

The Homogenous Culture

Hobsbawm
homogeneous,

rejects the nation as illusory

on the grounds

large-scale social formation exists

that

— homogeneity

is

no such suitably
the fantasy of

nationalists, that covers over the real divisions
in a given population.

Hobsbawm’s

critique of the nation

myself reject

I

and nationalism not on the grounds

that such

formations do exist, but rather on the grounds that the nation
should not be thought of as
a

homogeneous

it

presents the internal complexities of a host of actual and ideal
nations, against any easy

belief in their homogeneity.

My

this or that asserted nation to see

homogeneous

Hobsbawm’s

social formation.

“ straw man,”

Hobsbawm

is

disagreement
it it

really

which he

is

knocks down.

satisfied with this result, as

as the key social tension and structure.

Much

account of the nation that picks up where

with the criterion against which he tests

one: he begins with a reductive

is

easily

historical critique is accurate, in so far as

it

of my Chapter 3

Hobsbawm

nation without depending on homogeneity. Suffice

Hobsbawm
The

it

is

devoted

leaves off, that

is,

to offering

an

that conceives the

here to say that at the least

convincingly argues against any concept of the nation based on homogeneity.

points he

results

serves his purpose of presenting class

makes

are accurate, but the

framework within which he

and the conclusions he builds on them are constrained by

his

interprets these

own

conceptual

limitations.

Other theorists paying a great deal more attention
similar arguments. In Chapter 3

I

examine

and Etienne Balibar. Balibar’s conclusion

to the diversity

in detail the theories

is

similar to

structuralist (as well as semi-Marxist) position, while

complexity of the nation as the starting point

Homi

K.

Bhabha

Hobsbawm’s, though from

Bhabha

for a theory
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of two,

of data make

of

it.

takes the internal

a post-

Given the
cannot stand.
if

critiques by

Hobsbavvm, Bhabha, and Balibar, Gellner’s theory simply

clear that nations are not the end product of industrial
homogenization:

It is

industrialization does indeed tend toward homogeneity, the inherent
internal diversity

makes

ot the nation

it

an obstacle

to industrialization,

and

at the least

not

its

industrialization does not tend toward this homogeneity, then Gellner’s
link

Even

if

one argues

necessary to
futility

it,

of the

itself, in

a

that industrialization cannot itself

endeavor would greatly

he rejects the idea

—

last line

It

what

it

is

cited as Elie Kedourie’s

of industrialization

some of the world. And, Gellner

is

is

—

that nationalism itself

produces or

tries to

the product of industrialization, period.

the surface form of this tendency to homogeneity. [39]

would seem,

seems

is

of argument. At length and in no uncertain terms

homogeneity of nations. Homogeneity

Nationalism

produce the homogeneity that

inhibit the possibility

that contradicts the history of at least

very explicit in not taking the

the

broken.

is

but must rely on nationalisms that homogenize the social fabric, the

latter

way

product. If

then, that the link

to Gellner,

between industrialization and the nation

is

not

and presumably not the constitutional link he suggests.

Gellner does address critiques such as Hobsbawm’s summarily, arguing that of

course there are counter-examples to his theory, but that (1) these can be accounted for by
taking stock of other forces interfering in the process of nation-formation and the general

complexity inherent
but this does not
to

in

mean

any social situation and

that the general theory is

speak [139]. The problem

examples

(2) there will

to his theory, or

is

not so simple:

it

some amount of data

contrary, every nation and nationalism

is

wrong is

always be counter-examples,

the exceptions prove the rule, so

not that there are

that just cannot be

some

made

to

a counter-example to his theory.

counter-

It

hold in any instance. His commitment to homogeneity forces a commitment

of a pitched battle over the nature of nationalism and the nation
losers, as

I

argue

in

Chapter

3.

Here

it is

enough
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to

suggest that

in

it

the

does not
to

which both
is

On

lit.

one side

sides are

possible to develop a

theory ot the nation that does not depend on absolute
homogeneity, which thus accounts

much

better tor the range ot data associated with nations and
nationalisms.

Gellner does slightly qualify his commitment
industrialization tends

does not assume

it

toward

it

to

homogeneity, by suggesting

strongly but of course in practice
,

may

not reach

as the pre-condition of industrialization, but rather states
that

industrialization occurs,

it

will tend to

produce homogeneity. [108

-

that

He

it.

where

109 (note)] As

I

have already implied, the nation should not be taken even as a general trend toward
homogeneity. In Chapter

3,

1

argue that (1) such a nation

and so not the basis of general model and
nationalist strain

Here

it

enough

is

among

is

among many,

only one type

even such a trend might be one

(2) that

different ones associated with a given ideal or actual nation.

to state that,

even

if

a nationalism

is

such a general trend,

it

is

doomed

to fail in

any attempt

order.

might be expression of the homogenizing tendency of industrialization, but

It

to bring its

an expression that attempts

to

presumed nation

into

correspondence with an industrial

deform the nation away from

its

it

is

characteristic internal

complexity.

The Condition of Industrial Society
Let us grant that early nations did arise out of industrialization

need for cultural divisions of labor (see below),
that nations

and nationalisms will always take

once the concept of the nation was available,

say, not

this

it

exceeded

its

of industrialization. But,

cause,

form? Gellner appears

could be adopted without

this is the

becoming independent.

4

perhaps out of its

homogeneity. Does that mean

from an industrializing context. Such a nation/alism would be then an
direct product

—

same

New forms

to

strictly

Chapter

3.

The point here

is

that,

that,

deriving

indirect rather than

as saying that the nation has

of nation and nationalism might

emerge, out of more complex material and conceptual forces and tendencies.
this issue at length in

admit

even

if

I

explore

the Industrial Revolution

One sees here the perils of confusing accounts of the conditions or causes of nations with what they
actually are, as stressed by Lowell Barrington [1997],
4
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was

the condition of the initial development of nations
and nationalisms, that does not

mean

that every subsequent

industrialization.
arise.

form and instance

new and

In

is

a product of the force of

ditterent contexts, different forms

and manifestations might

Gellner’s industrial origins account works universally only

taken as the exclusive cmd dominant force
location.

It

Much more

not to him, then to

reasonable

is

if

industrialization

every aspect of society and

in

me and many

others, this

life in

is

every

an excessive speculation.

is

the notion that, once available, the concept and reality of

nations and nationalisms had to

some

extent ‘lives of their own’

-

quite

if lives

intermingled with economic and industrial issues.

One might
in

complex causal

also question whether even industrialization itself

is

not intermingled

relations with other aspects of modernity, including cultural and

political ones.

Gellner’s assumption of omnipresent and -potent industrialization itself depends

on a de-emphasis of all other aspects of human society and
culture, politics,

production
the

and social relations purely

(in his

Beyond even
It

so blatantly and vehemently detests?
this,

It

relegates

of the dominant

mind, not capitalism, but industrialism).

Marxism Gellner

idealized.

to derivatives

life.

Is this

modern

mode of

not the fundament of

5

Gellner’s representation of the workings of industrial society

is

reads at points as the kind of pure propaganda that embarrasses even those

devoted to industrialization
pure 19th Century.

An

-

contemporary age.

industrial society tends

pool of mobile individuals.
benefit the producers

in the

It

better

It is

toward a

pure abstract idealism;

flat,

egalitarian,

it

is

homogeneous

functions as rationally as possible, producing more to

and more plentiful food,

rationally organized, around material needs.

shelter, clothing, luxury.

The ultimate

society

^Nearly every mention - and there are roughly 20 - of Marx or Marxism
occasions an attack. Marxism is the object of even more intense derision
[1994],
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in
in

is

It is all

beautifully flowing,

Nations and Nationalism
Encounters With the Nation

elegant in

its

direct efficiency

and

more everything and everyone
This

is

The

rationality.

better industrialized, the

more and

serves and functions efficiently and rationally.

obviously idealization. According to Gellner, the bureaucratic
realm

within the industrial order the rational, efficient, social organizing
force of the state that
supports universal basic education, and the rational and effective
management of

Having worked

industrial endeavors.

for close to

two years

as a

US

federal bureaucrat

6

and another two as a social worker regularly engaging bureaucracies

—

made my way through

in other capacities

I

various federal,

state,

and local bureaucracies

find Gellner’s appraisal hopelessly naive. First of

bureaucracies

all,

as well as having

—

the structure and order of

usually an evolving formation based on feudalistic precedents, without

is

direct “ rational” reorganizing. Its Byzantine procedures and processes are anything but
efficient,

even when they are “rationally organized.” Indeed, when a bureaucracy

“rationally” reorganized for efficiency,
course, people, and their functioning

psychological forces

I

.

is

it

usually functions worse. Bureaucrats are, of

greatly influenced

by

same

all

sorts

have many a time received different answers

question asked of two different individuals in the same office
referring to the

procedure.'

People

who

are

who

person or people with

whom

one

is

are

of personal and
to the

same

supposed

to

be

supposed to be doing the exact same

job, as stipulated in clear regulations and job descriptions, perform

As anyone knows, when working through

is

them

quite differently.

a bureaucracy, the individual personality of the

dealing

is

the crucial factor for one’s success of

8

failure

.

One can

speculate that the naivete of Gellner’s understanding of how

bureaucracies really work and his overestimation (indeed, devotional valorization) of
their efficiency

6

and rational organization extends

to other

realms of industrial society.

As confirmed by Ackermann [1995],
So much so that now, as a matter of course, always

ask questions about important procedures of two
two different times. If their answers are the same, can be very sure that what they
me is true, because most of the time they do not give the same answers.
8
do not mean to insult bureaucrats, least of all the ones used to work with. Many are excellent and
devoted -- but even that is a function not of the role into which they are put, but other factors.

7

I

different workers at

I

I

I
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tell

Consider Japan, which

and unified

which

culture.

itself is

Yet, mobility

restricted

is

is

by the specific form of industrialism,

it.

What

is

more, their career trajectory (upward

generally determined by the level and status of their ultimate educational

Even

institution.

homogeneous

constrained by cultural imperatives. Laborers are hired by a
corporation

whatever level they enter

for life, at

mobility)

a highly industrialized state with an apparently

is

if

these do support Japan’s industrial success, the resulting structure

is

quite certainly not of the form that Gellner claims.

More than

this, there is the

practice, as well as

it

many

bulk of 20th Century psychoanalytic theory and

currents in political and social thought. Since the time of Freud,

has been more and more clear that

formations that cannot be reduced
behaviors.

9

Much more

is

to single

beings and their societies are complex

dominant aspects or

explicit motivations

and

going on in the mind of “industrial man” and in industrial

society than Gellner’ s simplistic

acknowledges and depends on
trade

human

on people’s “irrational”

model allows. Indeed, industry

this,

by

its

itself implicitly

use of manipulative marketing campaigns that

insecurities, desires,

and so

forth.

Gellner appears a

Victorian, maintaining the surface veneer of propriety, order, rationality, and efficiency,

even as a pool of human complexity, ambiguity, and tension bubbles below the
Just as

Freud shattered the Victorian

has

much of 20th Century

and sociological thought shattered 19th Century simplistic

political,

march of industrial
extols, he
politics,

illusion, so

society.

psychological,

illusions about the

Indeed, were Gellner truly committed to the progress he

would undoubtedly have

and anthropology

surface.

in favor

to

abandon

of the

fruits

his 19th

Century sociology, economics,

of the subsequent century’s intellectual

production.
Gellner’s mechanist industrial determinism reduces the rich complexity of human

experience to one stilling and voracious realm of life.

I

would argue

that,

were

industrial

theorizing, at the least the bounty of theories of human
psychology and sociality of the current century suggests the genuine complexity and irreducibility of the
psychological and social realms to any easy, single principles.

’Though even Freud might be accused of reductive
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society

-

or,

more

accurately,

would

industrial production

To

the extent that

industrial societies,

and

sociality.

it

has

modern

fit

Gellner’s description,

suffer profoundly.

has imposed

it

- truly to

society

at the least

its

ideal

of “ industrial man” on the subjects of

had a deeply negative

effect

on human subjectivity

Just because the industrial order does not admit the full range
of human

subjectivity and sociality, does not

human

complexity, molding

mean

beings to

fit

that

it

simply ignores

it.

It is

imposed on human

an industrial structure and machinery.

It

imposition excludes and suppresses this complexity, producing, to use Marx’s

terminology and incisive analysis, a profound alienation from

Though Gellner views
perfect

fit

to “

human

it.

industrialization as the highest expression of and

most

nature,” since the beginning of industrialization, there have been

plentiful protests about

its

dehumanizing, de-socializing, and other harmful

effects.

These protests and criticisms have come from every angle, progressive and conservative,
radical

and reformative. The very

fact

of these protests suggests a complexity to human

subjectivity and sociality that belies any easy claims that “industrialized
fruition of the

man”

[sic] is the

comprehensive nature of humanity.

Gellner asserts that the transformation from agrarian to industrial society strips

away

antiquated, tradition-based, non-rational forms of social organization and replaces

them with an open and malleable

social pool that supports an ever-changing industrially-

determined social structure. But,

is this

industrial order, with

its

“industrial man,” not a

very specific concept of social relations and subjectivity? Gellner believes that atomic
individuals are the basic constituent elements of

merely creates a context

in

which individuals

all

social structures. Industrial society

are freed of their contingent

constraining relations. Individuals can then be reformed into new, but
efficient, social structures.

what human beings

As

I

have been suggesting,

this
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now

rational

and

assumes a great deal about

are “naturally,” and, in fact, naturalizes

constructed form of subjectivity. Gellner ridicules

and

what appears

nationalist

to

be a

naturalizations ol

nations as natural

human

social

forms [48

-

49], but then merely substitutes his

own

equally dubious form of human subjectivity and sociality
(atomic individualism) in

He

place.

is

right to contest the possibility of “natural” social

entirely deluded in believing that

“atomic individualism”

is

and subjective forms, but

the absence of the

presumption of any natural social form. The lack of social relations might
possible only as the product of forces applied to “naturally socialized”

and be quite

its

itself

human

be

subjects,

artificial.

Indeed, atomic individualism has always been a philosophical abstraction that

mythologizes the logical (and sometimes

historical) origins

of human subjectivity and

social structures. Liberal atomic individualist partisans such as Gellner

myths of nationalist origins
around and engage

in the

in

long past ages, in nature itself [48

same type of mythologizing. Though

understood as a logical isolation of human nature,
form, which

is

suggestive of

its

-

condemn

the

49], but then turn

this is generally

usually takes a historical narrative

it

mythologizing form akin

to the

most deluded

nationalisms of origins.

No

one can do an experiment

or concept of

would

human

nature suggests

isolate individuals

insane in short order.

deny

away from

that isolates individuals in the

is

would undoubtedly leave 95 percent

sophisticated notions of this type of theory do not

social relations as an individual need, and Gellner

would probably not argue

industrialization actually isolates individuals. But, this supports

individualism

no social

is

not

human

that this theory

the natural form. Indeed, any experiments that

social relations

Of course, more

way

nature. Again, Gellner

my

that

point, that atomic

might claim that he

is

not arguing for

relations, but rather the absolute mobility of individuals within a set of social

relations and the absolute mutability of the relational structures themselves.

There
of

it.

is

no absolute

critique of this, but there

This suggests that there

individualism

is

is

is

neither an absolute confirmation

no absolute social form, and

that thus

atomic

a particular form, historical contingent, not the raw material tor
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all

possible social forms. This in turn suggests that there
are alternative social forms. The

ready and usual examples are organic structures (as
discussed elsewhere
dissertation), as well as

In Chapter 3,

structure

is.

Suffice

10
1

it

more

develop

my

which suggests

a

than Gellner allows.

social structures.

account of what

I

think a specifically national social

here to state that Gellner’s presumption of a certain natural
or

elemental form of human subjectivity
all,

summarize

difficult to

in this

much
It is

is

not defended by him nor absolutely defensible

greater openness to

human

social relations

and subjectivity

interesting that he believes that splitting societies into atomic

individuals opens up the greatest range of possible social structures. Given that
fact a specific

form of social

structure, assertion

of

it

it is

manner. The nation might be one of those forms,

many

in

as allowing the fullest possible

range of social structures in fact closes off a host of other types of structures in a

actually have

at

or, as

I

argue in Chapter

3,

stifling

might

different types. If this range of types includes a cultural container of

interchangeable atomic individuals,

it

includes other types as well. Thus,

Gellner’s theory holds for only one type of nation. But, then,

it

at

most,

must be mistaken about

the industrial nature of nations.

The

Interior

Acknowledgment of human

mean

that the industrial order is not

of Industrial Society

subjective and social complexity does not, of course,

homogeneous. At the same time, Gellner’s

representation of industrial society and subjectivity

is

idealized in a

manner relevant

homogeneity, as well. His theory echoes typical propaganda about the
least in its liberal-capitalist

to

industrial order (at

form) that masks a reality of inequality, immobility, and

exploitation.

apologize for any annoyance these references to Chapter 3 cause, but it has been difficult to keep
my critiques of existing theories of the nation on ideological grounds, and explorations of issues
necessary to development of my own theory of the nation.
10

I

separate
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GeHner dismisses

criticisms that the apparent or stated
egalitarianism and

mobility ot industrial societies (liberal ones anyway)
masks underlying structures of

domination
Marxist

line,

expanded
is

that are every bit as rigid

and

it is

and powerful as feudal ones. This

a compelling one that

to include a range of social issues

I

its

growing pains

A

—

hold to be very accurate, especially

when

and oppressions. For Gellner, any inequality

my

They

unfortunate to be sure, but not grounds for a general indictment.

general argument against Gellner’ position on the nature of industrial
s

development would carry

me

far

beyond the scope of this

dissertation.

It is

also

beyond

base of knowledge, given the extensive history and intellectual breadth of debates

about the true effects of industrial capitalism and whether or not

-

possible to focus on two issues relevant to this debate

way
is

of course the

the inevitable result ot the excesses and uncertainties of
early industrialization.

are

is

is

it

is

oppressive. But,

race and colonialism

-

it

in a

that has significant implications for Gellner’ general claim that the industrial order
s

fundamentally liberatory, not oppressive, for

all

of humanity.

Gellner does acknowledge that the internal structure of an industrial society, with
its

universal culture, does not produce perfect mobility. “Entropy-resistant” markers

remain

in effect, particularly race. This

that tend

markers are different from the borders of cultures

toward assimilation or separatist nationalism. They are anti-progressive,

inhibit or militate against the increasing mobility that

They

are

by default ‘throwbacks,’

ceased to erase. [64

-

that

is,

marks

that

is,

industrial development.

residual markers that industrialization has

70]

Though Gellner suggests

that they are originally

random groupings of people with

certain phenotypes in lower level positions in the industrial order [67], he accepts that,

over time, the people with those phenotypes become associated with low positions and
the characteristics that are in turn associated with
laziness, etc. [68],
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them

in

an egalitarian labor pool

-

GeHner considers race and other “entropy-resistant”
by society
affect.

arguing

-

to

He does

characteristics

-

which vary

be aspects of the pre-industrial order that industrialization
has failed to
not consider arguments that have been advanced from
various quarters

that, in fact, racialization is

an essential feature of industrial capitalism.

requires to accomplish the division of labor, by creating a
low-status group to

low

social roles that,

if

they were a danger to

trigger leactions against the industrial order.

members of the

all

By

fill

It is

very

industrial society,

might

stigmatizing one group and gaining the

help of the majority of society in enforcing that stigmatization, three
problems are solved:

how

to

fill

how

to

keep the oppressed minority

the low-level jobs,

Of course,

this

how to keep

the majority of exploited workers happy, and

in check.

does not mean that there

just that a racist system prevents full mobility.
industrial homogenization, the

minimum

argument

difficult.

unrest,

the solution

Still,

which Gellner dismisses
I

not

Where Gellner

am summarizing

is

to at least

as just the

full

members of the

groups was allowed,

—

some

is

of the system

is

a different form of difference, but

industrial societies."

For instance, the United

labor that

was compelled — by

Though

assimilation for

which

some

a gradual process and (1) traced their climb through the

and

(2)

depended on a pool of racialized workers or recent

obviously, not every industrial or industrializing society is the same, even
Gellner’s crude model does not allow for any real variation, but reduces every
instance of industrial society to one central model.

"This

is

is

a great deal of labor

to enter the labor pool at the lowest levels, levels at

was

levels of industrial society

that critique

[1985], that non-racial cultural

society were unwilling to work.
this

escape the lower levels of the

growing pains of development.

economy was organized around immigrant

circumstances and desires

sees this as the drive of

not perfect, and of course there

would argue, following Omi and Wynant

one just as necessary

to

mobility, but

views the slippage a

myth of mobility such

difference (ethnicity, but not necessarily nationality)

States’

some slippage and

concession to the oppressed that allows some

industrial order in order to maintain a

more

I

is

a suggestive phrase:

some fundamental way.
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in

immigrants (or both)
laborers

existed, in

to

do the lowest jobs. With

which

the conflict

this third group, a

between the three main groups

component groups) prevented widespread organization

What emerges

here

is

from

(as well as

against the system

that industrial society itself

racial divisions for its division

complex “division of

itself.

might depend on ethnic and

of labor. In other words, these internal divisions are

anti-industrial, but rather crucial

components of industrial

far

society. Thus, industrial

society does not tend toward a general homogeneity or internal mobility, but
rather

toward the production of divisions
between. This

is

different

that allow for full mobility within

and

little

mobility

from the more specialized groupings of feudal European

societies, but contains within

it

a rigidity that

is

not merely a residual of feudal forms, but

perhaps the novel feudal aspect of industrialization.

From

this point,

movements have

it

might be possible

their origins in the

to argue that at least

movement

is

on behalf of

the Leninist concept of one type

of “good” or anti-oppressive nationalism. At the same time,
is

nationalist

to fracture industrial societies

those at the lower levels of the division of labor. This

or economic focus that

some

it still

retains the industrial

limiting for a concept of the nation and nationalism.

Colonialism and Development

One can push

Gellner’s account of industrial society one step further.

appear to view colonized groups as part of the same industrial
France, the United States,

only

is

etc.) structure (division

an industrial society coextensive with a

industrial-age colonizing state itself

colonized groups and territories

is

state internally

of Britain,

fragmented, but the

part of a broader industrial structure including

- which

are,

on

racial

labor, as well as the crucial guarantor of industrial

Euro-American

not

of labor) as their colonizers. Thus, not

barred from genuine inclusion within the colonizing

the

(in the cases

He does

Industrial Revolution.

Even
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to

and cultural grounds, usually

state.

raw

Colonialism was a division

material.

It

was fundamental

very advanced industrial

states,

to

ot

colonial relations (sometimes informal) have been
crucial.

The

pursuit of oil has been a

diiving toice tor colonization ot and post-colonial
neo-imperial domination of MiddleEastern, Southeast Asian, and South

American

societies, as described in Daniel Yergin’s

The Prize [1991]. Colby and Dennett meticulously

complex concrete

detail the

political,

corporate, economic, religious, service, and military neo-imperial
relations binding
ot Cential

and South America

by Nelson Rockefeller

to the

much

United States economy, as planned and engineered

in the years before, during,

and

after

World War

II

[1995],

Rockefeller explicitly conceived of the Americas as a single industrial unit, with the

production of raw materials for the United States’ industrial engine imposed on various
states,

and including some

The examples go

industrial

development of some regions.

The bottom

on.

line is that Gellner has

an idealized and

inaccurate perspective of how industrialization has proceeded, and

production occurs. If he were to have taken

profound

failure.

it

into the field, he

how

industrial

would have met with

Indeed, no corporation or government body involved in colonial or

neo-imperial production would ever take such an analysis seriously.
It is

not that in the current age globalization has tended to create a world-wide,

unified division of labor. Globalization
shifted

due

to political pressures

Just

how

fundamental

it

is

nothing new, though

its

form might have

and technological innovations.

was

is

clear

from just how seriously colonizers took the

control of their colonies. Gellner’ s representation of industrial-age colonialism

too veiled apology for
their

Empire

in a state

it.

For him, “the point made about the English,

emphasis; 42

-

43],

,

lost the

.

.

.

The

Empire with a similar lack of attention” [my

Colonial empires just kind of happened as a correlate of industrial

superiority of one group by another, as
industrial relations.

a not

that they acquired

of absence of mind, can to some extent be generalized

English also, most laudably

is

it

They were, indeed,

were by the

invisible

“ pluralistic” [43],

conquest or direct intention of domination. The colonizer
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It

is

hand of trade and

was not through

military

not an intentional conqueror,

and therefore has no
domination,

its

real culpability.

The

industrial

European form of conquest and

seems, was/is superior to and more humane than the more
barbaric and

savage militaristic style ot other eras and regions

(that

is,

of the colonized cultures). [42

-

43]

His representation ot the reasons tor the end of industrial colonization
are

just as

problematic. The two reasons he cites are that the colonizers became guilty, so
they gave

up

their colonies,

and the United States and Soviet Union required

fought out by nominally independent proxies.
the second reason suggests the

oppressed and exploited.

They did not

fight

colonization.

It

-

was just

would say

be

that the attitude referenced in

main motivations of the colonizers

Of course,

and die

I

their conflict to

- to

stop being

Gellner utterly ignores the agency of the colonized.

in the millions

-

to free

themselves from the yoke of

the ultimate goodness of the colonizers that freed them!

They

did not develop brilliant theories of colonialism, carefully analyzing the material and

psychological forces to be overcome. This
societies did not eventually

is

not to suggest that

oppose colonialism. But,

some within colonizing

their “guilt”

was generally a

reaction to confrontation by the colonized in inescapable terms. Indeed, their desire to

end colonization were often intentionally produced by the colonized
fracturing and

all

to the Indians, tell

the Chinese .... Tell

it

to the

Mau Mau

(if

any are

left),

the Egyptians,

Vietnamese, the Filipino/as, the Algerians .... Tell
is

it

to

astonishingly inaccurate, especially for

in 1983.

As Edward Said argues
myriad of linked

to the

it

Zulu .... Gellner’ s representation

something published

political,

[1979], an entire ideology

was developed through a

academic, military, and social institutions. As he also argues

[1993], the identity of colonizers

was fundamentally linked

be seen by a read of any popular

literature,

era.

means of

weakening the colonizing society [Truong, 1985].

Tell this

the

as a

to colonization.

But, this can

newspapers, and so forth from the relevant

Take, just for instance, a novel by Agatha Christie from the 1930s, such as Cards on
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the Table [1966],

deviousness,

etc.,

It is

component

immense

with orientalist comments about the
mysteriousness,

of Chinese and other Asians. What

colonial functionaries,
crucial

filled

whose

ot the narrative, as well as the world/culture
invoked by

was “absent-minded” only because

Another novel by
after the loss

Christie,

it

Many

seem

all

They

the typical ways.

are

was so assumed ox taken

is

and subversive

Why

to

to the British,

who

and just

how

later,

are cardboard characters

relief for the

literature.

most

part,

with

Indeed, the challenges

make, are presented as absurdly

include any of this? Whether of her

please her millions of readers, Christie’s inclusion

Empire was

for granted.

positively obsessed with the end of

mere comic

racism and colonialism that they are allowed

inappropriate and inaccurate.

is

an example of just

intentionally they

own

desires or to

how

central the

were “absent-minded”

it.

Such manifestations of colonial consciousness
awareness and intentionality not only

foil

Gellner’s

are all but countless.

weak apology,

case against his representation of industrial development.
Britain
all

Christie’s

to reflect a general colonialist

characters are colonials and post-colonials

their superstitious relics, pornography,

about

it.

Hickory Dickory Death [1956], written 20 years

of India and as the Empire crumbled,

stereo-typed in

loss of

in the colonies are a

popularity suggests that her descriptions rang true, and her
colonizing characters

attitude that

to

more, two main characters are

and future exotic exploits

current, past,

interesting. Neither are at all original, but instead

Empire.

is

was already long

a colonizer before

its

It

The

but also add to the

must be kept

Industrial Revolution, as

in

was

mind

that

the case for

other initially industrializing states. If this does not guarantee that colonization was a

or the condition of industrialization,

it

does suggest that the colonial division of labor was

not a mechanical and inevitable result of industrialization, but rather developed out of
colonial structures and ideologies predating industrialization.

l2

Gellner’s

focal in a

own

dismissive remarks about colonialism occupy quite a

number of sections of Encounters With Nationalism

Said’s critique of orientalism

in

Chapter

12.
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bit

12

of space

in this

work and become

[1994], including a sustained attack on

What

is

more,

it

calls into question the

whole liberal-progressive developmental

schema. Differential levels of industrial development no
longer appear
discrete societies, but are actually part of unified
industrial orders.

By

to be

between

temporalizing

positions in single industrial divisions of labor and structures,
the colonizing beneficiaries

naturalized an arbitrary division of labor and hierarchical industrial
process.
primitive

More

areas were thus justifiably relegated to supplying raw materials

(involuntarily and at a huge financial loss) and later labor for the lowest,
most dangerous

and

difficult levels

of the division of labor. This

differences did not exist
structure

among

was formed through colonialism,
3

once a single industrial

the differences were rigidified, exaggerated,

Indeed, recent scholarship has implicated

developmental ideologies and practices
to

not to suggest that technological

dilferent societies, but that,

naturalized, and often increased.'

came

is

in

genocides.

depend on power, not the other way around

14

-

Superior “development” quickly

and power within a single

industrial system.

Colonialism was not the product of the differential levels of development due
the

uneven spread of industrialization.

It

to

was, rather, a factor in producing and

maintaining this unevenness within unified industrial structures, crucial to the internal
structure of production. Thus, differential development could not

nations

— which

is

mark

off different

a rejection of Tom Nairn’s account of nationalism [1981], one quite

sympathetic to anti-colonialism. Rather, proto-national distinctions were

in part

constitutive of developmental differences, and themselves have to accounted for by other
factors as well, including political and cultural ones.

1 '

Such as with the San people of southern Africa, as discussed in Edwin Wilmsen’s Land Filled With Flies
[1989], Wilmsen shows that the San people, long hailed as one of the last truly primitive “huntergatherer” societies on earth, actually (re-)turned to this method of economic activity only in the 20th
Century, after years of herding and animal husbandry, for themselves and others. They were forced to
hunting and gathering by the poverty resulting from their low racial and tribal status within South Africa.
In other words, they were barred from participation in more “advanced” forms of production due to racial
and tribal oppression, and thus “ primitivized.”
l4
See Hilmer Kaiser’s Imperialism, Racism, and Development Theories [1997] and Colby and Dennett
l3

995].
Gellner’s revisionist history should be recognized as part of colonialism. Just as denial is not after
genocide, but its final stage, in which the very presence of those killed is removed from history, so this
type of revision is the final stage of colonialism. One might call it the “discursive stage,” in which the
1

[

5
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Gellner

s

theory

itself is

not simply a bad analysis of the nation form,
but in the

service of a particular progressive industrialist agenda
that itself justifies and mystifies

colonialism and neo-imperialism. Perhaps more importantly,
his theory denies anti-

oppressive (especially anti-colonial) nationalism any genuine
grounds.

becomes

the mechanical product of shifting tides of industrialization,

effectiveness as a potential challenge to oppression

and ended anyway, and nationalism just marks

becomes

nationalism

looses

it

its

oppression would have lessened

this transition.

Anti-colonial nationalism

a derivative of industrial development and differentiation, rather than the

profound challenge

might well

be.

to oppressive industrial orders that

This

is

some forms

it

often considers itself

-

and

another part of Gellner’s control and exploitation of the nation and

nationalism. Nationalism

than

-

As

is

pushed

to serve the progressive industrialist

model, rather

serving as direct challenges to the practice based on and ideology of this

model.
Indeed, anti-colonial nationalism as such ceases to exist, becoming instead a mere form

of industrial nationalism. In deforming nations and nationalisms

to

fit

his progressive

industrial model, he does not merely exclude alternative forms, but rather covers

up

precisely those forms that pose a genuine challenge to his ideological agenda.

Deluded Nationalists and Revised History
Like

Hobsbawm

as well as Kedourie, Gellner views the world through a very

restrictive conceptual frame.

or dismiss what does not

fit

But, different from each, he does not merely “ irrationalize”
fully within the frame.

His frame

is

rather superior, in that

it

allows the nation and nationalism to show up as legitimate/real socio-political formations,
but

at

the

same time

it

“corrects” them to be consistent with the frame.

colonizers are relieved of responsibility, and colonialism de-emphasized. It might even be taken as a
reassertion of colonialism, through discursive control of the history of colonization, in the place of a now

untenable direct military and political control.
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His theory does not show the industrial origins and
basis of the nation and

On

nationalism.

the contrary,

it

deforms and

fits

the range of phenomena associated with

the nation and nationalism into forms that are entirely
consistent with the industrial

conceptual frame, that

derivative of industrialization. In perhaps cowardice,
perhaps a

is,

powerful, absorptive subtlety, Gellner chooses to tame nationalism,
rather than confront
it.

True

to his industrious thinking, he decides to put

it

to

work, rather than fight

it.

write figuratively, of course. Gellner does this by normalizing the
history and

I

sociology of nations and nationalisms within the bounds of a dominant
narrative of
industrialization.

The nation

is

perhaps not really domesticated by industry in

this

way,

but at the same time, one must not underestimate the effects of normalized histories and
sociologies. Gellner

big on claiming that intellectuals have had no real effect on the

is

development of nations

-

that they are not driven

(industrial) forces [see especially 123ff.].

by

ideas, but rather

That he believes

theory itself does not prevent us from wondering about

prophesy

—

especially

when taken

its

by material

much

this as

as he believes his

force as a self-fulfilling

seriously by those in power.

I

will return to this issue

below, in connection with Leah Greenfeld, a more ready instance of the potential power

of the pen.

To do

this,

of course, Gellner must argue for the complete dismissal of concepts

of nations and nationalisms that perceive some forms as these types of challenges.
Disregarding contemporary development techniques themselves, he silences the agents of
national

movements and

nationalisms, and the

members of nations. He

repeatedly

dismisses their concepts of what they are and are doing as pure delusion [see especially

48
is

-

49],

Here one can see Gellner’s orientalism run amuck. The essence of orientalism

the imposition of reductive concepts of another culture or

its

members, without regard

to the complexities that really exist or to the protests of the victims.

It is

a supreme

arrogance to presume to describe nations and nationalisms without any regard whatsoever
for the ideas

and understandings of those participating

142

in

them, as

if

they have no

capacity for any form of self-understanding or -reflection.
Given Gellner’ s

immersion

in ideology,

It is,

it is

also pure dramatic irony.

in addition, a necessary step. Nations

complex and externally

own complete

and nationalisms are internally

varied. For this complexity

and variety involving

explicit

and

unconscious motives, a range ot possible functions and interpretations
of nations and
nationalisms,

etc.,

Gellner substitutes one very normalized, very ideologically determined

closed interpretation of all these. This requires ignoring the self-conception
of nations

and nationalisms.

It is

means

is

accurate;

it

one thing

to argue that these

must be interpreted and

are by

no

another to reject them out of hand as irrelevant to the nature of

nations and nationalisms. Indeed, their very variety suggests a corresponding variety

among

the factors determining nations and nationalisms.

national

movements

them — progressive

What

is

more,

at least

when

are reacting directly against the foundations of Gellner’ s account of

industrialism, atomic individualism, etc.

—

one can be rather well

assured that they are not products of these foundations.

By
his

own

ignoring self-concepts of nations and nationalisms, Gellner clears the field for

theory. Indeed, he

is

free to transform the range of nations

and nationalisms

into

the seeming buttresses of progressive industrialism. Their history of struggle, their

successes,

become

associated with and evidence of progressive industrialism. That quite

often they have arisen as direct challenges to the ideology and practice of progressive
industrialism

is

erased from view and memory. That they quite often have represented

alternative social and ideological forms to progressive industrialism and the associated
liberal

atomic individualism

is

erased from view and memory. These alternatives are

erased from view and memory, as the ideologues of progressive industrialism and liberal

atomic individualism convince themselves and
is

their subjects that the "nature ol things”

progressive industrialism and liberal atomic individualism

further challenges to the order,

-

forestalling perhaps

on national or other grounds, even as the self-conceptions
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of nationals and nationalists are warped into conformity.
Perhaps Gellner’s theory

mere wish, but

a dangerous wish.

is

it

a

is

Nationalism and the State?

John Breuilly develops a theory of nationalism
in

Nationalism and the Slate [1982], He defines

based on reference

to a “nation,” that

other definitions of nationalism.
successful nationalist

According

movement,

is,

is,

nationalism

it

to

on behalf of a “nation”

More than
that

that relates

directly to the state,

be the pursuit of a

He

[1 - 2].

excludes

the capture or creation of a state.

to Breuilly, the characteristic ideology

A

features) should control a given state or territory.

a “ national spirit.”

If

of a nationalism holds that a

it is

“society (= nation)” [69]

ruled by those

who do

(those from another nation), then violence will be done to the
control

its

own

state.

For Breuilly,

conflation of culture and politics.
-

what

this is

It is

all

he views the nation as the product of a

this,

given cultural group (defined by prior statehood, language, or some other feature or

community with

state

reasoning

is

faulty,

their proper relationship should be

—

is

of

a unique

is

not share in this spirit

spirit.

Therefore,

because

a claim that the tension

set

built

is

it

it

must

on a

between society and

resolved in the nation, which

is at

state

once

both political and cultural. However, there appears nothing in the “political nation” that
is

inherently linked to the cultural, and vice-versa.

conceived of as a ‘cultural
citizens”
link

who have

spirit’

On

the one hand, the nation

between these two conceptions of a population, but

term “nation”

in

two

treating nationalism,

it is

the ideological content of a nationalism

not sufficient to stop at

Breuilly believes that the nature of nationalism

content of

its

rather links

make

ideology.

is

its

the

64, 69]

-

irrelevant.

When

ideological content; like Gellner,

something quite

The proper focus should be on how
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is

a rational

them by using

different senses that are presented as identical. [62

At the same time,

“body of

inhabiting a group, and on the other as a

a right to self-determination. Nationalism does not

is

distinct

the ideology

from the

becomes

-

widespread among a group and

what

it

says. Or,

more

This

gioups

—

group

accurately, the analyst

component groups within
movement.

how that

is

able to take or create a state, not on

must

manner

trace the

which

in

different

proto-national grouping are brought into a unified
political

[54ff.]

is

accomplished through linking the specific

interests

of different component

professionals, intellectuals, businesspeople, workers, peasants,
etc.

achievement ol national statehood. Through

its

false ideological reading

—

to

of the situation

of members of a proto-national group, a nationalism links the members interests
to
5

attainment of a state abstractly. The spread of a nationalism depends on making that
abstract link concrete; that

is,

segments of the population
etc.

-

of appealing to and convincing members of different

that their specific, concrete interests

can be met through attainment of the

state.

In other words,

to accept the nationalist reading of their situation, in such a

actions on their
is

made

easier

own

when

-

way

problems, insecurities,
it is

that the individuals’

behalf are seen to necessarily involve attainment of statehood. This
the individuals’ experience genuine problems that are related to

social differences that can be related to nationality, such as language

people’s native language

communication
It

is

phenomenon.

not the

-

such as

medium of business, governmental,

when

etc.,

in their society.

must be stressed

ideology might

getting individuals

that this focus is primarily

make claims about

It

must be analyzed

on the

culture, nationalism

is

political.

Though

nationalist

a primarily political

in purely political terms. [1]

After presenting his definition of nationalism and detailed but generalized

comments on

(1) the typical

component group of a

forms of and possibilities for participation by each

typical society (aristocracy, business class, peasantry, proletariat,

professional class, intellectuals, etc.) and (2) the nature and role of ideology in

nationalism, Breuilly offers a series of detailed case studies of different types ot
nationalisms.

The

specific typology

is

not relevant to the following discussion.
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What

is

important

is

that he presents histories ot nationalist

movements based on

the initial

definition and general analysis. These analyses are
detailed explanations of the success

or failure of nationalist assertions for statehood, in terms
of the link between statehood

and the specific

interests ol

members of different

constituent groups of the proto-national

society, as well as certain relevant additional factors.

The

Politics of Interest

Close examination of Breuilly

s

Groups

concept of the “political”

is

necessary to a

full

understanding of the implications of his general and specific accounts of nationalism(s).
tend to use the term “political” broadly, recognizing that the political

I

itself is linked to

the other aspects of existence, including psychology, economics, gender relations, family
structures, culture, etc. That

is

not to say that the political can be reduced to other aspects

of existence, or that any of these others can be reduced
in

to the political.

each other, but not identical another or reducible one

They

are involved

to another.

Obviously Breuilly’s analysis of nationalist ideology disallows such a broad
concept of the

political.

Indeed, he would recognize in

it

conflation of politics with other aspects of existence that

For him, the

and

political is strictly that

institutional aspects

be governed.

He

of the

state.

claims that he

is

which

Politics

is

is

the
is

same non-rationally based

central to nationalism itself.

concerned with the governmental

about deciding

how

a population should

avoiding the fault of theories that reduce politics to

other forces, such as economic or cultural. But, in doing so, he

moves

to the other

extreme, denying any substantive link between politics and other aspects of existence,
particularly culture. His opposition to such theories
nationalist equation of the cultural and political

In this middle

is

--

—

as well as to the supposed

excludes a huge middle.

the possibility that there are different forms of political activity

and ideology. Reminiscent of Gellner, he assumes
true nature of the political.

that his basic

framework

isolates the

But, there might be a complexity and variety to the political
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that

he denies. What

is

more,

this variety

intersection

between the abstractly pure

economics,

etc.

politics

—

Though he

is

might in part turn specifically on the

“political"'

right to reject

level of

and such things as culture,

any simplistic identity between culture and

and any nationalist ideology based on

this

—

he

is

not to reject considering that

they are linked.
Indeed, he fails to consider the possibility that even such obviously
false

nationalisms as the one he portrays as the general type

genuine changes

in the nature ot politics.

The

rise

linked to the emergence of mass politics in the

was recognized
it

had up

to

concern every

to that point been.

member of a

From

at the

very least are the register of

of nations or nationalisms was closely

modern
society,

era.

In the 17th Century, politics

and not just the

elite

a state perspective, the next two centuries were the

gradual inclusion of greater portions of societies’ populations in political

from different social groups entered the

model

political process.

for the mobilization of a population

This

by nationalism. Mass

life.

politics is

is

simply the

a direct relationship

the idea. [51]

But, people do not just enter the realm as isolated individuals. Recall
criticism of Gellner

on a similar

and emerging forms of social

point:

relation.

their entrance is also the entrance

From

general populations of societies into politics

This

is

culture,

my

of traditional

a non-state perspective, the entrance of the
--

even

politics

narrowly construed

the entrance of their social relations, contexts, etc. These, in fact,

Language,

Individuals

in fact, Breuilly’s

is,

organization of a set of individuals around an idea. The structure

between each individual and

whose reserve

gender relations, and so forth become

political

now become

-

- means

political.

even formerly

so.

not due to a “nationalist” error of conflation, but from real social and political

changes.

What

is

more, the

political itself changes.

The change

is

not smooth, for there

tension between what might be considered the traditional or formal concept of politics
(Breuilly’s) and the

new

or expanded concept.
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I

am

not arguing that this concept

is

is

a

embodied
nation

specifically or exclusively

by the nation, but rather

that the

emergence of the

part ot the transition. There remains a formal “
state perspective,” the one that

is

Breuilly himself adopts. But other perspectives
nationalist

become

perspective in stark terms delegitimizes

stark formal-statist perspective he adopts.

national perspective,

new

it

available.

His construal of the

as an alternative to the equally

And from what might

better be called a

issues and forces are seen to be relevant to this changing
sense

P®htics. At the risk ot using a Gellnerian turn of thought, the national
perspective

and the emergence of the nation as a
culture

-

is

It is

have

it,

social structure at the intersection of politics with

a necessary product of the popularization of politics.

not just about the introduction of the masses into politics, as Breuilly might

but of their culture, social relations,

etc.,

with them.

It is

precisely with the

popularization of politics that politics as decision-making by a field of interested atomic

becomes an ideology,

individuals

the ideology of the state.

The

state

-

as formal

democracy, or even as absolute subjugation of a population, which as Breuilly helpfully
notes

is

for the first time a direct relationship

power —

a formal or legal

is

framework

relevant to the society as a whole.

appropriation of Gellner
citizens or subjects.

from the

for the

such,

it

making and enforcement of decisions

must

-

at the risk

of another dubious

claim the power to determine the relations

among

the field of

cannot recognize alternative sources of social relations, and

so,

state perspective, national relations are invisible.

It is

little

It

—

As

between every subject and the governing

for this reason that Breuilly’ s extensive set of detailed case studies offers

insight into the formation of nations.

It is

not just that he reduces nationalism to the

pursuit of a state (see Gellner section and below): he reduces nation-formation to the
history of formal political relations from the state perspective. In other words,

when he

analyzes the development of a national movement, he does not register or discuss the

manner

in

which

different constituent groups and individual agents

other and internally structured, nor

how this changed
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were related

to

each

through the process of nation-

formation. Rather, he only explains that at this point,
this group or set of individuals

adopted nationalism, because of this or

that interest they

another gioup, and so toith. Hidden

the social texture and complexity

I

am

is

not claiming, however, that Breuilly’s history

these form critiqued quite often in the past few decades.

gioups

in a national

The problem

is

become meicly
concerns and
to

movement

that his account

in

interests.

They

and

is

discusses all constituent

reductive of each group. For example, peasants

when

are “nationalized”

who

thereby have certain

their interest is successfully appeal

[see 45]

is

anti-national.

It is

They

formation and transformation of states. What he does

exist as important forces in the
is to

reduce nations and

nationalisms to a state form, by factoring out as false nationalist ideology

within the realm of formal state politics, with

mean

Though he

not.

of what he considers characteristically nationalist ideology, he does

not reject nations and nationalisms out of hand.

fit

at that point

or the formation ot a nation, and does so even-handedly

also not to say that Breuilly’s account

rejects the content

so,

a “history” from above, in

is

He

doing

a set of people with a certain position in society,

by nationalist ideology,
It is

had

that he treats all nationalisms as if they

would be obviously problematic. The

its

all

does not

isolated individuals. That does not

were derivative of an extant

national

that

movement becomes an

state

—

that

exercise in

interest-group politics and parliamentary-style coalition-building.

Obviously crucial
forms”

is

to Breuilly’s reduction

of the nation and nationalism

his reduction of nationalism to pursuit of the state.

limits of such a view.

Here

I

merely

stress that, if this is to

In

Chapter

3,

1

to “statist

discuss the

be the definition of

nationalism, then any consideration of the nation must take into account

much more

than

nationalism, and extend to terms such as “national consciousness,” “national

movement,” “diasporan nation/alism,”

etc.

Indeed, a

more accurate terminology might

expose Breuilly’s concept of nationalism as “statism” or
clear

its

limited focus. Breuilly has committed his
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own

“statist nationalism,” to

conflation by

means of a

make

slipping

term.

He

connects nation and state closely by assuming a close
correspondence between

nation and nationalism

— which

of course depends on a broad meaning of nationalism

and simultaneously using the term nationalism
His

to the state.

full

conception of the

state

in a very restricted sense to link

means

that

it

—

closely

the concept of the nation that

it is

will be reduced through this linkage.

In addition to producing a reductive concept of the nation, this
restriction

on

nationalism excludes social and/or political movements in which nationalism
or national

consciousness
It is

is

an element, but not the sole dominant one.

not just that

I

do not agree with Breuilly’s focus on or assumption of a nation

formed through the exercise of rational

self-interest

by a grouping of atomic individuals.

The demographics of national movements themselves problematize

Within

this focus.

any group, there will be some who join a nationalism movement and others who do

The

fracture

might even cut across families. Breuilly

he focuses on arguing

why

fails to

not.

consider this issue. Rather,

nationalism cannot be understood as the politics of just one or

another social group [see especially 4 8 ff. ]

-

that different social

groups are led

to

nationalism by their interests. Given the fact that Breuilly himself assumes that a given

segment of society

—

social

group

—

is

united precisely by

its

shared position and interest,

the observable division within any group in a proto-national society between nationalists,
anti-nationalists,

and non-nationalists

is

a serious

problem

for

any theory of nation and

nationalism based on rational self-interest. Certainly, other factors must be

at

work, and a

different kind of analysis necessary.

That

is

not to say that an individual’s interest does not impact on whether or not

she/he joins a nationalist movement, considers her-/himself a

and so

forth.

member of a

given nation,

But, other factors are essential as well, including social relations that link

individuals in deep

ways

across “ interest groups.”

Breuilly ignores.
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These are precisely the relations

that

The

reliance

on

makes

interest also

choose a national movement when

is

it

it

difficult to

understand

why many

explicitly against their interests,

people

and they suffer

gieatly foi their participation. Appeal to the effects
of propaganda and manipulation go

only so

far,

but

more importantly.

An
In the

much

Exceptional Exception

discussed and touted Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity
[1992],

Liah Greenfeld presents the social histories of the formations of the English, French.
Russian, German, and (North) American presumed nations. Guiding these histories as

them

well as revealed in

supplementary

is

a general account of nationalisms and nations, which, in

articles, is applied to a

range of other presumed nations.

At the beginning and end of her treatment of the “ American nation,” Greenfeld
states that all nations are “exceptional” [Greenfeld, 1992:

Yet, “the uniqueness itself of American nationalism

[is]

402] or “unique[]” [484],

peculiar” [402],

America

is

an

exceptional exception.

Greenfeld reiterates

this special, exceptional

standard tenet of “Americanism,” that

is,

uniqueness ad nauseam, echoing a

the ideology that the United States

is

a special

“nation” that manifests most the special potential of human individual and social
achievement. America is/was the most “national” nation: “The national element in

[the

American

a

nation]

is

challenged by the fewest counter influences [of any nation];

it

is

purer example of a national community than any other” [403]. America was the most

“Americans pledged themselves,

sincerely committed to freedom and equality:
explicitly

and unambivalently than did the English before them

universal liberty” [423]; further, “.
equality to an extent that
truly liberated:

most concretely

it

.

.

the

American society was

was unimaginable elsewhere”

was an “oasis of liberty

egalitarian society:

[or

in the

from the

.

more

any other group],
.

committed

to

to

America was the most

enslaved world” [442], America was the

first,
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[452],

.

far

American society was “characterized

by a unique equality of conditions”

Indeed, “that equality in American society

[429],

had advanced beyond anything imaginable elsewhere
disputed

.

.

.

and

the reality in

America

at

in this regard

the time [1830] cannot be

was incomparably

better than in

any other society ...” [452], America was the most tolerant and
unantagonistic:
“

Unlike the case

in so

by the hatred of the

many

other:

it

other nations, American national identity

knew no

[resentment]” [422]; “

put certain uniquely American qualities into sharper

meaning
itself

to the

was

relief.

a universal nation, the nation of mankind.

.

.

.”

[my emphasis -

Its

in the respective national identities, in

alternative to the national identity

the people

the

who

pointing out

immigration helped

reinforced and gave a

to

new

most

uniqueness was a result of a

attitudes

America

it

and became a central

always remained a marginal

which was profoundly universalistic”

“ self-made” nation: “

it,

more than any

other,

[438], Further,

was a

creation of

believed themselves Americans, and a product of their national identity

and loyalty” [480], America was “singularly receptive
at

.

437]. “ But while in other countries ethnic

chauvinism of this kind easily crowded out alternative

America was

.

claim that America had a universal mission, and that the American nation

unique fusion of peoples

element

It

.

was not sustained

its

own “shortcomings”

as a nation,

America was ‘Number One,’

possessing an “unparalleled penchant for self-criticism” [461]. The

So America

is

special, very special.

admiration for America

spills

It is

Indeed, even

to culture” [461],

goes on and on.

list

“the best” nation. Greenfeld’s love and

over beyond these superlative statements above, to

restatements of the standard American points of pride (or self-delusion, depending on

one’s perspective). For instance, Americans possessed an “uncompromising

commitment

... to the purified principles of civic nationalism” [423],

conquest of the West, Americans came

to

be identified with “ a pioneering

unpolished, but honest, independent, and self-confident individual
difference between right and

Immigrants’ commitments

wrong and was

to the

Through

steadfast in his solid

who

.

.

the

spirit,

.

common

knew

with the
the

sense” [434],

United States “derived from the uplifting, dignifying
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ef fects of liberty

and equality, the exhilarating

even the expectation of a greater prosperity.

.

.

lure

.

of opportunity, and the enjoyment or

They embraced American

identity

eagerly, because only as Americans were they elevated to the
status of men” [435 j.

Again, the

list

goes on and on, but

I

will save

some of the more choice examples

for

references in support of subsequent points.

Such
Greenfeld

s

blatant statements of bias and aggrandizement are

enough

to betray

dubious agenda. They are not, however, necessarily sufficient

this

agenda.

that

makes them appear well-reasoned,

to

accomplish

To be credible, they must be supported by a historical narrative structure

functions in the service of that agenda

not biased. Examination of how this structure
is

central to

any discussion of the ideologically-

driven “use” of nations and scholarship on them.

Greenfeld’ s method

is

to

“normalize” the history of the United States around her

image of it. This includes focusing on
embarrassing details that

call

it

into question,

cannot be explained away. There are

away

details that reinforce that image, explaining

many

and

utterly ignoring those details that

points around which this normalization

occurs.

The

first,

ironically,

is

the very claim of a special, universally significant,

exceptional exceptionality. Such claims are anything but exceptional. Indeed, even

claims of “national exceptionalism” specifically based on a superior adherence
ideals are not unique to the United States. There are,

first,

to liberal

the legitimate claims of anti-

colonial nationalism to have been the true bearers of universal liberation against the

hypocritical structure of liberal colonialism. But, these
liberal theorists in the

US,

United States and Western Europe as

British, French, etc., liberalizing project.

theory of the nation

competing

—

historical

movements

What

and of the French nation

and

intellectual

primacy

is

more

in particular

in the

in fact

are often portrayed

an extension of the

interesting

—

by

is

that at least

one

claims for itself a

production of universal

liberty.

Julie

Kristeva’s Nations Without Nationalism [1993], originally published in French two years
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before Greenfeld

s

work, asserts for the French nation a primacy based
on very similar

tenets as Greenfeld's aggrandizement of the United
States.

Kristeva views modern contractarian liberal ideals to have

come from

Enlightenment, into the French Revolution, rather than from English
theory, into the

Ameiican Revolution,

French nation

is

is

its

is striking.

According

1

992

399

-

to Kristeva, the

uniquely and fundamentally universalizing, and based on voluntaristic

social contract principles.

more,

liberal contract

as Greenfeld lays out [Greenfeld,

411], Yet, the similarity of the perceived results

the French

It

emphasizes individuality,

universal principles suit

it

liberty,

and equality. What

is

singularly well for the integration of immigrants, and

counterpoised to illegitimate collectivist perversions of French national identity. These

points are, of course, central to Greenfeld’s representation of the American “civic
nation.”

There

are,

of course, differences.

Greenfeld limits the extent of the

First,

universalizing mission of the United States to

its

eventual territorial expanse.

The

conquest of half a continent and assimilation of millions of immigrants (most of its
population deriving from immigration) appear a sufficient universalization of America.

On

the other hand, Napoleon’s failures and the lesser

immigrants

in

French history require Kristeva

to

numbers and presence of

supplement the actual universalizing

reach of France in the ideal realm. Kristeva thus projects the universalization of the

French nation through the dissemination of French
ideals throughout the world,

which

universalistic, egalitarian, liberal

will ultimately transform the

world into a unified

global liberal society.

The

shift to the ideal

realm does not, however, negate the Napoleonic project

at

the core of Kristeva’s account of the (French) nation. Kristeva repeats the rhetoric of

universalization that justified Napoleonic expansion, represented as the spread of the

Revolutionary ideals. This suggests a sublimation of the imperialist/expansionist core of
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Fiench nationality

into the ideal or intellectual realm

universalistic account ot a nation necessarily

acknowledge and engage

this

is

16
.

This

is

not to suggest that every

Napoleonic, but Kristeva’s failure to

very significant aspect of Franco-Universalism

implies her acceptance or reflection of

it.

Franco-Universalism cannot be taken simply

face value, as Kristeva does, but rather must be acknowledged in

negative history and possibilities

Second,

around rational

itself

its full reality,

self-interest, Kristeva

assumptions about social agency

employs a more subtle

if

not

more

plausible

psychoanalytic account of the “need” for nationality. “Pride” in one’s nation

is

just as

Of course,

hackneyed and dubious

with

intact.

in place ot Greenfeld’s rather pedestrian

healthy narcissistic self-image.

at

this psychological account, if

is

part of a

more complex,

as Greenfeld’s “rational self-interest” assumption.

I

take this up again below.

The

crucial difference for us, however,

is

that

between the methods of Greenfeld

and Kristeva. Kristeva’s account of the French nation

is

essentially just the espousal of

the tenets of Franco-Universalism, in a linkage with psychoanalytic theory. Greenfeld

is

more

It

subtle, backreading her ideology into a historical narrative of the United States.

therefore requires a

more

detailed examination.

The American Nation

From

the

first,

Greenfeld assumes that the ultimate American nation will consist

of some form of homogeneous group. While she
“collective subject,” she writes in fact as

Americans

if

it

rejects the idea that the nation

is

a

were/had been. Greenfeld presents

as if a unitary group sharing key characteristics. For example, she writes ol

in the Genealogy of Morals.
is a somewhat Nietzschean point, following his analysis of Christianity
also has similarities to Greenfeld’s argument that Marxism was just sublimated German nationalism,
ol
another Nietzschean analysis. However, there is a much more explicit connection between the ideology
Napoleonic expansion and Kristeva’s French nationalism than between Marx and German nationalism.
l6

This

It

requires
Indeed, in the former case, the rhetoric is identical, while the latter is highly speculative. It
assuming (1) that Marx was a German nationalist in the first place, which Greenfeld justifies solely on his
at some
youthful embrace of Romanticism (though not German nationalism and (2) that, even if Marx was
take up this issue in more detail
point a German nationalist, he never moved beyond this ideology.
I

below.
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the

Amer it an people

leeling uniform urges [442], “ the

American respect

for the

individual” [460], and “ the American attitude toward reason”
[460] [my emphasis

throughout]. In her conclusion, she states that “to be an American
means to persevere in

one’s loyalty to the ideals

(which
at the

.

.

[484]

-

is

only one

way

to

“be an American”

her way). Indeed, she presumes a unitary “American national purpose”
[429]

is

core of the history of the nation.

Such statements undermine her
Greenfeld does acknowledge
entity.”

“

there

She also recognizes

American

nation.”

that, after

explicit recognition

new

independence, the

that each original state

of the more complex
states

reality.

“were not one

might have been considered

its

own

Indeed, she admits that, for a long time after the American

Revolution, there was no clear consensus on “what was, or whether there was, the

American nation.” [423] What she does not doubt

would

be.

Though she recognizes

this initial

is

that there should

complexity,

it is

have been or

formulated as a problem

hindering the proper formation of the United States nation, rather than an open
history in

which a range of equally legitimate and possible

Greenfeld begins

at the

moment

in

futures existed [see 423],

end, with an ideal goal of perfect unity and uniformity. Her

narrative assumes that the 13 colonies are an Aristotelian acorn

growth should always have been

into a unified “ nation.”

chronologically, she had developed

it

whose

Though she

in the reverse order.

natural, correct

presents the history

The exclusion of past

alternative strains of US nationality corresponds to an implicit exclusion of the

contemporary complexity of the United States as nation, which any assumption of
ultimate unity must make.

While some

in early

America might have questioned whether

there needed to or

should be one “American nation,” for Greenfeld there was never a doubt. This

assumption

in itself is powerful:

through

United States becomes illegitimate.

By assuming

It

it,

the multiplicity that existed in the early

must be subjugated

“
the unitary nature of the

American
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nation,

to a unifying, univocal totality.

Greenfeld authorizes

statements about what

is

consistent with that nature and what

this nature (see below), she

consistent with

away

it

makes

“un-American” -

in

spurious to American core values:

hearted” [483].
the

every era of American history, and have been

much

Benjamin Franklin, Thomas

“on

any other), Greenfeld dismisses

as

the whole, nativist sentiments

to enforce uniformity

Though

such things

Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson (who believed

United States a sacrosanct nation as

widespread and efforts

to explain

movements (excepting of

nativist

a range of influential leaders including

Jefferson, the Federalists,

defines

tautologically.

For instance, even though anti-immigrant
Anglos, of course) have occurred

Once she

of the history of the nation that are not

all details

suddenly inessential to the history. This frees her

as accidental or

championed by

is not.

I

treat, the

championed by many

political

Buchanan — had been

rising for years.

half-

was passed before publication of

groundswells against immigration

and media

as

were not

on the part of the leadership were

California’s Proposition 187

main work of Greenfeld’ s

it

the

figures, not the least of

The popular support

—

whom was

Pat

for such initiatives

is

clear

from voting records; frequent instances of anti-immigrant violence; and perpetual,
innumerable

racist

popular representations of immigrants.

marginal force, not even taken seriously by

it

It

can hardly be considered a

proponents.

Further, the racism associated with slavery and slavery itself become, rather than a
central element of

American ideology,

actually wn-American.

without reference to slavery, the differences between

Even more broadly, and

New England

and the South

becomes, respectively, a tension between true American nationality (with

its

“ unique

equality of conditions” and “ indomitable leveling spirit” [429]) and a spurious,

obviously un-American society, of ” docile
better

and trusted

strains in a

in

them”

[430].

Why

more complex “American

is

commoners who “knew

there no

room

knew

tor both of these as aspects or

nationality” or nation?
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their betters

The Ideal American Nation
For more incisive

any claim of the homogeneity of nations

theorists,

suspect.

is

Greenfeld does not question that nations are homogeneous. Rather,
she differentiates

between two types of homogeneity. The

homogeneity

characteristic of, for instance,

nation erases one’s individuality

and factors beyond one’s

Membership
nation

(its

is

—

control.

one

is

a “civic” or “social contract” nation.
to the ideals at the core

makes

it

from the English

“England”

444

-

of the

voluntaristic

—

in the content

nationals. Thus, the ideals of the

are “liberty,” “equality,”

commitment

[just listed]:

it

first

in the

manner

American nation -

“democracy,” “individualism,”

The nature of the American

to these ideals [see, for instance,

406, 413, 420, 441,
its

devotion to the

turned them into reality” [409].

Competing

The

449]

to a large extent)

of the ideals as well as

449, 481, 484], Indeed, “American society was exemplary in

English ideals

-

superior.

“ self-interest,” “ universalism,” and similar liberal “ goods.”

is

in the

merely part of a given group, based on forces

are the former type, but the United States (and

which they are embraced by

nation

Membership

nationalism.

determined by voluntary commitment

the latter. That

inherited

German

The second

Voluntarism must be reflected
in

is

the “collective” or “ethnic”

constitution, legal structure, and the principles underlying them). [444

Most nations
is

first is

problem, of course,

is

that

it is

Ideals

very clear that not

counted as Americans really have shared such ideals

-

at least in

all

those

who must

be

concrete terms, not just

through lip-service. For Greenfeld’ s claim that the essence of the American nation has

been adherence

to these ideals requires accounting in

some way

for the fact that

many

Americans did not or do not so adhere.
Greenfeld narrates the history of the United States as a development in which the
ideals in question

become dominant over

a period
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of two and a half centuries (1620s

through the

1

860s).

From

the beginning of the “ national”
narrative, these ideals are
the

”hero.” They are presented as the
essence of the nation;

all that

remains

is

the telling of

their dissemination throughout
the nation.

Competing

( 1 )

“American nation" -

sets

of ideals

-

or,

more

generally, alternative concepts of
the

are thereby rendered inessential.

They can be acknowledged

significant at this or that point in the narrative,
while at the

same time not being

as

definitive

of the nation. For instance, Greenfeld attributes
more developed forms of the defense of
slavery to a “nascent Southern ideology.”

The emerging

ideals

of this nationalism were

the anti-umversahst positing of one’s racial
group above others, the anti-capitalist valuing

of “honor above wealth,” hierarchy, and obedience.
[476] Because these were different

from the

of ideals that she claims for the core of US national

set

tautologically concludes that the nascent Southern nationalism

American”

identity,

Greenfeld

was “no longer

[476].

She then portrays the Civil War as the

battle

between these two

which the properly American ones emerged victorious and

the

sets

of ideals, in

un-American ones were

purged.
It is

unclear

why

these “ Southern” ideals are not properly part of American

ideology. First, prior to the Civil War, they certainly were important in the
general
ideological structure of the United States.

even under the supposition

commitment
seriously.

to pluralism

Only an

They seem “un-American” only

in retrospect,

that “typical Northerners” already did not share them.

would seem

to require taking divergent

anti-pluralistic history

would require

that just

opinions and ideologies

one

set

of ideals be

allowed as legitimate. One the one hand, Greenfeld touts pluralism, individual
etc.,

as key

American

ideals,

liberty,

while on the other she denies the legitimacy of any opinion

or ideology that diverges from a strict liberal line.
is

A

The pluralism she

finds in

US

history

then a pluralism of content, not one ofform. She claims that people valued pluralism

and

liberty,

and

that the formation

of the American nation was through dissemination of
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these core values throughout the
society. But, as she admits
[see 423], the reality of

pluralism and individual liberty
undercuts the possibility of their
being adopted as ideals
uniformly, by all in a society. Rather
than recognize in this tension
perhaps a key to the

complexity of the United States
delegitimating and excluding

“core”

liberal values.

all

(at least

from a

liberal perspective), she
resolves

by

discourses, ideals, etc., that do not
accord with her

She imposes a certain kind of liberty, forcing
the objects of her

narrative to accept pluralism by negating
their exercise of

Greenfeld might counter that she

is

it.

merely retelling the history of the organic

process by which these core liberal values came
to be held by most or

American

it

society. This brings

me

to

my

second point. With respect

all

members of

to slavery,

is

it

not

clear that these supposedly Southern values
have not been held by at least a significant
part of the population since the Civil War.

the 1960s

-

Most of the

social

including civil rights, feminism, and anti-war

predominant authoritarianism

in

US

- were

culture and politics. These

feared precisely because they undermined “authority.”
this authority

and

political

movements of

reacting against a

movements were

Given the widespread

cannot be said to have been voluntarily acceded

to.

often

protesting,

Furthermore, to take

one example, the continuing, half-century appeal of perhaps the most “American”
filmmaker, Frank Capra, directly contradicts any claim that the valuing of honor
over

wealth

is

“ un-American” or a purely “
Southern” divergence.

Capra seemed

to be claiming this valuing

identity, in

much

“America”

;

if

the

is

his films, in fact,

of honor over wealth as central

way Greenfeld claims

Greenfeld’s

Through

to

American

the opposite. Clearly different visions of

a legitimate representative of

some Americans,

so

is

Capra’s.
Third, even assuming that these really were the ideals of the South only and that

they were purged from the United States, this need not mark the emergence of the proper,
legitimate

American ideology

development

in a

as dominant.

complex of American

It

might mark simply a change or

ideologies. Before the change, these values were
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part
this

of America, but
does not mean

for

that

one reason or another,

evolved away from them. What

it

America thereby became committed

to a single, unitary ideology.

Just as the “ Southern ideology” might
have passed out of existence (which

argument

s

sake), other beliefs and ideological tendencies
might have

maintain the

initial

ideals alone could generate the war.

However,

changes occur only when specific

specific interest will benefit

American

identity.

from a given

She intends

this as

at

one point, she

be allowed,

national

it

allow for

emerged

is

ideal, will that ideal

framework without

the wayside does not

quite clear that

Only when a

be asserted as central to

an explanation of how slavery could have been

fracturing the nation.

mean

comes

But, if this argument

et al.

(2) This implies, further, that

It is

only

when

specific interests are

about. That sets of ideals continually

that ultimately only

emerge continually, taken up by other

one

set will

New sets

remain.

arguments against other

sets

fall

by

might

interests.

it is

not ideals that drive American nationality, but

interests that use the ideals for specific agendas. Greenfeld devotes relatively

ideals she

of

also follows that multiple sets of ideals might coexist within a general

linked to different ideals that conflict

for

to

this conflict

interests are linked to ideals.

resolved for so long with the pure American ideals of liberty
is to

I

complexity.

Greenfeld assumes that the nation was an ideal nation, and
so

political

more,

is

of ideals.

Much more

of a focus

is

little

space

establishing that the

views as definitive of the United States are actually the potent unifying force

she claims. The “hero” ideals must also overcome more practically-focused,
“ realpolitical” forces.

This tension between ideal and practical

of US history. According

explicit in Greenfeld’s representation

to Greenfeld, in the early years

tension between Jeffersonian idealists,

“freedom”

is

et al absolutely,

of the Union, there was a

who remained committed

and Hamiltonian

realists,

who tempered

the ideals by placing a value on the preservation of the
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to the liberal values

Union

their

simpliciter.

of

commitment
For

to

Jeffersonians (including Jefferson),
individual liberty and self-determination
were the

ultimate values, and to sacrifice them

was

to dissolve the

Union

that

was based on them,

Hamiltonians (including Hamilton) believed
some sacrifice of individual rights was
necessary in order to strengthen the Union
economically and politically. “ Hamilton

thought the compromise of national principles
a
[44

1

fair price for the

welfare of the nation ”

Indeed, " he sacrificed the individual to the
collective” [44
1

]

power and welfare of the

collective,

ideals of Greenfeld’s claims for the

which

is,

an end

in itself, losing sight

would seem appropriate

at

nation.”

to re-evaluate the nature

its

idealists

order to ensure the
to the

core

17

times took on the welfare of the nation as

of the ideals that made

really be “ idealistic” if even

in

of course, directly contrary

“American

Greenfeld admits that even Jefferson

]

engage

it

what

it

was

[442],

Based on

this,

of the “American nation.” Could
in realpolitics?

it

it

Greenfeld does not

follow up this line of enquiry. Rather, she goes to great pains
from there on to explain

why

the practical failings of the United States do not reflect a lack
of commitment to

its

“national ideals” or a more complex nature of the nation.
Jefferson, of course,

More

was unaware of his

importantly, Americans in general

quest for liberty, equality,

et al

—

-

remained

lapses,

and did not intend them [442],

whatever the concrete failings of their grand
fully

committed

to the ideals.

It

was not

their

lack of commitment, but rather the great absoluteness of the ideals themselves, that

created the gap. Americans were “committed to equality to an extent unimaginable

l7

This is, in some sense, a misrepresentation (and misperception) on Greenfeld’s part. Though one might
counterpoise a “ collective” to “ an aggregate of individuals,” it is not true that liberalism shuns the former.
In fact, central to liberal capitalism is one form of collective individual, the corporation. Individual owners
are fully absorbed into this collective, and lose their legal identity with respect to it. There is a key
difference, however. In the case of the collective nation, Greenfeld views the individual as lost,

suppressed,

etc.

On

the other hand, in the case of the collective corporation, the individual directly

membership. When he/she makes bad business decisions, only corporate assets are affected;
indeed, in most criminal cases and lawsuits against a corporation, corporate officers and others are not
directly involved — only the corporation is touched. In this way, the collective is a construct that shields
individuals who might bear direct responsibility for crimes and dishonest acts. To say that the corporate
collective allows an “excess” of individuality beyond it is merely to recognize its role in shielding
individuals from their individual responsibility.
This is hypocritical. So long as the collective serves individuals, Greenfeld apparently approves.
Only when it does not have such clear benefits, does she object. Her case against the “collective nation” is
based on the general features of collectively, which are fully present in the implicitly approved corporate
benefits from

collective.
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elsewhere.”

What

is

more, concrete “equality

in

anything imaginable elsewhere ” Unfortunately,

American society had advanced beyond
its

“brilliant ideal”

pure, that the gap remained huge.
[452] This, of course,

American nationalism, and

to criticize

it

for the

gap

is

is

was

so high, so

a strength, not a weakness of

quite misleading.

Unfortunately for Greenfeld, the nature of the gap
between ideals and reality in
the case of the United States

supposedly core
in the

is

truly gaping,

She avoids

ideals.

and belies a

this criticism

full

commitment

by claiming continually

to the

that conditions

United States were very egalitarian, and social and economic
differences minimal

compared

to other societies.

Abuses of this

equality, in the

sweatshop labor of women and children, can be

American

realpolitics of

Hamilton

[see 441],

form for instance of

attributed to such forces as the un-

Labor unrest becomes not an expression of

legitimate discontent with a system that tends to support exploitation, but rather
as the
assertion of a “particularistic interest” against the true national one [439], Labor leaders,

such as Seth Luther

in 1832,

“refused to see national interest

promote the welfare of the workers, and interpreted appeals
this

in

anything that did not

to the nation that did not take

welfare into consideration as thinly camouflaged attempts on the part of some

Imperial and Kingly sympathizers to subvert the American national purpose” [439].

Greenfeld’s analysis here

is

problematic in a number of ways.

First,

she dismisses

labor organizing as the hysterical spinning of conspiracy theories, by and for those
resentful of their lowly socio-economic position. This ignores the history of American

business, in which political forces aided economic in producing a serious level of brutal
exploitation. Certainly the 19th Century gap between rich and poor

today).

Workers

in coal

was profound

(as

it

is

mines, in sweat shops, in factories, lived in squalor, a step away

from starvation, with no medical treatment. “ Bosses” constantly squeezed wages down,
even as workers died
horrific conditions

at

young ages from

the

working conditions.

It is

hard to dispute the

under which most Americans labored, and all-too-many continue

to

labor today. Greenfeld dismisses a very persuasive, well-grounded, historically important
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challenge to the American order (the labor movement)
by ignoring the reality
manifested/

A

(not asserts).

it

strange form of social history.

Greenfeld portrays wealth differentials as an inevitable
by-product of benign
equal competition
439],

“Those not

among

individuals possessing different levels of ability
[see 438

specially

endowed

in

any way” were naturally disappointed

failure to gain wealth, especially in times
liberal formulation, this delegitimizes
It

of “scarcity” [438], In a

any claims

that the situation

transforms the protests into the mere resentment

-

-

at their

classic, discredited

of workers was unfair.

psychological understandable, but

philosophically ungrounded.

She does not extend the courtesy even of psychological understanding

to the

participants in Shays’ Rebellion. She does not recognize this as instance of popular
protest against the consolidation of economic and political

Revolutionary American

elites

who

power by power-

profited directly and indirectly from the war, over the

very population that made great financial and personal sacrifices in the war against the
British.

It

was, rather, terrorism [430].

quote by John Adams,
individual freedom

—

to

Thomas

implicitly,

Its

only appearance in her narrative

Jefferson,

admonishing him

among common

terrorism of Shays’ Rebellion” [my emphasis].

citizens:

And

this

“

is

through a

for supporting too

’You have never

comes within

felt

much
the

a general

discussion of the extremes of individual liberty, juxtaposed to the Terror of the French
Revolution.

Second, Greenfeld characterizes labor

interests as a “particular interest” against

the properly national interest. But, this “particular interest” (1)

majority of Americans and (2) was an interest utterly ignored
Sr.,

was

in the

that

of the vast

John D. Rockefeller,

type of quest for obscene profits in Dickensian 19 th Century America.

ideals”

were producing a society

(even

colonial-era

if

Century), then

how

that

it

“American

allowed hyper-exploitation of most Americans

America was somewhat

could

If

egalitarian, this did not continue in the 19th

be illegitimate for the vast majority of Americans
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to assert

their

views on

how America

should be? This would appear

be an exercise of

to

democratic participation.
Yet, again, Greenfeld dismisses

it

as an almost sinister operation
of

and perversion of properly American values.

self-interest

commitment

to Greenfeld's ideals counts as
properly

Self-interest

is

part of the core values of

seems, however, that Greenfeld recognizes

it

universal.

is

American idealism.

America according

it

to Greenfeld.

when

It

does not interfere

it

does not threaten the power of elites.

a deeper issue. Greenfeld holds that the
core

That they appear universal

’

appears that only

as legitimate only

with her grand narrative of America, and when

There

It

un-American

in abstract content

I

American values

As

will grant.

I

are

began

to

suggest above, however, Greenfeld appears to conflate their
content with their form. If

workers concepts of the nation are
the elites
the

who produced

its

mere content of their

particularistic,

how much more

guiding ideology, constitution, and economic structure? That

- makes

political ideology is “universalistic”

universal applicability of certain principles, and universal rights of

mean

that

it

was

the proper or actual ideology of most people.

slaves/abolitionists,

claims about the

mankind - does not

As many

labor leaders,

and particularly Native Americans have been aware, the rhetoric of

American universalism often operates
class.

so are the interests of

in the very particular interests

That such leaders as Jefferson might have been “sincere”

spreading liberty to (some) other Americans does not

mean

of a very narrow

in their

commitment

own

that their

self-interest did

not blind them to the failings and limitations of their “universalistic ideology.”
if

/

and

have freedom
free.

of others.

to act,

and benefit from

“ Self-interest”

I

will see

monopoly on

what

it, I

can also mean self-absorption.
it is

in

my

interest to see.

It is

I

am

After

all,

in as liberated

easy to ignore the situation

The lower

classes do not have a

the conflation of national and particular interests.

Further, if these universal values have
to) in

experience the society

to

American

become widely held

society does not thus represent
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some automatic

(if

not widely adhered

universal form.

Membership

in the

American nation was not purely

—

through direct means

them

-

“voluntaristic,” but

including threats ot and actual violence against any

and the indirect means of cultural persuasion considered by

liberalism John Stuart Mill to be
the operation of such

more

mechanisms,

recognizes this point in principle:
attached to an ideal for
interest must.

It

it

to

sinister than direct force.

at least in colonial

when

does not matter what the majority

used direct and indirect means

to

is

paragon of

Greenfeld even admits
[see 406],

She also

really saying that a

powerful

feel or think.

endlessly over the facts of whether those in power have

impose an

illusory concept of

America onto

quite likely that something besides pure voluntary acceptance

it is

required to change the positions of workers from their
fully

America

that

who opposed

she says that a “significant interest” needs to be

become prominent, she

Though one might debate

population,

was imposed

critical stance, if

it

the general

was

has indeed been

changed. Not only was the “universalism” of the supposedly original American

ideals a very particular universalism, but

inconsistent with
It is

its

it

might well have been imposed through means

content.

important to add that Hamilton’s “practical” ideas on

how America

should

function were no less an example of “ idealism” than Jefferson’s, in the proper sense of
the term.

They were

those ideas

ideas

on how a society should be organized. Whether the content of

abstract and glorious, or realpolitical and base,

was

makes no

Again, Greenfeld conflates form and content. Idealism does not refer
set

to the content

of ideas around which a society should be organized, but rather the

be made to correspond
a description of

economic

it.

It

to a set

of ideas

at all.

should be, that

is,

a different

It

fact that

it

of a

should

Hamilton’s vision of America was not

was, rather, an alternative suggestion for

structuring, a different vision.

difference.

was a

its

at all

future political and

different concept of

what America

American nationalism. One might even argue

that,

it

Greenfeld’s claims that early 19th Century America really was relatively egalitarian, then

166

Hamilton was more ot an
that

was

from

farther

that

idealist than Jefferson, in

which actually

Again, the abstractness of the

American
an end in

nationality

much

direct conflict
sets

is

of ideals

made

to

existed.

Greenfeld touts as the core of

liberal ideals

not a counter to this argument. After

is

an ideal of the nation as

all,

or of the general welfare of the nation as the supreme value,

itself,

an ideal as

pushing for a concept of the nation

as the valuation of individual self-determination

between “ reality” and “ ideal.” Rather, there

—

both of which presumably have operated

look

like

a conflict between ideals and

is

in the

reality.

It is,

is.

There

a conflict

is

certainly

is

here no

between two

“American nation” —

that

however, nothing more

than the conflict between the idealisms of “abstract liberalism” and “economic realism.”

The

“ universalism” of the liberal ideals

They were from

The excluded,

was

the beginning only to be applied to

in fact,

were

forcefully, brutally,

limited in another way, as well.

some

and continually barred from sharing

these ideals, from accepting them as their own, even as

gaining access to them.

From

values,

which

I

will take

does not even attempt

many devoted themselves

the beginning, slaves and

Greenfeld goes to great lengths

inhabitants of the United States.

women were

to explain these exclusions

up below. But there

to explain

it

is

away

to

excluded.

as inessential to the core

an exclusion so blatant that Greenfeld

away. Rather, she completely ignores

it,

admit

either

or because

because she herself is the victim of an American ideology

that cannot

she consciously or unconsciously recognizes the danger

poses to her normalizing

narrative of

American

history.

At no point

which includes discussions of its

in

in the

it

it,

90-page history of the United

States,

settlement, immigrants, and every other segment ot the

Greenfeld argues, in
population, does Greenfeld even mention Native Americans. While

good 19th Century

liberal fashion, that things

and the slaves were eventually

make

the

freed,

women

have gotten better

all

the time in America,

eventually granted the vote,

same claims regarding Native Americans. Wherever

Native Americans were purely excluded. They were generally
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etc.,

she cannot

the United States spiead.
killed, or deported, or

imprisoned

Even

in

concentration-camp inspiring reservations, where

the small residual populations of the tribes that survived

many

subsequently died.

(many being

utterly

wiped

out) continue to live in horrendous and oppressed conditions, continue to have naked

military force applied against them, etc.
will discuss this further below. Here, suffice

I

Native Americans

—

Even

if

one

is

to accept the

the right and ability even to hold

excluded groups, for

at least

generally,

it

argument

Native Americans

it

was not

—

of the

of

liberal

that participation in the

them - has been allowed

many Native American groups were genocided and
More

to say that the treatment

calls into question the “universalizing” pretensions

ideals Greenfeld touts.
ideals

it

for

some previously

no other reason than

if for

18

so were not there for bestowal.

suggests a certain constant principle attached to the stated ideals, one

that is perhaps less stated today, but is nonetheless in full force: there are always limits

on the

applicability of the ideals of

freedom and

equality.

Even

if,

in the

the excluded groups have varied (except for Native Americans), and

maneuverings have allowed (some) ex-slave progeny and

American

nation, groups are always being produced

who

women

United States,

complex

to share in the ideal

are excluded:

Korean

immigrants, communists, witches, (East) Indians, Iranians, gays, lesbians, bisexuals,
Latinos, Chicanos, Haitians, etc.

Given
identity

this,

it

is

crucial to qualify Greenfeld’s claim that

was not sustained by

been and be true

the [resentful] hatred of the other” [422],

that, at least in

resentment of another group
group. But, that does not

“American

--

some

that

mean

is,

instances,

might have

American unity was not based on

a

a feeling of inferiority or tear in the tace ot another

that “the other

perpetuation of “American national identity.
inferiority, that has characterized

It

national

“American

has played no role in the constitution and
It is

a feeling of superiority not

national identity”

-

superiority to internal

comparisons of the United
(and external) “ others.” Greenfeld’s incessant favorable
l8

A

“

those

posthumous” bestowal

who

is

at

most a clever technique of genocide

are long dead.

168

denial.

It is

easy to be respectful ot

States to other states, nations, and societies

is

a perfect instance of

American ideology and self-conceptualization

Central to

this.

not resentment of, but arrogance,

is

condescension, and imperiousness toward, “others.”
I

do not mean

in these ideals,

(self-interest)

presume

to

of course. For,

it

that Native

Americans would want

was such elements of the

and “private property”

that

ideals as “individualism”

were instrumental

deportations, genocides, and erosion of tribal civilizations.

perhaps the only “Americans”
essential

touts

-

have seen

Why would their “un-American”

rejected them.

America should

who

probable answer

most revealing: American nationality

The Native Americans

behind her
the

ideals.

American

colonizer.

how much

With dramatic

liberal ideals. [412]

The

this

and

as the ideals of Andrew

is

not based on land, but on

was one of the justifications

right to their traditional lands.

Greenfeld hides from the Native American Question
irony, Greenfeld cautions that the relationship

colonists and the mother country

She explains

meaning of the

therefore have no claim on American-ness based on their

of their genocide and deportation, and denial of their
interesting

-

can be called “American,” the most so? Greenfeld’s

habitation here; they are not American. But, of course, this

It is

Native Americans

concepts of an ideal society, of what

not,

ideals.

of native lands,

their dark implications,

Jackson? Are they
is

Many

“American nation”

be, not be as essential to the

of all

in the theft

in a position to appreciate fully the

American values Greenfeld

have participated

to

by appeal

to the

was not

that

between colonized and

commitment of each

actual answer, of course,

is

between

much more

to the

direct

-

same

set

of

and more

problematic for Greenfeld. The Native Americans were the colonized, and the

“American”
colonizer.
(British-

settlers

The

who became

situation

was

independent were merely a splinter group ot the

similar to South Africa, in that

and German-produced) struggled

for control

two

of a colony and

great proportion of land in America’s case translated into a great
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factions ot colonizers

its

colonized.

number of laborers

The
in

South Africa

s.

Greenfeld

answer thus once again ignores the

s

real instance

of

colonization.

The

British, for their part,

vis-a-vis the colonies
is

was morally defensible”

because of their commitment

reading

is

"were never completely convinced

correct, then

why

to the ideals

[421], Again, according to Greenfeld, this

of self-determination,

clear, as is Greenfeld’ s

complete lack of appreciation of the

“acceptability” of American separation. At the very

would remain

in charge.

central tenet of

10])

— was

modem

liberty, et al.

If her

did the British hang on to India so doggedly, never doubting

for an instant their legitimate right to hold that colony, to rule
is

that their position

The

ideal of “the

least,

it

completely? The answer

real

reason for the relative

white men, and

White Man’s Burden”

-

liberals,

another ignored

liberalism (espoused even by John Stuart Mill [Mill, 1977: 9

-

thereby satisfied.

American Racism
Etienne Balibar has perceptively attributed

late

20th Century globally-

disseminated concepts of race and racism to three sources: colonialism, the Holocaust

and Nazism, and the

many Americans —
identity.

it

treatment of

I

this

to

view

the

American

liberal

promote universal freedom and equality — could

to

38].

He

--

as well as

entirely.

who developed

slavery and even be slave holders?

committed

blacks [Balibar, 1991a:

have already mentioned, slavery poses a big problem

be that the very people

supposed

its

has recognized race and racism as central to American national

Greenfeld rejects

As
can

US

How could

it

to equality

only to three-fifths of another?

And

ideology

at the

How

— which was

same time approve

ot

be that these people so absolutely

freedom could approve of the bondage of millions?

people so absolutely committed

for Greenfeld.

How could

it

be that

could count one type of human being as equal

so forth.
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Greenfeld uses

many maneuvers

ol the United States. (1)

to neutralize the effects

She does not take slavery

work. Despite slavery, she

that seriously

makes repeated claims

still

of slavery on her history
throughout

America was

that

much of her

the

most

egalitarian society in the world, an “oasis of liberty in the enslaved
world” [Greenfeld.

1992: 442],

etc.

She dismisses the

white men:

“To

point out that such

would

in

fact that this “liberty”

was

and “equality” applied only to

reality only for the

our skeptical age be redundant, but

it

is

white male population only

worth emphasizing

populations elsewhere such reality could not be but a dream” [409].

undoubtedly
oppressed

little

comfort

--

woman to know

and might have been “salt

that his/her

in the

First,

wounds” -

it

was

for a slave or

master enjoyed unparalleled freedom.

Second, in arguing that a society enjoyed the greatest freedom imaginable
time,

it

can hardly be redundant

to

such freedom. This would seem

male

that for white

mention

to call the

that for a majority

claim

at its

of members, there was no

itself into question,

and suggest

that the

freedom of some was purchased through the slavery and oppression of others. Yet, on
this

key point, Greenfeld has an implicit defense. For

divisible,” so the liberty of

course,

is

Even John

a naive position.

the liberty of one person

some never comes

is

directly

exercise one’s liberty in such a
liberal society

must

way

at the cost

loss

liberty

least,

it

again, recognized that

of others.

is

“scarce,” that

is, its

by (an)other(s). That does not prove

to their

One can

certainly

of each individual to prevent them from interfering

“white males” was gained by oppression of others, but
atomic individuals devoted

him

as to deprive another of his/her liberty. Thus, any

with the liberties of other individuals. Liberty
its

of the liberty of others. This, of

Stuart Mill, to call on

impacted by the

limit the liberties

one individual implies

her, “ liberty is infinitely

own

self-interest

requires attention to the relations

-

it
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that the liberty

of the

particularly in a society of

is

quite possible. At the very

among “ Americans”

of the United States).

appropriation by

(or the broader population

It is

clear that the general prosperity of “Americans”

Certainly this was the case with slavery.
relatively

few whites. However,

cdl Greenfeld
especially the

(all

the result of oppression.

might be made

the oppression of Native

makes much of the

West

An argument

was

that this benefited

Americans certainly benefited

great abundance of the North

American

continent,

land off of the Atlantic coast): “in the vast expanses
of the West

[opportunities] appeared unlimited” [434], Greenfeld recognized that the “
prosperity” of

Americans (and hence

their practical equality) rested

on “the American land”

[436],

There was a “natural abundance of economic opportunities” [434],

Of course,
material construct.

the “naturalness” of the abundance
It

artificial ideological

and

required the elimination of Native Americans from conceptual and

actual possession of all lands that
narrative,

was an

came

to constitute the

which again completely ignores

United States. Greenfeld’

the existence of Native Americans,

is

fully

within the ideological vein that accomplished the ideal elimination of Native Americans.

America was,
Her

[436].

in Greenfeld’s

words, a “wilderness” [405], “open” [434] and “vast”

narrative suggests

it

wilderness for the Pilgrims and

“America’s” prosperity was,

as a natural bounty. There
all

who

in fact,

settled after them.

founded on land

was nothing but untamed
It

was

there for the taking.

theft, deportation,

and genocide.

Americans were not “self-made,” but a “nation” of thieves.
It is

significant that

John Locke, whose ideas about individual

property were most influential on the “Founding Fathers,” had in

developed an explicit argument justifying the

amounted

to the

create wealth

more
it

-

claim
that

that, if a

is, if

theft

group or individual

he/she/they are not using

liberty

On Government

of land from native inhabitants.
is

it

Of course,

in practice, the theft

with even Locke’s warped justification.

broken

It

treaties, forced deportation, terror,

[1980]
It

not using land truly efficiently, to

the

way one wishes

cynically, to produce wealth for oneself — one has the right to take

oneself.

and private

of native lands was not

to use

it

it,

or,

away and use

in the least consistent

proceeded through deceit, fraud, intimidation,

and genocide.
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One might even
the

argue that the central “ideal” or “national project”
that unified

American nation was not a

continent.

was (and

set

of

liberal values, but rather the desire to

The ideology of “Manifest Destiny” - which Greenfeld

is)

Americans

as central to

in a grand,

“ otherization”

American

conquer half a

also fails to discuss

nationality as any of the liberal values.

It

-

unified

century-long project. This conquest, of course, depended
on the

of Native Americans, which might also be considered a core value
of

American nationalism, and which has found
“others” against

whom

Americans organize

(communists, Vietnamese, Arabs,

etc.

later variations in a perpetual string

their ideological

The thing

of

and military might

that “unified”

Americans through the

1880s, if anything did, was their colonialist and genocidal relationship to Native

Americans.

worth pointing out

It is

that,

even

if the

exclusion of Native Americans from her

narrative could be rectified or revised, the fact of the text as written

shows

that her

concept of America begins without Native Americans. Their reintroduction would

would remain marginal

necessarily be an after-thought, and they

America. They would be merely a “nuisance” for her narrative,

—

not cause for a complete reformulation of

its

to the core

to

concept of

be “explained away”

grounding points. This echoes the

genocidal ideology of Westward expansion that viewed Native Americans as merely

nuisances that had to be “cleared away.”
(2)

Greenfeld argues that slavery was not materially harsh, but

in fact that slaves

enjoyed a reasonable standard of living: “the degree of material deprivation and physical
hardship associated with the denial of equality

in

America was

relatively small” [453],

Indeed, the perception that slavery was physically cruel was Abolitionist propaganda:
“ for propaganda purposes, Abolitionists stressed the mistreatment of the slaves by bad

masters and their physical suffering” [455].

The

real issues

were dignity and freedom, and the psychological unpleasantness of

being a slave. Indeed, slaves

who were

uneducated, and so not capable of the abstract
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thinking necessary to understanding their condition
of bondage, experienced
significantly less oppressive than did educated
slaves

freedom.

It

slavery that

who understood

as

the concept of

was, again, the gap between the ideals of America and
the illiberalism of

made

it

appear so bad: “American slaves might have been
better off than

slaves elsewhere, but they were slaves in America, which

oppressive.

it

It

was, in

fact,

free blacks

who

felt ‘the

made

their slavery appear

more

weight of degradation’ more.”

[453 -454]

This analysis
to a

merely abstract

because

it

principle,

is

wrong on

issue.

It is

so

many

levels.

not that slavery

is

First,

reduces the injustice of slavery

it

wrong because of the harm

does not accord with “American values.” Opponents

such as Lincoln [see 474] and Greenfeld, seem

to

to slavery “

it

does, but

on

have no concern for the

slaves themselves: “ Lincoln hated ‘the monstrous injustice of slavery,’ ‘because

it

deprives our republican example of its influence in the world; enables the enemies of free
institutions with plausibility to taunt us as hypocrites; causes the real friends of
to

doubt our sincerity; and especially because

it

forces so

freedom

many good men among

ourselves into an open war with the very fundamental principles of civil liberty’” [455].

Indeed, the “principled” concern appears to be
is

strictly utilitarian, at least for Lincoln.

It

not the contradiction of “American values” that harms America, but rather the

perception of this contradiction by foreign powers that allows them to dismiss American

claims of liberalism and freedom.
to

Howard Zinn’s

portrait

And

only whites figure

of Lincoln as a

both sides of the fence with regard
Lincoln’s argument against slavery

slick,

is

about

the contradiction that

and produces conflict

at

it

represents,

which

True

middle of the road politician playing on

to slavery [see especially Zinn, 1995:

how

Americans. He ignores the “ injustice” done
is

in the utility calculation.

it

182

-

187],

affected the interests of white

to blacks

-

for him, all that

seems

to matter

discredits the United States internationally

home.
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Second,
deprivation.

it

appears quite unlikely that slaves did not suffer
significant material

More

to the point,

one must wonder

how

Greenfeld arrives

at

such a

conclusion. She sites the cliometric data of Robert
Fogel and Stanley Engerman as her

evidence.

Howard Zinn

directly addresses such data,

“Economists or cliometricians

particularly.

how much money was

.

.

.

have

and Fogel and Engerman’
tried to assess slavery

by estimating

spent on slaves for food and medical care. But can
this describe

the reality of slavery as

it

was

to a

human

being

who

lived inside it?” [Zinn, 1995:

168]

Certainly the frequency of rape, torture (whippings, beatings), forced
labor under

extremely harsh working conditions, and so forth had

and psychological

control, abuse, degradation.

to

be great

-

By “psychological

the constant physical

degradation,”

Greenfeld means the psychological unpleasantness associated with the abstract realization
that

one

is

not able to actualize one’s potential as a free agent.

By

this term,

I

mean

the

very concrete psychological abuse constantly inflicted on slaves by those exercising

power over them.

It

does not take a Ph.D. to

feel the force

of these psychological effects

and manipulations.

Zinn argues

further:

One

recent book on slavery (Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman, Time on the
Cross ) looks at whippings in 1 840 - 1 842 on the Barrow plantation in Louisiana
with two hundred slaves: ‘The records show that over the course of two years a
total of 160 whippings were administered, an average of 0.7 whippings per hand
per year. About half of the hands were not whipped at all during the period.’ One
could also say: ‘Half of all slaves were whipped.’ That has a different ring. That
figure (0.7 per hand per year) shows whipping was infrequent for any individual.
But looked at another way, once every for or five days, some slave was whipped.

[168
I

169]

-

would add

of whipping

mechanism

is

it

that, unless slaves are to

not just about

how much

it

be considered unthinking animals, the issue

occurred, but

to

some degree

at

its

much

effect as an

on-going threat

to all

that

it

was

every moment, as that

it

did occur every few days.

The horror of the whipping was

experienced

effective a control

was. In other words, the cruelty of whipping was not just the immediate

physical pain (which was great, no doubt), but
slaves.

how

as
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a constant threat, and so

Further, tor slaves

who were whipped,

probably that even a single whipping caused

it is

psychological damage that did not heal immediately,
rape does (and did undoubtedly

owner, himself recognized

this:

among
“he

.

.

so

.

many

if at all, in

somewhat

the

manner

of the slaves). Barrow, the plantation

built a jail

and ‘was constantly devising

ingenious punishments, for he realized that uncertainty was an important
aid in keeping
his

gangs well

in

hand’” [169],

Zinn further offers Herbert Gutman’s counter
the

Barrow plantation

slaves

to

Fogel and Engerman’s claim that

became ‘devoted, hard-working responsible

identified their fortunes with the fortunes of their masters’” [169].
their statistics,

Gutman shows

more disorderly

that in fact

“

directly

engaged

from

one or

in

acts in 1840-41’” [169],

Zinn also offers a quote

that calls into question Greenfeld’s elitist,

contention that only educated slaves and free blacks were
their condition as subjugation

“They say

and suffering. “John

in fetters; yet, at night,

of our chains.

Little,

to

to recognize

a former slave,” says

two hundred lashes

I

in the day,

it

best:

myself and
and had our

feet

we would sing and dance, and make others laugh at the
Happy men we must have been! We did it to keep down

trouble, and to keep our hearts from being completely broken

Greenfeld appears

even offensive

“human” enough

slaves are happy, because they laugh, and are merry.

three or four others, have received
rattling

Arguing

’four in five cotton pickers

who

slaves

.

.

.”

[168].

mistake the psychological defense mechanisms and inner strength of

slaves as evidence that they did not feel the pain of their oppression, rather than recognize
their dignity

and strength even

She argues
with their

lot.

in

oppression.

that the relatively

Would

few slave

content? Or, would she recognize that the
physically and psychologically drove
activity to revolt? Surely a similar
in

good

show

slaves’ relative contentment

she likewise argue that the fact that Jews in concentration camps

did not revolt and overthrow their genociders

Tom’s” who,

revolts

is

evidence that they, too, were relatively

awesome power imprisoning and

down

made

them

with tremendous force any inclination or

argument can be made about

liberal fashion,

killing

slaves,

even the

“

Uncle

a utility calculation trading their dignity and
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obedience tor relative safety and comfort. Faced
with

life in

the cotton fields under the

eye of an overseer with a whip, were their decisions
not marks of their oppression

Ot course, Greenteld’s

characteristic tactic of separating slavery
into abstract and

material components and setting them in opposition

types of slavery

-

itself?

the aspects operated together.

is

dubious

itself.

There were not two

The material deprivation was

intimately

linked with the psychological and these with the
“abstract” denial of freedom and
dignity. This abstract denial

obedience a slave had

to

was made concrete every day,

show,

in the prison

outward signs of

in the

of his/her shack and

field, in the

unavoidable

sexual submission to the owner and overseers, in the ripping apart
of families and

complete regulation of their relations based on whims or motives of profit,
and so

forth.

Slaves did not have the luxury of turning off their material existence so as to
contemplate

By

slavery in the abstract.

of gruel,

etc.,

was

the

same token, every physical

cruelty, rape,

the direct result of the abstract condition under

whipping, meal

which one person could

have absolute ownership (control) over another. To think slaves did not experience even
the
in

most “material” of deprivations

an ultimate condescension.

to the free states via the

It is

as aspects of an abstract loss of

freedom

many

also to belie the evidence of so

Underground Railway, of songs manifesting the

deliverance from the condition of slavery, and so

is to

engage

slaves escaping
desire for

forth.

Neither were there two types of slaves, the one mind and the other body. Slavery

was

control of and assault on all aspects of the humanity of slaves.

whether the material or

intellectual aspect

It is

not a question of

of an individual suffered more. They suffered

as one, together. Indeed, intellectual or psychological control

was furthered by

and vice-versa. Slavery was a system of absolute control

employed varied

techniques,

some more

physical, others

that

more psychological, but

all

physical,

contributing to the

oppression of this and that individual.

This begs a further question. Slavery

American slaves were

is

wrong, period.

It

does not matter

if

better off than slaves elsewhere or industrial workers in the North.
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It

does not matter

The

versa.
like

ifits cruelty registered

real question

is,

why does

arguing numbers in a genocide.

only

3 million

Greenfeld pursue

Would

less

of a genocide

does Greenfeld take

American history? There

are,

I

this line

believe,

if

etc.,

died?

of argument

at all?

It is

Would

the

Armenian

only 600,000 had?

of argument

two

this line

vice-

the Holocaust have been any less terrible
if

Jews, Gypsies, gays and lesbians,

Genocide have been any

Why

more physically than psychologically, or

in

support of her normalization of

related reasons. First,

it

would appear

that, if

slavery were recognized as too brutal, too cruel, then no
amount of justification could

make

it

tolerable within the

Americans” were slow
freedom

-

that

American framework.

to deal

It is

one thing

to say that “true

with a problem that was in the main an issue of abstract

took white America a few centuries to invite blacks into the house of

it

freedom. If slavery was actually material harsh and physically brutal, such that
slaves

were oppressed

in a direct

and undeniable way, and

felt

the immediate, full weight of

oppression, then the contradiction with the “core” American values would be too great.
It

would not be

a matter of slowness, but of complicity in direct and immediate brutality.

Recognizing the
the “core” of

American

Indeed,

of slavery would require a revised, less favorable delineation of
nationality.

if the reality

seems beside the

more —

reality

point.

of slavery was

of abstract principles

brutal, then the issue

Slavery was not just a lack of abstract freedom, but something

a system of institutionalized cruelty and degradation.

Its

remedy would

not,

therefore, have been merely a granting of rights, of freedom, but required a change in

other “principles” as well.

It

would require an eradication of racism, which was

the

cause of and not result of the denial of abstract freedom to blacks.

According

to Greenfeld, the struggle against slavery

was a

liberal one,

and merely

required a fuller application of core American ideals, not a calling into question of them.

The

failure

of a mere granting of abstract freedom

as a stark counter-example to

to blacks to

end

what Greenfeld’s narrative seems
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to

their oppression stands

suppose. Greenfeld’s

argument assumes
slavery

was not

that

American racism was exactly equal

the end ot racism.

to slavery.

Rather than ending the racism

But, the end of

core of slavery,

at the

emancipation of blacks merely signaled the liberalization of their oppression. Blacks
could thereafter be granted formal freedom

new

racist

system emerged

-

with the rights to vote, and so forth. But, a

that reigned for 100 years, before

an apparent lessening of oppression, on the way

to

it

gave way temporarily

what appears

to

to

be yet another form

and era of post-slavery oppression.

would argue,

I

proposes

are, rather

in fact, that the type

of

liberal society

and ideals

that Greenfeld

than anti-racist, at best neutral with respect to racism. Their inherent

contradictions (majority rules versus the sanctity of the individual, equality versus
interest, etc.)

and abstract nature do not determine the general

social structure.

self-

On the

contrary, in their abstraction and contradictory indeterminacy, they allow to persist and

therefore buttress oppressive socio-political and economic structures.

There
racism

is

is

a general implication for Greenfeld’s typology of nations here. For her,

“collectivist,” versus liberal “individualism,”

which

is

not racist. Yet,

if

racism persists within a framework of atomic individualism, then “collectivism” cannot

be dismissed as racist without a similar dismissal of individualism. The forms are

Racism

different, but the effects similar.

grouped into
context

is

races,

a bit

which

more

in a “collectivist” context is gross:

are in a hierarchical relationship.

subtle.

Racism

people are

in a “ liberal”

People are not grouped into races. Rather, they are

evaluated solely on their individual “ merit.”

Socio-economic status

is

then taken as an

“objective” indicator of worth: in a liberal meritocracy, people achieve what their
natural abilities allow

them

to.

No

racial

prejudgment

characterized by structural racism?

The focus on

of structural elements, and therefore

—

grouping does correspond

to

made. But, what

What

is

if

a society

more, when

it

is

—

reinforces the

noticed that this or that

lower or higher socio-economic levels, the success
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is

individuals does not allow recognition

apparently without being racist

racist hierarchy implicitly in the society.

racial

is

01

A

failure is taken as contingent.

lower-status

As

I

and

this

makes

lower-status group, for instance,

its

failure

racism,

in tact, is a

other. Yet,

even

if

it

a central to

is

do not believe America

I

“American

combination of the gross and subtle

America were

free

not necessarily

even worse.

have argued above and will argue below,

of the "gross” variant of racism -

is

nationality.”

to

be free

“American

varieties, playing off of each

of the gross variety, that would not imply an
end

to

racism, nor the ultimate inessentiality of racism to
American nationality.

One might
individualism

take this line of argument a step further. Greenfeld
assumes that

—

that

is,

judging individuals

—

the color of their skin, their gender, etc.

why

is

is

strictly

on

their

own

merit, not based

on

inherently superior to a “collectivism.”

But,

hierarchization by individual any better than that by group? At least
within a

group, presumably

meritorious

members of a

lower-status group will be present, with

the potential of helping others in the group attain higher status than they
might within a

Of course,

strictly individual hierarchy.

higher-status groups as well

—

individuals of another group,

this is

to help raise

when

how

some

racism tends to function

among

individuals of one group over

evaluations based on “merit” would not have allowed

this.

Without these “racial-based”
and “objective”

—

it

distortions, hierarchization is

can be based on, say, genetic indicators

success or failure (healthiness, mental

model

agility, etc.).

really the correct context within

that they exist?

which

But,

to interpret

Does not atomic individualism

is

simply more precise

that really

do contribute

to

the individual-competition

such differences,

to the extent

actually transform these differences into

justifications for hierarchizations, based on a system of socio-economic competition that

tends to produce a socio-economic hierarchy based on these differences?

Greenfeld, of course, does not engage such issues, but prefers to assume the basics

of

liberal individualism

throughout her work. Yet, these issues have been raised within
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the

American

context, if they have also been put

down through

harsh and manipulative

means.
(3)

attributes

As

it

have already discussed, Greenfeld dismisses slavery as un-American,
and

I

to a nascent

This, of course,

ideals.

Southern nationalism

Greenfeld defines American ideals not
racism in every aspect of American
tautologically that racism (slavery)

This

is

made

Based

tautological.

is

easier

by the

odds with the proper American national

in part

to contain

life

is

at

over

its

on previous normalization,

racism

-

despite the persistence of

entire existence.

She then claims

not part of or inherent in the core American values.

fact that slavery

came

to be tied closely with the

assertion of “states’ rights” against the central federal government of the United States.

But,

was

this decentralization

—

this belief in local

autonomy — not a

central tenet of

Jefferson, against Hamilton?

Greenfeld argues that
determination.”

Rather,

it

this

was

was not

the correct understanding of “self-

individual freedom that

power. And, the claim of the “states’ right”
freedom.

Who

were white Southerners

This argument
States.

After

from Britain

is fine,

who were

all,

for themselves

illegitimate

It

was, in

it

fact, the fullest

was not

academics.

to decide things for blacks?

colonial settlers in the 13 colonies to declare independence

and the Native Americans
in the

as a step

South?

If the

is

alive in the East

that of the 13 colonies

toward the

--

not to

South’s secession from the North

fullest attainment

Who

is

from

Britain.

Yet,

of freedom and equality.

Greenfeld to determine unilaterally that

materially brutal? Her only evidence

Who

still

flowering of liberal (English) values [Greenfeld, 1992: 420tt.].

This suggests another issue.
slavery

to slavery directly contradicted individual

and oppressive, then so was

Greenfeld characterizes

against governmental

but begs questions about the very foundation of the United

mention on behalf of the slaves

was

was posed

is

one marginal work by two

she to dismiss a wealth of first-hand accounts of slavery by escaped

and ex-slaves? This

is

not to suggest that these should be taken as absolutely
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authoritative (especially given ditterences

and perspectives). But, certainly
estimation of any and
their

own

all

among them, based on

their experiences should

aspects of slavery.

different experiences

count a great deal

To deny them

any

in

their role in characterizing

oppression contradicts the “democratic” principles of “self-determination”
to

which Greenfeld claims

to

be committed. She denies slaves the right even to characterize

their situation, wresting control

from them, granting

to herself in pursuit

it

of a warped

normalizing narrative of American history. She even misrepresents the claims by slaves

of the cruelty they experienced,
abolitionists acting

Worse

still,

to be propagandistic claims

by (presumably white)

on behalf of slaves.
Greenfeld holds that American slaves were better off than Blacks

in

Africa [453]. She offers no evidence, no studies, just the groundless, ideologically-

generated opinion of the nationalist writer James Fenimore Cooper. Again,

Greenfeld

to decide this? Again, she decides

should have or did

feel

about

an abstract, intellectual form.

movement

fostered by

different opinion

19

etc.,

suggests slaves and Blacks had a

is

and slowly taken across the ocean

in

States,

bad circumstances

How could

how

in Africa

can

in

it

unspeakably

anyone argue

better.

have been better

(which certainly had

01 course, Cooper

s

etc.,

that

thrown

it

to

it

was

in the

terrible conditions?

“
materially no worse, and at least you were home.”

presumably

in

much

powerful, driving her to adopt a position that appears

kidnapped from one’s home region, from one’s family,

United

how they

Surely such things as the establishment of Liberia, the

well-contradicted by obvious evidence.

in the

and

Greenfeld suppresses.

This “will to control”

born

for the slaves,

is

She re-imposes control over them, reinventing slavery

it.

Marcus Garvey,

— which

what was best

who

better to be

hold of a ship,

And, even of those

be a slave? At worst, for those

own

internal oppressions),

For most

in Africa, life

it

was

was

argument was not based on a material

As Gellner s apology
This summarizes the nature ot Greenteld’s revisionist history ot slavery.
“ discursive stage ot colonialism, so is
final,
or
a
form,
another
in
colonialism
was
colonialism
Greenfeld’s revision a final, “discursive” stage of slavery.
19

182

tor

comparison, but rather on the difference between living

in a “civilized” society

one: slavers were “ better off in servitude in this country, than

barbaric

a state of barbarism at

home”

[453], This

have treated each other “civilly”
slaves as chattel and animals.

human, so were not

in the

living in

a ludicrous position. First, whites might

They were not considered

call native

when

United States, but they treated (and defined)

treated so. For them,

anyone). Second, to

is

and a

“civilized,” and not really

America was not

civilization (if

it

was

for

African societies “barbaric” was simply to apply the

worst of racist ideology. That Greenfeld quotes Cooper with approval, and without
flinching,
to the

is

scandalous, and betrays the racist/colonialist underpinnings of her approach

United

There

States.

is

continually valorizes

and held
liberal,

On

another a problem with Jefferson.

him

the one hand, Greenfeld

as a hero of American idealism. But, he

slaves. In order to preserve his place as a true

was

American and

also pro-slavery,

free-fostering

Greenfeld apologizes for his views. As part of a long tradition of

liberal theorists,

Jefferson held that citizenship and humanity of an individual depended on his [not her]
rationality.

the

same

Now,

slaves were from an inferior race, and not rational, so they did not have

rights as rational people. Thus, his pro-slavery position

noble one, based on his great esteem for rationality, [see 429

approve of the position, but

at the

exists:

was

—

herself,

430] Greenfeld does not

that

is,

a self-

un-American.

the end of slavery really the successful assertion of core

American values against oppression? That
War. Greenfeld

actually a very

same time rescues Jefferson from being just

interested, unprincipled pro-slavery type

Another issue

-

was

is

the standard nationalist version ot the Civil

however, offers the clue

to

an alternative reading. As mentioned

above, she admits that ideals alone do not effect social and political transformation
only

when

become

they “correspond to significant interests operating

influential [459], Thus,

commitment

to

“American

at that

it is

time” that they

ideals” did not presumably

Northern industry
account for the Northern push against slavery: the interest ot
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—

in

spreading a

new economic

order and

new way

to extract labor

from lower classes

did.

Slavery was certainly opposed by
abolitionists on principle (though
perhaps not the
principles Greenteld touts), but

became

obsolete.

ideologies;

it

was

it

was not ended on

principle:

it

The clash between North and South was not
the clash

was ended because

it

the clash between ideals or

between two economic systems, one reaching
back

to agrarian

feudalism, the other reaching forward to modern
industrial capitalism. The fact that
the
slaves were not emancipated until half way
through the war

And even

regard.

then the emancipation,

at least

-

1863

-

is telling in this

according to Zinn, was ambivalent and

utilitarian [Zinn, 1995],

Greenfeld would not agree with

supposed contradiction between

use of her analysis of interests. For her, the

liberal values

because most people did not notice

movement was

my

it.

and slavery was allowed

They did not

notice

to persist

simply

because the anti-slavery

it

not linked to a significant interest until the mid- 1800s. Thus,
interests on

her account tend to liberate ideals from contradictions and failings.

When

they

fail to liberate

do not correspond

to those ideals

the core ideals of American society

-

is,

how

was

is

is,

when

they

the case with the South and slavery).

of course, again tautological. The only thing

interests are legitimate

that

they tend either to fade out or to produce alternative

but illegitimate, un-American ideals (as

This

-

whether or not they correspond

are these core ideals selected? Greenfeld’s

that determines

which

to the core ideals or not.

ambiguous

text

can be read either

But,
to

avoid addressing this question or by asserting that they are themselves selected by the
initially

dominant

of why one

set

interests

of a nation. This

of ideal-producing

Her answer can only be

interests

is

latter assertion

obviously begs the question

legitimate and American, and another

that these liberal ideals are legitimate

and American.

I

is

not.

have

addressed these claims above.

One might
American

ideals

also question

was waiting

to

why,

if

the contradiction between slavery and the core

be discovered, abolitionists (according to Greenfeld
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-

see

above) found
it.

it

necessary to resort to exaggerating propaganda to
mobilize people against

In other words,

what could

it

mean

that people

were motivated against slavery not

based on ideals, but through manipulative tactics? This could
not have been merely a
matter of linking an interest to ideals consistent with

invoked the ideals through a

it; it

false representation of reality, creating a false interest. Clearly,
either this account of the
abolitionist tactics

is

contradict slavery

is.

A
and

free)

last

used

“American

wrong, or Greenfeld’s presumption

American

that

ideals did indeed

caveat regarding the present point: even where anti-slavery activists (slave
liberal rhetoric, pointing out the contradiction

ideals,” their politics

was not necessarily

between slavery and

liberal.

It is

one thing

to point out a

contradiction between a set of ideals and the practices associated by them, and quite

another to be committed to those ideals. Within the dominant liberal framework, the

most obvious and generally comprehensible argument against slavery might have been
liberal terms, but that

(4)
is

does not mean that those making

Perhaps the most extreme

the linking of

it

to

~

almost absurd

it

-

accepted these terms absolutely.

normalization regarding slavery

Marxism. The linchpin of this superfluous maneuver

of George Fitzhugh’s sociologically-based defense of slavery.
points. First, capitalism

society

—

or most

—

was based on economic competition

It

that

is

an analysis

consisted of two main

some members of

inevitably lost. Second, slavery eliminated that competition through

what might be called “central planning,” though Greenfeld does not use

made

slavery the perfect socialism: “ Socialism proposes to do

competition; to afford protection and support
about, at least, a qualified

at all

away with

free

times to the laboring class;

community of property and

to associate labor.

This

that term.

to bring

All these

purposes slavery fully and perfectly attains.” [Greenfeld, 1992: 477]

The connection Greenfeld
Fitzhugh’s socialism,
labor.

in

is

finds exists only at the surface level.

based on a strong critique of capitalism and

But, there the similarity stopped. First, slavery
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-

if socialist

its

Marxism,

like

exploitation of

- was

also pre-

capitalist.

It

socialism

was,

in

in essence, a racialization

mind

of serfdom.

as the goal of proletarian revolt

Marx

hardly had such a “feudal

and the overthrow of capitalism.

While Marx looked forward, beyond capitalism, Fitzhugh
looked back,

to a held over

economic form.
Second, for Fitzhugh, slavery was much
the latter, the

On

It

harsh than capitalist exploitation. In

employer assumed absolutely not responsibility

—

workers, while the slave-owner did
[477],

less

for the well-being of

the slaves were in a sense “part of the family”

the contrary, from a Marxist perspective, of course, slavery

was

exploitative.

exacted labor in exchange for the minimal material necessary to maintain the
labor

force.

In this way,

it

was

like capitalism,

though

it

dispensed with any pretense to

universal liberty and mutual, contractual consent. In effects,

Exploitation

is

exploitation.

The “happy family”

it

was

the same.

fantasy of slavery

was analogous

to the

“universal liberty and mutual, contractual consent” fantasy of capitalism.

What

is

dramatically ironic

Greenfeld not Marx. As
,

I

on

is that,

this point,

Fitzhugh corresponds

to

described above, Greenfeld argues at length that slavery was

not physically harsh. Indeed, she argues precisely that free blacks and white industrial
laborers were worse off than slaves,

Though

above].

which

is

the core of Fitzhugh’s case! [see 453ff. and

they have quite different evaluations of capitalism, their analyses of

slavery are disturbingly similar.

Third, Fitzhugh might have used a “theory of surplus value” as the basis of his

comparison between slavery and
have.

He argued

that “capital

capitalist exploitation, but not in the

commands

labor as master does the slave. Neither pays for

labor; but the master permits the slave to retain a larger allowance
his

own

Further,

labor
its

.

.

.”

[478].

way Marx would

Of course, even

if this

was

true,

it

from the proceeds of

was not

true

by much.

“truth” depended on the Greenfeldian position that slavery was not physically

harsh, and that

more was spent on

the maintenance of slaves than paid to industrial

workers.
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More
labor

is

importantly,

it

tails to

understand what

cheaper than slave labor"' [478], Contrary

differential

was not

was based on

is

meant by the statement

to Fitzhugh, the

in the relative material condition

key

in

’free

to this

of workers and slaves. Rather,

the greater efficiency of capitalist industrial
production,

workers produced more “wealth" than

“

that

which meant

it

that

mode of production. Thus, more

an agrarian

“surplus value" could be taken from industrial workers. The battle
between American
capitalism and slavery was between two exploitative systems; the
winner was not more
exploitative, but

Finally,

more

efficient.

Marx was

absolutely clear that the overthrow of capitalism depended on

the seizure of power by laborers. Fitzhugh’ s rejection of capitalism
depended on the

exact opposite, the loss of all power by laborers.

On

this score alone,

Marxism could not

have been pro-slavery.

Beyond
admit

that her

these points, there are

basic issues of logic. First, Greenfeld must

arguments are not based on any type of concrete

Fitzhugh and Marx: “it
So, her argument

is

is

is

historical link

highly unlikely that Fitzhugh was influenced by

that independently Fitzhugh

favor of slavery. This
is

more

actually worse, for

something inevitably Marxist.

It

it

between

Marx”

came up with Marxist arguments

[477],
in

suggests that in the defense of slavery there

also suggests that

Marxism

is

somehow

inherently

pro-slavery.

Second, of all the defenses of slavery, Greenfeld only examines Fitzhugh’s
detail.

It

in

thereby becomes a representative of defenses of slavery in general. But,

Fitzhugh’s apology was

at

best a marginal one, and

it

is

difficult to

understand

how

it

could have had any influence on Southerners with the value system she describes. The
sinister

connection between slavery and Marxism depends completely on the assumption

that Fitzhugh’s

was

a typical, not marginal, apology for slavery.

Greenfeld’ s argument becomes the extremely weak one

that,

slavery contained socialist elements, a pro-slavery position
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Take

this

away, and

because one apology for

is socialist.

By
all,

the

same

logic, all industrial capitalist theory is inherently
genocidal.

Heidegger valorized the structure of the use of slave laborers
from secondary

concentration camps linked to

Are

After

all

German

factories as a perfected

industrial theories or structures therefore genocidal?

on industrialism? Surely Greenfeld would not want

As

form of industrialization.

Are

all

genocides dependent

to argue for this.

a correlate, Greenfeld seems to suggest that

all

critiques of capitalism are

Marxist. But, her beloved Nietzsche critiqued liberalism and capitalism just as
harshly as

Marx, and much

in Fitzhugh’s feudalist

argument corresponds

to

Nietzsche’s ideas on

proper social organization. Nietzsche held, for instance, that democracy was inherently
bad, and that obedience to an aristocratic master the virtue of any commoner.

assumed the indifference of such masters
Fitzhugh’s critique of capitalism

is

in reference to

Nietzschean in

its

He

also

commoners. Certainly

valorization of a pre-capitalist

order.

The Gap
Greenfeld excludes both “good” and “bad” competing concepts of American
nationality and strains within

it

(Native American, labor,

women,

as well as racist, anti-

immigrant, imperialist/colonialist, and so forth) from participation

American

nationality.

I

in the “true”

have touched on just the more salient exclusions

—

multitudes of

other strains and concepts, most not even mentioned in her limited narrative, abound.

Those aspects and elements
as inessential to

American

The “plot” of her

that she

cannot ignore

—

such as slavery

she marginalizes

nationality.

narrative

is

simple: as these inessential elements

through the hard work of those committed

America has slowly approached

the ideals.

to the true

The

American

great step forward

was

away
of

the Civil War,

then, the path has been

and progress steady. Though the approach cannot be perfected
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fall

ideals, the “reality”

which ended 80 years of post-Revolutionary “adjustment.” Since
clear,

—

—

though

reality

can

never

come

into total

especially 483
I

correspondence with ideals

-

it

is

and always

closer, [see

484]

-

have presented an alternative view
of the history of the United

been a “nation” of multiple aspects and

strains.

Its

as well.

dominance of it. Though

have no doubt been clear throughout,

my

It

For instance, the

ot South and North struggled against
one another, the former for a
the United States, the latter for pure

States.

has

multiplicity has not simply been
a

between oppressed and oppressor, but within
them

split

close,

my

elites

mere position within
political

commitments

argument has not depended on them.

It

has not

required that one view be take as correct over
another, but rather that the variety of views

and forces

Though

that

have clearly characterized United

different views and forces have

And some

elements

-

such as racism

States’ history

come and

- have

be acknowledged. 20

gone, the multiplicity has remained.

remained,

if in

mutating forms.

My view implies a very different understanding of the gap between “American
ideals” as stated by Greenfeld and reality.

I

will not

deny

that these ideals are often

invoked as the core of American nationality (though they are just as often
challenged). In
fact,

Greenfeld

of its

official

of the United States

history

s

propaganda

—

on taking the

historical relationship

-

438]

--

than an analysis of historical data. But,

its

have already argued

relationship to reality, by not taking seriously the

that Greenfeld’s case

depends on explaining away much of

Her defense has been

the claim that these ideals cover over an oppressive reality

20

to delegitimize these, to

as resistant to the full instantiation of the worthy ideals.

accomplishes

This, of course,

this

is

How can one

between the two?

the reality that opposes these ideals.

them

restating of the standard points

reality seriously, as seriously at least as the ideology.

evaluate an ideology by dismissing

I

more a

with these “ideals” as a centerpiece, and complete with such

elements as the “melting pot” [see 437
insist

is

very covering.

a specific interpretation of that history.
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—

Even

view

as she argues against

her narrative in fact

I

Here,
ideal

and

wish

I

to

extend

my

critique, to

comment on

For Greenfeld, the history of the United
States

reality.

gap. For me, the United States itself is the
gap.
States.

The gap

the nature of the gap

is

It,

-

the closing of that

not the ideals, defines the United

ever-fluctuating and changing, and

fluctuations and their production

is

between

US

history

the history of those

is

through the application of force and propaganda,
as

well as the playing out ot material forces in given
circumstances.

This position hinges on the fact that things are not “getting
better

all

the time.”

Greenfeld’ s work

is filled

was decreasing.

have commented on a number of these points already, and here
add

I

only cursory examples.

of American society

economic system
that,

even

societies

if

it

had

-

with admissions that

First, in

of

its

many

and nations

shortcoming was not central or

instances, she tries to dismiss negative criticisms

racism and slavery [see above], sexism [455], exploitative

[see, for instance, 452],

its

this or that

shortcomings,
in the world.

it

anti-immigration [see 438],

was

etc.

-

by

stating

infinitely better in these regards than all other

This, of course,

a

is

weak excuse -

make when caught “red-handed” doing something wrong. Whether

the type children

they were really

better off than slaves elsewhere could hardly have been a comfort to slaves in America.

have also raised the question about whether
Africans?

Was

that

was

true.

Was

I

Africa really worse for

“Native America”?

Second, she characterizes failures as temporary, without following

their

transcendences to their conclusions. For instance, she admits that the reality of America
quite often failed to live up to the expectations of immigrants.

was

a temporary failure. [436]

this

“temporary”

overcome

failure

The problem

she never explains

was overcome. Again, even

initial exploitation, official

some America

is

always

if

she stresses that this

how and

at

what point

one group or another did

discrimination, and widespread prejudice (which

yet stands ready for re-deployment), there
place. Thus,

is,

Still,

is

failing

always another group taking

some immigrants.
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its

low-status

Third, she marks the progress ot
enfranchisement in America by

overcoming^ of the
natural

“artificial” distinctions

distinctions of race and gender [452],

its

of class privilege, and then

To Greenfeld,

it

gradual
to the

understandable that

is

progress would run this course, tor disenfranchisement
based on natural distinctions

would have been more
distinctions are

Take
Originally,

difficult to extirpate.

natural,’

was

complete

their

to

became perpetually bonded.

differentials

It

to say that these

In the

was not a

were leveled a

to the colonies to

mark those who were enough

bondage, and those

appeared naturalized.

mean

a construct that legitimized a system of slavery.

bonded laborers of various “races” came

however, race became used
to

it

especially by comparison to class?

In American, race

race.

But, what does

who were

American

like the

work. Soon,

bosses to be allowed

not allowed to pay their debts, but

context, race itself was a construct that

pre-existing natural condition. Thus, as class

bit in colonial

America, and ex-bonded servants became small

farmers and so forth, racial distinctions developed to replace them. Progress in class

meant regression

The merely apparent

in race.

naturalness of race

— which

Greenfeld

uses to explain the continuation of slavery after the alleged lessening of class distinctions

— was

in fact the justification

of this continuation. Her “objective” explanation of

oppression in American history again repeats the clearly ideological justifications given
for the oppression during
If

its

imposition.

gender appears more natural than

race, that is only because the specific

European systems of gender oppression pre-existed colonization of America. Thus, they
were not produced
distinctions.

was

in

America. However, the same case can be made

for class

Classes in medieval Europe were fully naturalized, and the key to liberalism

their partial

exposure as

artificial.

Why

for class

and not gender? What

early colonial times, necessity often drove just such an exposure; that

necessity forced (or allowed)

reigning sexist ideology

—

women

to take

on

is,

more,

in

quite often

roles that called into question the

as occurred again in the United States during

191

is

World War

II,

for instance.

Just as with the initial colonial opening
of class, this opening of gender

closed off during the 19th Century precisely
with the rise

American national ideology

[see, for instance,

was

and consolidation of the " core

Angela Davis, 1983],

There was no “natural'’ or understandable
progress here, but a playing off of
different forms of oppression against one
another,

recent film

be a

“G.

Jane”

I.

a perfect example. In this case, a

is

member of one of the most

membership mean?

It

which has continued

means

US armed

“elite” elements of the

that she

woman

to this day.

proves herself fit to

forces.

can and must be a participant

The

in the

What does
unprovoked

invasion of a sovereign country and the killing of many
of its soldiers (who are just

Muslims,

international
fell

from

and so not

after all,

law

is

really people with rights).

The

pretext for this violation of

a mistake by the United States', one of our nuclear-powered
satellites

orbit, into the

Libyan

desert,

and there

is

no

telling

what

that

“madman”

Qaddafi might do with the plutonium. As she proves herself fully capable of war
crimes,

“G.

I.

Jane” bonds completely with her

new comrades

--

even becoming buddies with her

would-be

rapist a

group”

overcome, unified against yet another “out-group.” 21

is

few scenes

before. Thus,

all

difference within the

Yet, despite this maneuvering and trading, there are

America

why

in the

after

women
Blacks

250

still

still

years,

make

do absolutely stark class distinctions and poverty remain?

less than

randomly

waste dumping?

75 percent of what

killed (lynched)?

when

Why

Given these issues and

is

it

it

is

found

to

Why

men make

are Native

I

have

same work?

Americans

have mineral resources or a

still

If

They should have gotten

said, be inside or outside the borders

192

it

do

are

for nuclear

not?

cannot be enough

better already.

acceptable to

of the United

Why

in the military or

it

Why

on reservations,

fit site

the other instances abounding in her narrative,

Apparently, as Greenfeld has her freedom, she finds

as

for the

even an issue whether “gays” are

to say that “things are getting better.”

Which may,

obvious problems.

1700s was characterized by a strong “ ’leveling principle’” [408], then

their land still taken

21

still

American “in-

States.

tell

others to wait

.

.

.

just a

little

more - just

as

it

was

fine for

America

to tell the slaves to wait, first

240

years,

and then another 100, then another 30, and
then
Ironically, the position that “things
are getting better all the time” in

requires a

maneuver

directly critiqued

influence on Greenfeld

s

by Nietzsche

will

it

a self-acknowledged major

analysis of nations and nationalisms.

shifting of the perfected world into the future.

always flawed, but

-

become

It is

It

requires a perpetual

“ otherworldliness”

perfect in the future.

America

The

sins

:

the real world

is

of the present are

forgiven by reference to the perfection of the future. Yet,
the future

is

always ...

in the

always another world away.

future,

Greenfeld
possible

-

is

s

history

—

even though

it is

sanitized of every problematic detail

riddled with excuses for the oppressive reality of America.

Some might

be

acceptable, but after a while, the sheer volume of exceptions and
explanations calls her
central claims into question.

counter-examples and

To
narrative.

story

it

put

The

enacts

it

narrative

it

tries to tell is

of the smooth instantiation of a

of the perpetual gap between these ideals and

this or that point, the

in other existing or

former lowly

role.

by economic and
States

the

making claims about

new
its

areas. Thus,

the shrinking of the gap at
reality against the

when one immigrant group begins

average socio-economic

status,

another

is

brought

to

in to

fill

There has always been another group, either “naturally” produced

political forces

by indirect and

Just as Greenfeld’s

ideals better regarding this or that piece of society, but opening the

assimilate, and to improve
its

all

of ideals. But the

set

reality.

United States has absorbed assertions of the

by enacting the

gap up

a Ptolemaic effort to account for

difficult data.

narrative absorbs problematic data by

ideals

is

another way, exclusions, exceptions, and excuses are the rule of her

story
is

Her

and conditions elsewhere, or created by the United

direct influence

on these forces and conditions

Vietnamese) or ideology.
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(for instance,

Regarding

racially

-

as

opposed

to ethnically

mnthin the group. Thus, some Blacks

fluctuates

_

distinct groups, 22 the line

are allowed

upward mobility, enough

to

undercut somewhat claims of totally
clear racism. In either case,
the fluctuation of the
lines separating ranks in a
hierarchy is the

what would otherwise be

key

to

maintaining hierarchy

its

to

general

membership

commitment

must not appeal

A

to their

of

anti-colonial or civil rights-style
collective conflict, against

clear divisions. Further, in both
cases, acceptance

of claims

in the face

is

in the alternative collective.

to participation in

membership,

often predicated

An

ethnic group

American society

at least

on

at large,

the

abandonment

must make

clear

while a “token”

outwardly.

similar analysis holds for gender.

Given her absolute valorization of certain

ideals despite the reality that conflicts

with them, Greenfeld’s distinction between “civic”
and “collective” or “ethnic” nations

becomes meaningless. The
on just as
as

any

rigid

The

23

The

structure

would no doubt point
to her version

is

grounded

an imposition of homogeneity, and just as ideological
a reading of history,

ethnic nation.”

or that group.

civic nation of the United States that she
narrates

ideal

of “liberty”

is

merely substituted for the ideal of this

and oppressive functioning are the same. As

out, the

same

Hobsbawm

reductions, assumptions, and exclusions are necessary

of the civic United States as

to the

most extreme examples of “ethnic

nations.”

Greenfeld’s

last line

of defense

is

the

“good

intentions” of Americans.

mentioned, she believes that Americans have an unparalleled penchant for

toward improvement of the nation [452].

If this

is

true,

why does

As

I

have

self-critique,

she echo American

ideologues in dismissing and delegitimating a number of central, well-grounded critiques

of American society and ideology?

22
I

follow

Omi and Wynant

“These remarks

are not

in

meant

observing this important distinction [Omi and Wynant, 1985].
to suggest that her typology of nations is accurate or complete.
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Retargeting and Retooling
Ultimately, Greenfeld’s treatment of
the nationalization of the United
States

is

not

the theorization of that “nation,”
as part of and toward a general
account of nations and

nationalisms.

It is,

rather, the use

of the rhetoric or appearance of
theorization of the

nation and nationalism to advance her
the core of the
fact, a

“American

nation.”

own

ideological agenda,

Her general theory of nations and nationalisms

as

is,

in

function of her “Americanist” ideology, and
works to buttress and consolidate the

supremacy of that ideology. Her work

in general asserts
(1) the ultimate

absolute purity and goodness of the “American
nation” and (2)
all

which she represents

other “ nations”

of ideals.
theoretical

I

-

and, indeed,

all

its

and nearly

great superiority over

possible nations not organized around the same
set

have pointed out explicit statements of this superiority
above. Her general

work

nation, state,

and

is

a manifestation of American arrogance and disrespect
for every other

society.

It

forms a powerfully

anti-pluralistic attack

on

all

alternative

concepts and manifestations of the nation, in perfect accord with the
standard tenets of

American foreign policy and neo-imperial ideology.
Central to these, of course, has been an antipathy to

her attempt to link
here.

According

US

slavery to Marxism.

to Greenfeld,

Marxism

Marxism -

as manifested by

Her engagement with Marxism does not

as developed

by Marx was,

sublimated nationalism, and, indeed, an extreme nationalism akin

in fact, a

stop

complexly

to National Socialism:

[T]he supposition that an internationalist doctrine, such as Marxism, conceived by
a Jew and carried on by scores and scores of other Jews, which called on
proletarians of all countries to unite, may have something in common with that

most horrible variety of militant and xenophobic nationalism, for which antiSemitism was the driving passion, seems utterly preposterous. Yet the two are
close kin; they are, one can say, brothers
they come from the same parentage
and are products of the very same upbringing. They are both elaborations of the
matrix of German nationalism, a system of beliefs and aspirations, which was
profoundly socialist, and while socialism, however obscured, is nevertheless a

—

central element in National Socialism, so

German
The way

this

is nationalism (and very specifically
nationalism) a central element in Marxism. [387]

worked was simple: The “young Karl Marx” was a “German

“ in the sense that he completely agreed with the fundamental tenets of
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nationalist,”

German Romantic

nationalism.

.

.” [56],

Yet Marx was also a Jew, and as such, he
could not comfortably

espouse a German nationalism that “ from
beginning of the nineteenth century

.

.

.

its

earliest

had strong

days

racist

in the late eighteenth

and the

and specifically anti-Semitic

connotations” [56] Therefore, through a subtle
psychological movement, Marx
substituted “class” for “nation" [393],
[i]n

Marxism

classes took on

all

which substitution

is

the characteristics of the

evidenced by the

Romantic nations”

fact that

[393], as

conceived by German Romantic nationalism. 24
Greenfeld extends

this line

of thinking

to

consider Marxist-Leninism in the Soviet

Union. Echoing her position on the origins of Marx's revolutionary theory,
she argues
that

Marxism gained hold

in

pre-Revolutionary Russia as Russians recognized that they

could not, as a traditional nation-state, compete with the Western powers, most notably
Britain, France, the United States,

and Germany. Led by Lenin, some Russians adopted a

critique (the Marxist one) of these

powers

among

nation-states that they

Russia after

scheme

its

would

lose.

that did not

depend on a

The “spreading of the Revolution” beyond

success in Russia Greenfeld thus retrospectively reduces to simply a

for extending Russian power. [Greenfeld, 1993:

There

direct competition

is,

of course, something

to this last point.

58

-

59]

But, the point

is

perfectly

consistent with the position that Russian imperialism continued under Marxist-Leninism

not because the latter ideology was fundamentally nationalistic, but because

powerful enough to extirpate Russian imperial nationalism

fully

it

was not

from the society

that

adopted Marxist-Leninism. While proponents of one might have used the other as a
to

advance

their agenda,

linked, this does not

tool

and through a long process they might have become closely

mean

that either

is

reducible to the other.

There is an important difference between my criticism of Kristeva’s and Greenfeld’s universalism, and
Greenfeld’s critique of Marx’s. Theirs are based on an explicit universalization of a particular nation(statefs set of values, and the imposition of these on the rest of the world. They thus explicitly extol the
superiority of their own nation. Marx, on the other hand, does not argue for the superiority of this or that
nation. That Greenfeld interprets the motives of his socio-economic theory to be nationalist suggests that
Greenfeld is disavowing her own suspect nationalism by projecting a valid critique of her own work onto
Marx. At the very least, the attack on Marx is hypocritical.
24
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We may make a similar claim
strains

Claim

of something akin

is

among

nothing

others.

to

about Marx. There

''German nationalism”

new-it was

leveled agatnst

is little

doubt that Marx had

in his theoretical

work. But

this

Marx long ago by Mikael Bakunin
[1972]

Bakunin's writings in the early
1870s showed

than Greenfeld the “Germanic”
nature of Marxism.

much more convincingly

He examined Marxist

theory and

practice as instantiated in the
Internationale instead of basing
his critique on psycho-

analysis of

Marx

himself. His critique of

Marx keyed on

the point that Marx-led

Marxists from industrial countries were
too close to Western capitalist
and political
sensibilities.

Thus, Greenfeld

but not to assert

it

may

be correct to assert that Marxism
was “nationalist,”

as a nationalism fundamentally
opposed to other Western national

conceptions based explicitly on

liberal individualism.

of the world), the key point about Germany
States

- was

theoretical

that

it

was fundamentally

work and by pushing

for

-

For Bakunin (and most of the

and France, and

imperialist/colonialist,

German

Britain,

and

that

rest

and the United

Marx, both

in

leadership of the Internationale and by

ignoring the issues specific to workers and peasants
from less industrially developed

regions (particularly in Eastern Europe and Asia), echoed
this basic “proto-First

Worldism.”
In this sense,

Marx s

theories

by the position of his society

was not

were not sublimated nationalism but rather

in the world.

tainted

In this way, his nationalism, though present,

specific to his theory, but the almost inevitable

baggage of any writer

in the

advanced countries of nineteenth-century Europe and America. Greenfeld’s analysis
of
Marxism-as-nationalism

floats

on the

analysis of a few individuals, namely

had an

inferiority

analysis

is

Marx and

elite

vis-a-vis “the West.”

and

is

Russians,

based on a psychological

who

certainly might have

However, completely missing from her

an account of the actual “peasants” and “workers” who took up Marxism or

Marxist-Leninism
really

complex

intellectual level,

concerned

in

Russia (as well as other places). What was

all that

much with

it

for

them? Were they

the place of their culture and state vis-a-vis “the
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West,” or were they a

bit

more concerned with

the fact that their children

were

starving,

they were always cold in the winter, they
were subject to an arbitrary, all-powerful
bureaucratic structure, and so forth?

The problems with Greenfeld's argument, however, run
much deeper than being
last stab at a retreating

Marxism

or a reductive reading of twentieth-century

Russian/Soviet history that “explains” the
fact a brilliant

communism
was always
as

as a vital social force

“communism” now
;

And

there

that

propaganda,

attitudes,

communism

Union

— just

to Iraq, Iran,

social, institutional,

as

where we are being

in history

dead, Greenfeld consoles us. For,

threat

war preparations,

aniwational-ist propaganda
the Soviet

The

is

we

(the

gone,

is

plenty of nationalism around, so

is

of communism there. Her argument

fall

Cold War maneuver. At the point

really nationalism.

we do

We

etc.

West) faced for so long

its

we might

real nature

emerges

in

told that

-

we

mislabeled

nationalism.

not have to scrap our anti-communist

merely have

to reconfigure

retarget our nuclear missiles

them

to

be

away from

and North Korea. Rather than scrap the anti-communist

and psychological ideological complex

that has

been nurtured

only reconfigure the elements of the complex

and conceptions easily

in the

into our

consciousnesses as to approach being foundational of the “American psyche,”

attitudes

is

“communism”

United States since the 1920s and before, and which has penetrated so deeply

Most of the

a

we need

to apply to a slightly different “threat.”

fit

the

“new”

threat, not

only because most

of our old enemies coincidentally show up as our new ones, but also because our rather
abstract ideological notion of “nationalism,”

which

calls

up vague images of Nazis

goosestepping, an (apparently) maniacal hoard of indistinguishable Palestinians shouting
at a

news camera, and so

forth, has

no trouble being

fit

into our equally

vague concept of

“communism.” 25

25

The recent James Bond film GoldenEye explicitly focuses on this retooling of a Cold War implement
(Bond) for the post-Cold War. The film attempts to convince the audience of this transformation precisely
by portraying an element of the old enemy we thought were fully indoctrinated Soviet communists to have
always been corrupt criminals (though, in the film, not Russian nationalists).
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This

is

not to say that Greenfeld's condemnation
of “nationalism” catches

nationalisms. This
types,

good and

is its

subtlety:

evil types if

US) and Eastern (German =
analysis

is

even extended

you

her analysis in Nationalism actually
distinguishes two

Western

will.

fascistic,

to link

all

French [with reservations], and

(British,

Russian = communalistically

totalitarian).

Eastern nationalism with aggression and

show

This
it

to

be

the cause of war and genocide. In “Nationalism and
Aggression” Greenfeld (with Daniel

Chirot) [1994] shows exactly

how

good versus bad nationalisms.

her good/evil distinction should be used, in cataloging

It is

no surprise

that the traditional

United States end up on the “bad” side (Russia, Syria,

and new enemies of the

Iraq, etc.).

Predictably, good, “civic” nationalisms are those based on “individualism,”
and

bad ones are those based on “collectivism.” For individualistic nationalisms, “the
borderline between

‘us’

and ‘them’

is

frequently blurred” [86] due to the primacy of the

individual, while in collectivistic nationalisms, the “group”

perception, and

“we” and “they”

nationalisms see “foreigners”
collective nationalisms

the

view

the basic unit of

are always clear, discrete units.

at least as

“fellow-men,”

if

What

is

more, civic

not as fellow nationals, while

“ foreigners” as a fundamentally
different species outside of

bounds of moral imperatives governing decent human

individualistic nations tend to be

interaction. Thus,

more humane toward “enemies” and

genocide and nationalist violence than

With

is

given to

less

collectivist nations.

telling irony Greenfeld claims that “individualistic nationalisms are

definition pluralisms” [86], But this

is

a sophistical logical error: there

is

by

nothing about

differentiation of a group into individual units that implies that these units will be

appreciably different from one another.

versus collective nationalism

is

More

than

this,

Greenfeld's ideology of civic

itself blatantly anti-pluralistic.

She dictates

that there

is

one type of legitimate nationalism.
This distinction

movements.

It

is

particularly devastating for small and minority nation national

requires emerging nations, which do not have the
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power

to

determine the

nature of “acceptable” nationalism,
to conform to what
to

is

given to them as acceptable, or

be rejected as illegitimate and disallowed
through indirect and direct actions.
Further,

Greenfeld

even

s

in the

theory assumes and allows one unified
nationalism per nation. This

case of “civic” nationalisms, which are
pluralist not in containing
contending

nationalisms, but insofar as an essential, unified
nationalism allows plurality

shallower

true

is

at a

level.

As

have argued, a nation often contains many, quite

I

fundamentally opposed nationalisms, that

of the nation and agendas for

more deeply

at different

it.

is,

different,

and even

different, explicit, established conceptions

But even these nationalisms tend

to fracture as

one looks

individuals with different perspectives on the nation,
different

conceptual frameworks, and so

forth.

The dynamic

interrelation of these distinct (though

potentially overlapping) nationalisms can contribute

much

to the richness

of the nation.

Greenfeld's theory forces a reduction of the possibly rich plurality of
nationalisms of a

given nation to a single, unified, and therefore limited nationalism.

By assuming

a

unified nationalism as the essence of a nation, a perceiver performs a reduction
of the
nation. If this perception

reduced

in actuality,

is

a Great Power's expectation of a nation, the nation might be

through manipulation, influence, and force.

Greenfeld's theory codifies the litmus

test

applied to emerging states by the

United States and other powerful Western countries
suitably “ democratic.”

to

determine whether or not they are

Indeed, her recent work on the link between non-civic

nationalism and aggression both legitimizes and expresses a more general attitude
prevalent in

US

and other foreign

policies.

If the

“civic nationalism” so defined, then that state

Second,

if

an emerging

eliminating

all

is

state displays a plurality

“ideology” of an emerging
a threat to

all

the

“good”

of possible ideologies,

it

state is not

nations.

is

forced toward

but one, the one “in line with” civic nationalism. In practice, the

“nationalism” selected out through pressure and interference by the United States
strain

of power, usually

elite

(Anastasio

Somoza
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in

is

a

Nicaragua, the former Shah of Iran,

Nguyen Thieu and Nguyen Ky

in

Vietnam, Ferdinand Marcos

in the Philippines, various

figures in Turkey, etc.) and so the least legitimate,
if a single nationalism must be
chosen,
as well as generally dictatorial.

Thus,

Western democracy

often manifests itself in small and minority nations

as a limiting, dictatorial (non-collective to be sure) authoritarian
exploitative ideology.

This

is

origins

not due to the flawed nature ot non-European or “ lesser” nations,
for in their

most demonstrate a range of possible

progressive. Rather,
is

good or bad

Great Power

US

not a measure of

interests.

nationalism

-

many of which

are quite

suggests that the criterion for determining whether a nationalism
its

content, but the extent to

which

it

advances Western

This suggests that the groundless antiWestem-ism that Greenfeld

among many non-Westem

perceives

from

is

it

ideologies,

is

nations

-

the resentment that she claims

is

absent

actually a quite understandable and legitimate reaction to those

who, through implementing a

particular ideology in a particular way,

deny non-Westem

nations the plurality, complexity, and self-determination enjoyed by the Great Powers of
the West.

Greenfeld's essentialist analysis of nationalisms of East and West boils

quaint old notion that Russians are this way, French are
so forth. Especially in

its

that,

down

to a

Germans another way, and

gross simplifications of the natures of “East” and “West,”

Greenfeld blatantly displays precisely the “us” versus “them” mentality that she
lambastes as one of two key results of collectivism that lends
theory, there

is

at harsh,

communism

nationalism itself qx presses a nationalism that

mystified

its

political critique

In her

(their) Eastern

blanket condemnations of “them.”

In the end, Greenfeld's critique of

and

to aggressiveness.

no blurring of the borderline between (our) Western and

nationalism and no hesitation

intellectual

it

is

for being a

misleadingly presented as a progressive

of regressive social forces.

nationalist agenda, then so

do

bad form of

If Soviet

communism

critiques such as Greenfeld's.
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What

is

worse, Greenfeld's “civic” (Western)
versus “collectivist” (Eastern)

nationalisms

is

in the

end just

itself a retooling

rather unoriginal reiteration of

helped reorient

US

of an original Cold

Hans Kohn’s 1945

wartime propaganda

for the

War

instrument.

It is

a

analysis of nationalism [1945] that

Cold War,

in critiquing

both Russian

nationalism as well as explicitly Asian (anti-colonial)
nationalisms that were emerging.

For Kohn,

Western nationalism was,

in

its

connected with the concepts of

origin,

individual liberty and rational cosmopolitanism.

.”

.

[330], Greenfeld unabashedly

incorporates the former almost directly and loads the
that causes the civic nationalist to see

entity

“humanity

[Greenfeld, 1994: 87], For Kohn, the

latter into a universalistic

as one, fundamentally

later,

humanism

homogeneous

derivative Eastern nationalism

“lacked self-assurance” and indeed came out of an “inferiority complex”
[Kohn, 1945:
330]. This Greenfeld reflects through her reading of Friedrich Nietzsche's Genealogy
of

Morals

to

produce her concept of “ ressentimentf “a psychological

state resulting

from

suppressed feelings of envy and hatred (existential envy) and the impossibility of
satisfying these feelings” [Greenfeld, 1992:

15], the

psychological basis for the

development of Marxist nationalism, Russian nationalism, and the

As Kohn

at the

role in the fight then

Cold War retool the

beginning of the Cold

War

like.

retooled anti-fascism for

brewing against communism, so does Greenfeld
retool for a fight against

communism's

at the

its

expanded

end of the

successor.

The Poverty of Philosophy

What does

philosophical analysis have to offer the study of nations and

nationalisms? Philosophers claim to reach to the fundamental issues, problems, and
principles underlying our natural and social worlds. Philosophy of Science claims to

explore the deepest issues of the basis of scientific knowledge, Ethics the possible
justifications for

and causes of moral positions. Logic the basic form and

rational thought,

and so

forth.

Political

Philosophy
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is

supposed

to

possibilities

engage the deepest

of

levels of political principles, structures, activities, and
so forth.
interpret the fundamental nature ot these,

and

to

Its

analyses are meant to

ground or justify practical positions and

actions in the concrete political realm.

This claim to foundational enquiry, consolidated by Kant,
exploded by Marx and
Nietzsche,

is at

the origin of Western Philosophy, in the figure of Socrates.

complexity of that role

own

perhaps more present in the work of Descartes.

is

The Meditations

The

the relevant text to understanding this.

Was

the Meditations his

honest presentation of intensively subversive possibilities that undercut the very

foundations of the Catholic ideological complex that dominated Europe. Were

Meditations 2 through 6 merely a cover for the devastating possibilities opened up

Meditation

1

—

even

his

way of resolving

the exploration of Meditation

1

in

with his

perhaps genuine Catholic faith? Did his honest enquiry unleash demons that would
eventually wreak havoc on the pre-modern belief system, regardless of his intentions?
Or,

was

the Meditations an attempt to contain the

Descartes was merely the

new

radical possibilities that

glimpse and formulate clearly, but which already were

first to

beginning to form around him? Were they an attempt

to subjugate the

new

spirit

of

enquiry to the pre-modern, Catholic ideological complex?

One might choose

the

more

favorable, radical interpretation of Descartes’ texts,

despite the inevitable protests of those
intentions,

and so

forth.

the merely explicit,

They perhaps

who have

who

all

his letters,

are not qualified to speculate

what was really going on

represent the type of scholar

read

—

know

his explicit

on what was beneath

and anyway, they for the most

part

tends to buttress reigning ideological authority, whether

in the discipline or society.

Whatever one’s ultimate
it is

appraisal of Descartes (and the

clear that the questions above at least

even

if

one assumes

it

mark

to cut against his explicit

unconscious motives, desires,

beliefs.
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same holds of Socrates),

a possibility implicit in Descartes’s work,

and underlying, conscious and

What

is

more, no doubting

- no

interrogation of the presuppositions and
pre-

reflective conceptual frames of oneself, one’s
discipline, one's society, etc.

There are always blind-spots, and points
But,

always possible

it is

to

push doubt

that are not

to

-

is

pushed through chance or

an uncomfortable

level, the level at

pure.
denial.

which

structures of domination begin to be perceived and
alternative possibilities open up.

What

the Meditations do

is

to set a possible standard

of reaching to the very

foundations of ideological systems and challenging them to justify
themselves. Indeed.
Descartes calls upon one to doubt what

given

in

one’s world

-

to de-naturalize

appears the most rational, and so

forth.

and Foucault have heard, despite

its

A

look

at

is

most assumed, most obvious, most apparently

what appears the most
It is

natural, de-rationalize

what

a call that philosophers such as Nietzsche

origin and perhaps their disavowals.

mainstream contemporary Anglo-American

Political Philosophy,

however, would suggest the second interpretation of Descartes

to

be more credible.

Granted, philosophers are people, influenced by their surrounding culture and
state/political structures, indoctrinated in certain ideological

complexes, and so

Yet, despite this, one would hope that the Cartesian call would

philosophy departments. One would hope that
that realm in

own

echo

Political Philosophers

which ideology has played such an important

role

--

-

in the halls

in

of

approaching

would engage

in their

Cartesian projects, as a prerequisite for engaging particular political objects.
If this

does occur outside of the mainstream, most frequently within Feminist

Philosophy, a look
that

still

forth.

it

does not

On

at recent

at all

"philosophical perspectives on national identity" suggests

when philosophers engage

the contrary, they import the

the nation and nationalism.

same old

ideas they have been using in political

theory for centuries, merely applying them to (imposing them on) the "nation" and
"nationalism."

The one

place where one

would expect some

tainting of approaches to nation and nationalism

prevalent and complete.
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is

the place

respite

where

from the ideological

it is

perhaps most

Philosophers have, in the vein of Kedourie,
rejected such things as nationalism.

What makes

recent philosophical

work on

rejections or ignorance has been displaced

the topic noteworthy

is

that the old blanket

more and more by a concerted

"understand" the nation and nationalism. This
"understanding-'

is

active,

effort to

and generally

effects a conceptual transformation of the
object into existing philosophical terms
and

concepts, thereby robbing
object of study in the

first

it

of

interesting distinct features,

its

which make

it

a worthy

place. This transformation tends to be the
ideological buttress

of a more practical absorption and control of the nation and
nationalism by the dominant
political forces

of the contemporary world

-

most notably "liberalism" and the

liberal

state.

Rather than taking the conceptual richness and novel elements of
the nation as a
spur to develop
to established

new

philosophical ideas and methods

and threadbare

political ideas

deny any richness or novelty. They

--

opening new possible alternative

and analyses

-

recent approaches implicitly

stick rigidly with the given available ideas

and

concepts, squandering the opportunity to overcome their obsolescence. In contemporary
liberal philosophy, the

It is

not fear of the

something new

-

liberal spirit

of discovery" has given way

new - which would imply

but self-satisfaction

societies, political structures, etc.

—

-

that

that

philosophy

is

promise and

Why

falsity

do

I

of

its

this

sterility

its

conservatism. The result

that,

because the promise of

claims so extravagant, the disappointment

claims

is

that

is

and intellectual laziness.

move, one might remark

so great and

recognition that there was

one understands the nature of people,

grounds

somewhere between inbred philosophical
In a Greenfeldian

at least

to a rigid conservatism.

much more

at its

broken

intense.

focus on "liberal" philosophy? Simply put, mainstream philosophy

liberal philosophy.

There are variations, such as communitarianism,

is

that maintain the

general conceptual framework of liberalism, while flipping this or that tenet upside down.

And

there are those strains, such as Feminism, Post-Structuralism/Post-Modernism,
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Marxism,
always

etc., that

have carved out significant space within philosophy.
But

space

is

But, particularly in the approach to the nation, mainstream
Political Philosophy

is

in alternative

Liberalism has even

liberal.

One need

philosophy, as Continental, or "Social and Political,"

made

this

etc.

incursions into these alternative spaces.

only recall the 1994 American Philosophical Association
Eastern

Division Meeting's Panel on "Nationalism and Internationalism"
[December 28, 1994] to
see this manifested.

Ten of

1

1

participants espoused

some type of liberal

line,

though

with varying political commitments. The main debated following their
presentations was

about whether the

(liberal) right to self-determination

was properly an individual

only, or could be legitimately exercised by a group. All discussion

was

right

strictly in liberal

terms and with the general tenets of liberalism assumed.

Other recognized philosophical work on the nation and nationalism
liberal.

This

is

is

likewise

suggested strongly by the contents of the Fall- Winter 1996-97 issue of

The Philosophical Forum a "Special Issue on Philosophical Perspectives on National
,

Identity."

Most mainstream philosophical

represented

among

its

analysts of the nation and nationalism are

authors and the sources they explicitly draw on.

Its

various articles

describe and/or take a comprehensive range of the different positions current in

mainstream philosophy. This issue

is

especially pertinent because

it

is

supposed

to bring

together the range of philosophical perspectives on the nation and nationalism; what

represented in

its

is

pages can be taken as a leading journal's belief about the mainstream

consensus on what

is

part of this range.

An

examination of

its

contents will support

my

contention of the "poverty of philosophy" on the nation and nationalism, and offer further

important insight into the manner

academic approaches

to

it

in

that claim

which the nation

some

sort
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is

used and manipulated

of positive engagement with

it.

in

Can
This question

the Nation or Nationalism

central to a

is

number of essays

in the

concerned with the status of the Quebecois movement
it is

a legitimate and justified

Be Liberal?

movement. He assumes

in

Forum. Kai Nielsen

He wants

Canada.

that this

to

is

show

that

depends on whether or not

establishment of "a sovereign Quebec[] will destroy Quebec's
liberal democracy"
[Nielsen, 1996

:

And,

justified.

He
antiliberal

42 ].
if

If nationalism is necessarily "illiberal," then

Quebecois nationalism specifically

no nationalism

is illiberal, it is

is

not justified.

admits that some nationalisms are of the "fanatical, antidemocratic,
and

form" that subverts

all interests

Such a nationalism

interest'" [43],

moral equality

is

and

rights to "’the pursuit

"incompatible with liberalism

of the national
.

.

.

which affirms

[for all people]" [43],

Nielsen argues that not

all

nationalisms are

illiberal.

"'Some nationalisms are

peaceful, liberal, and democratic'" [44]. Thus, there are "good" nationalisms and "bad"

ones; the "good" are liberal.

Nielsen then argues for the
to

it

be "ethnic," and thus
is

actually liberal.

It

liberality

deny membership

of Quebecois nationality. Though

and

in fact utterly disregard non-ethnics,

allows immigration and

full

participation of immigrants, so long
-

nationalism": membership

common

is

I

might

open, so

it

is

is

defined in terms of participation in a

in the previous section, that

be oppressive and, by supposedly

assumption that liberalism

What
illegitimate

is

is

49]

It is

a "cultural

culture.

The

consistent with liberalism.

have already argued,

still

appears

to

to

as they learn the dominant language and history of the society. [48

culture

it

is

inherently

good

an explicitly "liberal" nation

liberal standards, illegitimate.

is

Thus, the

dubious.

more, the assumption that any non-liberal nationalism or nation

is

ungrounded. Nielsen assumes there are two types of nations or

nationalisms, liberal and anti-liberal.
nation/nationalism. In doing

this,

The

anti-liberal is

any non-liberal

he assumes that "liberalism"
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is

equivalent to or

necessarily linked with "democracy"
and respect for others, and that
the only
respect others and be democratic
liberal "is at

civilized

odds with some

moral outlook" [43

But, what

if

is

beliefs

— my

through liberalism. Indeed, any
position that

are

is

many forms of democracy, and

substantive participation, as

say that

it

is

I

suggested in

alternative, non-liberal

is

available. This

my

Chapter

1

treatment of Thom. The nation

form of political organization. 26 That

allow

It

might be "democratic" or

is

not to

not, just

this here).

denial of this alternative possibility produces a
double-edged conceptual

poverty. First, as with Greenfeld,
to be legitimate, they
"liberal."

(I

community

might also be through other forms of

always "democratic" or participatory.

as liberalism might be oppressive or not

The

liberalism with

not even fully democratic. Certainly
a range of equally or more

is

institutional politics, but

might represent an

not

not necessarily "anti-democratic"
and

legitimate forms of popular participation
in one's political

might be through

is

emphasis].

the non-liberal nation

representative form

to

and principles which are an essential
part of any

monomaniacally self-devoted? There
its

way

it

limits the options available to national

must be or represent themselves

to

be (and thus tend

Second, the complexity of the nations and nationalisms

is

movements:
to

become)

flattened into a

purely liberal framework. Even those nations that can be represented
as liberal (such as
the Quebecois) are reduced in this way.

because they are resisting

become

liberal

And any

that cannot be or refuse to be

oppression (colonies of liberal

—

often

states, for instance)

-

a conceptual "other," maligned and dismissed without true analysis or

understanding.

While he appears
hospitality

to

by inviting them

be opening the door

to

some

into the liberal house, he

nationalisms, and showing good

is in

fact forcing the invitation

on

This is a tricky point. It is not that - as I will discuss in Chapter 3 - the nation cannot take a liberal form,
but that even this form cannot be explained by appeal only to liberalism. It is not generated by liberalism,
but a liberalist deformation of an externally-generated social form. The concept of the nation in general -as a set of potentials that include fascism and liberalism - is a conceptual alternative to liberalism that
potentially overlaps with it.
2<
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them. There

an "option," but a coercive and exclusive
one.

is

excluded, and

some

will refuse to

come - and

Some

nations will be

they will pay a conceptual and
possibly

actual price. His granting of the possibility
of liberalism to nationalism might
be a

but one that

That

comes with
is

gift,

serious conditions and obligations.

not to say that the very limited terms Nielsen
sets are bad in themselves.

Certainly cultural openness and respect for others

is

a legitimately desirable national

trait.

But, by linking these necessarily to liberalism, he
forces nations conceptually and

possibly actually to accept a whole complex of associated
liberal characteristics.
not explore what such a nation

is

whom

in detail, but other authors do,

He does

will treat below.

I

Judith Lichtenberg offers a similar analysis of the possible
liberality of the nation.

Like Nielsen’s, her argument assumes that liberalism

-

maintaining (1) “a certain

conception of the equality of human beings” and (2) “an emphasis on individual

freedom or autonomy,” which

result in (3) “tolerance, respect for individual rights,

pluralism” [Lichtenberg, 1996: 54]

-

“the forces of good”

tests various (liberal) formulations

She then

[53],

is

“good.” Indeed, she

and

refers to liberal politics as

of the nation

against the various criteria of liberalism.

Her conclusions

are

whether a national culture

more

is

restrictive than Nielsen’s.

democratic and open, she looks

promotes the well-being of individuals within

it.

Beyond just

Her answer

particular participation in a single national culture that

whether

at

makes

it

actually

it

hesitant.

is

the issue of

There

is

nothing

necessary for individual

well-being. Other attachments (such as religion) and access to multiple cultures might

What

serve as well or better.

is

more, cultures are given, not chosen, and so do not

necessarily increase individual life-options. At most, a culture

used to

it,

grew up

in

it,

and

it

makes one

feel

is

“good” because one

comfortable and secure. [56

-

59]

Not

strong case.

She also questions
above

all

others

more

the “nationalist”

commitment

to his/her nation’s interests

strenuously. For her, the privileging of “one’s
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own" can only

a

is

come

after ensuring a fair distribution

of resources globally. Only then
can each

individual have access to a supportive
national culture, and the distinctiveness
of one’s

not

mean an

exclusion of non-nationals. She sees this
as a big limit on the liberality
of

nations, given “the facts of national
selfishness and greed.” [64]
Finally, she raises the issue of pluralism.
There are too

have a

state,

and

all

land

is

Thus, a nation must be tolerant of other
nations

deep diversity, ” then

to

Besides the general
nation (which

states.

I

liberal

it

is

an open question. [68

-

69]

take up below), there are certain obvious problems
with Lichtenberg’s

states (and national cultures).

movements

does. This

assumptions that prevent a genuine concept of the

analysis. First, an obstacle to nationalism

among

territory.

But, does nationalism undermine state unity?
If there cannot be a

state.

commitment

nations for each to

taken already anyway. Further, nations
overlap on

This requires that nations share
within a

many

is

the differential of wealth and freedom

Her analysis seems

to

assume

that all national

are in rich states/nations. But, one of the key motivations
for nationalist

movements has been

resistance to economic exploitation and oppression perpetrated
by

stronger states, especially in the form of colonialism.

What

is

more, one of the key liberal justifications for colonialism

(as

it is

for

invasive development projects today) was that the colonized needed help in forming a
society capable of economic and political parity with colonizing liberal states. 27 Thus,

where the

differential

argument once justified colonialism,

it

now

continues in this vein,

but delegitimating the autonomy of the colonized.

Even

if

Lichtenberg does not intend

this application, the

complete

distributions of wealth within liberal societies serves as a stark warning to
results

of a global

liberal system.

Nationalism that blocks

non-liberal space, might not be justified liberally, but

it

See especially John Stuart Mill’s

On

Liberty [1977: 9
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-

10],

all

of fair

about the

this global reach, to bracket off

might be justified against more

objective criteria. Lichtenberg’s restriction on nationalism

:7

failure

—

that

its

liberal legitimacy

depends on a previous redistribution of wealth and
and nationalisms are legitimate only
and revolutionary

resistant

in contexts in

meaning

political

social

“goods” - means

which they can have none of the

that has often

will be politically irrelevant “ lifestyle choices.”

that nations

been

their core.

Rather, they

Lichtenberg’s insistence that they be

recognized as “political” and not merely cultural
[60

-

61]

is

not meant to claim that they

are meaningful politically, but rather to serve as a
warning about their potential

deleterious political effects.

Ultimately, Lichtenberg
liberally legitimate.

makes

it

difficult

though not impossible for a nation

She requires a very particular type of nationalism and

to be

nation.

Indeed, her criteria resemble an

IMF

restructuring plan, requiring deep changes in the

traditional concept of the nation

and

strict

national

beyond

community must
its

borders

-

effect liberal

adherence to an external form. Indeed, a

change

to legitimize itself.

in the

world

Her treatment

is

-

further liberal goals even

thus not so

much an

analysis,

but rather a conceptual “border patrol” around political legitimacy. The only concepts

allowed

in are liberal.

Yes, concepts of non-liberal origin

the language and customs of liberalism (that

The

A central
nationalisms

is

become

enter, but they

must learn

liberal).

of Self-Determination

issue in recent political debates and public policy regarding nations and

the “right” of self-determination.

philosophers have been,

which nations have

A

“ Right”

is,

may

What

is

The questions often engaged by

meant by “self-determination”? and What determines

the “right” to it?

number of Forum essays

Moellendorf sets out certain
a right to secede to form

its

deal explicitly with the latter question. Darrel

criteria

own

which must be

state.

He

satisfied for a minority nation to

argues that the right to secede

is

have

not an

individual right, but can only be exercised by a group. In this way, the size of the group
is

irrelevant

—

only the justness of

its

claim

to self-determination does. [Moellendorf,
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Of course,

1996: 88]

moral justification of the right

‘'the

.

.

.

derives from

its

service to

legitimate interests of individuals”
[89], In other words, only a group
can exercise the
right, but

can do so only

it

The

doing so benefits

basis of the right

first

structures to

if

is

which she consents”

membership”

its

individual

members.

the “individual’s interest in
being governed by state

[90].

The linchpin of his argument

is

that “cultural

a “primary good” for individuals.
Cultures offer meaningful options

is

and supports for the exercise of autonomy.
And, they are not easily replaced
cannot just

move from one

would have

subjects of a state to

Of course,
membership
dictated

state,

but national

their culture or being

which they do not consent.

the

new

state

must be neutral with respect

in the separated culture, but at the

to culture.

same time allow

It

must allow

the individual

autonomy

by liberalism.

those

left

rump

state,

it

choose between abandoning

to

There are further caveats.

more,

be ruled by the given

to

blocked for them, they would have to emigrate
and abandon their

is

culture. Thus, they

one

culture to another without difficulty.
[90] Thus, if members

of a minority national culture no longer wish
self-determination

-

behind in the rump
nor deprive

must not

minorities. [92

-

it

or

First, the

state.

its

secession should not result in injustice to

The secession must not undermine

citizens of their just share of original resources.

result in the oppression

of residents of the

new

is

not strengthened

suitering oppression by the state majority [93], All this does
to disregard the security

I

make

of the rump

state

-

nothing

including

is

new

members

are

allow the seceding nation

a relatively minor point. Moellendorf s language regarding the

that, if there

arranged along national

is

if its

else.

preservation of a just resource distribution despite secession

does not mean

state,

What

93]

Second, a nation's case for secession

(1) First,

the security of the

was

lines,

sloppy. Presumably, he

is

injustice in the initial state that

then the secession should correct
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was not
it.

specifically

The requirement

should be that injustice would not be increased
by the secession. But
the relative level of injustice

is

important.

defensible on a utilitarian argument) that,

then

it

It

this suggests that

would seem obvious (and perhaps even

if “injustice” is

not increased by a secession,

should be allowed.

Moellendorrs

intentional disregard for conditions of oppression
appears to

generate even this error.

Though

the error

is

minor, the disregard has

much

deeper

implications for his analysis.

The main argument
a national minority

is

ignores the reality that

is

most often the motive

denied either option. The nation

precisely because

it

has no say in the government of “

precisely because

it

is

is

being destroyed or repressed

its” state,

and

it

has no say

oppressed or discriminated against. Even though Moellendorf

explicitly denies that oppression has a bearing

how even

is

for secession:

on the

right to secede,

it is

difficult to see

the forced choice between culture and consent to the state (which

not oppressive in a liberal sense, since in either direction

it

is

his

model)

involves an inevitable

suppression of autonomy. This level of oppression apparently does have a role in his

model, even

he does not recognize

if

Without

it.

it,

there can be

no justification

for

secession.

What

is

more, in most situations where the minority nation has any kind of forced

or limited choice, this

is

the result of the activity of the state majority.

To pose

the

question of whether the minority should act to secede or not ignores the activity of the
state majority,

and assumes the minority

is

making a decision

the contrary, under conditions of oppression

determined constrained options

—

—

at

some “zero

point.”

or even milder forms of historically

the historical dynamics are already under way, and not

controlled by the minority. Indeed,

if

the minority actually were in such control, the

question of secession would be moot. The oppressor group has already acted and
acting.

On

The moral burden would seem

to

be on
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it.

is

Furthermore, tor the minority

of action. In

this context,

no acting

is

it

is

as

toward secession. Moellendorf assumes

not a question of acting or not, but
of what type

much

if

not

that an act

more of a decisive action

toward secession

be evaluated; a negative evaluation requires
the minority to remain

of not acting. But,

in a context

oppressive forces bear

much

evaluated as

down on

by the

situation.

It

can act

matter which option

Given

mean

it

this, the

use the term

of this

rather than the

its

that the

“zero position”
in

which

an action that must be
is

not a morally neutral

oppressed minority’s actions are fully determined

in different

ways, but the

manner of evaluating

—

is

reality is that

real context,

complex and

One cannot even be

and thus

it

will

pay a price no

determination

on which

it

really

is.

complex

entity

is

a nation’s “right to secede”

to transform

difficult question

clear

full

What Moellendorf does

necessary.

the liberal tendency to force such formulae on
here.

is

The former

dichotomy of perfect agency and

right

from

right

the minority, not acting

to

chooses.

applicable, and a different
still

at the

needs

that

of dynamic historical change, especially
one

as acting (toward secession).

position. This does not

is all

as acting

is

it

is

not

-

if

one can

to abstract the issue

into a very simple question,

There

reality

is

no easy formula, and

proves quite problematic

the true “ agent” of a given situation,

nor of what that agency really means.
(2)

If,

under the theoretical and

institutional structure

Moellendorf proposes,

secession must be justified without reference to oppression, oppressed groups whose very
survival might depend on secession might not be allowed to secede. Moellendorf would

probably counter
criteria.

this

by claiming

However, he admits

constitutes a nation [96].

—

I

that

that in

any such group would probably

some cases

would argue

that

it

is

it

is

fit

the other

not clear whether this or that group

precisely in situations

where oppression

especially efforts at forced assimilation, historical revision of a group’s very existence

(the Turkish

government’s portrayal of Kurds as “mountain Turks” without a

distinct

ethnic or cultural identity, for instance), genocide, erasure of historical monuments,

214

etc.

—

are

most

intense,

uncertainty

greatest.

is

“ national
identity”

and the

of a minority most under siege, that the

This means that the most oppressed nations
would have the

least

recourse to “justice.”

This

is

something

like the situation tor the poorest,

most

inarticulate

and

marginalized defendants or complainants, versus rich and
articulate ones, within the court

systems of liberal democracies such as the United

States.

The

“flat” treatment

favor those nations with the most resources and secure identity,
that

is,

would

the least

oppressed. This would most likely not change even
if the legal and political institutions

he calls for to decide about claims to

this right

claims to adjudicate cases on the same

and poor, oppressed and

The
becomes

is

liberal

the inverse of

its

of rights, and in front of it rich

The very

would depend on

a court system that

possibility of presenting a

the relative strength of the

need for independence.

concept of “right”

tied to individuals ,

we have

created',

liberal principles

free, are treated differently.

viable case in front of this institution

minority, which

were

itself is

fundamentally problematic

and whether or not

it is

in this

way.

It

enforced depends essentially on an

individual’s ability to protect his/her personal property, this right.

Though some

societies

are better than others in assisting the poor, marginalized, etc., in defending their rights, in

no society

is

an individual’s

status, wealth, race, gender, etc., not a (or the)

determining

factor in the enforcement of their rights.

An

“politico-ethics” that views a “right” as property

cannot avoid

this.

I

—

that

does

liberal theory

—

have commented on and will comment further on the negative effects

of conceiving of “national identity” as an individual possession
this

is,

—

with a focus on what

to the nation so conceived.

Here,

I

focus on what this does to what might be called “social justice,”

if this

term can be used outside of a right-rhetoric context. As Moellenberg’s essay
demonstrates (and Lackey’s, below, will demonstrate), when a right becomes property,

no longer manifests an

ethical

judgment. Liberalism transforms “right” and “wrong”
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it

from an evaluative judgment about a
situation
oppressiveness of a situation

Moellenberg

is

-

to a

is

it

1

am

concerned here with the

in the

hands of one of the

parties.

“right” and “wrong,” and only
concerned with

what “rights” an individual or group has as

makes

and

mere possession

unconcerned with what

evaluative ethics

-

its

property. This

abandonment of an

impossible to fight against oppression as
oppression. Indeed,

makes unconcern about “right” and “wrong,” and
and even the sign of enlightened, objective
(3) If a nation s claim to secession

it

specifically oppression, acceptable

social consciousness.

is

based on the individual rights and interests

of its members, then presumably any dissension within

that nation

secession. Moellendorf s claim that the right to secede

is

would disallow

a national or group right but

derives from individual rights completely ignores the
inevitable tension between them.

One

option would be to allow dissenters to stay with the original

has already argued that culture

is

state,

a “ good” to which they have a right.

but Moellendorf

Add

fact that, if the minority is geographically contiguous, the
dissenters will

their

homes, and the

right

would not appear

Of course, Moellendorf might

to this the

have

to leave

to stand.

argue that the issue could legitimately be settled

through democratic vote. But, he has also argued regarding the dissent within the
original state, the

numbers of the minority

are not supposed to matter [88

-

89],

Though

the dissenting minority of the minority might not constitute an independent culture

(though a more sophisticated and complex grasp of culture than Moellendorf s might

open

this as a possibility), a

democratic vote forcing

produce a “Tyranny of the Majority”
to the

push

dissenters

I

-

to join in the secession

On

his

own

argument,

it

would seem

that the

right not to secede, regardless of their numbers.

will argue in detail in Chapter 3 that nations without states tend split

of secession or independent statehood. Moellendorf s argument
rests national rights

would

reflecting the very tyranny that, presumably, led

for secession in the first place.

would have an absolute

it

--

on the issue

and any argument

simply on the rights of individual members qua individuals
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—

is

that

a de

facto denial of self-determination
to any nations with any
internal complexity (which,
ironically,

necessary to a truly dynamic, diverse,
or “ pluralistic” nation).

is

have expected as much:
rights

if

one assumes

that the individual is the sole

and agency, then no group can be asserted

with the assertions of individuals.
Fortunately, as the
illustrate, the

must

It

can stand

that

in

One might

fundamental unit of

any kind of tension

fall.

model of the nation

I

develop

notion of the absolute atomic individual

is

in

Chapter 3 hopefully will

ontologically inaccurate.

As

such, legitimate decision-making processes
that recognize that people are in
fundamental
social relations

and cannot simply ignore these when making decisions
are not only

possible but the norm. Individual agency itself is
tied up with group structures. This

is

not to say that the group has priority over the individual,
but rather that their relationship
is

complex, tense, and
It is

dialectical.

not clear that Moellenberg would be concerned about these
problems with his

theory. After

all,

he

is

not concerned about oppression. Ultimately, what

Moellendorf in decisions regarding which nations have a legitimate case
whether or not they advance the
liberal rights

liberal cause.

of all concerned. And,

abstract rights.

It is

it

A

is at

stake for

for secession

is

secession must preserve or extend the

must be put forward

in liberal terms, focusing

regulated by these rights, and the regulation

is

on

imposed by an

institution.

Indeed, under his schema, national revolutionary

movements would become

subject to a regulatory agency and liberal criteria. Yet, these
the political structures and theories in dominance, as

colonial national

movements were

employing liberal justifications

much

movements

as concrete oppression. Anti-

directed for the most part against liberal colonizers,

(recall

again John Stuart Mill).

From Fanon

Chatterjee, they have been conceived as deep critiques of liberalism.

according to liberal principles and by
delegitimize them. At the very

often challenge

least,

liberal institutions

it

would undercut
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To

to

regulate

them

would be almost automatically

their “self-determination” at a

to

fundamental
for their

level:

claims

to

they could not determine their political
principles or even the reasons

independence; these would have

to

be the uniformly imposed liberal

principles laid out by Moellendorf.

Revolution

a challenge to an existing

is

emergent or repressed
system, revolution

-

social structures

that

is,

and

framework

that

cannot accommodate

political aspirations.

Under Moellendorf s

a change in basic political structures and
ideology

- would

be impossible. All national movements would be
reformist, and the establishment of new

independent

would become

states

Rather than serving legitimate cases for

trivial.

self-

determination, the system would absorb revolutionary tensions
and critiques into a
relatively stable state system based

the state system,

it

would preserve

cases, as well) against

what are

—

on

liberal principles.

that

system

again as

I

in general

controlling the changes in

terms (and in most particular

argue in Chapter 3

“national” tensions with and revolutions against

level,

By

--

actually at their deepest

it.

Philosophers such as Lichtenberg and Moellendorf seem to conceive liberalism as

some
they

sort

of exclusive

fail to

(elite) club.

In their jealous protection of

consider the possibility that

many

and with good reason. Though they believe
outside

it

tend to see

it

for

what

national

its

membership

movements do not want

in the absolute superiority

rolls,

to join

,

of their club, those

it is.

Moellendorf s work extends the work of Nielsen. Beyond simply requiring a
liberal

form

for “legitimate” national independence,

results in support.
(liberal control)

It

lays the

groundwork

it

requires liberal justifications and

for imposition

of

liberal evaluative criteria

through institutional means.

Douglas Lackey takes the issue of self-determination one

step further.

Where

Nielsen determines the legitimate form of an independent nation, and Moellendorf

determines what arguments can justify self-determination by a minority nation, Lackey
considers what means a seceding nation can use to secure
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its

independence.

Lackey grants
state.

He

same

not the

102

-

conceives

tor

this

should rightly be

its

group has a rightful claim on

claim as a “claim right,” that
is,

Lackey

there

is

that a nation has recently lost or that

it

what a person may do

in a

claim the right of self-defense (through violence)
[103

Lackey then takes things
the cause
in

which

is

in a different direction.

1977 additions

to the

[109] His argument

Geneva Conventions on

is

1

996:

of what

generally not

is

its

cannot

104],

He

argues that the “justness” of
it.

nationalists carry out their fight that determines whether their
it.

It is

defense of

meaningful sense, so

not relevant to the methods that can be used in support
of

legitimate, not the reason for

at

-

in

in pursuit

a further limit: a state

had

own

as the claim to property.

is,

what a nation can do

limits

Of course,

property.

its

the right to act in a certain way.
[Lackey,

as liberal rights theory limits

his/her right to his/her property.

something

that a national

as a “ liberty right," that

Now, just

103]

argument

It is

the

methods

manner

are

based on an examination of the

the conduct of war.

He

looks specifically

debates about the status of irregular soldiers not representing existing state

governments. Are these legitimate fighters? This, he believes, hinges on whether they
are granted Prisoner of

certain guidelines,

status if captured.

a

civilians

is,

they have

they meet

if

and by distinguishing

delegates from post-colonial states were well aware, this

minor

it

civilians.

greatly increase the chance that an irregular

Though

The answer

most notably by not attacking

themselves fully from

As

War

point, this

is

would

in fact

become

an entry into the deeper issues

last

provision would

a Prisoner of War.

Who was

at stake.

instrumental in decoupling the reasons for which one fights and the legitimacy of
fighting?

As Lackey

admits,

they advocate such a stand?
struggles

much

—

it

was “especially European delegates” [106]

As much

as

was

it

in their interest(s) not to

particularly in the years after they had lost their empires

in their interest(s) not to

compromise

—

it

Why

would

favor liberation

was

also very

the ability of state-sponsored militaries to act,

regardless of the justness of their cause.
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This should have “raised a warning flag”
for Lackey.

It

has two serious

implications. First, and obviously, basing a
consideration of abstract, absolute rights
on
the proceedings and results of international
negotiations

is

beyond naive. Such

negotiations are merely and completely the playing
out of state interests in conflict. The

agreements never have anything
determined by

all

to

do with

principles, but are the resulting vectors

the different interests/agendas and the military,
political,

propagandistic, and economic forces behind them. This

while

initially delegates

came discussing

other abstract principles [105
right

-

Or does

it

indicated by the fact that

the “right to national self-determination” and

106], in the final agreement, there

of national self-determination” [109], Does

issues at hand?

is

mean

mean

this

that the negotiations

that

is

it

“no mention of the

is

irrelevant to the

became unconcerned with

abstract

principles and fully occupied by realpolitical maneuvering, such that even the rhetoric
of

“rights” and “principles” was dropped?

Of course, even were

this rhetoric present,

betrays himself on this point decisively.

became just

in

1863”

[1 10].

His reason

He
is

that the

which he sees

in the

Union did not have

War

to

done

for the

and social

most cynical of

structure, in the

statement of principle,

why was

Talk of rights and principles

its

no statement

in

success in the

it

I

have

not instead an

Southern economy

War?

If

it

had been a

1860? Or 1850? Or 1789?

in

such contexts

only

the right to use

Was

interests, specifically to disrupt the

there

War

Emancipation Proclamation. But, as

hope of undermining

Lackey

have been just, required a

suggested above, was the freeing of the slaves done on principle?
act

that.

“the American Civil

states that

violence to suppress Southern secession. For the
different justification,

would have been just

it

is

inevitably the application of a

“philosophical deodorant,” to cover over the obvious, unpleasant odor of realpolitics,
hypocritical maneuvers, and base self-interest.

Second, what was the dominant or ultimately prevailing
conference?

It

allowed military force

to be legitimate,
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even

if

it

interest at the

was oppressive. This

is

a short step

German
If

the justifications given by major Holocaust
perpetrators in the

military, of their participation in that genocide:
they

the orders

that

away from

was not

were wrong

indeed, morally repugnant to the greatest degree
possible

their responsibility. This is the potential result
of

force and the reasons for

He

-

were just following orders.

fails to

which a nation

is

which

it

is

-

any decoupling of military

used.

take this up, except for an obvious ending caveat, that the
state from

seceding does not have the right to use force to oppose the secession.

Military force requires

some

other justification. [109-110]

justifications are quite easy to generate.

Any good

The problem

such

is,

lawyer or philosopher can come up

with some grounds for suppression. Quite often, nationalists are branded as criminals
disrupting civil order, and so forth.

Lackey might counter

that he cannot be responsible for such duplicitous or

inappropriate abuses of law and power. Yet, he cites with approval one absolutely clear

example of the repression of a population justified by appeal

to

normal law and order.

For him, there was nothing wrong with the French treatment of Algerians prior during
(and presumably before) the war of independence.
(starting in 1954) France

government

had offered

The

for Algerians.

France, but wanted their

own

issue

state.

On

the contrary, according to him,

French citizenship and representation

full

was

solely that Algerians did not

want

in the

to be part

of

[103]

This, of course, ignores the whole reason for the Algerian national movement, the

oppressive colonialism of the French. After centuries of domination by the French, the

Algerians understood exactly what “democratic participation”
continuation of their oppression through different means.
citizenship did not and

would not have eliminated

their colonialist mentality,

structure of

power

in

and so

forth.

It

A

in

France would mean

reality

the pervasive racism of the French,

would have not eliminated

of any formal
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a

simple granting of

the general

which French dominated Algerians economically and

These would have been the

-

political

culturally.

enfranchisement. Lackey

fails

to see this,

because he

-

in

standard liberal fashion

-

looks only at the formal
political

structure.

This means ignoring the weight
of history.
as colonization

is

oppression; the

damage

to

Algerian social structures, culture,

in their internalization in

described so compellingly by Fanon
[1963]

change

in

power-relation as deep and complex

not remedied merely by the granting
of the vote. The deep scars of

of colonialism,

effects

A

Algerian subjects

- would

governmental structures. Indeed, the

etc.; the

-

psychological

all

those things

be unaffected by a merely formal

effects of this history

ensure that the change in formal structures
would have

little

impact.

would most

likely

The weight of

history (in conjunction with the contemporary
extension of non-formal colonial power)

would have prevented Algerians from being

able to exercise their formal citizenship.

Perhaps more importantly, such a simple change
would

reward France
wiped the

its

brutal colonization

slate clean,”

consolidated
institutions,

for

all

gains

by leveling

made by

and so forth

-

all

and domination of Algeria.

It

individuals. But this leveling

the French majority

at the cost

in effect

-

have been

to

would have

would have

as individuals, businesses,

of the Algerians.

It

would have been

like

one

individual stealing most of the assets of another, and then
inviting the other to join

him/her as a minor partner in a jointly owned company.
consolidate the annexation of Algeria. Even
not a violent act in

itself,

if the

the very conditions under

It

would,

in fact,

have been

to

French offer of enfranchisement was

which Algerians

w ere
r

forced to

choose were determined by the violent conquest of Algeria centuries before,

as well as

the constant application of force necessary to prevent the frequent expressions
of

Algerian resistance and discontent from threatening French domination.

For Lackey

to

examine

this

complex

situation only in terms

miss the very heart of the power relationship and oppression.

makes

a pretense of democracy, then

it is

acceptable.
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If

of formal

colonialism

politics

is liberal

is

to

and

He might

counter

that, despite

a mistake regarding the history of
France and

Algeria, his basic principles are sound.
Yet, the misunderstanding of the
history of

France and Algeria

grounded

is

in his problematic differentiation

administration” and “colonial domination”
[104],

He

between “colonial

argues that the delegates to the

1977 negotiation on the Geneva Convention additions
chose “colonial domination”
purposely, in order to distinguish situations of serious
domination from other “colonial”
situations.

a conquest.
basis,

its

how

But,

can a colonial administration not dominate?

inherently violent.

It is

very presence

use violence

at

is

Even

every moment,

its

Of course, most dominating

And,

as

I

have mentioned,

to

more, even

is

ever-present threat of violence

use violence on a daily
if

it

does not need to

not “neutral.”

is

a mental or psychological violence.

is

of violence without directly performing

daily.

no longer needs

it

on going violence. What

deferred or delayed physical violence

violent.

if

the perpetuation of

It is

Any

it.

regimes

-

colonial administration

even

liberal

ones

~

is

It is

This

the use

perpetually

use actual violence

hidden from view, by criminalizing and

this is often

marginalizing victims.

What

is

more, the very structure of “administration”

“autonomy” of those

that limits the

potent than direct physical violence.
to individuals.
“ legal”

It

subject to
It

limits

It is

it.

more

is

violent.

It

itself is a force

subtle and in fact

more

and manipulates the very options presented

regulates actions without even

making

alternatives available.

It

can be

and “just,” and yet violent and oppressive.
Lackey’s analysis

is

a stop-gap. After

their right to self-determination

even under

all,

some

restrictive liberal criteria.

another obstacle to national liberation: now, even
limited in the

means

it

can use

to secure

power. They ignore the oppression that
instead focus on the methods

it.

is

employed by

nations will be able to “prove”

This

is

if a

nation has the “right” to

a standard

223

it, it

maneuver of those

the cause of a liberation
that

Lackey adds yet

in

movement, and

movement. Indeed, focus on

these

is

removes the

real justification for resistance to
oppression,

from the genuine issues

To

whom

at stake.

the extent that Lackey’s liberal agenda

delegates,

former colonial powers, and other

self-determination

movements may

Ho

the French,

and citizens

movements

it is

linked to that of the

liberal

“European

powers, the very oppressors against

are struggling determine the

form

in

which these

those powers that create the need for violent liberation

movements

For instance, two decades before the Vietnamese rose actively
against

Chi Minh spent years

that,

is

act.

In general,
in the first place.

and deflects attention away

under

in

France attempting to convince French politicians

their liberal principles,

non-violently talked with

whomever he

Vietnam should be

could.

then, in 1946, he implored the United States

He

He

free.

got absolutely nowhere.

(whom

patiently and

And even

he had just helped defeat Japan) to

put pressure on France to free Vietnam. Only after these efforts had long proved

impossible did he begin organizing for a military resistance.

This pattern has been repeated over and over. National and other groups attempt
peaceful solutions to serious oppressions, only to be rebuked or ignored. Peaceful means
are thus blocked off by their oppressors. Their only option

Lackey’s

liberal analysis, they

should just keep trying peaceful methods

this sense, the less explicitly violent the oppressor, the

oppressed.
this

On

this analysis, the

second option

keep pursuing

it

is

really

- and

is

it

is still

forever. In

weaker the position of the

have the option

to fight or not to.

autonomy —

in reality

it

But,

has limited options.

on them. But, what of the power

is it

not

its

Is

it

own

not up to that

power

to restore the

fault if the latter turn to violence?
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On

that has eliminated

not responsible for creating a situation in which only

possible for the oppressed?

oppressed’s options? And,

still

--

no longer one. Thus, even though the oppressed group can

Lackey’s analysis, the burden

violence

oppressed

thus has abstract

their peaceful options? Is

becomes violence. Yet, on

Joseph Carens rounds out the treatment of
self-determination, by ignoring
viable possibility. His locus (as Nielsen’s)
the

Canadian system can

better

is

accommodate

Canada

28
.

His project

is

to

it

as a

understand

the minority cultures of the

how

Quebecois and

various native peoples.

He

begins by recognizing a federated nesting of social
commitments and political

citizenship [Carens, 1996:

111].

Quebecois individuals, for instance, are

a distinct cultural group, and also citizens of Canada.

How can

at

once part of

one make sense of the

sometimes conflicting memberships?
Carens recognizes three dimensions of citizenship. The
dimension. In

this

dimension,

[112] This dimension

all

citizens of a state generally have the

often in tension with the second, which

is

depends on an individual’s emotional commitment
“ francophones living in

Canadians” [115].

One

Quebec tend

to identify

How can the tension be

possibility

first is

is

to a

is

the legal

same

legal status.

the psychological.

It

group or identity [113]. Again,

more strongly

as

Quebecers than as

resolved?

that minority cultures be granted special rights or statuses

within the formal structure [112, 114]. This

is

acceptable only to the extent that these

special rights or statuses counter the effects of oppression, and create concrete equality in

the political sphere

[1

12,

1

14

-

115].

Following a standard justification of Affirmative

Action, Carens means that any differentiation should be an instrument to effect a genuine
equality that

would have been produced by formal

That the Quebecois-Canadian tension

am

is

equality in the absence of oppression.

also

among

organizing a rather confused passage by Carens here),

institutional

arrangements of federalism ... so

of differentiated

Quebecois

political identity”

to identify

it

levels of a federal system

is

(I

possible to (1) “adjust the

that they reflect the psychological realities

[115-116]. In other words, a system can allow the

more strongly with Quebec, but anglophones with Canada

as a

-Apparently, the only area some of these philosophers concern themselves with is Canada. Perhaps
—
interesting
an
Canada
is
credit
does
his
to
especially when its native population is considered, as Carens
case to look at. But, as the focus of one-fifth of the authors, as well as a running concern for some of the
others, the North American provincialism of much of this thinking is clear.
28
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whole.

It is

also possible to (2) emphasize
other provincial identities as well,
and thus to

decentralize the federal system, generally
weakening Canadian identity
[116]; (3) leave
the system as

is,

with Quebecois reluctant members
of Canada, without a positive

attachment; (4) use the deep diversity of
Canada as the basis for
.

.

common

identity"

[

1

1

7];

some

sort

of “unity and

.

or (5) “ try to find a positive, rather
than a critical, basis for

strengthening the identification of Quebecers
with Canada” [116],

Carens decides
[117],

He

(4) is too

vague and cannot see any concrete form

it

might take

decides (3) would be “unfortunate” [116-117],
And, he decides (2) would be

"politically unattractive” [116],
(1) and (5) are possibilities. (1) unfortunately has a

tendency to undercut a genuine unity
is

29

So

[1 16].

that leaves (5),

and Carens thinks “there

a lot to be said for this approach” [116],

Many
obviously bad

questions arise. First,

why

separation mentioned only as an option so

is

need not be considered [see 116-117]?

it

If there is

no obvious

psychological change that can resolve the difficult issues of Quebecois identity

Canada, that might suggest
concerned

for all

that

only justification

-

that separatism

is

a legitimate option.

Canadians are better off sticking together,

at least for

Second, Carens

Quebecois

rejects structural

-

it

legal or

in

Though Carens decides
would seem

that the

has been the 1995 plebiscite.

change

in the state;

what he

is

after is

psychological change. Rather than really addressing the deep issues underlying the

“psychological” manifestations, his plan

What

will

it

take to preserve

commitment on
plebiscite

in a

2
''I

to

change the psychology of Quebecois.

basically as

the part of Quebecois?

it is,

The question

but with a genuine positive
is

might yet occur. In concrete terms, he seems

of Canadian identity
In this

Canada

is

-

around something

like the

pressing, because another
to call for

some

sort

of marketing

1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

way, the essence of a genuine, universal Canadian citizenship could be packaged

form appealing

would assume

it is

to

Quebecois.

as bad as (2), but Carens does not
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seem

to agree.

This approach

happen

some

is

tor

problematic to say the

is

Quebecois

change

to

least.

It

assumes

that all that needs to

minds somewhat, and things

their

will be fine.

sense, the difference between a direct enforcement
of unity and this marketing

approach
poison

in

is

that the

hunted

is

not shot but rather given a very appetizing dinner

—

with

it.

Regarding “aboriginal'’ Canadians, Carens
differences require

some

sort

at least

recognizes that the deeper

of change on the part of majority Canadians. Again, he

ignores the possibility of separation, which

much more justifiable, given

is

“aboriginal” peoples were brutally conquered and their lands stolen.

with

In

how to

that natives

get these “ others” to

buy

into a general

He

At the same time, he represents

[1

this as

1

concerned

Canadian system. He recognizes

might be justifiably very suspicious of such a system and

the history of oppression by similar systems.

is

that the

its

“justice,” given

7 ff.

an issue of “cultural differences between

aboriginal peoples and the rest of Canada,” not part of a continuing tradition of

oppression. [117] That

is

not to say that the differences do not have concrete effects: for

instance, the Charter (as a the basis of a

common

legal system) will

by generally non-native people, “people selected and trained

be put into practice

in certain

ways (and

not

others), people attuned to certain considerations (and not others), people taught to regard

certain forms of communication (and not others) as intellectually respectable and

relevant”

[1 18].

The oppressiveness of the system

will be an effect

of the cultural

difference, not a flaw in the system itself (such that any implementation of

it

will tend to

operate differentially over a population, to the detriment of some [perhaps arbitrarily
selected] subgroup) or a function of a societal racism against natives.

Carens accepts

that insistence

on the Charter

is

unacceptable, because

it

has been

experienced by “aboriginal peoples” as another iteration of former systems of

“hegemonic and
would seem

to

alien control” [119]. In place of this, he has

open up again the

possibility of separation.

227

If

no concrete solution. This
majority Canadians would

be worse off alter separation,

would

is

it

require reparations as well, as

Carens offers instead an

among

justice, citizenship, etc.,

Fanon

imagine natives being

this

of public deliberation, of the type advocated

entail a sincere attempt to negotiate the
nature

the different groups constituting Canada.

He

of

states that

“doubtless a utopian and unrealistic view of the possibilities of
shared public

deliberation,” but finds

it

useful as a measure against which to evaluate any attempts
to

impose the Charter or other one-sided universalisms. What

is

required

builds a “ shared identity,” a conceptual shift that creates “genuine
[

Of course,

so.

stresses [Fanon, 1963],

ideal process

by Ins Young [120]. This would

this is

difficult to

is

deliberation that

common

bonds”

120 ],

One might
nationalism.
territory,

and

characterize this as a “puzzle” theory of multi-culturalism or

The

task

into

one conceptual

because the table
the pieces, rub

is

is

to

fit

a

number of nations
identity.

-

or cultures onto one geographical

If the pieced

do not

fit

together (perhaps

warped), then one should simply cut off the hindering protrusions of

some

grease on them, and push them into place.

That he thinks

this

approach

into the deeper issues at stake.

produce the desired

unity.

is

hopelessly idealized and utopian should clue him

The process he suggests seems almost

But, something stronger

is

necessary.

It is

a “that

which”

will

the relationship of

oppression that exists between majority Canadians and natives that dooms such a
dialogue to failure.

As

I

argue

at

length in Chapter 3, cultural negotiation without

concrete changes in power relations does not eliminate oppression. In the Canadian case,
this

would mean fundamental changes

in the institutional/state structure.

Finally, Carens addresses the third, “political dimension of citizenship.”

him, the issue

is

whether or not an individual or group

government of their

state.

In other words,

For

feels represented in the

what can be done

to help

Quebecois and

natives feel represented in the politics and decision-making structure of Canada? For

Quebecois,

it

has depended to a large extent on having a Quebecois prime minister.
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He

infers

from

this that a teeling ot representation

group prominently figuring

in the

depends on having someone from one’s

government, which seems rather obvious.

This has not occurred for natives. Rather than consider

why

it

does not occur

that a racist structure prevents participation in or identification
with the state
to suggest that the solution is a

“prominent Aboriginal Trudeau might not

-

-

he seems

feel

represented in their government because they are not. And, especially regarding
natives,
it

seems unlikely

that a substantive presence in the

government

is

possible, under the

current system.

change

And

this, again,

that

would preserve Canada but

government seems
appear

at least

begs the question,

to require a

Why

maintain the current system?

Ptolemaic structure. Separation in some form would

a plausible alternative.

communities

to the central

are constituencies of individuals, each of

government via a representative with

whom

whom

minorities can be conceived only as a constituency.

not one that

is

should

It

feel

assumes
connected

he/she identifies. Identify with

the representative, and thus identify with the government. But,

is

systemic

also represent natives substantively in the central

Yet, even this assumes a certain conception of the groups involved.
that

A

it

The nation

is

not clear that national

itself is a structure.

If

it

perfectly independent of the overall state structure, nor one discrete from

other sub-state groups, that does not require that

competing individual

loyalties nor

its

structure be ignored.

It is

of individual experiences of oppression

identification with a central government; and

it

is

not thus

some

not simply

that hinders

individual change that

can create the identification.
It is

conceived
integrated.

unclear how, in anything but a loose confederation, differences that are

in

terms of groups structures, and not individual identifications, can be

One can be

part of different relational structures,

no doubt, but

to the extent

that the structures themselves are related in a structure of domination, they tend to
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conflict.

This conflict

not ameliorated by an individual

is

commitment

to

both structures,

as captured in abstract concepts.

Ultimately, Carens goal

Canadians

members of each
membership
that,

figure out

into a basic liberal state structure,

questioning that structure

way

is to

itself,

participate.

in this

way

Though he does

group structures,

and make them

it.

Rather than

that

is

merely individual characteristics.

fit

that the state

is

becomes

which they

program he suggests.

is

requires a

implicitly suggested

citizenship) does not recognize the group
its

the essential group in

move beyond

the liberal state

committed. Even granting quota blocs within the

representative system (which

individual slots in

in this

not intend to call for a weakening of Quebecois or native

the result of the

which Carens

It is

into the individual slots of citizenship in a

To recognize minority groups as groups 30
structure to

like

group. In doing so, he engages them directly, reducing their group

in their nations or cultures to

It is

plug Quebecois and native

to

he seeks to transform the individual psychologies of

with adjustments, they can be

liberal state.

how

legislature or

itself.

government,

It

by

his analysis of political

merely

sets aside a

to contain a set

number of

of identical (group-

determined) individuals. Beyond negotiating the concepts of citizenship and

would require a transformation

in the

justice,

it

understanding of the very concept of (minority and

majority) group, which would necessarily leave behind Carens’ desired state structure.

What

None of the
actually

is,

authors

I

Is

a Nation?

have treated develops much of a concept of what the nation

before they deliver their analyses of how

and

it

its

members should

act

what “rights” they have. Nielsen, Lichtenberg, and Moellendorf invoke leading
concepts of the past decade

—

of Yael Tamir and/or Will Kymlicka, usually

and

liberal

— which

equate the nation with a “ culture” [Nielsen, 1996: 45ff.; Lichtenberg, 1996: 55;
does not mean viewing them as discrete, rigidly bordered
will argue in Chapter 3.

•’“This
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entities

with some discernible essence, as

I

Moellendorf, 1996: 87]. For Lichtenberg,

For Moellendorf,

it is

independently of individuals “in”

which has value

common

human

beings

it,

culture

all,

is

a “thing” that exists apparently

akin to a physical environment, the possession
of or

for the individuals.

Lackey has an even vaguer
a group of

a zone of the familiar and comfortable.

a set of practices and/or beliefs that
are a meaningful for the

exercise of individual autonomy. For

participation in

it is

who

“

history” [Lackey, 1996:

The nation

definition:

view themselves

is

a

“

as having a

’people,’” and a people

common

100 ], This, of course, could refer

to

is

ancestry and a

an extended

family as well, or even a club like the “Daughters of the
American Revolution.”

Presumably Lackey should have supplemented

his definition with the idea

of a unique

culture or language, and other elements specifically mentioned by
Nielsen: a nation must
also be

“a

historical

community,” one

“more

that is

or less institutionally complete,” and

occupies “a given territory” [Nielsen, 1996: 45]. 31

These definitions

treat the nation as a readily identifiable set

of individuals

who

share certain basic features: living on the same territory; and/or speaking the same

language; and/or having the same social environment (culture); and/or having the same
history (or thinking they do); etc.

The

nation,

group of people identified by some shared

on

this type

characteristic.

structure, but a category of individuals. This

is

of definition,
In this

way,

the basic form into

it

is

quite simply a

is

not a social

which

a liberal atomic

individualist account flattens any group.

To

say that the national culture

is

an environment

to individuals is only to further isolate the individuals.

culture

is

given, and individuals simple

swimming

pool).

swim about

Weather and currents

a nation just a set of individuals in

some

that offers

meaningful options

The individuals

are given, and the

the culture as if in an ocean (or

(or pool rules) allow certain strokes and paths. Is
sort

of given condition or container? This begs

3

Interestingly, this layering of aspects (history, language/culture, institutional structure) recalls Stalin’s
definition of a nation, as a “historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life
and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture” [as quoted in Hobsbavvm, 1992: 5].

Stalin’s definition

is

better, but all are

decidedly poor.
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of questions, particularly

sorts

all

the features of the nation

I

in light

of some of the issues

have suggested

I

have raised and some of

preceding sections of this and the

in

first

chapter.
Further, the culture

relationship to

As

it.

I

the

is still

same

for everyone,

and they

have (following Hobsbawm) argued

still

have the same

and the previous

in this

chapter, and will argue further in the next, such homogeneity does not occur, least of
in

any group that

is

considered or considers

itself a nation.

Surely nations are more complex than
as well as a

Clearly

more complicated

some

Two

this.

Certainly

it

has an internal structure

,

relationship to history, geography, language, and culture.

further, deeper explanation is necessary.

of the contributors

to the

Forum

,

recognize these

to their credit, at least

points.

Paul Gilbert attempts to determine this internal structure, recognizing that

enough

to say that the nation is a “

community

all

community” — one must

also specify

it

is

not

what type of

[152].

Gilbert offers three models, “the family model, the civil society model and the
state

model”

[153].

The family

is

which one

a given group, into

is

bom

or forced by

sexual desire. The relationships are “valuable in themselves,” because they provide
certain unique “social goods” (presumably such things as security, belonging,

commitments

are concrete, to particular people.

The commitments

family” over and above the individuals that constitute

it;

etc.).

The

are not to “the

they are to those individuals as

individuals. Finally, they are the product of a primary affection toward other family

members

that

is

given. [153

-

The obvious problem
nationalism [154, 156],
to.

154]
is

that this

One has

a

model lends

commitment only

Beyond excluding “others” from membership,

associations as well: the family-nation

is

it

itself to

to those

an ethnic or

one

naturally connected

is

de-emphasizes other types of

the primary identity [155
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racist

-

156],

A

subtler problem

concrete relations.

over and above”

is

that the tamily-nation

A member has "no

my

does not exist independently of the

necessary obligations to an entity

obligations to individual members. “There

is

-

‘the family’

no room here

-

any

for

conception ot the nation as a persisting entity with a particular history
that shapes the
identity of

its

members.” [154

Gilbert’s

is

155]

-

a very limited concept of the family.

year-old Hegelian one. Not only have fundamentally

It

new

seems, in

fact, to

critical tools

be a 200

been introduced

in the intervening years, but the very nature

of the family has changed. More than

Hegel’s concept of the family was just as

existed in bourgeois and industrial laborer

it

this,

contexts in Western and Central Europe. Obviously, references to a “ familial” nature of

by

the nation

nationalists

and others do not

refer only to the typical

Western nuclear

family.
First, the idea that the

family

is

simply “given”

Families and membership in families occurs in
causes. (1) Arranged marriages,

YUPpie

produced through what would have
concept of reason. The

economic or

first

social logic.

two

And

(2)

all

where

all sorts

of

mergers, and dating-club selections are

to count as “reasonable”

methods, on Gilbert’s

on some type of

random sexual

certain criteria are selected and then potential

criteria.

The psychology of family

obligation

human need

of psychoanalytic theory and the

dynamics of a family

of ways and due to

the dating-club selection transforms

natural, unanalyzable feature of a

ignore

sorts

an Hegelian abstraction.

are not “sexually” driven, but based

attraction into a reasoned process,

mates evaluated against those

all

is

is

very complicated.

It is

for close social relations.

field

of psychology on

not

some

Gilbert seems to

this point.

The

internal

are incredibly complicated, and anything but reducible to such a

one-dimensional form. All sorts of internal forces develop and external forces impinge.
Gilbert also ignores feminist critiques of the family. “Obligations” can occur through

oppressive coercion, internalized oppression, and even the direct use and/or threat ot
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The “desire”

violence.

for a

husband can be produced by a patriarchal

socialization,

including forces that undercut confidence
and a sense of security, as well as more
external
forces, such as
(3 )

As

economic

necessity.

for chlldren being “

their entrance.

Though such

indefinitely, that does not

a

member may have an

mean

commitment. Family members
with

all sorts

choose

to

born into" the family,

affective reaction to her/his family

that this reaction will be

alienate, abuse, let

down

of long-term emotional and structural

merely the condition of

this is

one of obligation or
one-another in

effects.

A

all sorts

of ways,

child might eventually

break with her/his family for these or other reasons, or that
break might just

happen.

There are also other types of families, often specifically referred
families.

to as

“chosen”

Same-sex relationships are never given because they must be asserted through
,

effort against

dominant oppressive norms and

and abuse do not occur

in

some, but that

different levels. Children are adopted.

That

forces.

in general they are

Though

both parents and child,

this contradicts Gilbert’s

“transferable to others

who

is

not to say that coercions

chosen

the adoption might

-

and on many

fill

some “need” of

claim that family relations are not

stand in” for traditional

members 153 ],
[

Gilbert presents the situation of the child (and a partner) as an either/or: either
relationships are entered into voluntarily or not.

and involves a

dialectical relationship

The

reality is

much more

complicated,

between volition and external determination.

Children are born into a family but exercise volition relative to that situation; children are

adopted but perhaps through some external necessity; one chooses a partner, but
driven by internal and external forces; one “

gender” and cannot

falls in

live without that person, but

basis against oppressive forces toward

its

in part is

love with a person of the same

must

assert the relationship

on a daily

dissolution, etc. This type of dialectic

is,

obviously, something basic to Hegelian philosophy, but to which Gilbert seems oblivious.
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Second, the preceding

-

especially the remarks on the internal
oppressive

structure possible in families, as well as the
distinction between parents and children

suggests that the specific form of relationship between
different family

members

-

varies

within a particular family and even moreso over the
range of types of families. These

remarks by and large refer only

to nuclear families:

relationships exist in extended families,

Third, the

members of extended

an abstract category

in addition to

their history, in specific

its

certainly additional types of

which themselves vary by culture and context
families in particular tend to

constituents.

Many, many

known and passed

on, but

it is

is

symbolize the abstract “ family,” which
Gilbert might claim that the

remain concrete, or

that

is

is

The

history

many

cultures, ancestors

come

revered and served, as well as a source of

naming of ancestors

indicates that

commitments

such a commitment merely extends the concrete family

obligation past death, across worlds. Perhaps this

symbolization

this or that area.

precisely in terms of the persistence of a

family, despite difficult or destructive circumstances. In

strength.

families are aware of

added to with an understanding of members’

also

participation in the history. Often, the history

to

their family as

and geopolitical terms, and recognize a lineage from concrete

people (genealogical charts) and from unknown people from
is

view

also an element. There are

is

in part true, but the abstract

complex variations

as well

—

for instance,

the belief that ancestors are present in or acting through one.

One wonders,
They

indeed, if Gilbert has ever watched one of the “Godfather” films.

are filled with references to “the family” that

particular relationships or individual

make

members. Though

clear

its

transcendence of

fictional films

can hardly be

taken as “hard” data of actually existing types of families, they often do express beliefs

about families that are held by some people.
then
that

it is

likely that, within

means

some

of family

exists,

families, this belief in their abstract nature exists. But,

that this type of family does exist.

participate in such families,

If this belief in this type

which do

Of course, one need

really exist, to confirm this
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only listen

more

in

directly.

on or

These

all

are

much more complicated

senses of the family than Gilbert allows, as

well as marking types with histories and an abstract,
persistent existence.
limited concept of the family? This

frame, which

is

is

The

liberal lens.

precisely the type of nuclear family of members without
self-

consciousness of their family as a structure
its

this

presumably, a function of Gilbert’s conceptual

is,

determined by a reductive reading of Hegel through a

concept he holds

Why

atomic individualistic and

in itself, that is consistent

with liberalism, in

There are three points that are relevant

capitalist aspects.

here.
First, the

it

is

family

not an entity in

is

itself,

but merely a network of relations. Thus,

not a group that can stand against the atomic individualism of liberalism.

alternative to this atomic individualism, but rather something that can be
-

as a

network of discrete individuals

typical of

advanced

within

it.

It is

no accident

On

accommodated

that the family

On the

one hand,

it

form

hides the oppressive or societal causes of many types

the other,

it

further

that society

from

undermines the legitimacy of the family as an

alternative to liberal social structures.

It is

merely given and emotional.

It

can be nothing

but a tolerated irrational necessity (at most) within an ideology that valorizes “rational”

and “chosen”

and structures.

activity

Racism might
might operate

in

be, in

some

or

all

some

instances, driven

nations.

However,

is

with reference to

civil society, state, or culture,

is at

by a

there

is

“ familial" mentality,

most one form of racism, and

(1) nationalist racism

and

(2)

racism

to

this

is

no mention of racism

except as driven by a familial mentality.

imply

that

it is

the sole key to understanding

in general is quite problematic.
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and

a hidden suggestion in Gilbert's

produced solely by such a mentality. There

remarks: racism

This

-

based on unanalyzable, “natural” affections. This serves

is

of family relationships, protecting those oppressive structures and
criticism.

not an

liberal-capitalist states is the nuclear family Gilbert tries to describe.

Second, the family

two functions.

-

It is

This, of course,

implicitly protects liberalism from an
implication in racism, though Gilbert’s
implicit
logic

might run

My

in the reverse direction. 32

point

of the nation. Nor
its

not to claim that the family, properly understood,

is

is it

s

I

wish

my

model

remarks on

to point out the reductive nature

of

concept, as an effect of a pre-accepted liberal conceptual
frame.
the family

If

much from
that,

the correct

to valorize the family against the liberal
order, as

frequent oppressiveness suggest. Rather,

Gilbert

is

is

really this varied

the nation. Thus, Gilbert

however

s

and complicated, one would expect

model

is

at least as

not even defensible as an abstraction

inaccurate, offers insight into the nature of the nation. That he
rejects

because

it

entity,”

does not mean that his concept of the nation will be any

does not address certain features of the nation, such as

its

it

being a “persisting

less reductive.

On

the

contrary, his reduction of the family to one type of relation and his gross, undialectical

understanding of the role of history in a social group does not bode well.

The ultimate

issue

is

why invoke

a “ family model” at all?

Why

does Gilbert

attempt to understand the nation in terms of an entirely distinct social form? One reason

might be

that “nationalists”

take up further in Chapter

—

sometimes

3, this

refer to their nation in familial terms. But, as

hardly amounts to an equation

~

I

even by “nationalists”

of the nation with the family form. What of “non-nationalist” nationals? What of the

“objective” reality beneath? Even
features (such as
least

its

if the

nation corresponds to the family in

some

relationship to history), and even borrows some, that does not in the

prove an identical form. That Gilbert uses a reductive, 200 year-old, culturally

specific (Hegelian) concept of the family

makes

remote, and the application of the family that

This question can be generalized:

the possibility of identity that

much more

why

much more

obviously inappropriate.

try to explain the nation

simply by

reference to other types of social forms. Presumably something as significant and

widespread as the nation would have

32
I

treat the relationship

its

of racism and the nation

own form. The

at length in
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attempt to describe

Chapter

3.

it

in

terms ol

something else can only signal a conceptual poverty

engagement with

"known” and

that (1)

does not allow a direct

the object of study, but instead
(2) requires that

previously-generated social form.

Would

not

necessary, to justify the linking of the nation to the
family?

it

be reduced to

some

some

historical tie be

Some

historical derivation

of

structure or concept?

Instead, Gilbert invokes in turn three other types of
social structures, as possible

forms of the nation. He invokes three of the very few genuinely available

He

in liberalism.

33

excludes the corporation for some reason, perhaps as a function of the
structure of the

Philosophy of Right.

Of course,

the very equation of these Hegelian structures with the

nation appears to be doubly culpable, given that Hegel himself conceived the
nation as
distinct from them.

The second

Civil society

individualism

is

even more suspect:

the core of liberalism.

realized,

is

is

the field in

It is

and the justification for

civil society.

all state

which atomic

and other social

structures.

Gilbert presents the standard liberal account of civil society, as a field of economic and
social

exchanges through “reciprocal obligations” executed because of a perceived

“common
it

interest” in fulfilling them.

allows them to

fill

their

needs

private needs of individuals.

interdependence

Though
model of the

.

.

.

-

it

is

Civil society

The “reciprocal

obligations
-

.

.

.

spring from the

157]

for Gilbert “civil society furnishes

community”

necessary to individuals, because

a “public good,” in addition to fulfilling the

among members.” [156

national

is

[157], the fact

what

is

is,

in

many ways, an

that a civil society cannot be a

nation. Gilbert recognizes, the “social cohesion” generated by the

members

in preserving the necessary civil society

attractive

“common

interest”

of

might not “predominate" over other,

individual interests [158]. Indeed, the system might emphasize

some

interests over others

This does not mean that a familial society is considered good by liberals. On the contrary, it would seem
quite objectionable. What it does mean is that liberalism recognizes the family as a real social formation, if
a non-liberal one. It then conceives of the family as best it can, given its limited conceptual tools. The
conception is not a liberal type of group structure, but a perspective on a non-liberal one that is,
33

nonetheless, acknowledged to exist by liberals.
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an exploitative manner [158], At the
same time, there

in

be egalitarian, as

to

Hobsbawm

argues forcefully and

fortunate aspect of the nation, but

it

is

Gilbert also recognizes that “
national

community

not a matter of

that

it

is

some people

Obviously, the competition

assumed or required
It is

so far as
the

its

“group”

unclear

“unity”

how
is

it

as

among

to have,

A more obvious doubt

is

is

not a

more

for us

whether the

can really suggest a group structure.

rising within that structure that
disqualifies

to

That

3.

model has the kind of unity required

common good"

not a group. Civil society seems

do not given themselves over

take up in Chapter

might be legitimately doubted whether
the

as conceived under this

“ interde en
P dence” or sense of “

nothing that requires a nation

the reality.

speak of the actions of the community”
[158],

to

is

it

I

is

it,

but the fact

a milieu constituted by individuals

members, but

rather enter into

it

It

who

as individuals.

individuals, and the selfish nature that individuals
are

undermine any sense of group

identity.

such a social structure can even be considered a group,
except

compelled by a container

-

generally a state. But, this

means

in

that

constituted through this container, and the individuals’ relationship
to the

is

container determines their membership in the group. The relationships
of “civil society”
are irrelevant to this, and can never constitute group relations, contrary
to Gilbert’s belief.
It is

not just a matter of regulating relations of exchange so that they are

individuals exchange goods and services;

it

is

a purely

fair.

In them,

economic exchange, which cannot

begin to capture the complexity of national (or most genuine group) relations. The very
arbitrariness of

what “civil

society’

one belongs

to [see

157

-

158]

this.

That “civil society” can even be considered a “group” [156]

of at

least Gilbert’s liberal conceptual frame.

That

is

is

is

clear evidence of

proof of the poverty

not to say that a nation cannot have an internal structure of a civil society

form. But, the relations of civil society cannot be said to constitute the nation. As
out in Chapter

3, at

I

lay

most such relations can be one type of relation among many. More

importantly, they can function as national relations only as part of the general structure of
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They

the nation.

are not present in that national structure
as constituents of a civil

At most, a network

society.

economic

ot

(not equivalent to a “civil society”

)

relations that

can be a part of the nation (not coterminous
with the

nation) area of the national structure. This

elements on top of a

civil society.

and cannot be reduced

to or fully

not a self-contained “unity”

is

is

not just a matter of grafting cultural

The nation and

civil society are distinct social

absorbed into each other

—

forms,

without a destructive

at least

reduction of one or the other into a flattened, dependent version.
Gilbert last tests the “ state model” of the nation.

discusses

is

it

clear obligations from

Through

institutions,

it

members

structures and relationships

it

and each

beyond

arbitrary formation,

and

other.

is

state units arbitrarily.

and thus not one

that

that

it

Why

is

members of the

clearly distinct

demands

from the

this state,

the allegiance of

mean

its

citizens

and not some other.

that a nation

seems an

It

the depth of

meaning

cannot manifest

but that a state does not produce a nation simply out of itself.

itself as

just a

way of acting and

might be conceived

in

of civil society or the

living,

and so

it

does not produce unity

terms of values or language [162]. But,

state, the

and that has or protects unique

union

is

when

it

[1

is

6 1 ],

35

Such a contention would seem

to

which

a social structure that connects people into a unity

(cultural) features to

which people are attached, thereby

be very historically inaccurate, and a reference to

it

Hobsbawm

leave this point aside.
“This is a good criticism of the liberal concept of culture, but the proper conclusion to draw
concept is not good, not that culture is limited in this way.
But,

Culture

grafted onto one

guaranteeing their attachment to the structure. Grafted onto a family structure,

34

a

34

Gilbert solves the problems he raises predictably, by appeal to “culture.”
is

state.

can even support a range of social

whose existence captures

This does not

in the nation. [160]

It

to others as

the merely political. [159]

Gilbert’s problem with the state

over other possible

(to itself

has a continuing existence that

relationships of individuals to

alone

It is

can act collectively (through a government), has a clear membership, and

demands

state,

the state he

the social contract-type liberal state, though not necessarily
democratic.

good, because

presumed

As expected,

in

order.

I
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is

that the

accomplishes the abstraction necessary

to the nation

-

focused on values or language.

[162]

This type ot simplistic grafting does not
change the

engage the nation

There

directly.

difference between imposing one
non-national

is little

concept on the nation or two. The nation
society, or family.

fact that Gilbert has still
yet to

not culture, any

is

more than

In fact, this tendency to reduction
trips Gilbert up.

is state, civil

it

In the opening of

his essay, he argues that the nation has
a special relationship to the state.

whether something

do

is

so, Gilbert argues,

The nation produces

a nation
it

The

whether

it

can support or produce a

must be a community

that supports a

state

“common

test

of

[149-151], To

life” [151

-

152],

the state in order to preserve and regulate the
social structure of the

nation through institutional
[152].

is

The

means

— to

enforce “performance of communal obligations”

on the nation

state, in turn, relies

to

provide the motive for participation

in

the state [151]. Yet, in the closing of his essay, he attributes this
function to culture.

Obviously, he cannot ascribe

to the “nation,” as

it

he as been investigating the

state as a

possible structure of the nation. At the same time, in the opening he claims that
the

nation supports a
state

“common

life.”

In the conclusion, he has attributed this feature to the

(and civil society and family), which

is

necessary to augment the limits of the

culture.

Though
insistence

this

confused circularity

on not engaging the nation

articulated

and comfortable

illustration

of the claims

To
those

who

I

is

certainly not a function of liberalism, the

directly, but instead

through other already

concepts. Gilbert’s work, unfortunately,

made

a perfect

is

in the introduction to this section.

his credit, Gilbert does recognize the need to consider the relations

among

constitute a nation. In a communitarian departure from mainstream liberalism,

he recognizes that the nation

problem, as

I

have

others, culture

is

a

is

something more than an aggregate of individuals. The

said, is that his ideas

way of life

about those relations are purely

that individuals enact
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-

a cultural group

liberal.

is

As with

just the set of

individuals

who

enact a particular culture. Individuals
participate in a state, and

constitute civil society. Indeed, the
problem in each case
feel

is

how

to get the individuals to

attached to a state or civil society, to
overcome an inherent individuality against
the

group.

His concept of the family

is

in

some ways

the

cases individuals combine to form a family, in
others

within a family, the individual

problem

is,

is

most promising. Though
it

in

some

pre-exists their entrance. Thus,

not quite the atomic individual of liberal
theory. The

rather than explore the possibilities this opens
up, Gilbert rejects this as a

feature of the passivity of the family.

Carol Gould seeks a concept of the social group, applicable
not reduce

it

to nations, that

does

either to an aggregate of individuals, or to a collective that
in turn reduces

the individual to a derivative. She claims to locate the middle ground
between these in
the idea that groups are formed by '"individuals in relationships'" [Gould,
1996: 75],

On

this account, individuals are

social relations.

recognized as in part constituted through their

Specifically, "an individual's participation in

as a form of common activity

is

some mode of cultural

life

a condition for self-development" [76]. This means that

individuals need participation in a group in order to develop fully as individuals.

By

"cultural life,"

Gould means

"joint participation in explicit

and organized or

institutionally-defined practices, such as the celebration of holidays or historic events, but

also the

more

tacit

forms of activities expressing shared beliefs or values, such as modes

of social behavior, styles of dress or speech,

Gould invokes

the concept

we have

etc." [76].

The problem here

is

obvious:

already seen, of culture as individual practices of a

number of individuals. Though Gould

states that these activities are

[76], this suggests a herd mentality

much more

do the same things, together. This,

I

would

than an interesting cultural structure. All

think,

would not

assist in the

the individual, either as individual or as participant in the group.
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done "with others"

development of

This hints
individual
culture

is

is

at

deeper problems.

On

"in" or her/his culture exist

justified because

it

Gould's account, the social relations
the

merely for the benefit of the individual.
The

benefits individuals [77

-

78],

It is

culture cannot be considered a purely
individual right, because

an individual actually
claim a right

36

in the culture

Yet, there

to.

the cultural group.

Even

is

-

no sense of a genuine reciprocal commitment

to others in

the necessity of the group in asserting the
right to culture results
in

order to assert a right to

it.

type of genuine lateral commitment would be necessary
for meaningful

relations out of

which something

like a nation

features of Gilbert’s concept of the family.
it

can only be claimed by

an isolated individual does not have a
culture to

because the individual needs the culture

Some

it

true that the right to this

could be constituted, and recalls certain

Even

if

Gould wanted

to correct this

problem,

appears that this commitment would only be out of self-interest,
(1) as a means of

preserving the culture, which leaves the actual connection to others as
a secondary
consideration, or (2) as a payment to others for their participation in the
culture, which
benefits the individual.

Perhaps more importantly, Gould has not described some new or useful concept

of the group. Rather than describing genuine relations

that exist

among people

culture or nation, she reduces relations to the fact of having something in

example, sharing a

common

together, or at least having a
identity group,

which

characteristic(s).

is

This
tradition.

whole, but

is

It is

is

common

to say,

interest" [74],

is

common:

"for

intentionality, or acting

She has merely offered an

an Aristotelian category of people

In this case, that characteristic

of individuals engage

common

purpose or having a

in a

who

share

some

the set of cultural practices a

number

in.

a third concept of group that has been fully available in the Western liberal
distinct

from the Aristotelian organic whole and the Hegelian

essential

the Western philosophical tradition's standard understanding of large

36

set aside the obvious objection that such a person might
pressing for not being in a culture.
I
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still

have a right

to a culture, all the

more

groups, as "identities." Gould's insistence that
the individual

group [74] prevents her

truly transcending the aggregate:

ot the aggregate are alike.

While

it

is

the only

everybody

—

while undermining individuality or difference.
the same, does not

is

mean

on Gould's account.

as they are

fundamental ways, and

may even

change

members

is, all

allows a unity based on sameness even in
action, and

thus overcomes certain problems with the aggregate
concept,
self-interest,

ontologically prior to the

it

On

maintains individuated
the one hand, just because

that they are not atomic, self-interested
individuals

On

the other, each individual acts like others in

think like them.

It is

on the basis of this

that those

who

take this to be the form of a nation (or nationalism) or the nation
(nationalism) in general,

condemn

the specific nation (or nationalism) or the nation (nationalism) in
general.

In

On

some

sense, this concept

the one hand, individuation

of the group

is

the same.

The

combines the worst features of individual and group.

becomes almost

stressed, in the sense that every

characteristics of the individual

member of the

thus reiterated by the existence of each member.

On

powering: individuals within

are the same. In

nature

is

it

act the

same and

"group" are

the other hand, the group

some

member

is

over-

sense, their

defined by the shared characteristics that define membership in the group.

One

loses even the complexity of an organic or, in Gould's terms, a "holistic" group. And, one
loses any chance at real heterogeneity,

individuals

—

though not

at all

which

guaranteed.

is at

least

allowed by an aggregate of

3'

This concept reduces the social relations that exist among members of a group

merely formal relations of identity. In concrete terms,

it

is

to

difficult to see their

"togetherness" as anything but an aggregation. Their "togetherness," or direct

connection,

is

mediated through

beliefs, interest, etc.).

Though

their

common

in reality,

characteristics (activities, practices,

being together even because of shared

would argue, in
consumer cultures, individuation has not in the least inhibited a marketmgdriven homogenization. Even atomic individualism without a homogenizing group structure tends toward
homogeneity - though its ideologues still often blame the homogenization on some type of group

"Indeed, the mere

fact

of individuation does not imply individuality or heterogeneity.

fact, that in post-industrial

mentality.
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I

characteristics

is

bound

produce some genuine

to

not describe or account for
these
reality, these relations

-

is

in these terms.

what

is

important remains the relations.

Gouid.an group, individuals are not
together except insofar as they
are

driven

at

In

themselves might drive the recognition
and "valuing" of a cultural,

and recognize one another
relation

Gould's analysis does

nor does she perceive the group

linguistic, or institutional milieu,
but

In a

lateral relations,

in

-

one another

most by a need

,o

be

that

is,

like o,lher

identify with

alike,

one another. Their

people, not to be wilh or connected

to

other people. This might even be taken
as evidence of an insecurity;
group membership

on Gould

model merely

s

development beyond
This relation

allays the insecurity, rather than
fostering individual

it.

is

also uniform over all pairings. This

options for living. There

is

would appear

nothing in "culture" as Gould has defined

it

to restrict

that allows for

the heterogeneity (not only in terms of
individual characteristics, but in social
positioning

and the relations themselves)

that

is,

of course, strongly present

in

focus on concrete or lateral relations, rather than
abstract identity, allows for
at the

same time reducing

the group to

Given these problems, one

individual

its

is left

to

components

wonder what exactly

A

any large group.

without

that,

in aggregate.

the benefit

is

that

Gould

believes cultures provide to individuals. Indeed, her very
focus on benefits to individuals
is

misguided. If social relations are fundamental

constitute individuals,

it is

would necessarily be

individuals

good or bad

effects.

and group memberships

To claim
is

is

in

in social relations.

them. And,

—

such that they

in part

the issue of benefits can be central. For,

it

will not

affect the individuals.

such as national
it

how

These could be good or bad, have

But, this will not determine (though

whether or not people are

relations,

not clear

to individuals,

it

might affect

to

some degree)

impact on the fact that the relations

Some

social relations

-

including group

are not productive; yet the social connection or group exists.

not "justified" seems beside the point. This becomes point of logic

when

recognized that groups and relations have different effects on different individuals.
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it

Gould

is

concerned with establishing a "right”

benefits tor individuals.

Of course,

this is to

atomic individualist frame. The question

is

remain

to culture,

in the

and does so based on

same old

its

self-interested

not one of benefits, but choice.
Whether a

culture or nation "benefits" an individual
or not, the individual should not
be forced to

abandon

For some members of oppressed nations,
membership

it.

burden and commitment than a

benefit.

It

might be true

that this

is

much more of a

commitment and

bearing of this burden improves the character of the
member, or something like
that is not the reason for the

more than

sacrifice

involve a

lot

more

More
and a

group. If group membership
"benefit"

is

to

it

is

importantly,

lot less benefit

its

someone

it

can

than assimilating or abandoning the

externally enforced, that

Gould reduces

is

another

way

in

which

culture or nation to a sort of club that one joins for

Yes, one might sacrifice in some

and

the case of an oppressed minority,

it

not part of the picture.

Instead,
benefit.

but

that,

commitment. Being a member of a nation can involve

benefit.

sacrifice

the

way

for the club,

other members, but the reason one does

realizes that

no benefits are going

to

all this is

It

also, as

I

to feel

for benefits.

argue in Chapter

3,

is like

committed

When

come, he/she usually quits the

some, perhaps, a minority or oppressed culture or nation
not true universally.

and come

some

club.

a club, but this

is

For

certainly

tends to be the result of the

absorption of that culture or nation into a broader individuating (liberal) political
structure.

On

Gould's model, the group exists only so long as individuals constitute

no independent existence, and ceases

among

its

to exist

is

passive.

One

of the group, but one does not participate

It

has

with the dissolution of the "relations"

constituent individuals. [77; see also 79] Yet, as Gould describes

participation in the group

it.

acts in certain
in the project

ways

as prescribed

it,

by the norms

of creating or re-creating the

group. Again, the activities that Gould cites indicate that a "culture" exists, and
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individuals merely tap into
it

does not mean that

it

it.

That

some

sort

exist if all individuals stopped
practicing

does not exist beyond the individuals, as a

That Gould does not ascribe
in

would not

it

to

members of a

set

of practices.

culture agency in

of dialectical tension with what has been previously
given

further the poverty of her notion of a cultural group.
She excludes one

complex

structure of actual cultures.

"volition" to choose

The only "agency"

between leaving or remaining

member

a

-

constitution

its

—

also suggests

more aspect of the

appears to have

in her/his cultural group.

is

the

This

preserves both individual and group as rigid opposites, rather than
complexly related and

interdependent terms.
In the end, Gould's pretensions to the rhetoric of a deep challenge to
existing

concepts and of insight into
reiterating a

alternatives

is

just that

hackneyed concept of the group, by

innovative perspectives on
theorists

new

it

-

least

such as the emphasis on relations.

of whom

is

Sartre, in

She winds up

rhetoric.

in fact eviscerating

from a variety of perspectives have focused on

of the group, not the

-

this

some

potentially

Of course,

non-liberal

very question of the nature

The Critique of Dialectical Reason.

Gould's self-enthusiasm seems to depend on ignorance of such work. Indeed,
see

and

how

it is

hard to

the ideas (1) that groups and social relations fundamentally affect individuals

(2) that

groups are formed not just of individuals

in aggregation, but

relations to each other, could be seen as particularly novel.

most every perspective

in social

and

The

first is

through their

fundamental

political theory that considers oppression

to

and

resistance, as well as fundamental to entire branches and schools of psychology and

psychoanalysis. The second has been readily available in
political theory that considers the nature

much

alternative social and

of community. That these ideas are not present

within liberal philosophical circles does not

mean much,

limited.

247

except that these circles are

Putting the Nation to

Work

Frank Poole extends and complicates
the position

which the nation

modern

state

is

necessary to guarantee the unity
or cohesion of the

freedom

m government,

that Gilbert takes,
according to

"negative," that

is

is,

state.

does not enforce participation
of individuals

but rather tends to prevent
governments from interfering with
individual

(private) activities.

He

takes the opposite position
from

Thom,

valorizing this

negative freedom against the "positive"
"Liberty of the Ancients." The
coercive, requiring "an enormous
.

amount of surveillance and

day-to-day existence, including [individual]
opinions,

occupations, and even
areas. [125

its

state"

s

arises:

citizens

.

.

.

.

.

.

latter

modern

was

control over the details of

religious beliefs,

family lives." The former emphasized
freedom in just those

130]

-

Poole

problem

For Poole,

resembles Gilbert's

for a state based

to support

it.

"civil society"

very closely.

on negative freedom, there

Of course,

is

And

the

same

no inherent motivation

for

this support is just as necessary as in
classical

times, to preserve the private or individual freedom
that the individual enjoys and wishes
to.

[131]

What can justify

a civic

commitment

in the

could assume that social commitment was inherent

However,

and does not presume anything

instrumental justification

state in order for

the

more

state? Classical theorists

in the nature

of the individual.

for the "proponent of negative freedom," the nature of the
individual

individualistic,

An

modern

the

it

room

is

is

social about the individual. [131]

clearly possible: the individual

to protect his/her private freedoms.

must support

Unfortunately, the larger the

the

state,

for individuals to not fulfill their civic obligations, without any

significant detrimental effects.

38

[131

-

132],

What

is

needed instead

is

a choice by the

individual to identify him-/herself as a citizen of the state, and to desire to

18

fulfill civic

am not sure why this is a problem. It would seem that a perfect freedom exists in a situations where
individuals may either participate or not participate in the state, without detrimental effects either way. Of
course, Poole might have in mind an indirect coercion, in which some people must serve the state because
I

they realize others are not.
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The

obligations.

nature ot the individual does not determine
this commitment, and for

not to undermine the negative freedom that

it

is

supposed

to serve,

must be

it

it

freely

chosen. [133]

Hegel

solution to this problem, as he understood

s

it,

was

in the

rational identification of the free citizen with the rational
laws of the state governing him
(not her for Hegel) [135], For the purely self-interested
individual,

who

conceive of the requirements of citizenship instrumentally"
[134] and

them

"can only

who

as possible in pursuit of his/her interest, the laws of the state (and

its

will violate

organization of

society, presumably) are experienced as constraints [135].

But when [such an individual] acquires the perspective of the citizen, he
recognises these not as constraints but as conditions of existence of activities,
pleasures, forms of knowledge, and meanings which are not otherwise available to
him. The individual qua citizen accepts, indeed wills these conditions, much as
dancers, chess players, and language speakers, and language speakers accept and
will the rules which make their chosen activity possible. They are no longer
experienced as external constraints or duties, but as the objective correlates of the
citizen's

Though

own

identity

.

.

[135]

a strict interpretation of Poole's

words would suggest a preservation of

instrumentality, the last line allows a (very) charitable reading.
rules express the essence of an individual's activity
fact express the (chosen) nature

of the individual

—

that

The idea

they are not a
is

is

means

that these

to

it,

but in

that activity.

Poole rejects the Hegelian optimism that a properly educated individual will adopt

He

the citizen's perspective.

Some

[137].
state.

other

That means

distinct

from

means
is

is

the possibilities of democracy"

which emerged almost with Hegel's philosophy, but

quite

it.

who

historically

more pessimistic "about

necessary to ensure a citizen's "willing" commitment to the

the nation,

For Poole, the nation

of people

is

is

in reality nothing

are conceived of, and

who

much.

It is

conceive themselves, as belonging

formed and geographically located community"

simple doctrine that the nation should have a

must represent a nation

[137].

Why

"nothing more than a group

state,

[137].

to

an

"Nationalism"

is

and, for a state to be legitimate,

it

then have the nation and nationalism been such
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the

powerful forces

two centuries? And how can they be
the vehicle

in the past

guaranteeing the cohesiveness of the state?

Why

for

not class, or religion, or political
party?

[137]

Poole opts tor a slightly revised Herderian
version of linguistic nationalism, with
appeals to Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson.
a uniform culture

became

As Anderson

society.

communities became
political,

As Gellner

argues, in the 19th Century

crucial for the interchangeability necessary
to industrial

argues, social conditions created a context in
which language

larger,

and a

common

language

itself a crucial

medium

and economic linkage. Thus, culture and language became

individuals' daily lives, and the foundations of individual
"identity"

for social,

central to

itself.

[138

"National identity" became central over competing identities (which
are
adopted), because

it

-

139]

still

"successfully appropriated the linguistic and cultural resources in

terms of which other identities are articulated. National identity provides the
inarticulate

ground of other
identity,

All other identities are articulated on top of national

identities." [139]

which becomes assumed.

It is,

after all, the linguistic

and cultural medium of

social relations themselves.

"National identity ...

is

instead, a conceptual frame that

structures our

not fully available to rational reflection" [139],
is

It is,

given by the accident of language and culture, yet

communications and even perceptions of the world. One's "national culture

has inescapably formed [one's] voice and [one's] vision" [142], Co-nationals "speak the

same language, experience
terms" [142],

It is

the

same emotions, and experience

the world in the

same

the "essen[ce]" of an individual, not as a set of rigid defining criteria,

but as the form and context of free activity [140].
In this

way, national identity

does not have to be emphasized.

is

the foundation of subjectivity. For this reason,

it

If a state reflects their nation, national subjects

"recognize themselves in the political form of the nation-state" [140]. They do not have
to actively participate, but

submit freely as

to

an internal power [140]. National identity
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IS

not "freedom" in the liberal sense,
but rather exists as the "necessity"
that grounds a

space of free activity (the negatively-free
[141],

a

much more
What

state.

all

sorts

varied

very poor.

is

phenomena than

a

self-

As argue

is

just a

Chapter

in

1

mere demand

more, the ,dea that the nation

is

and/or the mere

from

the unfree condition of freedom

It is

39

Poole's concept of the nation
ts

state).

3,

"nationalism"

for the coextension

of nation and

group of people on a given

territory,

or external perception of a shared history,
has been problematized

of perspectives on the nation

-

to the point

where

it

cannot be offered as a

serious position without a great deal of supporting
argumentation. In Chapter

3,

1

also

discuss the limitations of such a view.
In this chapter,

nation

all

nations

-

I

have already called into question the idea that members
of a

think or act or in
as described by

Chapter 3)

-

this is

some

other

Hobsbawm, and

to

are alike.

Given the obvious heterogeneity of

further developed

simply not a defensible position. Even

structures of consciousness, and not

of the nation

way

more concrete

by Bhabha

if its

focus

characteristics,

an identity group. That Poole explicitly notes

it

(as discussed in

is

on

is still

individuals'

the reduction

that a given "national"

population does not really share a given language or culture [138

There are three possible interpretations of Poole's vagueness on

-

139]

is

this point.

misleading.
First,

it is

possible that he recognizes the heterogeneity out of necessity, but then maintains his
original theory of homogeneity.

Second,

mind: Even

if

it is

possible that Poole has something like the following argument in

objectively co-nationals are not identical, they think that they are [139],

Thus, they perceive themselves

common

to

have the same language and culture, and each sees the

national state as reflecting these.

relationship to the state.

Of course,

They thus have

the

same (committed)

the perception of likeness drives

them toward

actual

likeness.

w This

represents a variation on the previous arguments

251

we have

seen linking liberalism to nationalism.

Third,

it

is

possible that this perception itself determines
their structure of

consciousness. They perceive the world as

if

they form an identity group, as

language and culture were uniformly experienced
by each. This,
is:

the "shared fiction" in

some sense

in effect,

if their

means

that

it

corrects for any difference, producing
the effect of

perfect linguistic and cultural identity.

Under

the force of this

common

fiction, the

group

tends toward homogeneity.

A

generous rejection of the

first

possibility

and attention

references to the fact that people really act and think the
possibility.

The vagueness of this

accomplished

-

description

reflects the inevitable

-

to Poole's frequent

same suggests

specifically,

of how

the third

this correction is

problems with the type of theory Poole has

advanced, no matter what adjustments are made. In any event, each
represents a variation

on the problematic nation

More
state that is

as identity group position.

None

tenable.

is

importantly, this account flies in the face of the obvious data. Within every

presumed

to

a variety of opinions on

—

be a nation

why

or

why

and even every nation

that is not a state

different opinions

on what

structure of consciousness, and

it

that

is

there are

not the national state or a proposed path to statehood

truly expresses the "national character" (or will of the people)

many

-

is.

-

because there are so

Clearly, if people really share

some

basic

reflected in their actual or desired state (as Poole

believes happens), then such debate would not occur. Just as clearly, such a contentious
"national identity" prevents

it

from being the key

to the universal

commitment of citizens

to state.

Poole's account portrays the nation as the guarantor of the

state.

This

itself

suggests the genesis of any nation that does tend to solidify citizens' commitment to a
state.

it.

It

It

must be produced by

must manipulate the

the state, for the express purpose of binding individuals to

structures of consciousness of

its

"citizens," to

cultural basis that necessarily identifies the state as the proper object of
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produce there a

commitment.

This

is

actually does

he admits,

'

Hobsbawm

precisely what

is

put

it

to

work

criticizes.

for the liberal state.

What

Poole's account of the nation

The nation

fills

a gap in liberalism.

a liberal political order does not create" but
requires "a degree of social

cohesiveness and commitment" [143],

If this

commitment does not

exist organically,

cannot be "presuppose[d]," contra Poole, but must be
created. Thus, the
creates a nation to

national identity

overcome

-

its

liberal state

through a very problematic "language" = "structure of

necessary failing of liberalism that

-

is

like the nation as the

a necessity specific to liberalism.

cannot produce a

it

be committed without being coerced.

room

it

shortcomings. The "necessity" that Poole ascribes
to

consciousness'V'essence" argument

something

As

It is

state structure to

a

It is

which people can

necessary for the liberal state to produce

means of this

coercion.

Not only does Poole leave no

for alternative concepts of the nation, but he also puts the one

form of nation he

does allow to work as a tool of coercion and psychological enslavement. While for
Poole, the sole function of the nation

is

to buttress state authority,

intentionally alternative concepts of the nation that often drive

it is

precisely

movements

against this

type of coercive state power.

The nation becomes
becomes a scapegoat
realities

the sole repository of

it

women
—

of power and coercion even

relegates coercion or

none

the nation.

He

that

its

bondage

were not

at the

fails to see that the

that ignores the real

not rational and chosen.

in a formally "free" society.

It

to the private realm.

power

whim

in the

home

it is

at the

run by the free husband and father

of that man. In

this case,

among

individuals.

They

is

it

to

are already not free,

no more responsible than the
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Poole relegates

simply an abstraction

regardless of whether they are forced to participate in a state or not.

exacerbate their bondage, but

looks only

For instance, historically

realm of "negative" freedom

relations

It

eyes to the informal realities below. In some

and children enjoyed no freedoms

at least

is

for the gaps of liberalism. Liberalism cannot account for the

formal political structures, and closes
cases,

what

The

liberal

state

may

realm of negative

Ireedom

tor

And, neither

it.

likely as not to be the

freedom"

negative
to

means

-

foreclose

there

them

the nation,

which under such circumstances

is

just as

or expression of a drive to
freedom against the bondage of

Poole's optimistic claim that "the
truth of liberalism"

change [141] misses the

freedom

is

reality that in all realms

-

is its

openness

including that of liberal negative

a tension between the forces that
allow options and those that

is

deterministically.

These two forces cannot be distributed the
former

to

liberalism and the latter to the nation.

Poole hides the ideological manipulation
central

by naturalizing the
it

latter.

By

placing

it

concept of national identity

outside the realm of rational reflection,
he makes

appear necessary or inevitable. What he neglects

citizens

to his

are identical in this respect. While

some

to

acknowledge

is

that not all

are manipulated unwittingly

by

propaganda, and to some extent internalize an ideologically
tainted structure of
consciousness, others ar q performing the manipulations. In
some cases, these others do
out of missionary zeal. But, this zeal

comes with
exercising

the

is

often produced through a reinforcement that

power of manipulating minds, and gaining power

power over

others.

41

it

In other cases, the line

is

in a state

even more

clear:

through
there

is

a

relatively conscious effort at manipulation. In either case, de facto
representatives of a
state

manipulate

its

"average citizens."

"national" language or culture.

It is

One must

not enough to note the existence of a

ask.

What

typically creates a "national"

language? What typically institutionalizes and regulates culture? What inculcates and
enforces the "national" language and culture, through education, laws, and so forth? The

answer quite often

is,

an existing

state (or, occasionally,

toward a particular conception of a

an institutionalized movement

state).

This naturalization denies the agency of individual

powerless

in the face

of "national identity." This

40

citizens.

naturalistic

They

are pretty

much

and mechanistic view of

This recalls Thom's relegation of all passivity to the nation and all activity to the republican citizens
assembled.
4l
An example of this might be the type of American idealist central to Greenfeld's account of the United
States. Belief in this case requires a (willing) gap between ideals and reality.
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identity formation supports his

By

"pessimism about the

possibilities

of democracy"

137 ],

refusing to acknowledge the agency of
individuals in the production of
propaganda,

he transforms apparent failures of democracy
into metaphysical necessities.
to

[

By

refusing

acknowledge the tremendous force of propagandistic
manipulation on "average

citizens," he

views the

"failures"

of "democracy"

victims, though he does not allow

At the same time,
Poole, national identity

whose

identity

constant fight against

is

For those whose

least regarding minorities, that

identity

on the whole

-

it is

who do

but

who

Poole's theoretical prejudice for

choose

the

their failures.

of agency and the nation. For
life.

weak, or

states are

He blames

may

It

who

be so for those

are prevented

from

in their state, national identity is a constant struggle,
a

dissolution

secede. But what of those

to

a given, pre-conscious backdrop of

reflected

its

them enough agency even

this inverts the actual relation

states are powerful.

seeing their

be their failures.

to

—

as

I

have argued above. Poole might counter,

at

the fact of non-identity that drives such minorities to

not try to secede, and neither try to impose their

also will not or are not permitted to assimilate? Here
statist

nations

is

clear.

He cannot account

for alternative

forms, yet does not recognize the huge gaps in the form he advocates.
Indeed, his account of the nation

is,

use Gore Vidal's term, "crypto-fascist." If

to

the majority in a state identifies itself with the state, and sees the state as the reflection of
its

identity essence,

this

it is

a short step

from there

essence are undermining or polluting the

alternative in such a situation

is

bad enough

to the

state,

—

view

that those

and do not belong

forced assimilation.

alternatives include deportation and genocide. That

some

form, and others to milder forms of liberal appropriation,

who do
in

it.

not share

The

best

The worse

nations do tend toward this
is

inherent tendency in the nation, but rather the openness of

a function not of

its

some

the concept of the nation

itself.

Finally, this placing of national identity

weakens

it.

This

is

a variation

beyond access by

rational reflection

on the frequent "non-rationality" or
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"irrationality"

of

national identity. For the nation to legitimate
it

must attach

itself to a rational (liberal) state.

dependent on the nation, he
dependent on the

its

at the

same makes

For a nation to

state.

and thus

rationality,

-

for

it

to

be "rational,"

While Poole appears
the nation

-

-

at least indirectly

to

make

the state

for its legitimacy

-

reject service to a state is to lose its
connection to

legitimacy.

This naturalization also re-instrumentalizes the nation.
The instrumentality

is

rationalized and generalized to the state as a whole, rather
than attributed to individual
citizens.

The

rationality

of the nation depends on

its utility

for the state:

its

legitimacy

is

in serving the (liberal) state.

One
state.

serve

question that Poole does not address adequately

He assumes
it.

The

state naturalizes

state is just as "irrational"

properly liberal states

of the state that

is

why

the presence of the state, and his only question

This assumption of the

intend this.

is

—

as the nation.

-

it,

as well

the nation needs the

is

how the

- though

nation can

Poole does not

despite a form of "rationality," in the case of

Indeed, from his perspective,

it

the truly pre-reflective ground of social and political

is

the assumption

life.

This

is

part

of the reason he cannot or will not recognize alternative conceptions and forms of the

On

nation.

his logic, this

would require accepting

might foster a non-state socio-political structure

in

the possibility that a non-statist nation

which

its

members might

see

themselves reflected.
Poole's reductive subjugation of nation to liberalism, in support of the liberal
state, is either

strain in

same

a function of or generates his poor reading of Hegel. There

Hegel

that subjugates disparate terms to

dynamics of Hegelian philosophy, an external perspective on

(such as the nation)

is

always giving way

engages an object, the object
-

to

command

a

meaning -

is

to

certainly a

one organizing schema. But,

time, the dialectical nature of Hegelian philosophy mitigates against

dialectical

is

this.

at the

In

a social object

an internal perspective. As the subject

itself affects the subject.

The power of subject over

object

-

inverted, as the object reconfigures the interpretive frame of
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the subject.

The subjugation of a

social object to the general

perspective) itself transforms that
system and subjugates
perpetually turns conceptual frames
inside out. This

is

it.

schema of Hegel's system

The Hegelian

(a

dialectic

a productive, if idealized,

model

of how social science should proceed.
Unfortunately, a typical Anglo-American/analytic
reading of Hegel such as
Poole's focuses entirely on the rigid subjugation
of disparate social objects, and ignores
the dialectics.

The

result

is

bad social science, and worse

political theory.

Meta-Nationalism

Omar Dahbour,

in his introduction to the

Forum,

lays out the "philosophical"

issues related to the nation and nationalism. These
reflect the general presumptions and

limitations

I

have already treated

at

length in this section. This

is to

"Guest Editor" of the Forum, Dahbour presumably had a big hand
contents

-

be expected: as

in selecting

its

which, unfortunately, are limited by his limitations.

There are two distinctive elements

to his introduction,

however.

First,

survey of the "philosophical" issues regarding the nation and nationalism

he

ties his

to certain

canonical texts in the history of Western philosophy. Second, based on this survey, he
offers

some

point, or

general conclusions. These apparently are meant as

common

some

sort

of starting

reference point, for the other essays in the Forum. Unfortunately, these

conclusions are mere restatements of central tenets of Elie Kedourie's antinational-ist
theory of the nation and nationalism. [13-14] If this

is

the best a self-described novel

philosophical engagement with these objects can produce [see

more poor than

my

introductory

treated Kedourie in Chapter

approaches

1

comments

suggest. At the

1],

same

"philosophy"
time,

I

have

is

even

fully

and the limitations on the general analytic philosophical

in detail in this section; at this point, these

mention.
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do not require more than a

It is

Dahbour's manifestation of certain beliefs
about the relationship between the

history of philosophy and the
nation/nationalism that requires further
are

two dimensions

to that relationship.

First,

comment. There

such philosophers as Locke, Rousseau,

Kant, and Hegel provide the key concepts
with which to approach the nation today.
This
is

clearly manifested in the essays of both
Gilbert and Poole,

Hegel

is

explicit.

Gilbert's three options for

whose common

reliance

on

group structures are closely adapted from

Hegelian concepts, and Poole's analysis of the necessity
of the nation

is

entirely in

Hegelian terms, and based on analysis of Hegel's philosophy. 42

Dahbour extends
regarding nationalism

—

this

dependence. For him, the main contemporary debate

whether nations are "primordial" or "modern"

in origins

-

can be

described as the question of "whether national identities are formed in a
Lockean or in a

Hegelian fashion
years

- most

pre-modern

[Dahbour, 1996:

2].

That

serious theorists agree that,

cultural elements, nations

not the important thing to notice.

this

debate has not been central for

many

however much "nationalism" might appeal

and nationalisms are a modern phenomenon

What

is

to

-- is

the reduction of a contemporary debate to

philosophies developed two and three centuries ago, in ages where the nation had become
barely noticeable and

Perhaps

this

was

at best in the early stages

of its evolution as a social form.

debate appears central to Dahbour precisely because can be construed

in

terms readily available in the philosophical canon.
I

have already argued

that ultimately

Lockean

liberal

concepts and Hegelian ones

(as interpreted within a liberal conceptual frame) are not appropriate to the nation.

the development of new philosophical concepts and frames through which

is

necessary

to

engage the nation. Dahbour mines the same old canon

is

What

for as yet

unused pre-existing

concepts for application to (imposition on) the nation.

Second, he repeats Kedourie's position
nationalism
42

[6],

Dahbour adds

in

Rousseau

Though in both cases apparently focused on
Phenomenology of Spirit.

that

[3],

Kant

Fichte

[4],

the Philosophy of Right
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the ultimate creator of

is

,

and (presumably
which

is

much more

J.

S.)

Mill

limited than the

t5] ’ 35

We "’

Crea ‘ ing an eVen

by these thinkers
I

is

g er impression that the history of philosophy
marked

the history of the genesis and
evolution of the nation and
nationalism.

have already strongly

and

stro,,

criticized

reality of the nation

such a restricted position on the
origins of the concept

and nationalism,

in

my

well as, less directly, Greenfeld).
There was a

between emergent concepts of the nation

discussions of Kedourie and

much more

in general

emergent national phenomena

-

that

(as

dialectical relationship

and specific nations, and the proto-

national social formations actually
coalescing without

of nation and nationalism. Even granting

Thom

full

association with the concepts

such thinkers had some role

in interpreting

or even creating a context for their
conceptualization

-

nations and nationalisms were not just ideas
that were imposed on reality. They
did not

Athena-like spring from the foreheads of philosophers,
but depended on complex social,

economic, and

political transformations

and developments.

This point eludes Nicole Fermon perhaps even more than
Dahbour. Her treatment

of the nation and nationalism

She offers these not even

is

an extended interpretation of various texts by Rousseau.

as merely

one perspective on the nation

- which

requires that one overlook the tact that there really were not nations

writing

-

of course

when Rousseau was

but as a path to central insight into the nature of the nation, up to
and including

the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia [Fermon, 1996: 26],

Even granting
government

that

Rousseau was writing about nations,

- however related

the nation very narrow.

to

"customs"

He may have

elements of nationally-specitic

in the

his focus

Hegelian sense

- make

is

his concept of

recognized the emerging importance of the various

historical, cultural,

and popular consciousness

formation and legitimation, but that does not mean that he understood

concept of the nation

on laws and

purely organic, in which the individual

whole. That, as clarified by Hegel, the individual

somehow

is

it

well.

in state

In fact, his

absorbed into a greater

finds his (not her)

"individual freedom" in this absorbing organism has remained a highly problematized

point in Rousseau scholarship, and absolutely cannot be taken
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at face value.

Rousseau

absolutely explicit and concrete about
this organicism.

is

a great body'" [25],

is

political

body"

to her,

takes this concept and runs with

"body

[28, 34] or

According

committed

Fermon

politic" [30, 34], a "sovereign

Rousseau's central concern

to the nation [see especially 24].'

central feature of the nation,

Fermon

is

wants

made

is

[30],

a

and so

to get the individual to

that

Rousseau

is

forth.

be

writing of the

by Benedict Anderson, about the

by nationals

for their nation [24], This,

to say that people feel a positive attachment to their
nation,

imagination of community. The love

"nation."

body"

is

43

the generation of nations too material or mechanistic.

imagination as a community. The nation

On

The nation

"nation"

not central to Anderson's account, and comes as a
concluding caveat against

possible charges that he has
Fie just

felt

how

As evidence

offers a quotation

profoundly self-sacrificing love"’ often

however,

44

is

it.

The

is

is

is this

... a highly charged

love, really?

its

not generated by this love, but by the

a result.

Fermon's reading of Rousseau, however,

And what

based on

it is

this love that

"Because la patrie

and personal love"

[23],

is

produces the

feminine

in

French, this

Indeed, the love of one's "nation"

is

simply a transference of love for one's mother onto one's "'mother tongue"’ or motherland.
[33

-

34] This displaces properly sexual love, being a

"'a

thousand times more delicious

than [love of] mistresses" [33].

The evidence of this
texts,

based on the

transference by Rousseau

fact that his

mother died giving

is

a psychoanalytic reading of his

birth to him.

psychological terms, he had to replace his mother, and did

with the concept of the "nation."

[3

1

-

In simplistic

this (at least intellectually)

32] This might be a defensible reading of

Rousseau. But the peculiarities of Rousseau's atypical psychology,
generalizable to

all

commitments

to a nation, or to all aspects

44

is

hardly

of the nation (beyond the

issue of individual commitment). Let us not forget that Rousseau

^Fermon's

it

was

quite atypical and

interpretation.

This, of course,
about the nation.

was

Poole's concern for the state, and reiterates the question of
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why Fermon

thinks this

is

even

many respecs

in

from Ins psychology

bizarre.

to that

That

of all

is

no

but undermines any attempt
to generalize

fault,

nationalists (in their "normalcy"

and

distinct forms

of

particularity).

More

importantly, this

What

theory.

is

a gross misapplication of
psychoanalytic “literary”

a psychoanalytic reading does

is tell

us about the author

anything about the author’s subject.
Nietzsche makes

Good and Evil,

-

it

does not

this absolutely clear in

tell

Beyond

he recognizes that his proto-psychoanalytic
analysis of philosophical

texts to reveal the desires

and wills behind them

tells

us nothing about philosophy, and

everything about philosophers.
Yet,

Fermon

presents her reading as a basic insight into the
fundament of all

nations. In the vein and citing Julia Kristeva,
she extends Kristeva's fetishization of the

use of the term "mother" in "mother tongue" [see
31, 33

This

is

citizens

how

state

in their construction.

Fermon

is

women

are not used and

right to point out the

hegemony
[33,

is

36

produced
-

37],

and

in part

-

37],

She

is

across

all

first,

by regulation and control of women's

that assertion of

she

fails to

independence from these

recognize that this use and control of women

types of political and social structures.

requires (1) that

unique

it

To view

it

as the

key

to the nation, generated with

is

it,

activities

roles,

is

and

[31].

universal

to the nation

be effectively the exclusive nature of the nation and (2) that

political structures that

it

be

and not a more general feature of social and

imported into the nation.

43

Second, she conflates these concrete

effects of construction and maintenance of state and cultural

power with

the relatively

limited use and significance of the metaphor of the mother in nation-formation and
JS

expand this point in Chapter 3, where make clear that this does not mean that "nationals" are not
responsible for engagement in gender oppression, or that nationalisms do not extend this oppression.
I

in

also correct to point out

challenges to patriarchy, are quite often experienced as threats to the "nation"
But,

ways

as mothers, wives, etc., are coerced and exploited into
producing

through a national moral education [35

and sexualities

34] to a Rousseauian variation.

a limited approach to the nation not because

oppressed by nations and

which women,

-

I
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national consciousness.

No

actual nation, but that use

is

doubt

it

would possible

to find

it

used with reference

every

to

just as doubtlessly not generally
or often a central feature in

the constitution of the nation.
Indeed and again,

it

import of sexist conceptual structures
into the nation

The upshot of Fermon's

often

is

more

likely a

secondary

46
.

article is that the nation

must be understood through

Rousseau's texts, and moreso through a
limiting psychoanalytic reading
of them. This
control of access through canonical
philosophical texts

general project. Dahbour, Fermon,

merely inaccurate.

et al's "history"

is

a variation

on Dahbour's

of the nation and nationalism

not

is

a normalized history, that transforms the
nation and nationalism

It is

into philosophical constructs best
understood in canonical philosophical concepts.

Rather

than developing philosophy to engage the
nation and nationalism, this normalization

transforms them to

condescension
rather

demands

fit

prefabricated slots in philosophy. "Philosophy,"
in

to the realities

of the world, does not deign

that the realities

In light of this,

it

conform

to

its

to step into that world, but

it.

appears that the failure of "philosophy" to produce genuine

insights into the nation and nationalism

chosen path, based on the presumption

is

not merely an unfortunate shortfall.

that "philosophy" already has within

wealth of concepts, systems, and methods

—

all that is

it

It is

-

a

in its

necessary to understand

everything.

One of the most

serious critiques of national self-conception

histories are normalized.

They emphasize only data

that

is

is

that nationalist

consistent with the existence

ot their nation in history, such as the existence of cultural elements that only later

became

associated with the nation, while organizing their narrative around the emergence and
activity of "the nation," at historical points

where no such nation can be said

to

have

existed. This false history often contributes to the construction or consolidation of the

"it is telling that elsewhere in the Forum, there is barely a mention of gender or gender oppression. Is this
another foisting of problems with liberalism (as much as nationalism) squarely onto nationalism — a subtle
and devious use of the accusation of gender oppression as itself a tool of oppression?
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nation at the time the history

produced.

is

I

have described

this

phenomenon

in

my

discussion of Greenfeld.

Dahbour

et al's

normalization of the history of philosophy to include
the

generation and continuing engagement with the nation
and nationalism might be termed
"meta-nationalism." Rather than normalize history around the
desired presence of a
specific nation,

it

normalizes the general history of the nation and nationalism
around the

philosophical canon. There

proves

itself

is

a deep irony here. At the very point at which philosophy

most incapable of engaging the nation and nationalism with penetrating or

very precise analysis, philosophers reconstruct the history of nation/alism
to represent

philosophy as central to

it

it.

This "meta-nationalism" need not be positive in
particular philosophers (that

is,

centrality of the philosophical

Rousseau can be

canon

its

sexist).

in the generation

evaluation of the nation, nor of

Its

point

is

to establish the

and analysis of the nation and

nationalism.

Concluding Remark

Given these preceding

set

of analyses,

it

would seem

that

an answer

to the

question of Descartes' possible paths Anglo-American analytic Political Philosophy has

emerged. Rather than grow through engagement with new social forms and forces
case of Descartes, a

new

contemporary analytic

scientific

and material approach

Political Philosophy, the nation

to the world; in the case

and nationalism),

it

new

force into support for the old.
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of

has chosen to

defend the old order (Catholicism or atomic individualism), by reworking and
manipulating the

(in the

Phoenix Rising
In a recent

ethnicity,"

and

Daedalus

academic

literature

from one

in

one

gender for a
than

.

.

.

on these

He

topics.

which nationalism (and

[Tiryakian, 1997:

-

gender and race

in the

-

as well as religion and

contemporary, modern age,

explicitly challenges the anti-national
bias of the

which nationalism (and

in

focusing on nationalism

article

to a lesser extent

Edward A. Tiryakian

to

47

149

-

150],

religion et al)

religion et al)

He

cultural bundle,

calls for a shift in

is

is

dominant

“the dominant paradigm,”

viewed as “a reaction

to

modernity”

recognized as a “factor[] of modernity”

argues that nationalism, religion, ethnicity, race, and
a

dynamic

set

of factors creating modernity, rather

constraints or residuals in the general process of modernization”
[149], as

is

so

on the usual “liberal” view.

The key form of the “dominant paradigm’s”

relationship to nationalism

characterizing nations as “ invented” communities, artificial constructs with
positive or negative function.

approaches, which

I

Hobsbawm,

is

theory

some type of

Balibar, and Wallerstein represent Marxist

have also argued view the nation as an invented social myth

functioning “ in the creation and maintenance of power or the attempted seizure of

power”

[156].

Tiryakian represents Gellner’s functionalist view as a variation on
that

it

reduces the nation to an “artificially” created tool of modernization.

have emphasized the difference between Gellner and genuine
Tiryakian, “artificiality” here seems almost to
centuries.

More

importantly, that Tiryakian

agenda

is telling.

It

his

own

I

mention

this to stress the

its utility

importance of the

own

for a

distinction

manipulation of the nation form becomes

apparent.
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For

within the past few

allows Tiryakian to remain convinced of his

from such obvious cases, even as

however,

recognize the specific nature of

Gellner’s failing not as a claim of the artificiality of the nation, but of
specific

I,

antinational-ists.

mean simply produced

fails to

theme, in

this

article, at least in
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academia.

His inclusion ot Anderson
reasons. First,

it

is

in this

grouping

is

based on a bad reading of the “ imagined
community.” According

Tiryakian, Anderson views the nation as
an idea that
population.

equally problematic, for two

The key

to the nation is the content

is

of that

disseminated throughout a
idea,

which

is

holders imagine themselves to be participants.
Tiryakian’s objection

produced by some members of the society,

that

to

is, is artificial.

of a nation
is

in

which

that this idea

is

This ignores the bulk of

Anderson’s theory, which concerns the form of this
dissemination: the “idea” of a nation
is

not antecedent to participation in

structure that
that

it is

but rather produced out of the communicative

emerges with “print capitalism.” The nation

recognized by

its

members. The

and manipulated (communication
certain people [elites] determine

significant

it,

is

structure itself can be centralized, controlled,

one-way and through centralized media conduits,

what

is

communicated and how,

problems with Anderson’s model

greatest strength, perhaps,

is

that structure to the extent

is

in recognizing

for this reason

etc.),

and there are

and others.

Still,

Anderson’s

both material and mental forces in the

constitution of the nation, but Tiryakian misses the former.

Second,

this

to the restrictive

shift is

view of the nation

20 years too

approaches,

at least

Anderson’s have

bad reading therefore ignores prominent alternatives

late

-

that Tiryakian criticizes.

there rose, with the rise of

one other particularly European

their limits,

it still

call for a

Hobsbawmian and

strain.

If

“paradigm”

Gellnerian

beginning efforts such as

has opened up into a set of conceptual possibilities

outside of Tiryakian’s “dominant paradigm.”

paradigm (conceptual frame)

His

in the literature,

Further, locked in the

[see especially 161

-

162], he ignores a

dominant European

whole range of

alternative theories and concepts produced from perspectives and political developments

outside that frame.

One should

also differentiate post-structuralist approaches,

Tiryakian collapses into Marxist with the inclusion of Balibar there.
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which

Tame “Wild

Cards”

Tiryakian’s reductive description of the
literature clears the field for
his

imaginary

paradigm

an “emergent” strain

Against the “ invented tradition” theme,
Tiryakian invokes

shift.”

in the literature.

These theories revalue the nation and
nationalism

as a crucial element in democratic
state formation,

order.”

They refocus

attention

nation as a

state.

in this strain.

Edward

Shils presents the

of the democratic tradition of modernity”
[159], The nation

’center’

national self-consciousnesses of members

grounds the

“a discourse upholding a democratic

on the “nation” aspect of the
“«^/o«-state.” [159]

Tiryakian cites a number of theorists
“

own

-- is

what sustains the “civil society”

At the same time, the nation

is

-

or

that

not a simple function of “self-interest,”

but rather the product of a variety of economic,
psychological, political, cultural, and
historical factors. [161]

Dominique Schnapper formulates

the notion similarly, as a “ ’specific form of

political organization,”’ that concretizes the abstract state into
a “real

citizens.’”

It

The product

‘community of

blends ethno-cultural relations and open civic participation. [161

is

the civic nation, akin to Greenfeld’s.

It is

ethnicity,

however,

-

162]

that is

democratized and thus egalitarian, making civic not abstract and formal, but concrete and
immediate.
In the
liberal

first

instance, this shift appears

concepts of the nation

I

little

have been treating

more an
in

assertion of variations on the

bulk of this chapter. Tiryakian

especially interested in a tired notion of the “civic” nation as a

conceptions. His

initial explicit project

was

foil to alternative

to establish the nation as

an independent

variable in modernity, not reducible to other forces, and so to legitimate

he has reformulated

it

precisely in a form that

is

is

determined by an extant

it.

But, to do so,

political

agenda

and conceptual frame. Apparently ignorant 19th and 20th Century “liberal nationalism,”
he triumphantly announces the discovery or production of a new understanding of the
nation

— which

is

the

same old “civic”

or liberal one.
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The
nation

specific features he extols
relevant to the “civic ”
nation are familiar.
This
contractual, a voluntary
political association
[162], It is, further,

is

"democratic,”

stressing the equality of
participants
civic

-

as if this can only be
guaranteed

concept, or even guaranteed
by
Yet,

it

is

by

this particular

at all.

it

not motivated by economic
or political self-interest.
Tiryakian stresses

the emotional or
psychological dimension, which
exceeds, according to him,
liberal

accounts. For Julia Knsteva, 4 '
the ''paramount function
of the nation ...
pride in individuals and groups”

- “national

pride

narcissistic ideal’ the child initially
internalizes

into an

to the

from the mother, which

is

inspire

“’good
then elaborated

ego ideal” [164].

The

specific

form of this psycho-emotional
component

Tiryakian himself describes

it

in 18th

form of psycho-emotional force binds an
individual
is to

legitimate

paradigm
tradition

-

-

to a

not important:

168],

What

group

ideal.

matters

that

is

some

Tiryakian’s big

it.

This formulation merely subjugates the nation
”

is

Century France as * freed religious
sentiment

applied in a political context, to a
political object [167

move

comparable

[is]

is to

to

a

different

“dominant

not within the literature on the nation, but
within the general intellectual

of the West.

It is

a psychoanalytic or even psychological
tradition that refers to

and inhabits the “private” space within atomic
individualism. Tiryakian merely
reformulates the nation as a function of psychoanalytic
or psychological forces. The
nation and nationalism

modernity,

become

""wild cards” within the overall system of rational

allowed space within the psychology of individuals while

at the

same time

not requiring a transformation ot that system, or being recognized
as part of or posing an
alternative social or political form.

drives a

4S

different

Recall especially

The

issue

""paradigm,” but rather

my comments

in

become

how

it

not

how

operates within the given

opening the Greenfeld section, above.
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the nation represents or

paradigm.

The

paradigm”

is

not superseded, but merely expanded to
include another

element.

The term “wild”

is

revealing. This characterizes the “emotional”
nature of the

nation and nationalism. They are wild, and the implications
of their presence in this or
that context

uncertain

The term “wild card” means

[see 161].

and “nationalism” are not

nation

tixed, but rather

precisely this:

have multiple possible meanings

and values within the more fixed realm of “modernity.”

While Tiryakian represents

this

wildness as the independence of nationalism from

the characteristic constraints of “modernity ,” he uses

it

in a different

way. Tiryakian

stresses that his rejection of simplistic versions of “rational choice theory” does
not

an embrace of “an

such as Shils’ to
choices,

irrationalist perspective

call for

on nationalism”

[161].

He

mean

interprets theorists

an expansion of the factors included in analysis of people’s

beyond just economic or

cost/benefit, to “psychological, political, cultural,

historical factors that are given equal or greater weight” [161]. This

and

expands the realm of

“ rationality,” rather than attributing the nation to irrational
forces.

He
fact

is right,

no “paradigm

The nation

is still

or attachments
this chapter

—

but only partially. This
shift” at

all.

It

new method

preserves intact the

for analysis of the nation

initial

is

in

system of decision-making.

constituted by atomic individuals expressing

some

sort

of preferences

a very limiting and normalizing concept of the nation, as the balance of

should suggest.

More

importantly, this “rationality” of the decision-making

is

not due to a

“rationality” in the decision-makers, but rather to the comprehensibility of their decision-

making process

decision makers. Rather,

it is

Tiryakian’ s ultimate project

manipulate
price of

its

it

There

for theorists.

is

is

anything but respectful acknowledgment of

recognition that what

is

comprehensible

is

malleable.

not merely to understand national commitment, but to

toward an object of his choice. “Nationalism” gains “rationality”

free functioning.
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at the

It is

no defense against criticism

that Tiryakian claims to be or
is positively

disposed toward this other, this “wild card"

have already suggested

I

disposition requires a deformation: if the
nation can be bent to

then and only then

is it

legitimate.

Even other

fit

that this

a slot in “modernity,”

theories positively disposed toward
the

nation but that do not do this (such as Anderson’s)
must be rejected.

Tiryakian has made the

nation

(and race, gender, religion,

’

savage" of contemporary conceptions of “ modernity.”
appreciated for

its

commitment

For Tiryakian, that means

is

unpredictable.

“noble

“ good,” and to be

naturally democratic and humanizing tendencies,
but

as a pure tendency, national

“civilized.”

It is

etc.) into the

It

it is still

savage:

therefore must be

that the “national sentiment”

must be focused on

the proper object.

One Nation — With

Liberty and Justice for All?

This issue, as with Gilbert, Poole, and Fermon, becomes for Tiryakian the way

which the “national”

features of societies buttress the liberal order of states.

in

The

significance of Tiryakian’ s restrictive notion of the nation becomes clear in his

application of

it.

While claiming

to put nationalism, ethnicity,

and race on new and solid

footing in “modernity,” he actually deploys “nation” against “ethnicity” and “race.”

As

his approving treatments of Shils, Schnapper, and Michael Lind indicate, he views a

“nation” as coterminous with an extant

state,

and the proper

role

of the nation

to

be the

shoring up of that state against fractious forces within, including “subnational” ethnicity

and

race. [163]

the past

He

with approval the general failure of separatist nationalisms over

cites

few decades, and

the near non-existence of serious irredentist ones [151].

Indeed, proper nationalism ensures the dominance of a majority nation within a
multinational or -ethnic

other” [160],

state,

Of course,

thereby preventing minor nations “ from warring with each

the real issue

is

usually the tension between an often oppressive

majority and minority nations, which this account ignores, and which nationalism of this
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type decides in favor of the majority
(and
Kristeva’s apparent pluralism

is in line

her, ‘-immigrants” are invited
guests

inclusion

by

is

components”

to

with Tiryakian’s “ majority rule.”
According to

who

should be grateful

- from

is

to their hosts, for their

no question of who

that

is,

explicitly, saving the nation

borders, that

minorities

is,

—

is

-

as

component of the

such things as “ethnic particularism”
[162], Tiryakian

being steamrolled into a

new

in the

cites

with

United States are

hybrid “ Trans American” identity. The only true
or

the majority identity that absorbs

an oppressive nation. Those nations

that resist

charge,

have been “ repressed.” [164]

approval Lind’s claims that race and other forms of
difference

legitimate nation

is in

recognize within the nation even those
already internal

Tiryakian's sole concern
nation-state

paradigm of domination). Thus,
even

of the •‘welcoming host.” There

fiat

and who has the authority
“historical

its

all

difference within the state

- demoted

to “ethnic” or “racial”

domination and absorption are not legitimate. One would expect

49
at the very least that recognition of these distinct, “marginalized”
groups within a state

or

presumed “nation” would be necessary

to

developing an adequate concept of it.

Indeed, one would expect that the presence of minority nations (and ethnic and racial
minorities,

would

which may or may not be nations

raise questions about just

acknowledge

their

obvious

how

reality,

(following Lind) calls for their

as well) within the

national such a state

and work

summary

to

is.

supposed “ nation-state”

But, rather than

understand their significance, Tiryakian

dismissal from intellectual consideration and

political legitimacy.

0

Phoenix’ Rising

The proper nationalism, according
and
49

political order

to Shils,

binds individuals to the central social

and authority [160], For Schnapper, national

my

To

anticipate

At

this point, the referent

identity represents the

treatment of Bhabha in Chapter 3.
of this term shifts from the commonly understood mythological one — as the
reassertion of the same old theories from the ashes of previous assertions — to its concrete referent in US
S0

military history.
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proper

socialization

ot individuals into the

“community of citizens”

concretion of the state. The proper
nation/nationalism

is

that

is

the

a tool for integration of

divergent individuals and groups into a
given dominant political (state) structure.
This

new paradigm”

obviously functions to preserve the “old”
power of state authority.

Nationalism

one

-

a problem:

how can

the proper type of nationalism

produces a “nationalist sentiment” for an existing

that

order

becomes

be cultivated, and improper nationalism

presumably according

to

solution for Tiryakian

is

different

from the

institution

“merely” ethnic or

The

simple.

nation-state. This

-

is

is

-

The

is

its

socio-economic

be avoided or undercut? The

based on groupings or movements

allowed because people have

and leadership of their nation-states and associated

nationalism

and

that seeks to fracture the state,

racial lines

fracturing

state

lost trust in the

civil societies.

Non-state

the result. Restore the trust, and these will be eliminated.
[173

credibility

of this argument depends

the current “nation-states”

became “national”

-

first

on

-

176]

setting aside the question of how

or formed. For most,

it

was through

separatism, irredentism, or the systematic elimination or marginalization of minorities.

Tiryakian also seems to forget the obvious examples of elimination of minorities toward
consolidation of a “national” state he cites early in his essay, the Armenian Genocide and
the Holocaust [151].

Second,
their

the

it

depends on assuming

that the mistrust of individuals

governments and the dominant majorities,

Armenian Genocide and

is

and minorities, of

not justified. But, as examples such as

the Holocaust and the general track record of governments

and dominant majorities suggest,
agreements and promises by the

it is

quite justified.

US government

Think of the thousands of broken

and white majority

to

Native Americans,

leading time and again to land-theft, massacre, internment, and genocide.

One can add
corruption and

lies.

scene of a spate of

to this a

more general tendency on

the part of

governments

to

In the United States, for instance, just the past 30 years have been the

lies

and scandals, from pre-Tet propaganda regarding the
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status

of the

War

in

Vietnam,

to secret

so forth and so on.
is

that so

Any

many people

bombings of Cambodia, Watergate,

lack of trust

the Iran-Contra Affair, and

would seem more than justified

(including, apparently, Tiryakian)

still

do

- what

trust their

is

amazing

governments

or the promises of majorities. Yet, Tiryakian, in
a willfully naive analysis, attributes
distrust in the

United States entirely

to

“the student protest

movement of [the 1960s

introduced a distrust of authority that has continued to this
day” [174]
students were not reacting very understandably to deep,

which have continued

The

issue

is

at

—

that]

as if these

times genocidal, deceptions,

to this day.

not simply that Tiryakian’s slightly modified liberal “paradigm”

prevents an adequate analysis ol minority nations (and ethnic and racial
minorities),

dismissing them (in the familiar liberal/psychoanalytic manner) as perversions
or

deformations of the proper form of the nation and “national” devotion. His unique
“ innovation” relative to the reductive
and manipulative approaches
is

that he sets as the priority

agenda

purported “ erosion of trust,”

for

contemporary social

in the service

“ paradigm.”

His only concern

dawn on Tiryakian

is

-

is

-

it

that others should

-- or,

One would expect

paradigm” would cause him

as

change theirs f
one

It

directly, to

his

does not seem

to

that will get to the

into actually

undercut their great power

their perpetual trustworthiness

mostly

the sensitivity that he claims to the limits of the “dominant

to take

Instead, Tiryakian calls

manipulation of that social

moment changing

governments and minorities

even more

over subjects and minorities, thereby making

of the

as derivative of his

he does not consider for a

to transform the

trustworthy institutions or groups

irrelevant.

scientists the analysis

that the simplest solution, as well as the only

root causes of the problem,

have already treated

of its restoration. In other words, even

social reality contradicts his expectations of

liberal/psychoanalytic “paradigm”

I

pause for self-reflection about his own.

on the ranks of social

reality, to force a

It

does

not.

scientists to assist in the

correspondence between individuals’

For Tiryakian, this distrust appears a variation of the “ invented tradition” “ paradigm”
nations and nationalisms.

5l
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in

the study of

psychological and political commitments and the
liberal-democratic-contractarian-statist
or just plain statist expectations of

This must

start

them [173

with a change

-

176],

in the attitudes

of intellectuals, whose work

including a “sort of ‘genome project’ to study nationalism”
[172]

paradigm

shift.

Tiryakian

intellectuals in their

distrust

of the

is

is

crucial to any

disturbed by the lack of trust of East European

new, post-communist central governments [174], He can understand

earlier,

communist governments, but not of the new, supposedly

democratic ones. Tiryakian

fails to

liberal-

consider that the experience of intellectuals and

others under

communism might have engendered

Tiryakian

including a critical approach to

’s,

-

--

in

them

sensibilities

beyond

apparatuses of power that allows them to

all

perceive the limitations of and dominations by even liberal-democratic-contractarian state

governments and

majorities.

A

genuine “paradigm shift” might have been possible by

building on their unique experiences with different forms of political domination, rather

than bemoaning the reasonable and intellectually textured results of these experiences.
Ultimately, Tiryakian’s manipulative, even cynical, project becomes clear.
attributes

contemporary sub-state minority “cultural movements” (based on “ethnicity”

or “race”) to result from a mobilization of dormant individual national

“

He

commitment by

’moral entrepreneurs’” [172]. These movements are thus reduced entirely to the

products of successful marketing campaigns, using the methods of psychological and

emotional manipulation standard
Tiryakian wants these

“

to the advertising industries

of consumer

’moral entrepreneurs’” studied, for two reasons.

current age of post-Cold

War “economic, demographic, and

understanding of the appeal of such leaders

is

national

can be learned, and then used

commitment

to states.

First, in the

technological” “change,” an

crucial for preventing

them from

or disrupting the emergent liberal-democratic-contractual states [see 171
their techniques

societies.

for the legitimate

-

172],

fracturing

Second,

purpose of producing

His tone indicates disapproval not ot their methods, but

of the social objects the methods serve.
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Though Tiryakian's agenda

is

similar to Gilbert, Poole, and
Femion,

conceive the nation as a tool for closing
the gaps within
a significant difference.

nation,

While the others believe

and so can be opposed by exposing

liberal contractarianism,
there is

that are

simply describing the nature of

the limits of their description,
Tiryakian calls

for specific actions to transform
social reality into line with his
problematic

He

recognizes the reality of non-state nations

-

agenda for

- and explicitly calls for their

and displacement by properly state-associated nations.
He wants

minority nations, ethnic groups,

This

is

it.

though his analyses of these, which

reduces them to joint preferences of atomic
individuals
dissolution

who

to eliminate

etc.

very disturbing, and provides an intellectual
rationale for the forced

assimilation that has

become

many genocides and

population displacements.

the focus of countless state regimes, and the
force behind
It is

almost incomprehensible that he can

explicitly recognize the “ forms of state repression and
attempted elimination of

populations” [152] that has been a major part of statist nationalism, and
then turn around

and develop not merely a justification

The methods Tiryakian uses

to

for

it,

but a novel method as well.

advocate for these methods of social control also

require mention. Precisely in order to protect a “dominant paradigm” of state
power
against (1) concrete disruptions by sub-state minorities and
(2) alternative concepts of the

nation and nationalism, as part of genuine political and intellectual transformations,

Tiryakian appropriates the language that such movements and

He

thus displaces a genuine transformation, and passes off in

shifts

its

themselves employ.

place a defense of the

status quo, clothed in the rhetoric of transformation. In place of a critical “politics of

suspicion” that challenges political manipulation, he interjects a politics of manipulation
itself.

Whether

it

is

naivete and intellectual limitation, or a deeply cynical duplicity,

that drives Tiryakian to serve

genuine “paradigm

shift”

is

of this type of agenda

is

irrelevant.

Even

never simply a matter of “new” ideas.
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It

if the

former, a

requires as well

actual political transformation,

status-quo preserving

-

which

Tiryakian’s work

utterly absent

from Tiryakian's “conservative”

account of the nation. Without

political structure pulls all potential
shift,

is

the

is

runaway

this,

the gravity of the status

-

quo

ideas into a safe orbit. Without this
political

mere appropriation of a

radical scholarly style

and

positioning, without substance.

Even

if naivete, his call for a

how

in order to figure out

general sociological project to “study” nationalism

to generate the “right kind” is part

of a tradition of

sociological and anthropological studies in the service of
dominant state interests.
the

Phoenix Program

rising again,

It is

from the ashes of the corpses of its previous victims.

Conclusion

As

in

Chapter

1

,

1

have treated a number of different theorists of the nation,

offering a range of perspectives on

been limited

to liberal or

Of course,
theories.

Though

but rather absorb

social,

large

mainstream Western theories and analyses.

variations

it

on cosmopolitanism, these do not

reject the nation outright,

into the grander global inter-culturality that characterizes our age.
exist, but

"Nationalism"

economic, and

always as incomplete, fragmented, and mere parts of a
is

the delusion that they are unities in themselves, but

political realities require a revised view,

non-national concepts of the social.
Buell's National Culture

One might

However, the range of Chapter 2 has by an

other approaches exist, including for instance contemporary "globalist"

Nations and cultures
greater whole.

it.

A

typical sustained

and the New Global System

and organization around

example of this

is

Frederick

[1994],

also cite a strain originating with Benedict Anderson’s Imagined

Communities [1991].

In recent years,

many

literary critics, culture theorists,

and others

have analyzed the nature of and psychology behind so-called “imaginary homelands.”

The general claim

or assumption

is

that nations are psychologically or literarily

constructed idealized concepts. They are not necessarily or exactly disparaged, but they
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are not

They

engaged as aspects or components of
complex material-mental

are, rather, perceived as psychological
fantasies, or

social formations.

symptoms. In a Nietzschean

vein, they are reduced purely to functions
of the individual psychologies of
their literary

or cultural producers.

The

reality

of the nation becomes the psychological
and

literary

mechanisms of its production.
I

do not

as described in

interpret this as the general

Imagined Communities.

solely to an idea that

is

I

meaning of “imagined community,”

do not believe

rather the participation in the idea by

its

A nation is not just the

members - which

the content of the idea, the image of the nation, even if this
the

instance, in

same

time, in recent work,

Exodus’

influences

home

the “ imaginary

is

dangerous because

it is

politics while safely isolated

interference [327].

32

is

Whether

homeland”

to

is

idealized.

this type

that he focuses

his analysis to be generalized.

distance nationalism”

participation itself is part of

Anderson describes precisely

[1994],

idea, but

Anderson strongly suggests otherwise. For

homeland.” The only qualifying characteristic

and might not intend

the nation

imagined, but rather balances consideration of
the idea with the

form or structure of its production and dissemination.

At

Anderson reduces

that

at least

His point, in

of “imaginary

on exiles or

expatriate,

fact, is that

“long-

“radically unaccountable”

:

an expatriate

from the consequences of his/her

the qualification holds or not,

it

is

clear that he does elevate

importance in an overall-analysis of nations and

nationalisms, with a corresponding emphasis on the individual psychology of the

imagining, and de-emphasis of the social relations producing and marked by

it.

This

essay opens the possibility that Anderson has re-interpreted himself into line with the
“

imagined homelands”

this strain flattens the

52

This position

statism,

—

strain, or

complex

always was

its

origin.

Whatever the

case,

potential of the concept of the “ imagined

it is

clear that

community,”

or prejudice against expatriates - might be determined by Anderson’s problematic
to identify nations by backreading from eventual states, as is true especially in his

which tends

treatment of post-colonial

states.
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transforming

it

from an interaction of material and mental
forces and

structures, to a

flat,

purely mental shadow.

There

also a strain in

is

and manifested

in

Marxism - advocated by Lenin, manipulated
by

Vietnam, Cuba, China, and elsewhere

oppose the nation. As an inversion of Tiryakian,

movements

as

components

does not necessarily

that

Gilbert, Poole,

revolutionary nationalisms that disrupt liberal-capitalist
imperial national

-

communist

Through colonialism, subject nations became underclasses, and

movements could

and others,

it

valorizes

Lenin supported

states.

in the global

Stalin,

anti-

revolution.

their nationalist

thus be counted as part of the general revolt of the
proletariat (or

peasantry).

Immanuel Wallerstein
through his

offers a variation

^Vo^ld System Theory

the global class structure
societies, but

on

this linking

[see especially Wallerstein, 1991],

must be understood not merely

between “core”

states

of class and nation,

On his

analysis,

as exploitation within states or

and blocs of states, and “peripheral”

states,

neo-

colonies, etc. This analysis recognizes that the establishment of states through anti-

colonial

movements has

not altered the fundamentally exploitative relationship between

former colonizers and former colonies, with the exception of some token slippage. The

problem with

this

approach

is

that

it

again simply

already extant, fairly rigid theoretical structure
Wallerstein, the nation and nationalism
exploitation

--

exploiters or exploited.

ethnic elements are national only

-

become

fits

nations and nationalism into an

in this case a late

Marxist one. For

either a function of

economic

Similar to Gellner, any pre-existing cultural or

when tapped

for service in this general

economic

structure.

This type of approach can be productive
replicates the logic of Greenfeld’s

nations are good
if

if

and only

if

in specific

circumstances, but ultimately

“good”/” bad” nation/nationalism

split.

Simply

put,

they correspond directly to class struggle, and they are bad

they do not. The conceptual limit or error

is
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the

same

as in

Hobsbawm,

the only

difference being that he considered

even

if

all

nationalisms

at

some

level to support exploitation,

ostensibly linked to socialist movements. Their
national component ultimately

undercut their class component.
In Stalin’s hands, this evaluative policy turned
sinister.

matter of supporting anti-imperial struggles. For Stalin,
or national tensions could be used in any

way

it

became more than a

It

meant

that

any

to support class struggle.

cultural, ethnic,

For instance,

in

1905, Stalin was on the scene in what would later be Azerbaijan, organizing
resistance

among

oil

industry laborers.

Some owners were Armenian, and

Stalin used the ethnic

difference between Tartars (Azeris) and Armenians to mobilize the
Tartars against these

owners. Most Armenians
fields,

in the area

worked side-by-side with

and the violence against Armenians quickly overshot

its

the Tartars in the oil

intended target. The

Tartars massacred thousands of Armenian laborers and their families.
In the early 1920s, Stalin

was

Interior Minister of the

new

Soviet Union.

He

again turned to ethnic difference as a tool for consolidating Soviet hegemony over the

newly conquered “republics.” For

instance, he transferred the region of Karabakh,

populated mainly by ethnic Armenians for

all

of recorded history, to the

Soviet Socialist Republic. His logic was simple.

First, if

new

Azerbaijani

Karabakh, which had a long

history of semi-autonomy under and resistance to Russian Imperial rule, remained part of

the

Armenian S.S.R. (which

itself

had just been forced

between Turkey and the Soviet Union

to partition

it,

into the Soviet

Union by a pact

precursing the future Hitler-Stalin

pact on Poland), then Armenian resistance might be unified against Soviet rule. Second,
if

Karabakh were placed under

the Azeris, then not only

resistance be split, but an important faction
hostile regional group.

survival.

The

to

look to

Azeris, on the other hand,

potential

would be forced under

The Karabakh Armenians (and

concern for them) would be forced

would

Moscow

the authority of a

the Republic Armenians, out of
for support

and the means for

would be equally occupied with
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Armenian

a powerful

minority within their local sphere
of power. To keep the Azer.s
threaten to increase Karabakh

Armenian

in line,

Moscow could

resources, power, and/or
autonomy.

Thus, the current conflict between
Karabakh Armenians and the
Azeri

government does not have

its

Azeris and Armenians, but

is

effective origin in

some “natural” antipathy between

the direct result of development
and exacerbation of ethnic

tensions by Stalin, that endure
because they were institutionalized
in the formal political
structures of the Soviet Union and
hence the post-Soviet states. In
the shadow

of the

Turkish Genocide of Armenians, the
pride of Azeris and Turks
Azeris, the origin in

Baku of the very pan-Turkism

that

in the

Turkish ethnicity of

drove the Genocide, and the post-

Soviet pan-Turkic alliance between
Turkey and Azerbaijan, conflict becomes
almost
inevitable.

Yet, these Marxist approaches to the
nation are waning in importance.
That
to say that this

approach has no concrete consequences, particularly

in the

forces sometimes opportunistically

this rationale, as well.

my

I

believe that

not

former Soviet

Union and Eastern Europe. Non-Marxist
But,

is

employed

treatment of the problems with using class

analysis as the sole conceptual tool for approach
to the nation in the

(with a few additional comments here) treat the issue
sufficiently.

Hobsbawm

section

To pursue extended

critiques of variations ot the general position

would add

lengthy (perhaps too lengthy) dissertation.

would, moreover, resonate with the spate of

annoying victory laps by
That

is

a cause

I

liberal capitalists, celebrating the

have no wish

(which yet has much

It

inessential length to an already

to further

to offer) or the

of hegemony within and across

—

either

toward the

ascendance of

states.

Marxism

did not get the nation right, but they did get

“defeat” of communism.
dissolution of socialism

liberal capitalism

after

much

full

and

its

consolidation

Marx and socialism beyond Marx

else right

53
.
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Hilmar Kaiser [ 997] has argued that the linking of class and nation in general, and Wallerstein’s “ World
System Theory” in particular, were instrumental German contributions to the Turkish Genocide of
Armenians, and have become standard tenets of the denial of the Genocide. Since the Genocide, some
1

Turkish propagandists have joined with

some Marxists to represent the deaths of at least a million
as the inevitable result of class struggle, in which exploited Turkish peasants and workers
overthrew their Armenian capitalist and agrarian exploiters. This argument has always ignored the fact that
the vast majority (that is, close to 100 percent) of Armenian victims were peasants in villages beside
Armenians
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More
the

generally,

have chosen

I

dominant and ascending

to focus

on

liberal

political force in the world.

approaches because liberalism

With

and consumer capitalism’s
appropriation of ’‘globalism,”

the "fall"

is

of "communism"

political options

have become

quite limited. Recent liberal
theorization of the nation
reflects and exploits
this

ascendancy, driving nations (and
states) toward dramatic
reconfigure, ons consistent
with
liberal capitalism.

have a more limited reason, as

I

dominant

become

in

well.

As have
I

contemporary Anglo-American analytic

claimed, liberalism

Political Philosophy, that

a generalized assumption rather
than a rallying point (as

War). From

my own

philosophical perspective, this

is

is

it

was during

so
it

has

Cold

the

oppressive and carries with

it

yet

greater dangers for oppressed and even
not-so-oppressed groups. Exposing this

oppression and danger

my work

on the nation

is

any project of alternative

essential to

power of various

a far greater threat than simple antinational-ism.

directly.

Even when

I

intend

to be.

In the long-run, the absorptive
is

political theory, as

antinational-ism

is

The

liberal perspectives
latter at least

assumed and not

explicit, its

on the nation

can be confronted

form

is

clearly

antagonistic to the nation, and can be recognized as
such. Appropriations of the nation
are

much more

subtle.

They often

take the form of approbation or gentle, almost

Turkish and Kurdish peasants, or humble craftspeople

in urban areas (see Stephan H. Astourian’s
introduction [Astourian, 1997: viii - ix] [besides ignoring the facts
that (1) a large percentage of the
victims were children, whose deaths can hardly have contributed
to an overthrow of the fantasized
Armenian domination, (2) Turks and Kurds took on the order of 100,000 Armenian
women and °irls
(usually peasants) into sexual or domestic slavery, again hardly a form
of general proletarian or peasant

liberation and (3) the German and Turkish governments used
250,000 Armenian soldiers from the lower
ranks of the Ottoman Army as slave labor (generally working them to death) on the Berlin-Baghdad

railway]).

Kaiser builds a case against this use of World System Theory in the service of Genocide and its
on Donald Quataert’s important work on the class demographics of the Ottoman Empire.
Quataert s research explodes the myth produced to justified violence against Armenians before and after
denial, based

Genocide, that the merchant/capitalist (both at the local and empire-wide levels) class in the Ottoman
Empire was mainly Armenian. In fact, u there simply was not a widespread ethnic division of labor’” in
the Ottoman Empire:
particular groups generally did not control or dominate particular activities in the
Ottoman Empire as a whole
An ethnic or religious group that dominated an economic activity in one
particular region did not necessarily do so in another.’” [Kaiser, 1997:
- 2]
Had before July 1998 become aware of Kaiser’s work on the link between World System Theory
and the perpetration and denial of genocide, might have reconsidered not treating it in detail.
the

.

.

.

I

1

I
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unnoticed pushing

in

one direction or another. They are neither
antagonistic nor overtly

demanding.
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CHAPTER 3

A THEORY OF THE NATION
This dissertation has two purposes.

expose the ideological tainting and
nation and nationalism. Second,

I

limits

mean

First, in

Chapters

1

and

2,

it is

of much of the contemporary

to supersede this tainting

development of a comprehensive theory of these

social

and

phenomena

intended to

literature

limits,

built

on the

through

on the

initial

critiques.

The
beyond

first

this,

takes as

its

part of the dissertation

is

not simply a literature review, but grasps

toward the type of critique Edward Said

levels at “orientalism.”

Thus,

“data” theories of the nation and nationalism themselves, as discussed

it

in the

introduction.

Throughout the
to alternative

critiques of various theories,

I

have

partially

developed or alluded

concepts of nation and nationalism, built on less ideological or

at least anti-

oppressive philosophical and political foundations. Though the focus has been critique,

an alternative concept has been developing throughout. Specific points have peeked out
at different points.

At

this point, the balance shifts,

away from

critique,

theorization of the nation and nationalism. In this chapter,
earlier positive points, integrating

them with

other,

I

and toward positive
revisit

and further develop

new components,

into a

comprehensive theory.

The development of these new components engages
Chapters

1

and

instance, the

2.

That does not mean, however, that they could not have been. For

work of Etienne Balibar

points of departure for

my own

figures prominently in the following, as a set of

ideas.

As

will be clear, there are

problems with Balibar’ s work. At the same time,
of issues crucial

other theorists not treated in

to a

it

fundamental ideological

has a value in

at least raising a

range

comprehensive and tenable theory of the nation and nationalism

something most of the work treated

in

Chapters

282

1

and 2

fails to do.

At some

points,

—

Balibar

is

purely anti-national; at others, he
exploits problematic theorization
and critique

of the nation and nationalism
offers interesting insights

advancing his

in

for positive use here.

points in Chapters
political

1

and

political

agenda;

at yet others,

he

on these phenomena. Thus, Balibar
has a legitimate place

each chapter. Having ample theorists
for use

work

own

2,

As

my

I

in

Chapters

did suggest and in

1

and

some cases

2,

1

in

have reserved his

partially explore positive

treatment of Balibar's work will also
point out the

and philosophical shortcomings relevant

to Chapters

1

and 2

-

but without

focusing on them.
Similar remarks could be

occupy a place
theory are

On
contains

the other hand, the
that

also could

each chapter. In Bhabha’s case, however, the
positive aspects of his

much more pronounced

little

traditional

in

made of Homi K. Bhabha’s work, which

than in Balibar’s, and compel inclusion here.

work of other

recommends

it

theorists, especially Partha Chatterjee,

for treatment in Chapters

1

and

2.

cited in a

It is

more

manner.

The Margins of t he Nation,

or the Nation on the Margin^

My analysis of Thom's theory of the nation focused on the tension between the
nation as a historical or pre-historical given, and the nation as the product of the
activity

of

its

constituents.

I

have referred

to the

presence of both of these tendencies within the

nation, in a productive tension.

My references to this point,

however, have been vague. In "DissemiNation:

Time, Narrative, and the Margins of the Modern Nation" [1990], Bhabha develops an
explicit theory

of this tense relationship. Indeed, he sees

this tension as

complexly

constitutive of the nation.

For Bhabha, the nation

homogeneous

cultural

is

a narrative construct that responds to the loss of fixed

communities

Mass migrations and demographic

in the transition

from pre-modernity

intermixtures characteristic of the
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to

modernity.

modern

era have

irreparably disrupted the
previously given local,
direct

homogeneity [Bhabha, ,990a:
29,].. Agamst

emerges

as the next focal social
form.

se,

not a concrete material
social

i, is

of 'identical' individuals
on a certain

ptece of land, speaking a
certain language, and
so forth.

It is,

umfying homogeneity against
the apparently fragmented,

m the modem world.

As

assertion,

metaphor" expressing the desire

The
them

i,

is

no, a

for lost

'real'

comprise

rather,

in, erased

an assertion of
structure of culture

social formation, bu,
rather a

community

[291],

assertion of the nation refers
to the people

(in a narrative sense) to

cultural

this irremediable
heterogeneity, the nation

However,

group, ng, for mstance
consisting of a certain

community and

who comprise

it,

thereby causing

These referents are the nation
as

it.

well.

Were

they simply the objects of
narration, there would be an
actual nation corresponding
to its
narrative. But, these objects are
also subjects - they act in
ways that are no, necessarily
consistent with a grand national
narrative.

correspond to conceptions of the nation,

The

activities

of the people,

circumstances might privilege
authoritative.

who

The

its

no narrative

of the people of the nation does
no,

narratives.

in fact, constitute other
narratives.

Though

material

(a) certain narrative(s),
this/these narrative(s) is/are not

In a perpetual shifting, those

narrate, so

reality

is final.

narrative, the people's activities

who

are narrated are always

becoming those

Indeed, by the very fact of being
referenced in a

become

distinct narratives:

the

mere existence of

difference from the imposed narrative itself
expresses alternative narratives

-

in a sense

automatically producing them.

These 'automatic' responses are not necessarily
"counter-narratives"

competing grand

narratives, but rather supplementary narratives that

Page references

add

to

that assert

and

will be given in brackets. The first time a work
is referenced in a series of references
to
° rk th name of t ie u thor wil1 a
ear followed by the year of publication for the edition
PP
cited
f
f
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nd the referenced
page number(s).
If some ot this information is given in the
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Bracketed references within a sentence concern material in that
sentence only; references after a
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complexify the referents of an
this or that, to specify

what

specified

is

-

them

initial narrative.

The

latter

attempts to fix the people
as

as national. But, their
activities always reveal

spectfication

is

limiting, after all

-

and so adds

"totalizing" narrative of the nation,
without "adding up" to a

These narratives cannot be integrated
because they are already
the people are

more than

in

it,

into the

new

to the initial,

totality [305],

grand totalizing narrative precisely

as points of ambiguity or
"doubleness"

'national' in the totalizing sense,

sense (the sense of the grand narrative)

They

at all.

-

points at which

and so not "national"

itself

marks

the failure of the totalization. If a

to integrate the differences, the
incessant activity

points of ambiguity/"doubleness" within the

new

in this

are points of undecidablility.

differences must be disavowed in order
for a narrative to indicate a totality

disavowal

more than

new

narrative

is

-

These

and their

posed

that tries

of the people will result in similar
referent.

2

For Bhabha, a totalizing narrative references the
people of the nation as the
subject of national activity.
nation

is

complex

the
is

Is the

nation simply their activity?

complex of different and divergent

Bhabha does hold

narratives of (the) people.

that the

However,

this

not totalizable, and certainly not as a unified national
subject that produces a

unified narrative. Within the 'national' population are
"contentious, unequal interests and
identities

[297].

Only through

the assertion of a totalizing narrative itself are the people

unified into the subject of a totalizing narrative, but this

is

actual activities of the people as subjects are at odds with

"Totalizing narratives"

Bhabha

is in

irresolvable tension with

ol a totalizing concept of the nation,

people. [297]

2

its

it.

labels as the "pedagogical" aspect of the nation,

while the immediate activity of the people
nation

a narrated subject, and the

is its

"performance." The pedagogy of the

performance

which

is

—

any resolution must be

in the

form

again in tension with the performance of the

3

will explain this in more detail below.
Though unacknowledged and perhaps unrecognized by Bhabha,
I

3

his

account of the social structure of the

nation appears a modification of Nietzsche’s account of the structure of consciousness in The Birth of
Tragedy. The pedagogy of the nation appears derivative of the Apollinian aspect of consciousness, while
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The
"natton”

-

tens, on

is

between these two forms of
national narrative

provisionally minim, zed so long
as a

much

-

aspects of a singie

greater difference

is

perceived

between the "nation" and (an)
external group(s).
Communities are bound together
by an
"ambivalent identification of love
and hate.” So long as an
external group existson
which internally-generated hate
can be projected, love is
dominant within the group.

However,

if the

d.fference that

m ithin the group, then the
hate
This,

Bhabha

argues,

is

is

is

used

to justify projection

of hate outward

turned inward as well.
[300]

is

discovered

4

precisely what has occurred in
the contemporary era.

He

reads Foucault to suggest that
states in the current era are
in a perpetual '"competition"
with other states. As this becomes
apparent, political agents recognize
that the difference

b6tWeen
futile.

StateS iS 3

Each

PCrmanent fact Tensions with other

state is thus

thrown back

In this sense, projecting hate
outside

into itself.

becomes

states are

Difference

is

recognized as

static

and

no longer found outside

it.

insufficient for relieving internal
pressures.

Observable difference within the nation
becomes the focus of this discharge.
"Difference" within the nation becomes
significant. The antagonistic difference
that was

presumed

to exist

between

exist within this nation.

narratives

emerge

this national culture

The

and other national cultures

internal disunity of the nation

in efforts to control this difference,

is

is

found to

revealed. Totalizing

and preserve the sense of unity

that

existed prior to the collapse of outwardly
focused aggression. With this, the tension

between the pedagogy and performance of the nation
becomes

What

is

central. [301]

the nation after this recognition of internal
disunity?

internal ditference be obscured

by a unity relative

to

No

longer can

an external other. Neither can

its

it

be

the imposition of a state on a population: such
impositions are totalizing, and drive

recognition of difference.

Nor can

difference be relegated to the private realm, versus a

public sphere in which individuals are alike and unified. The
inclusion of individuals

the Di° n y s an
i

will be

is

reflected in the performative. This psychologization has significant
implications which

explored below.

Bhabha bases

this analysis

on "Freud's concept of the 'narcissism of minor differences.'"
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within the public sphere

is

an imposition on them, and

their resistance is not a
matter

different kind of difference
without reference to the public

private

-

imposed

-

that

is,

of a

their escape into the

but rather a difference within
the public that cannot be
assimilated into the

publicity.

[

304 ]

Further, this difference cannot
be subordinated to a grander
pluralistic unity.

One

cannot simply describe the complexity
and different narratives of the
people within a
single, over-arching narrative.
This

is

simply the imposition of a totalizing
narrative onto

the revealed disunity, with the
totalizing narrative itself regulating
difference (the
different narratives) and thus
occasioning difference

Even

if this pluralistic narrative is
absolutely

from the imposed form of difference.

minimal

in

what

it

imposes,

it still

accomplishes a homogenization of difference.
But, the activity of the people produces
difference not within the totalizing narratives,
but as something that cannot be

accommodated by such

narratives

— even

through activity occurs after or beyond

pluralistic ones.

pluralistic or

It is

"added to" the totalization without the

all totals.

It is

a revision or editorial

comment

result

assertion of difference

any other forms of totalization.

a supplement to a totalization, that challenges and
reworks
it.

The

it

without being absorbed into

"adding up" to a

that cannot

It is

total

-

it is

beyond

be merely addressed by the

totalizing narrative, but challenges the very grounding
assumptions and foundations of
this narrative to

be rethought and reworked. 305
[
]

A nation is also not the complex of the activities of its people, unified by mere
temporal coincidence and perception of
interprets

Anderson

to

it,

as Benedict

Anderson might have

it.

conceive the nation as akin to the plot of a complicated

Bhabha

"realist

novel," in which the mere simultaneity of the "diverse acts and actors on the
national
stage" links

them

together, though they "are entirely

unaware of each

function of this sychronicity of time." The "imagined community"
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is

other, except as a

simply abstract

awareness of this simultaneity.*
For Bhabha, the disjunction
between narrator and
narrated underm, nes the
possibihty of such simultaneity:
the narrator and narrated
do not
act in the same instant,
but the one after the other.
[308 309]

Finally, a nation

is

not the product of a mere

Renan. As Renan admits, any
historically existent

common

common

will to

on a forgetting of the history of
the national population.
This
all

the bloody, violent deeds
by

driven from

its territory,

remember

in the past.

Indeed, the

even produce a reaction against the nation,
a

narrative

-

had a

the difference that existed before
and that

Renan's will
with

to

nationhood

is

omissions. Yet,

its

history, after all, contains

as well as the divergent origins,
erasures

any myth of unity grounded

role.

is

culture.

it

is

rebirth of those divergent groups.
[310]

not a one-time social contract that
imposes

It

must be continually reaffirmed almost

in fact,

no way

to save the concept

Hobsbawm

contemporary

am

It

thus opens up the possibility of

of the nation as a

"totality," a unified

era.

not sure that this

is

this simultaneity, but

exposure, experience,

Bhabha

to reject the very possibility

of the

does. Rather, he sees in the dynamic between pedagogy and

performance an emergent form of national

I

the possibility of not

Indeed, this impulse itself is merely one aspect of the more
complicated nature of

nation, as

on

it

as '"a

[310-311]

the nation. This impossibility does not cause

the

force might

grants legitimate agency in the constitution
of the nation to each

the fragmentation of the nation.
is,

these events

implicit in the nation, against

memory of violence and

individual, and legitimates a possible 'no' to the
nation.

There

of languages and

To remember

daily plebiscite.'" But this continual
reaffirmation contains within
It

into the nation or

simply the will to accept the totalizing
national

obligations to the nation in perpetuity.

willing the nation.

nationhood depends

which disparate groups were coerced

dialects, migrations, invasions,
conquests, etc., that
is to

will to be a nation,
contra

narrative.

Their tension was mystified until

The demystification of the tension was made possible through

the

an entirely accurate reading of Anderson. This imagined linking might depend
appears to depend on other factors as well — commonalities of language, media

it

etc.
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US fr0m mter ' natl0nal
t0 lntr a-national

on

era

I

Wi,h rec08nit,on of the
:

PC0Ple

^
the

’

—
-*

—
-

difference that
characterizes the post-

-*

-

g na

J

e and

tendency o f , he dynamic

repro uee ..self can
be mterrupted and
(2) of breaking fee from
the modernist
concept of the nation as
a totality.
In the activity of the
people .ha,

Bhabha

isolates a certain form,
tha,

is

disruptive of to, adzing
national narrative

of "minority discourse."
This discourse

supplementary chailenge from
within and beyond
W'thout

bemg ° r bemg absorbed

merely resistance
better

general,

it

becomes

int0 a totalizing
namttive.

It is

it

is

recognized not as

end of negotiating a

which cannot be absorbed

It is

not,

however, an

no, the counter-assertion
of an alternate totalizing
narrative by

a fixed minority, against
the dominant majority.

o feVery

When

into the national unity),
bu, as resistance to
totalization in

the basis of a strategy
of resistance.

oppositional position.

the

that d.srupts the
totalizing narrative

to this or that totalizing
narrative (with the possible

form of inclusion

is

into a totality, that

It is,

which

is

on the contrary, precisely

that

constantly produced as an
excess

^e "minority" or "marginalized" in Bhabha’s sense

,0talizi "g

are no,

a set group of people, but rather
the perpetually sh.fting and
reformed border of the
nation, consisting of wha, is
excluded and/or ’disciplined'* by each
successive totalizing
narrative.

At the same time, the production of the
marginalized
immediate

activity:

the minority

indifferent process, as
J.

S.

is

is

not a purely unstructured,

not merely the temporary, abstract
product of an

one might understand the minority position
on a

political issue in a

Miilian world. The totalizing narratives
function by assigning national significance

to difference

-

initially external, but

now

internal.

In

much

the

way

that racist ideology

creates the significance of certain phenotypal
differences, and so constructs race, a
totalizing national narrative creates difference
by
111

—

the Foucauldian sense of imposing
explicitly or not
into conformity with the dominant discourse.

them
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-

making

certain differences significant

a form on the objects of discipline that

deforms

for national identity.
Thus, the margin

is

produced by totalizing narration,
but not as a

purely arbitrary selection
of those to include in the
nation and those to exclude
or
discipline into conformity.
(1) the characteristic

language, lineage,

The

'signification'

of (a) certain difference(s)

form of the modern nation,
which tends

etc.

-

in general,

homogeneity

- and

to

influenced by

is

emphasize such things as

(2) the particular forces

of
oppression operating or predisposed
within a society, particularly
forces that had been
focused outside the nation prior
to the reflection of the
nation's "hate" into itself.

The

latter

cannot be analyzed as a set of forces
simply

to extirpate:

they contain "traces of

[a

range of] diverse disciplinary discourses
and institutions of knowledge that
constitute the
[very] condition and contexts of
culture" [313],

Bhabha

is

explicit about the "strategy" of
resistance

discourse, providing multiple examples.
His focus

is

grounded

in

minority

a form of minority produced

through post-colonial immigration into
former colonizers and Great Powers.
"Minority discourse acknowledges the status
of the national culture

-

people

-

and the

as a contentious, performative space of
the perplexity of the living in the
midst

of the pedagogical representations of life"
[307], To the extent
marginal become present

in the nation, the non-totalizable

that the narratives

of the

complexity of the nation as the

agency of members despite the imposition of fixed concepts
of the nation as given from
the past

becomes apparent, and

militates against coercive totalization. Indeed,

recognition of the performative aspect of the nation "provides
... a narrative authority for

marginal voices or minority discourse" [301],

The

strategy of resistance capitalizes

the failure ot the totalization,

show

on

that this or that difference

exclusion or discipline that the totalizers believe
patriotic, a braver soldier, smarter in school.

another attempt to discipline or exclude.
the natural national language.

And

this authority.

it

to.

The marginalized expose
does not support the

The immigrant becomes more

This forces another attempt

No more

bilingual classes

yet the marginal disrupt, do not
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—

at totalization,

English should be

fit:

the Indian

immigrant reads Shakespeare, Austen,
and Joyce with
and writes beautiful

letters in

is

is

-

a

more

is

dark, her religion and history
'strange.' Indeed.

opened within

Shakespeare, Austen, and Joyce

none

understanding,

English that are the envy of Anglo
recipients. She

'Anglo' than the Anglos, yet her skin

through her, difference

penetrating^

'the

King's English,' that

is

reflected back into

presumably gay man, a woman, and
an Irishman,

'properly' Anglo. 7

Or, the immigrant transforms the
supposedly sacred national language,
the

supposedly meaningful cultural
activity,

activity,

with no significance beyond

understanding of or reference to

of the

itself.

this 'depth,'

He

new home

culture into merely mechanical

speaks the language without

merely imitating the sounds he hears without

a deeper purpose. This undercuts the
pretensions of totalizing national narratives
to a

transcendent national culture, reducing the culture
to an "antimetaphoric" mundanity.

[315-316]
This cycle can give
itself,

of the

itself

comes

fitting

of

lived,

way

to a process

immediate

into question, the

of renegotiation of the basis of the nation

activity into the history

homogeneity presumed

of a nation. This history

in the past (in 'English' (male,

heterosexual) literature, for instance). This transformation of
cycle into process

and more purposeful, more and more of a strategy
process.
the

As we have

that

it

it

more

can be guided into a renegotiative

seen, the minority "insinuates] itself into the terms of reference
of

dominant discourse."

should be.

that

is

It fits

within this discourse even as

it is

more than what

it

antagonizes the implicit power to generalize," to overcome the instability

has introduced into the familiar concept of this or that nation. The insinuation, the

antagonizing can be intentional, that
strategy, as a Marxist faith in the

is,

a strategy.

It

need

not,

coming Revolution might

be.

however, be a totalizing
It

need assume no

specific set of players, no specific structure of the 'communities of resistance, no specific
1

'future history,'

and so

forth, [see

307

-

308]

'These particular examples are not from Bhabha's work itself, but believe they are useful
compact manner the gist of his overall account of this strategy of minority resistance.
I

in a
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in

understanding

Th

'

S reileg0tlatl0n alters

cuiture, without

however stoppmg « he attempts

change, the national culture
marginality.'

the constant

the fundamental
assumptions

It is

itself

a,

and basics of the national

tota„za„on. Yet, as the
assumptions

becomes more marginalized,
more of a 'zone of

no, that the inclusion
of the marginal.zed changes
the nation, but that

renegotiate undercutting of the
successive

totalizing

assumptions

foundations, and history of the
national culture opens the
national process to include

more and more people. As

the nation

Of the people, inclusion depends
Minoritarian

component

members

in

less

becomes more and more the product
of the

and

less

on reference by a

activity

totalizing narrative.

are no longer manipulated
into conformity

-

even

into a fixed

a pluralism; neither are totalizing
narratives of the nation altered
to include

them. Rather, the totalizing
narratives are more and more
displaced and 'marginalized'
themselves, [see especially 301 302].

A

Step Forward

Consistent with his critique of totalizing
narratives of the nation, Bhabha
does not

attempt a general theory of the nation
[320], but rather problematizes the received
concepts. Whether or not one with a different
understanding of the issues concerning
totalizing national narratives

is

bound by

this totalizing stricture against

transforming

Bhabha's work into a comprehensive theory,
his insights must be engaged by any
such
theory. His work, in fact,

A

key insight

is

to

marks a noteworthy advance

move

in the literature

on the

the totalizing national narrative inside the

nation.

dynamic

that

constitutes the nation, rather than taking totalizing
narratives at face value. Theorists

such as

Hobsbawm and Kedourie

test the reality

underlying national narratives against

the narratives themselves, assuming that, for the
nation to be genuine, productive

than a falsifying manipulation of a population

—

the underlying reality

with a dominant totalizing narrative. As Bhabha's work makes
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—

rather

must correspond

clear, this

correspondence

IS

not possible, and the
conclusion of such theorists

is

that the nation

is

a falsifying

manipulation.

Bhabha, on the other hand,
insightfully apprehends
is

that the 'reality'

of the nation

not merely the performance
of the nation, but rather the
dynamic tension of its

pedagogy and performance. The
performance
independently of the pedagogical

-

it

is

itself

does not have meaning

the pure activity of the
people perceived relative

to totalizing narrative.

Bhabha thus produces a theory of the

nation that avotds the pitfalls
of privileging

the unity of the nation against
internal difference, as a
pluralistic, liberal (relegating

difference to the private realm),
or dialectical account would, while
at the

allowing for a form of national culture
not destroyed by

it.

that,

while cut across complexly by
difference,

What Bhabha accomplishes

is

to

conception of difference

is

is

acknowledge and describe the

relationship between the reality of an
individual nation and
liberal, non-pluralist

same time

its

grand concept. His non-

crucial to an understanding

of the nation

form, which itself was originally a reaction
against the community-destroying,
individuating liberal and pluralist forms of
modem social organization.

His description highlights new issues and
complexities, such as the relationship of
the nation's present and past, the relationship
of the individual to the nation, and the

disjunctions in narrative activity and reference.

What

is

more, he offers an account of the

nation that acknowledges the significance of its internal
marginalized, and invests them

with a special role

At a crude

in driving the progressive articulation
level,

of the nation.

one might characterize Bhabha's concept of the nation as a

tension between unity and difference or controlling repetition
and creative production, a
non-dialectical (non-totalizable) product.
in the

The nation becomes processural —

it

is

always

process of being produced, so long as neither given unity nor
fragmentation

becomes dominant. This

is

not a progressive or teleological process. At every moment.

293

through the present performance
of the nation, new

’rules'

of process are produced,

new

trends followed, and the current
vector of (future) development
abandoned.

This nation

is

not the standard

modern

referenced in the pedagogy of the nation.

It is

nation,

At

the meta-national level, Bhabha's

predominance ot

itself is precisely

what

a "post-modern" nation. Indeed,

appears to view the nation form as a
crucial agent
itself.

which

work

in the

is

Bhabha

process of interrupting modernity

represents a shift from the

the totalizing/totalized nation to a

new

form, which itself follows and

helps drive a shift from modernism to
post-modernism. Through this

shift, the

grand

progressive historicism of the nation, which
views the present as the product of the past,
is

displaced by a perpetual production of the nation
in the present, which subverts any

grand teleology or even linear historical continuity,
[see 292-294 and 298]

What makes Bhabha's work

exciting

the minority/marginal that problematizes

very engine of cultural production that

is

its

is

that

he does not preserve the nation against

unity. Rather,

he makes the marginal the

the nation, not as a rigid, causally determined

unity, but as a site of the activity of the national people.

He

recognizes in the nation a

truly processural basis or temporal aspect, such that
analysis of social structure alone

insufficient to explain the nation.

nation, a

form frozen

fundamental
It is

to

At

—

the

movement —

that

is

it.

Bhabha

significant that

inverts the usual positioning

own

such techniques yield a cross-section of the

of the temporal process

in time, bereft

identifies himself explicitly as writing

in-between marginality of the emigre,

his

best,

is

of the academic

object of study, but this

Rather, the he and the

him

exile, diasporan,

is

from within the

migrant minority. In

relative to his or her object

this

way, he

of study. He

is

not a simple identity relation of subject and object.

are offset in the
,

way

that the subjectivity

and objectivity of the

national people are. [see 301]
In this light,

He embraces

Thom's

failure to

condemn enthology

takes on increased significance.

the transformation of ethnology from ideology to science as
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making

it

legitimate,

around

and even lakes Edward
Said

h,s assertion

ethnology

is still

At the same time

lo task for sinrptifying
,9th

Century oriental^

of its ideological function
[Thom, 1990: 27). But,
scientific

the objectification
that

Thom

of cultural groups

-

if

by more "scientific"
methods.

objects to claims of the
"givenness" of the nation,
he vaunts

an ethnology that objectifies
social groupings:
ethnology of traditional nationalism

at the

in

other words, he

same time

condemns

the self-

that he exculpates
externally

imposed ethnology. Bhabha has
pushed production of the nation
beyond both
and external totalization. 8

internal

Diminishing Returns

Bhabha maintains
of totalizing national

that the activity

narratives.

It is

totalization itself coming to reflect

of the people perpetually disrupts
the assertion

possible that this will be recognized,
with

its

own

provisionality.

Under such conditions,

going renegotiation of the assumptions
of the culture becomes a positive

state,

the on-

one

that

allows not just the mere survival of the
people independently of totaling narratives,
but
fosters the flowering of the active
people.

In
will lead

DissemiNation," Bhabha

beyond the nation even

is

in its

somewhat ambiguous

as to

whether

this process

post-modern form. Perhaps the ambiguity

is

This general point resonates with my dissertation
project itself, at least in its critical aspect.
In my
pro os< d tkls d| ssertation as an exercise in
Armenian intellectual agency in an effort to heln
P
l
Iran^f^A
transform Armenian Studies" from an objectification
P
of things Armenian to an expression of ArmenL
subjectivity. This can be function can be expressed
within Bhabha's framework asm attempt to
disrupt
^ the
dominant discourse in the academic study of the nation
and nationalism.
Consistent with my own critique of Bhabha, however,
my work goes beyond a mere
n 0 the dot nant dlscou [se, of the grand
meta-national narratives. Negotiation with the
P!
fh° merely ultimately
narrators ot these
reinforces the discourse itself: it might alter the
content of the
discourse somewhat, but will do nothing to diminish its
damaging power over people and politics.
My
w ° rk s,® eks t0 .8° beyond negotiation, to "narrate the narrators,"
i

that

.

.

t f
objectiflers,
the (external) theorists of the nation.

in

is,

to objectify the

Though, at the meta-national level, seek to open a space
which productive conceptualization of the nation is possible, my work
is at odds with Bhabha's
Mv

objectification of the objectifies

negotiate

new conceptual

is in

his

I

frame merely a negating counter-narrative, which does not
new forms of the same old totalizing
® theory of the

possibilities, but rather asserts

nation.

But, my goal is precisely to undermine the academic narration
of the nation, to change the
conditions under which academics and others who conceptualize within
the "dominant discourse" - with
immediate and significant oppressive impact - perform the narration, and
to stop such narratives as much
as possible. Though my reach probably overextends my
grasp, my method is appropriate to this goal.

At the same time,
national narrative.'

my

project also

moves beyond
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criticism, to posit

its

own

'totalizing

meta-

purposeful, ,o suggest the
indeterminate nature of the
process

me

here,

however,

is

not the specific

by Bhabha, but rather whether
maintains

it

this

in

as described

process has the transformative
effects .ha, Bhabha

does.

contemporary cultural

criticism, particularly that

which

is

theory. This literature finds in
the type of disruption that

~

What concerns

outcome of the process of
negotiat.on

Bhabha's analysis of the renegotiative
narrative process

the

question.

contemporary engine of meaningful

social

is

consistent with

much of

informed by post-modern

Bhabha advocates an _ perhaps

change against oppression. At

least

regarding the specific manner in which
Bhabha presents this engine, this appears
to be a
naive analysis.

To begin

with, perpetual interruption in
itself is not necessarily an advance
for the

marginal zed/oppressed
1

.

The key assumption here

remains forceful throughout
the following

what

is in

its

exercise.

calculated in advance, and

it

is

9

),

-

legitimate significance.

in fact

less

and

and drink

to the

:

dregs
it

93],

can be

Even

as a repetitive time, but which,

less, to the

As

-

point where even the issue of

disruption itself becomes routine,

it

absorbed into the status quo.

There are ample examples of this
"radical rap"

was

accomplishment and

Volume

1

in

contemporary U.

S. culture.

Originally,

quite disruptive of racist white ideology, at once a forceful
assertion of

resentment against a racism that

'See

diminished. Think of

one can recognize as a potentially institutionalizing
time

culture
is

is

itself

very unpredictability becomes routine,

- which Bhabha posits

becomes

its

into the temple

its

the impact of disruption

deprived of

power

becomes a part of the ceremony [Kafka, 1961

and then mundane. As time flows

is

its

form of disruption

repeated over and over again; finally,

perpetual undermining becomes predictable

following Kafka (and Sartre

that this

Yet, in time,

Kafkan parable: Leopards break

the sacrificial pitchers; this

is

it

named, and a demonstration of cultural

ability equal or superior to typically "white"

of the Critique of Dialectical Reason.
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musical forms.

However, the disruption gradually
with

its

own

time slot on

for all sorts of reasons

type expressed in rap
social

and

punch, and ultimately became
institutionalized,

"MTV." And even

-

-

lost its

as

music videos themselves
drew criticism

including for the commercial
marketing of societal forces
of the

ironic

political positions,

and harsh criticism of music
videos, often based on
gained

its

own

time slot on

"

institutionalization of disruption
or alternative supplement

of "indie" (independent)
film-making
festival

into a relatively

and cable channel (Sundance),

its

own

icons,

VH
is

critical

This type of

1

echoed

mainstream

in the transformation

activity, with its

and a growing mass market.

Further, disruptive challenges
can function to support their
causes. Sidney

provides a brilliant and prophetic
illustration
narrative of popular resentment

counters. This

is

is

capitalized

own

in his film

Lumet

Network, in which a vibrant

upon by the very oppressive forces

a crucial point, and a frequent
occurrence

-

it

the oppressive reversal of

Bhabha's formula.
Finally, disruption

might become desirable and mass consumed,
as occurs

in

Network. Horror films offer an obvious
example: where once the occultly dangerous
caused genuine

Western

-

now

it

causes a desirable fear that

particularly U. S.

One cannot
shows

fear,

-

culture.

is

consumed

in

mass amounts

This consumption of disruption

turn on the television during the day
without

is

in

pervasive.

wading through countless

"talk

that feature all sorts of "abnormal" people
describing in detail their "abnormal"

behaviors, and perhaps engaging in such behaviors
on screen. 10

One can

hardly turn on

the radio at any time without finding a "shock
jockey" saying or representing him- or

herself as doing things on the air far outside the
bounds of "polite society."
In the 1970s, such talk

shows were

truly shocking,

got fired lor the "shocking" things he said on the

become so

institutionalized and

disappointed

As

is

Show.

when

mundane

that

it

air.

is

and

in the

1980s Howard Stern

By now, however, shock

has

expected and consumers are
,

not shocked or disquieted sufficiently.

the case in the most perfected forms of this type of television
program, such as The Jerry Springer
r
*
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Perhaps Bhabha would argue

(hat

of course particular forms
of disruption lose

them effectiveness and become
institutionalized, but
original

power

are perpetually produced.

contemporary Western society

is

I

that

would argue

new forms with
that,

their

on the contrary,

characterized in general by a
growing range of

disruptive cultural interventions.
Multitudes of television programs
seek to

and

"dirtier" facts

films are
are

more

and

situations;

more and more

own

show deeper

newspapers become more and more
sensationalistic;

violent, psychologically
disturbing,

and sexually

explicit;

people

violent, shooting each other
over trivial issues, exhibiting
pathological "road

rage," etc.; fashions and fashion
advertising are

unusual; and the National Enquirer

is

more and more

routinely risque or

the nation's best-selling "newspaper,"
followed by

a host of similar publications. At the
same time, these "disruptions" are less
and less
significant or noteworthy. People have

become used

to

them, and take them or leave

them. Again, in the type of societies that
Bhabha seems to expect cultural disruption to

have

effect,

This

it is

is

becoming

true

when

more and more used

to

less

and

less effective in

disruption

is

general

“

linked to oppression issues. Majoritarians
are

being challenged on issues of race, gender,
sexuality,

etc.,

oppression, and so such "disruptions" are less and
less disquieting and effective. Society
is

dominated by a backlash of indifference. Protests and
demonstrations have become a

matter of mundane routine, quite often even for their
participants, surviving more by
reference to the pure intensity of past protest than present
energy.

What
Bhabha

is

more, perhaps where the shock

expects. Perhaps only

weak

is

meaningful, the reaction

disruptions have a chance of being

is

not what

met with

negotiation, precisely because they can be absorbed. Confronted with
a truly powerful
disruption, a majoritarian might be antagonized not to renegotiation,
but to a

extreme form of totalization

“Even

—

more

akin to the extreme (and violent) homophobia that a

the invocation of cultural disruption

by academics has become rather
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trite.

"heterosexual" male might exhibit
precisely
into question, [see

punty and persecution"
this

-

extremism

from where

This "faith"

this

is

him

perhaps because

it

who

so extreme

in its extremist reaction,
"the

speaks," and gives

way

-

comes

Bhabha

thinks that

disrupts the position of

paranoid position finally voids

to the possibility

of renegotiation

[3

1

7],

of antagonizing the majority might
be based on

political activity.

demonstrations, as a

at

is

it

in the positive results

their truth. This type

bystanders,

sexuality

type of reaction, that "elicits
those racist fantasies of

Bhabha's understanding of Foucault's
police to beat

own

characteristic of extremist nationalisms.
Yet,

majontarian enunciation:
the place

point where his

315-317]

Bhabha acknowledges

even

at the

Foucault, after

way of exposing

the

antagonized

all,

raw oppressive power

that

of Gandhian strategy depends on the reaction
of masses of

either (1) identify with those being
beaten,

and so come

develop an

to

antagonistic relationship with the police or
(2) have sympathy for those beaten, or at least

do not have the stomach
stop the extremism.
beatings,

all

the

to be implicated in their beatings,

What Bhabha seems

more

if

to

miss

is

and so who apply pressure

the overriding tendency not to see the

they are presented and represented endlessly through
media

accounts, talk-show debates,

-

etc.

consuming or including. Such a

not to care, not to engage. Narrative

strategy can work, but depends

effectiveness. Indeed, this context might be historically
specific

and 40s

in India (Gandhi), the

1950s and 60s

in the

is

to

me

a large

not

all-

on a certain context

and past —

for

the 1930s

avoided, cultural

renegotiation and transformation does not necessarily take place.

and had reported

is

United States (Martin Luther King).

Thus, even where an extremist majoritarian reaction

directly, witnessed,

to

I

have participated

number of conversations with

domestic social workers or community-level international development workers.
Typically, these workers have erected a psychological Maginot Line against right-wing
critiques ot their "do-gooder" personalities and politics; their "soft" approaches to the

poor and down-trodden; and

their

openness

to different cultures, races,

299

and

lifestyles.

They

are ill-prepared for a critique
from a different direction, that
points out their

complicity

agendas,

in

etc.

contemporary systems
This

delusions that,

especially true

is

at least

(institutions) of oppress, on,
imperialist

when

their

and

"good intentions" are exposed as

racist

self-

according to Aristotle, they are
responsible for and that mask

darker operations of self-interest.

Upon

hearing such a critique, they often
reduce

safely into their system of thought.

Bhabha’s

ultra-racist

When pushed

it

into terms that

can be absorbed

harder, they do not react violently,
as

would, but rather simply disengage, labeling
their challenger him- or

herself as irrational and potentially
violent.

They

refuse to hear the arguments that,
if

they were to acknowledge them, would
undermine their entire political legitimacy and

even sense of identity

to the extent

volunteer. Nothing

renegotiated, and valid and powerful critiques
are henceforth

is

it

is tied

up with being a social worker or Peace Corps

recognized by their "outlines" and pre-emptively
disengaged. Only

when

forced to engage, as in a class or seminar

at the

point where they view their identity coming into question.

Bhabha might counter
would, after

all,

that his focus

is

-

when

"cornered"

—

do they become antagonistic, precisely

not changing individual

mind

sets

—

this

just produce a set of homogeneous individuals.
Recalcitrant racists are

not inconsistent with an anti-racist society. Indeed, their
presence might play an essential
role in the reproduction of that society,

might be the controlled trigger for the on-going

re-assertion of anti-racist sentiments by the majority of the society.

culture and society as a whole, not

mere

my

whole has not been changed by
points,

it

is

prior criticisms were based

renegotiations.

What

obvious that substantive social change

is

is

focused on the

I

made

on the

in reference to

fact that society as a

more, even regarding the

in a generally

requires the transformation of a significant percentage of

conceive of an anti-racist society that

is

individuals.

This counter-argument only works against the points

Foucault and subsequently:

He

its

oppressive society

membership.

It is

hard to

composed of a majority of racists. Even
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later

the

imposition of an.i-racis, behaviors
by force

-

happen

does not produce a truly

-

on the unlikely assumption

anti-racist society,

that this

can

and militates against the

democratic, non-totalizing social
form Bhabha advocates.

Prison Narrative

Bhabha's appeal

to cultural disruption is
limited in

-

closed within the narrative level

narrative, not material challenges

mean simply

I, is

another

way

well

as

It is

about interrupting narratives with
other forms of

and change.

literary narratives or artistic

Of course, by

works.

It is

"narrative,"

enunciation

more

Bhabha does not

generally,

whether representative of something
(pedagogical) or expressive of the narrator
(performative).
Yet, even if one might read

Bhabha

as intending to include actions within

enunciation, these can be present only in the
form or content of narrative.
are purely "cultural.”

Bhabha collapses

narrative realm.

To accomplish

which

and

levels text

this,

life into text

As

such, they

narrative and materiality into a single realm,
a

he invokes Edward Said's concept of "wordliness,"

[292]. Materiality

becomes merely the

referent of

narrative.

At
from

the

same

narrative.

time,

Bhabha

and social processes"

Bhabha

implicitly maintains a sense of the material distinct

rejects a "'centered' causal logic"

[293],

His intention appears

between "cultural formations

to be to free the cultural

from

determination by purely material social forces. What results from his
rejection of a
causal connection between culture (expressed in narrative) and
social processes

—

either direction or both

an

-- is

account of how processes

in

a sundering of the two. Missing

each realm

-

that

from

his theory

is

of culture and that of materiality

-

in

affect

the other.

This is perhaps most clearly and repeatedly affirmed in the "Introduction"
[Bhabha: 1990b], the collection of essays containing "DissemiNation."
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to

Notion and Narration

Instead, he opts for the
"purer linguistic air," that
narrative/cultural level.

He emphasizes

beyond what remains of the material

to focus

is,

the excess of language

for him,

on the

beyond

its

content,

and leaves the content behind,
[see 314

-

315]

On

one hand, Bhabha opens up the
narrative realm of activity
and negotiated

the

change within the nation; on the
and social change. Worse,
in

in

other, he forecloses other
forms of activity to resistance

doing

so,

he renders even the privileged
form ineffective:

sundering the cultural/narrative from
the material, he guarantees
that cultural

resistance, disruption, and negotiation
will be reflected back into the
cultural. Thus, the

cultural space itself (the narrative
space),

loses

its

for the

becomes

the prison of resistance.
Signification

pretense to reference, and cultural
transformation and negotiation become

dominant powers. Changes

in the cultural

-

narrative changes

-

'safe'

affect only

culture.

What

more,

is

correspondence

in

doing

so, they are unstable

and unanchored. Without

to actual social changes, they are
easily

Rhetoric becomes easy and meaningless.

It

becomes,

changed and manipulated

in fact, a

further.

cover for the same old

oppressions, obscuring them. Rhetoric changes
without driving any changes in the
material realm. This

become adept

at the

is

readily apparent in U. S. society. For instance,
sexual harassers

language of anti-harassment.

The gradually decreasing

effectiveness of disruption

growing disjunction between word and
narrative disruption
social relations

depends on
effective if

what

is

its

it

and

is

Without reference

the result in part of the
to material forces,

meaningless. Material disruptions by their definition disrupt
actual

structures.

effects

act.

is

On

the other hand, the

on the material.

power of narrative disruption

"Disruption" as

ultimately changes social structures

Bhabha describes

- how they

are

it is

only

produced as much as

produced. Disruption disquiets social agents, hopefully challenging them
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to

changes

in their

determine them

As
Union,

Umon,

oppressive aettons.
to

It

prods people toward social
change, but does

it.

and philosopher Ernst
Neizvestny wrote prior

artist

to the

end of the Soviet

in the

West, one could write or
say whatever one wanted,
while in the Soviet
a poet could be executed
over the contents of a poem.
Only in the

Soviet Union

dtd art thus have meaning,
precisely because

West, where anything and
everything

no longer a

life

social relations,
effect

and death
it

beyond the

is

it

could incite and reflect
action; in the

filmed and said,

issue. [Neizvestny,
1990]

becomes a zone
rhetorical.

This

in

is

art

When

has lost

culture

is

its

significance,

it is

sundered from

which the most dramatic transformations
have

little

the space that Bhabha's
"practice of cultural

difference" opens.

This was obviously no, the ease

in

Ancient Athens. Socrates was put

precisely because his rhetoric had
affected the thinking and actions
based

younger members of that

society.

The Athenians recognized

Athens were

part

own

like Oliver North, the
prosecuted-Constitution-trampier

into a conservative talk-show host. 1 '

it.

been powerful enough

to

One can imagine

that,

was

who

reflected in the fact that

Only one talk-show host
evoke

radio call-in

show

instead

has been recycled

Consistent with Neizvestny's point, the power
of

Socrates' challenge to Athenian society

death in order to end

of many

of the current tele-radio age of meaningless
"disruption,”

Socrates would not be put to death, but
would be given his

- much

it

death

correctly that this

threatened to destabilize their society,
and put Socrates to death. 1 ’
if Socratic

on

to

that reaction, but

in the

Athens put him

contemporary era appears

to

to

have

from a fringe extremist white

supremacist, not the majority society.

Plato, though he (belatedly) protested Socrates'
death, failed to understand its validity from the
general
Athenian standpoint He did, however, learn the implicit lesson
taught, and (1) restricted his protests or
disruptions lo textual representations of the past events
of Socrates' trial and death and (2) marginalized his
own impact through founding the Academy that allowed space for deeply
penetrating philosophical
F
F
production without any danger to the broader society - or to
himself.
One can only shudder at this analogy. The analogy is limited, of course,
by the fact that North's crimes
were not rhetorical but quite material. It was through the
separation from (his) rhetoric from reality that he
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Worse than being
oppression.

By

ineffective,

Bhabha’s narrat.ve focus tends

acting without reference
to material social forces,

free to function oppressively,
without betng nottced. just as

wtth

its

in fact to

enable

eaves these forces

it ,

language exceeds

indeterminate meanings and
potentials, so does the social
exceed

its

content,

its

representation.

Free from scrutiny through
representation, free from being
fixed into a

narrative that

subject to negotiation, the social
forces of oppression are free
to operate

is

without interference. While
Bhabha recognizes that the exercise
of power might be more
effective by tapping into and
maneuvering in the space opened up
by negotiation [296 he
297],
does not recognize the potential
of its maneuvering all that more
freely in the

space of non-narrative materiality that
I

stress that

cultural production.

I

am

it

to

monopolize.

not proposing to privilege the
realm of social processes over

As Hegel reminds

corresponding change

comes

at the

us, structural political

conceptual level

is

change without a

unstable as well.

What

I

am

doing

is

challenging Bhabha's focus on narrative/cultural
production.

Gone But Not Forgotten
The implications of Bhabha's focus on
of cultural disruption and renegotiation he

selects.

works. His selection of Handsworth Songs
is

a film by the Black

district

the narrative are clear

It is

are uniformly literary /artistic

particularly significant in this regard. This

is

Audio Collective during

of Birmingham, England" [306],

They

from the examples

the uprisings of 1985, in the

the film not the riots, that
,

assertion of culture difference; the film displaces the riots.

More than

is

this,

Handsworth

the focal

the film

presents the riots themselves as mere representation/reference to
something else: "There
are no stories in the riots, only the ghosts of other stories"
[307],

The

riots

(and the film)

are not acts, they do not accomplish directly rather, they refer/represent.
Acting
;

displaced by referring.
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is

In this case, the film

disruptive.

In another case,

explanation as an apparent
difference.

- making
Bhabha

'report'

it

slips

it

-

is

considered socially

a fiterary work, presenting

without

it

on or example of the operation
of disruptive

Salmon Rushdie's Satanic

In

and viewing

Verses, Gtbreel Parish,
a, a

Muslim

cultural

Indian,

repeatedly mimics a dead
English colonialist in the
presence of his widow, Rosa

Diamond. This mint, cry deprives
and patriarchy"

that

the narratives of the
"colonial tdeologies of
patriotism

he mimics "of their imperial
authority” [318], The mimicry

interrupts

Rosa Diamond's incessant

narrattves

on which her sense of identity depends,
causing her own

in fact

repetition of the standard
English historical
identity to

come

into

question.

The immediate question
narratives of an old

woman,

is,

why

challenge "imperialism" in the form
of the

narratives that are anachronistic
and do not reflect the current

forms of neo-imperialist rhetoric or
domination. Going
it

is

Bhabha seems

irrelevant.

to get

that he fails to evaluate the effects

Further, this
difference.

It is

is

swept up

such narratives

is

as easy as

idea of disruptive narrative so

much

by any other standards.

a literary representation of a fictitious
operation of cultural

not evidence in the least of the actual
possibility of effective operation of

this strategy, but at

most

offers readers a

Nor could Bhabha argue

similar effects.

in the

after

hope

that similar activity

on

their part will

have

that the text itself functions disruptively,
to spur

individuals to cultural disruption or to cause

it

itself.

The Satanic Verses was anything

but disruptive of Western culture and imperialism;
on the contrary, one well-discussed

Muslim reaction
of the

to

it

became an extremely timely and

same old anti-Muslim

useful justification for continuation

orientalism, despite the partial institutionalization of
Said's

critique in the preceding decade.

Bhabha

slips inside the narrative

of Handsworth Songs as well. His purpose

appears to be to find confirmation within the film
instance

-

of the privileging of narrative

—

in the narrative

of an interviewee, for

("stories") over material change.
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What

is

more

significant,

however,

al referent.

that he fails to distinguish

is

between narrative and
presuntabiy

His positioning inside or
outside the narrative

“ r™

because he does not recognize
a distinction. There

HmdSWOrlh S° nSS

The

narratives, that in turn refer
to

something

is

is

unstable, precisely

a double level of reference-

- narratives thentseives refer to interna,

else.

Bhabha's shifting within these
nested narratives suggests
a kind of 'happy
skepticism' with regard to
material forces

-

one never gets

to them, but perceives
or

participates in disruption
nonetheless. In reality, this 'happy
skepticism'
rhetorical cover-up.
in

-

1985

becomes

The

actual referent of Handswarth

lost in

is

undercut by

mistaken to think that the

is

-

some power

own

to representation to

this referential instability.

riots

can be displaced so easily, and that

narrative disruption can function
effectively without depending on
them.
the film derives not from

Bhabha's

the riots that took place

an unstable shuffle from
representation

representation. Their actuality

Bhabha

Sengs

is

The

efficacy of

inherent in a disruptive representation
of social

unrest through film, but in the residual
force of the actual riots in Birmingham.
That

Bhabha’s obscures

this derivation

does not mean that

it

from him, readers must rediscover elements
of the past

A

string

of references

-

to references

does not

is

to

produce disruption. In

stories that are ghosts

themselves produce the passion or will

Humean

to action

Songs depends on
disquiet
felt at

felt

the

its

to action.

moment of their

the film

is

Any

The

-

the string

in this
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invocation

A string of

is

just a linkage, and

case the actual

memory of an

film triggers this

produce an original disruption.

if

-

disruption caused by Hcindsworth

simply the fading

occurrence.

necessary

toward social change.

connection to actual disruption,

upon viewing

is

of other stories

terms, representations do not in

references depends on an actual disruption to have effect

does not create the passion or will

cue

he has obscured.

that

does not contain the genuine shock or disruptive
moment that

of the string

exist, and, taking the

riots.

The

original disquiet

memory, but does not

Obviously, for those

them might

trigger other

resonances with so

many

movements allows them

memory of some

who were

not affected by the original

memories of similar

disruptions. This

is

representation of

not the point. Their

other anti-raeist, anti-colonial,
anti-authoritarian acts and
to

access the power of any of
these disruptions.

A viewer's

simtlar disruption supplies the
force behind the film's
disruptive effects.

Indeed, Bhabha's assertion that
"there are no stories in the
other stories" [307]

themselves might

is

riots,

only the ghosts of

consistent with this possibility:
the disruptive impact of
the riots

in part derive

from their reference

to the global, shattering
disruption

caused by highly effective anti-colonial,
anti-authoritarian, and

movements and

riots,

anti-racist resistance

actions around the globe, in colonized
and colonial societies alike,

decades before.

Such a dependence on anti-colonialism

is

even more evident regarding Bhabha's

representation of The Satanic Verses.
Bhabha's focus on this 'new' form of narrative

challenge to the narratives of imperialism
displaces the
colonialism.

Bhabha marks

earlier, direct

this as a post-colonial strategy

challenges of anti-

superseding earlier anti-

colonialism.

But, does

it?

Even granting

that Gibreel's fictional disruption

of Rosa's imperial

narratives reflects actual possibilities of disruption,
such challenges are trivial to the point

of being irrelevant. This challenge merely replicates
disruption that has occurred with

much

in a limited, narrative form, a

greater force and impact long before

decades after the end of formal colonialism, and well into a

new

it.

It

occurs

era of new forms of neo-

imperial domination that cannot be expressed by the old formula
that Rosa embodies.

She herselt

is

the (literally) dying residue of an obsolete form of colonialism

obsolete by anti-colonial struggle): a challenge to her leaves intact the

domination that have emerged and continue

from these new forms, and success

is

to.

new

Worse, such a challenge

is

structures of

a diversion

potentially a step toward complacency.
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(made

Moreover,

this literary disruption
itself

anti-colonialism that

m a post-colonial
authonty makes

it

came before

depends completely on the
successes of

material terms, Gibreefs

it,

mimicry

is

world, and authorized by the
success of anti-colonialism.

meaningless as disruption.

It is

too

because

late,

it

is

only possible
Its

very

already

acceptable. Doubtless, in fact,
most contemporary British Anglo
readers found Gibreefs

mimicry and Rosa's

old-fash, oned imperialism quite
amusing, precisely because even

they, as oppressors, have
superseded
that

it.

She

is

members of the contemporary ascending

Americans tend

to find so

Most importantly,

akin to the old blatantly racist
grandparent

generation of much more subtly
racist North

amusing.
in narrative terms,

disruption has derives from the

whatever disruptive power Gibreefs

memory of anti-colonialism. For contemporary

cultural

disruption and renegotiation even to take
place as represented in The Satanic
Verses, and
for

it

to

have any chance of success, requires the deeply
seared memory of anti-

colomalism among the former colonizers. Cultural
disruption and renegotiation
parasitic

3.

upon

the active

power of a

past anti-colonialism, and the extent of

its

is

success

is

function of the residual power of anti-colonialism.

This process of cultural renegotiation
colonialism.

It is

realm. At best,
anti-colonial

it

powered by

is,

in fact, the cycling

down of a dying anti-

the residual reflection of anti-colonialism into
the cultural

functions to finish out certain social-change trends initiated
through

movements;

at worst,

it

obscures consolidation of a post-colonial order

developing through assertion of new forms of imperial domination
that cannot be
expressed

in the

formulas of classical anti-colonialism. In the

a threat to one's sense of self and security, becomes, as

latter case,

memory,

what once was

a harmless object that

can be handled and manipulated.

At

this point,

disruption. Here,

I

it is

social change, but that

might supplement

my

initial critique

not simply that disruption has

of the institutionalization of

become

less effective as a tool

contemporary disruptions are not disruptive
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in

of

themselves, but

have impact only through
reference

genuine disruptions of the

to

past.

As memories of

.he initial impacts fade
in the face of changing
socia. structures and
forms of oppression
- as well
as efforts to erase them so does the effectiveness
of contemporary dtsruption.

The foregoing
colonialism and

its

is

not meant in any

struggles

-

way

minimize or cast aspersions on

to

quite the contrary. This

was

anti-

a powerful force that

reshaped global politics and
economics, and produced liberation
on a level never
achieved before. At the same time,
as with any force of political
change, it has its

span of effectiveness; the forces
of oppression

(if

I

may

through other means.

life

be Manichean) have responded

this order-shattering threat
to oppression, reconstituting
their

power

1

'

to

in other forms,

16

'Socioanalysis'

After witnessing the explosion of
nationalism in the early 1990s and the
tendency

toward violent, even genocidal backlashes by
nationalist majorities against minorities,

Bhabha appears
Nervous

to

States,"

have modified his position. In a 1994 essay,
"Anxious Nations,

Bhabha extends and

revises his analysis of minoritarian
resistance to

totalizing national narratives. In this essay,

Bhabha focuses much more on

the tendency

of a nationalist majority toward violent repression
of difference, and unambiguously
for a transcendence

of the nation form

a general

minoritization' of culture"

-

totality to

space of complex hybridity

-

national cultures. His

avowed

goal

is

that

"a

cultures and the

transformation of culture from asserted

new cosmopolitanism

[Bhabha, 1994: 215],

abandonment

is,

as the productive end of the renegotiation of

through the hybridity ot cultural boundaries

cosmopolitan centers

calls

In the final section of the essay, he presents

itself.

to

be found and formed

on the model of the great post-colonial,

--

It is

through the fracturing of national

ot the fantastic desires for cultural

15

homogeneity

—

or their

Or, one can hope, merely some of their power.
This reconstitution, or neo-imperialism, was in fact an innovation by the United
States that has carried us
to the top of world power in the 20th Century [see Harumi,
1997:
'

].
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-

supersession by a pluralism that
simply multiplies the unities
or relegates them to a

secondary role

-

The 1994

that the limits

of the modern nation can be
redeemed.

strategy for reaching this
goal

is

roughly the same as in
1990, the

renegotiative disruption of myths
of unity. In 1994, however,
specific aspect

and technique. He focuses on how

Bhabha foregrounds

a

nationalists refer to the past
as the

proper determinant of contemporary
culture. The general tension
between pedagogy and

performance

is

specified here as the tension between
what

is

apparently given from the

past (nationalist fantasy projected
into the past) and the immediate,
actual present that

exceeds determination by

Bhabha

this past.

Similar to his treatment of Renan
in the 1990 essay,

sees contemporary nationalist
invocations of the past as covering

its

genuine

complexity with a simple linear determinancy.
The nationalist version of the past
the cultural
It

is this

homogeneity

is

that

that appears to be given to the
present is natural or primordial.

pedagogy of the nation

that represses the present, "democratic"

performance of

the nation.

Bhabha describes
broken.

It is

the

method by which

this

hold of the past on the present can be

not a matter of setting present against past, as

if

the difference were merely

generational or between two iterations of a culture.
Rather, the past itself must be re-

opened

to

expose the multiple

were present

The "strange

at

each point

possibilities, the cultural ambiguities

in the

and

pluralities, that

development of the supposedly homogeneous

culture.

forgetting of the history of the nation's past" [Bhabha,
1990a: 310] must be

challenged, and what has been forgotten remembered. The past
of the nation then loses
its

totalizing, determining

exploration of

it

exposes

past cannot determine if

Bhabha explores
Ishiguro's The

power, not because

its

it

is

own

it

is

ignored, but because intensive

lack of totality and inherently multi-valent nature.

indeterminate.

a range of variations on this basic technique. In

Remains of the Day,

number of good Englishmen

The

Kazuo

the present pretensions to democratic beliefs

among

are revealed through a flashback to have been preceded by
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a

pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic attitudes

view as founded on a commitment

in the past.
to

Their present "Englislmess,"
which they

democracy,

is

Indeed, the other side of
Englishness, colonialism,

revealed as something else
entirely.

is

revealed to be "intimately
bound

up" with Nazism: the former
Nazism was not a fluke, an inessential
attribute, but a
perfectly logical correlate of the
foundation of Englishness, colonialism.
[Bhabha. 1994:

211

-

212], This exposes the complex truth
of Englishness,

comfortable present of a self-satisfied
majority that

its

oppressive side. The

feels justified in preserving
its culture

against recent immigrants and in fact
requiring their assimilation into

disrupted by the revelation that the essence
of the culture

laudable at

is

it

is

thereby

not so very democratic or

This opens the possibility for transcending
homogenizing, unified culture,

all.

with participation by the immigrants.
Elaine Reichek’s Native Intelligences reveals
the presence of Native Americans
in
the apparently

mundane

details

of the domestic space of contemporary white
North

Americans. The Native Americans and

their cultural productions

wall-paper patterns, wall-hangings, and so

forth.

Reichek's work

go almost unnoticed
is

meant

in

to trigger

recognition of this presence, and not simply as a step toward
a critique of past

extermination and land-theft or contemporary "nativist"
forces recognition of the Native

thus of

how

American

spirituality.

as present in white North

Rather, her

work

America today and
,

past colonialism and appropriation continue to operate in
contemporary

white North American culture, corresponding to a continued oppression
of Native

Americans on

reservations, continued theft of their lands and destruction of their
cultures,

sovereignty, and rights. This recognition reveals that the comfortable, holistic
white

majority culture

is

actively implicated in on-going ethnocide and oppression.

Interestingly, here the present

is

opened up

to difference

[214-215]

by destroying

its

unity

against the past. Contrary to the typical self-satisfaction of contemporary white North

Americans, the present does not represent the supersession of the
extermination and genocide.

It is

evils

of the

past,

not the flowering of the true essence of the past.

such as

Rather, the revelation of the
presence of oppresston of Native
Americans in contemporary
whne society transforms the evils of the
past into an essential element
of white culture,

presumably forcing a re-evaluation
of it.

Such
strategies.

It

strategies

of resistance are subject

must be stressed

strategies are inaccurate.

that this

They

their disruptive

power

concrete social forces makes

it

basic concerns as the 1990

does not mean that the criticisms
grounding the

their complexity.

mean

less than

same

are profoundly accurate, and
the literary

means of making them captures
penetrating critiques does not

to the

artistic

But, that they are accurate and

that they effect

Bhabha

and

genuine social change. Not only

is

believes, but their narrative de-linking
from

very difficult for whatever power they
have to

spill

over

into the concrete realm.

Bhabha's discussion of Reichek's work contains
a

telling phrase:

her work

unpick[s] and refigure[s] history's 'unconscious,'
amnesiac realities" [214], Other points
in the text

manifest a similar influence of psychoanalytic
theory on Bhabha's treatment of

the nation.

The 1990 essay suggests

this as well, in invocations

implicit allusion to Nietzsche's The Birth

bounds imposed by

of Tragedy}

totalizing national narratives

is

6

of Freud 17 as well as

its

The object of renegotiation of the

to renegotiate the

domination of the

Dionysian' activity of the people by the 'Apollinian' structure
of the totalizing national
narrative.

The general process suggested
society, or 'socioanalysis.'

Through

it,

is

what one might

call the

psychoanalysis of

past subjugations of difference or present

repressions of past difference are exposed. Contemporary difference

from

its

is

thereby released

derivative repression.

This, of course, does not produce a

new

'unified cultural psyche' in place

of the

prior totalization of culture. Just as post-modern psychoanalysis recognizes precisely
in

attempts to produce a unified subjectivity the repressive force that causes psychological
l7
18

See Footnote
See Footnote

5,

above, for one instance.

4,

above.
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problems, Bhabhan socioanalysis
seeks

to release culture

from totalizing narratives

attempt to produce an analogous
social unity. Just as the
individual subject
into an untotalizable

complex of

forces and elements, so

is

culture.

is

that

fractured

And, just as

subjective boundaries are challenged
and complexified in this process,
so are national
ones.

It

only through the removal of
past totalizing repressions of
difference without

is

replacement by

Beyond

new

totalizing repressions that the
'health'

the questions

I

of society can be achieved.

above about the effectiveness of the
type of cultural

raised

disruption that drives socioanalysis,
a deeper problem exists.

psychoanalysis has always been that
forces and positionings.

way

as to

accommodate

Whether

cannot operate on the level of social and
political

it

transforms the psychology of the individual
in such a

it

or submit to those forces, or to resist
and oppose those changes,

depends on forces outside the
It is

The problem with

activity

of psychoanalysis

itself.

determined by external socio-cultural conditions.
For instance, Freudian

psychoanalysis maintains concepts of normalcy and
illness consistent with systems of

gender and sexuality oppression characteristic of
Western
to

rework "deviant" individuals (gays,

etc.) into

what they are supposed

to

lesbians, bisexuals,

It

attempts

independent-minded women,

be according to that society, to force them into

conformity with a totalizing psychological narrative that

predominant socio-political

industrial societies.

itself

has been determined by the

forces.

Other forms of psychoanalysis

—

such as feminist psychotherapy

—

often

recognize these determining influences on Freudian psychoanalysis. In
line with

Bhabha's socioanalysis, they attempt

to

into the subconsciousness of a subject

Obviously,
directly.

effects

The

this

subject

is

remove

the constraints

and repressions introduced

by the oppressive socio-cultural

removal does not

forces.

alter the socio-cultural context itself, at least not

continually confronted with forces that undermine any positive

of therapy. Indeed, a strategy

that

opens the subject
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to difference

and destabilizes

totalizing self-concepts
might

make

the subject

more vulnerable

to internalizing

oppressive externa, forces.
Unless the deeper structure of
oppression
resistance to

it

through therapy remains
provisional and

the therapy will have even

More

some

level

partial.

And,

challenged,

is

this

assumes

that

of initial success against
internalized oppression.

often than not, only changes
in the oppressive context
can have this effect.

Agam,
activities that

as with Bhabha, successful
therapy might

might potentially

remove

alter the socio-cultural
context

barriers to social

change

of the subject. But, the

success itself might depend on
external mitigating factors.
The more extreme the
oppression, the less likely therapy

even

if

context

it

or therapy alone

-

will

remove

its

effects.

And,

does, there remains the issue
of dealing with the oppressive
socio-cultural

itself.

Socioanalysis

though

-

it

is

subject to similar concerns.
Oppression

might have a strong cultural component.

cultural level

is

No

is

not purely cultural,

doubt dealing with

it

on the

important. However, without a corresponding
transformation of material

relations and structures of domination,
such a strategy remains provisional and
partial.

What

is

more, the strategy of socioanalysis might
conflict with the requirements of

material liberation. For instance, where
a minority

is

the potential victim

socioanalytic renegotiation with the dominant
majority might have

of genocide, a

little effect.

Indeed, socioanalysis might preserve oppressive
cultural elements in a transnational hybridity.

Bhabha assumes

from the imposition of totalizing

that everything that

narratives.

is

bad and oppressive stems

If this is not true, then

elements of

oppression can survive the transcendence ot totalizing cultural
forms, only to be
reasserted in the
(its

new

hybridity.

deployment) has been a

tool

Indeed, to the extent that the use of totalizing narrative

of oppressive forces, they might compel new cultural

torms serve such purposes just as well
cultural disruption

by oppressive

—

as suggested in

forces.
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my

treatment of the use of

Perhaps the factor that militates against

change

that

was wrought by

latter

age

is

the

anti-colonialism. Perhaps, just as with
cultural disruption,

the legacy of anti-colonialism

Thus, the

this in the "post-colonial"

is

necessary to the possibility of successful
socioanalysis.

depends on anti-colonialism just as much as
the former. To the extent

that socioanalysis

effective,

is

it

relies

on a context

in

which the

social

and

political

transformations of anti-colonialism have been
extensive. Without this concrete
foundation,

it

would produce merely

accommodation of the marginalized

rhetorical changes that themselves
to the oppressive status quo.

effectiveness within this context, this effectiveness

oppression, but to

As

its

access to the

is

not due to

would mark

Even assuming

its

power

to

the

its

end

power of anti-colonialism.

the successes of anti-colonialism give

way more and more

forms of oppression, the slippage of socioanalysis

into a purely

to post-colonial

accommodational

operation becomes inevitable.

The Difference of Difference

My argument thus
are

more severe and

means

that

would seem

far

destructive than

he suggests.

Am

I

to suggest that the

Bhabha

thinks.

They cannot be overcome by

then in general agreement with

tensions within the nation too great to be overcome, or

As

I

problems within the nation

mentioned above,

in

at least

"DissemiNation," Bhabha

end product of the renegotiative process. At some

is

points, he

Hobsbawm? Are

the

the

accommodated?
rather ambivalent about the

seems

to

be assuming that

the process will not supersede the nation understood as the tension between pedagogy and

performance, but rather tend

to

transform the nation into a zone of marginalization

a space defined by the immediate and "perplexed" activity of the people.

view

this as a transformation

He

itself,

appears to

of the concept of the nation from a Western, modern one,

a post-colonial, post-modern one [see, for instance, 303], At others, he seems to be
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to

hintmg

ambiguous language),

(still in

at the ultimate "transnational

dissemination" of

culture [see, for instance, 320],

By

1994, however, Bhabha's position

is

much

less

ambiguous. He has clearly

shifted his account of the nation to
emphasize a strategy of cultural difference
that

ultimately leads beyond

He

thus dissolves the nation in a broader
cultural complex. This

only option.
process

to trans-national, trans-state
hybridity.

it,

He might just

is

not Bhabha's

as well have recognized that the failure
of the renegotiative

often due to the fact that the majorities and
minorities in question should not be

is

considered as parts of a single nation, but as distinct
nations. The tension within the
nation

is

due

to the irreconcilable difference

between a national minority and the

dominant majority.
In

1

DissemiNation, the majority-minority tension

is

always contained within a

nation(-state): a former colonizer-colonized (or enslaver-slave)
tension

superseded by a majority-minority tension within a cultural

Nervous

States,

however, the discussion seems

to

had been

In "Anxious Nations,

'unit.'

concern a different type of minority-

majority tension, more reflective of anti-colonial struggle. This does not
represent

Bhabha's acceptance of distinct nations, however, but rather the folding of colonial
tensions into a state.
result

By

valorizing trans-state, trans-national cultural hybridity as the

of the renegotiative process, Bhabha avoids having

nations within a

to

engage the issue of distinct

state.

Importantly, his analysis cannot apply to colonialism, because

within

the possibility of separatism, of the breaking

it

minority.

II it

were applied

colonizing power, and that
that

Bhabha's analysis

minoritarian national
19

to

Though

is

to the colonial situation,

at the cultural level.

it

does not contain

away of a marginalized,

it

assailed

would require negotiation with

In the following,

I

will attempt to

the

show

likewise inapplicable to the latest form of separatism, the

movements of the

1990s, on similar grounds.

19

detail here certain formal similarities of these movements to anti-colonial ones,
do not mean
suggest any closer similarity. Contemporary separatist movements are generally not anti-colonial.
I

1
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Bhabha

anticipates such an objection
by insisting that he

is not concerned
with the
tensions between two groups that
are the referents of totalizing
narratives, but with the

margins between and within them.
is

If a minority has

its

own

totalizing pretensions, then

no longer properly marginal, and
no longer a potential agent of resistance

totalization, the

Yet,

to the

fundamental oppression.

where do

the "marginalized" of his focus

come from? The examples he

chooses are primarily post-colonial
residuals: Native Americans
genocide and perpetual internment, the
progeny of slaves
colonial immigrants to former colonizers
(both the poor
elites

it

whose home

status

was challenged by

in the

who

On Bhabha s

economic refugees and

They

or fragments of alternate cultural groups,
and their "difference"

form produced by

United States, and post-

are

anti-colonialism).

in the

is

are themselves parts

derivative of this fact.

account, however, they function as if they
have no history, and have

simply appeared from some external non-zone,
within a totalizing nationality. This
because he does not refer

to their history, but rather

account of their situation or

activity:

he

splits

because

it

is

not

has no bearing on his

them away from

their origins, consistent

with their presumed tendency toward performance over
pedagogy. They are minorities of
their

new

"nations" simpliciter.

Bhabha

conception of minority

s

is

thus intensive',

it

refers

simply to a division

within a given presumed unit. Minorities are "fragments" of
previously disrupted cultural
units (whether former colonies, slavery-era 'Africa,' or tribes),

new

now permanently

part of

cultures that cannot thus be unitary.

Bhabha

at

points appears to imply that a minority

narrative of the majority.

Though he recognizes

is

the product of the totalizing

minorities as produced through

immigration, their minoritization results from totalizing national narratives that generate
difference by giving
narrative referent

is

it

significance.

The "discovery" of difference within

the nation as

perceived as a function of the internal psychodymamics of the culture

Though they

often respond to just as deep and intense oppression, this oppression has taken a different
form, with a different history. It is important to avoid any reductive comparisons.
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in

question

-

the reflection of

The minority

itself.

projection of difference onto an external
other back into

its

is different,

but cannot claim that difference, because
to do so

be tor the members to assert their

own

restricted to pure activity, that

immediate action without a

is,

only structure their activity can have
reductive narratives of the majority.

totalizing narrative.

-

the only

way

it

Members of the

its

new home

DissemiNation,

can be unified

by Foucault that
It is

-

is

through the

20

is

contained entirely

dynamic

that

Bhabha

is

explicit about

he describes.

It is

reflects difference into the interior

containment within a

of the "nation." [301

significant that Foucault uses the term "state," while

between the two terms,

depend on correspondence
well:

[see 301

to a state. This

for instance, in the introduction to

-

-

302]

Bhabha uses

"nation" in

would have had no doubt

to

302] Definition of a nation seems to

assumption

is

manifested

at

other points as

Nation and Narration, Bhabha remarks

Palestinians "have not yet found their nation" [Bhabha, 1990b:
Palestinians

that they

state as

the rigidity of state borders described

apparent reference to the same socio-political formation. Bhabha does not seem
differentiate

The

culture. This in turn requires a proper container.
In

this is the state.

the condition of the

minority are

(totalizing) structure.

Bhabha’s concept of minority assumes that a "fragment"
within

would

7],

that the

Surely in 1990

many

were a nation; the problem was, they did

not have a state that would ensure the survival and autonomy of the nation. Indeed,

Bhabha experiences Fanon's "exploration
immediately identifying

it

and as a dissolution of the

of] the

space of the nation without

with the historical institution of the state" as a near revelation,
totality

of the nation

into the

performance of the people

[Bhabha, 1990a: 303].
In fact,

Bhabha cannot

differentiate

nations might exist within a single state

is

between nation and

to

state.

To admit

that

two

admit the possibility that a minority might

20
Though Bhabha does acknowledge that their purely marginalized status can become the "gathering points
of political solidarity" [307 - 308]. This gathering does not depend on or imply a unifying narrative,
however.

318

be a nation

itself,

type of organic

with

its

totality:

own complex dynamic. Bhabha

any pretensions

wholeness are merely the assertions of

to

totalizing nationalist narratives. That
these

account of the nation. As a

result,

does not allow the nation any

do not define a nation

he appeals to the

state to

is

the of Bhabha's

guarantee the bounds of the

process of cultural negotiation. Otherwise,
his parsing of this or that social
dynamic as a
nation

is

arbitrary, as is the designation

Even

of

its

interior

components and

difference.

the strain in "DissemiNation" that suggests
an ultimate supersession of the

nation by trans-state, trans-national hybrid cultural
forms depends on a container,
ultimately "the city."

His

full shift

toward trans-national, trans-state hybrid cultural forms

Nations, Nervous States," suggests awareness of this problem.
Indeed, the

some sense of the

distinction

between "nation" and

implications of this difference, he sidesteps
national, majority-marginalized

dynamic

spills

dynamic might

over the borders of the

that is actually a state splitting into

for his theory

consideration.

—

it.

state

"state."

"Anxious

title

indicates

But, rather than exploring the

Precisely at the point at which the intrareveal distinct nations in tension, the

and nation. Rather than the presumed nation

two nations — which would represent a deep problem

the internal fracture eliminates nation and state

They

in

are superseded

by a

cultural hybridity that

from further
is

a joining of fragmented

remains of the national disintegration.
Refuting the 1990 statism

is

quite easy.

It is

simply a matter of presenting cases

that are clearly or can be tenably perceived to be multiple nations within a state, whether
fully or partially contained within the state.

Examples abound, such

mentioned existence of a Palestinian nation within the

where these reveal

state

of

as the above-

Israel.

What

is

more,

a dominating majority and a fully or partially contained minority

nation, the 1994 reformulation

becomes untenable

not an option that a group or conflicting groups

obvious one. According

to

Bhabha,

as well.

may

It is

choose, but

not that renegotiation
it

for a minority nation to assert
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is

is

not the only or most

its

unity in the face of

oppression by the dominant majority

is

for

it

to replicate the totalizing,
internally

oppressive behavior of the majority. In this
way, the presence of two nations within
a

simply a function of two competing totalizing
narratives. At the same time,

state is

appears to be an extreme disruption not subject

Bhabha's dismissal
are not themselves

is

simplistic.

It

methods of oppression.

to

any of the objections raised above.

assumes
In

many

that fragmentation

cases,

however,

differentiation of a subject minority, but the
assimilation of

dominant majority,

that

is

the goal of domination.

and hybridization
not the

it is

members

its

into the

The Kurds of Turkey

example: the Turkish government, media, military,

etc.,

do not claim

different, but rather that they are not different, that
they are
resist the

it

are a perfect

that the

Kurds are

"Mountain Turks" and should

delusion that they form a distinct cultural group. The
goal

is to

dissolve the

minority into the majority nation.

Bhabha would claim
Forced assimilation certainly

his analysis to apply to assimilative narratives as well.
relies

on a totalizing

narrative.

According

to

Bhabha,

resistance should not be by a problematic totalizing counter-narrative, but
through

disruption and renegotiation of the conditions of narration themselves.

The

result

would

be a continuing process of undermining the totalizing, absorptive narrative, toward a
recognition of the performative aspect of the nation, or a supersession of the Turkish
nation, itself dissolved within a trans-national, trans-state hybridity.

Unfortunately, in this case, Bhabha's strategy does not have the beneficial effects

he believes

Perhaps
clear,

it

to.

this is

In either case,

however, the destruction of the Kurdish nation occurs.

toward some superior cosmopolitanism, but as

my

section on

Ree makes

cosmopolitanism does not represent a supersession of the key relevant power

structure

—

flexibility.

order will

particularly an imperial one

The Kurdish nation
at

most mutate

is lost,

—

and can even be viewed as a

result of

its

but Turkish state power or the power of the state

into a derivative

form of domination.
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In cases in

which oppression

assertion ot minority unity

specifically

must be understood

ot ’classical colonization,' in

which

means fragmentation of the

relative to

The

it.

the assertion of difference

is

situation

minority, the
the opposite

is

crucial to continued

domination. In pre-modern empires, assimilation
or difference was irrelevant

dynamics of power.

In the

modern

era,

to the

however, a dominator must make a
decision

between forcing assimilation or emphasizing

difference.

Though Bhabha’s model

clearly

preserves the emphasis on racial/cultural difference
central to the oppressive scheme of
classical colonialism, in other situations, the
oppressive majority seeks not to exclude but
to include.

for

even

from

Positive social change

this tends to

not an issue of negotiated, non-totalizing
hybridity,

is

meet the goal of the dominant group, but rather

’dis-integration’

the dominator, with out annihilation.

Here the "difference" between nation and
scheme, a majority coercing assimilation does so
majority might not be national

does not correspond
cultural hybridity

at all.

It

state

becomes

crucial.

into its national narrative.

might be coercing participation

to a particular nation,

In Bhabha’s

and so can correspond

But, this

in a state that

to a non-pluralistic

produced through a negotiative process. There

is

no specific national

culture as goal of this process. Indeed, a perpetual renegotiation or cultural

indeterminacy serves the object of the
the minority nation

is

an obstacle to

statist

majority perhaps best.

state integration that

existence fragments the state and undermines the
Further,

Bbabha does

the

21

presumed

A

-

its

state's relative indifference to culture.

not recognize the difference between a margin that

group or part of one. He cannot recognize a minority nation
.

the other hand,

must be overcome

the excess of a totalizing national narrative and a margin that

marginalized

On

is at

that

the

is

same time

is

simply

a distinct

as a totality

subjugated minority under the pressure of forced assimilation (with

alternative being genocide)

is

a site of profound contention and tension, of

21
Bhabha clearly resists such a possibility. For instance, when discussing Huston Baker's self-described
work on the '"new national modes of sounding, interpreting and speaking the Negro in the Harlem
Renaissance,"' Bhabha uses quotation marks around his own use of the term "national" in reference to these

activities,

emphasizing

his evaluation

of

this

use as problematic. [Bhabha, 1990a: 296]
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instability

and the ever-present

of dissolution (whether members
of the minority

threat

accept the majority's agenda or reject

it,

or whether

has been partially effective, as
in

it

Northern Ireland). In such a case, the "unity"
of the minority (nation)
the

dominant trend toward dissolution

(into the majority or

is

through annihilation).

Bhabha’s account of the relationship of unity
and dissolution

is

thereby reversed: the

assertion of unity (of the minority), not
difference (within the majority),

disruptive

moment

annihilation

is

- where

not at stake

—

a livable form

in the tense relationship

is

between

totalization

the assertion of internal difference resistant
and disruptive. Bhabha's

Bhabha might

is

It

reacts.

will then

in a process

become

It is

the perspective

not the opening unity that
its

is

is

the

distinct unity

to

moment, of resistance

to

it.

fragmented by the genuine difference internal
is.

to

For Bhabha, difference

A

is

to

it.

On

it.

The

effort

the

always intensive,

of the minority

that

is,

within a

totalizing narrative asserts the nation as a unit(y) that
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is

Difference within the minority

is

totality.

any event,

,

not logically posterior to an asserted unity, but anterior to

previously asserted

rejection. In

of the marginalized minority a minor national narrative

is

dissolution.

which the majority then

not a replication of the totalizing

is

fragmentation as asserted by the majority

overcome

assertion

might be the simple

It

might begin with the purposeful

it

logic of the majority, but rather

contrary,

initial

not assertion of difference by the

of forcible assimilation.

of case, the assertion of a

From

on an

the purposeful rejection by minoritarians of the initial

assimilative totalization. Or,
in this type

of

derives precisely from the pure activity of the people, the fact that

of minority people against the majority's narrative,
It

in fact a denial

of the minority, presumably under the pressures of

they exceed the totalizing narrative of the majority.

moment

is

the essence of the immediately present people.

yet respond that forced assimilation depends

this is the assertion

forced assimilation.

activity

the resistant,

the majority's totalizing impulse can be
disrupted into

the very agency that, on his account,

majority, as a

is

and margin. Only where

rejection of the assertion ot minority unity in the
face of oppression

of difference. But

asserted against

is

then intensively fragmented.
For a marginalized nation, unity

is

extensive, that

is,

the

linkmg across an already existing
or asserted fragmentation.
The oppressed minority
nation begins extensively.

Bhabha might

object that this

is

precisely his position: the nation
arose in Europe

as a narrative response to the
fragmentation of pre-modern social
structures, just as in

other circumstances

it

has been a response to similar
fragmentations

-

by minority

groups to forces disrupting their traditional
social structures as well as by
majority groups
confronted with 'disruptive' immigration.
Setting aside the issue of whether
"narrative" for the
is

a response.

that

Bhabha

As

moment, Bhabha's point
a totalizing response,

elaborates.

As

it is

is

accurate.

The nation

in

it is

such circumstances

subject to the issues of difference within

it

discussed above, his consideration of this internal
complexity

of the nation, of the untotalizable difference within

it,

is

crucial to understanding

In

it.

the case of a majority nation, the forces of
fragmentation that trigger the totalizing

narrative response 22 and the difference 'within' that
cannot be totalized or contained in the

national narrative are the same.
In the case of a minority nation, however, the oppressive
forces of fragmentation
that trigger the national response

The response does

equivalent.

difference

-

does not attempt

homogenizing narrative

--

that difference.

it is

Rather,

and the fragmentation properly internal

to

it

are not

not obscure an initially genuine fragmentation or

to

reduce the activity of the people to a unified,

which should be rediscovered through the disruptive agency of
the initial force of fragmentation that obscures the presence

of an actual social formation, and which

is

opposed by assertion of the existence of that

social formation.

That

this counter-assertion

should also be problematized does not

not legitimate. Both the counter-assertion and the problematizing of
irreducible

moments of the minority

nation, and function in the tense

it

mean

that

are legitimate,

manner Bhabha

“Whether understood as the initial response to fragmentation in early modern Europe, or as every
beginning of a contemporary cycle of totalization and resistance.
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it is

describes.

However,

it

that

moment of fragmentation

second

delegitimate the counter-assertion,

at that point

it

comes

is

taken fully to

into resonance with the initially

destructive iragmentation. Both aspects
must be maintained, in order for the minority

nation (1) to resist oppression in a
(2) non-oppressive manner.

With

his focus

Bhabha misses

on the majorities and minorities of formerly
colonizimt

states,

these complexities, and ends up privileging the
performative aspect of the

nation universally. 23
that fragmentation

He

fails, in

other words, to recognize the 'difference of
difference,'

might function differently and have different meaning

in different

circumstances.
But, even as regards anti-colonialism

cannot be simply dismissed as equivalent
the first place.

It is

itself,

to the

not a simple matter of

the assertion of a competing "unity"

form of domination

becoming

that marginalizes in

like one's oppressor.

A

fundamental, dichotomous opposition was crucial to anti-colonialism. Perhaps
that colonizers introduced racial/cultural difference as a hierarchy

which they came

is

true

from the moment

with future colonies. Anti-colonialism transforms

in contact

it

at

this

difference by challenging the hierarchization, and changing a difference within a state
structure to distinct state structures.

a relation of domination.

It

The new form of difference was key

to the colonizer, that

through separatism.

To

reject this

basis for the

form of opposition

form of resistance

movements beyond mere
reflect

that

in

such a way that

Bhabha

it

resist

0n

this point,

asserts.

and oppose;

denies that on which

opposition and assertion of a consistent

(if

he parts company with Nietzsche,

Apollinian aspects of the

to reject anti-colonialism,

is

It is

one thing

to

which

itself is the

push anti-colonial

opposition, to question to what extent their practices

forms of oppression they

proceed

23

of

can restore an original or actual/organic difference only

through rejection of an imposed difference that binds the colonized
is,

to a rejection

human psyche

[see

is

it

it

come

another to claim change must

depends. Direct, unflinching

admittedly processural) political and

who

maintained a need for both Dionysian and

Ackermann, 1990:
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].

to

philosophical position

not necessarily 'bad' or oppressive
(in

is

of such an alternative without reference
situations

is

an unjustifiable totalization

othenzation that Bhabha claims

My

critique of

Bhabha has

characteristic of separatism
cultural difference because
it

is

unproductive

On my

to situation or the specific
differences in
itself;

it

replicates the logic of totalizing

the core of the dominant
implicitly focused

and anti-colonialism.
it

a blanket rejection

I

mode of national

thought.

on the type of intra-s/ate tension

do not

Bhabha's strategy of

reject

cannot engage intra -national difference,
but rather because

taken up by a true (national) minority.

account, Bhabha's analysis of the nation, and the
dynamic he describes,

become merely

a

problematic only

Bhabha seems

if

is

itself);

moment
when

it

in a

is

more comprehensive theory of the

nation. His account

taken as the comprehensive dynamic.

On

is

the one hand,

to consider his ultimate rejection of totalizing national
narrative as

necessary to a theory of the nation, but on the other, he makes clear
that he

only to add to the given understanding of the nation, and not

of it himself [320]. Taken

in the latter respect,

implicit pretension to universal application are

An
As touched upon

it

is

to

is

attempting

produce a general theory

invaluable; taken in the former, the

its limit.

Impoverished Minority

above, Bhabha's concept of "minority"

is

limited to formerly

colonized or enslaved, residual or newly immigrant groups within the society of the

former colonizer or enslaver. As explained
fragment of a

now

there, his

concept of "minority"

irrelevant social formation, a fragment that has

is

of a

been absorbed

into a

society dominated by totalizing narrators.

Yet, he explicitly claims reference for this term to "diaspora(n)s" [see, for
instance, 319], "migrants," and any other "wandering people[]

within the

Heim of the

marks of a

shifting

national culture and

boundary

its

will not be contained

unisonant discourse, but are themselves the

that alienates the frontiers
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who

of the modern nation" [see 315].

His privileging of fragmentation
over cohesion dictates an
impoverished concept of
"minority" or "marginalized" that
does not contain the actual concepts
of "diaspora(n)" or
"migrant" (group).

Diasporan immigrants and migrants are
not Bhabhan minorities. They
are not

simply part of the society into which they
have been

injected.

(national) connection with the rest of
the diaspora or their

They maintain

home

country.

significant

The diasporan

properly understood maintains permanent
resident in a place, but does not
recognize the
culture or society of that place as his or
her primary community.

home, and

is

working generally

to

support family

members

Bhabha's misunderstanding of the term migrant

is

The migrant

in the

home

will return

country.

evident in "DissemiNation." 24

There he describes the situation of and resistance by
a "migrant" "Turkish worker

Germany."

Chances

25

are,

In fact, such a Turkish "guestworker"

he has lived in Germany for years

children were likely educated exclusively in

if

the inverse of a "migrant."

is

not

German

in

all

of his

life.

Either he or his

schools, and speak perfect

German.

His children might even be third-generation "guests." The
classification of "guestworker"
in

Germany

is

way

a sham, merely a

in

which the German

state

prevents Turks, Kurds,

Vietnamese, and other immigrant laborers from acquiring German citizenship
diluting the purity of Germany and attaining a better position from

exploitation of their labor.
into the society

They

and essential

True, this

is

to

are

it.

permanent residents of Germany,

[see

it

analysis applies.
24

thereby

to challenge the

fully integrated

Klusmeyer, 1993]

consistent with Bhabha's account of the totalizing narrative that

produces a minority through making significant differences

meaning. But,

which

~

precisely because this minoritarian

A true

migrant

is

is

that

not a "migrant" that Bhabha's

a "guestworker"; the 'sham'

And

have no transcendent

is

the global

economic and

follows Ree's, as discussed above.
Again, as represented (narrated) for him by another author, John Berger, whose narrative is certainly
external to the Turk's experience. What is worse, in Footnote 59, Bhabha acknowledges having "composed
th[e] passage [on the Turk] from quotations scattered throughout [Berger's] text," adding another layer of
narrative selection and perspective. As with his reliance on literature above (Rushdie, Ishiguro), Bhabha is
caught in the realm of narrative representation and signification, without direct connection to the "people"
whose "narrative movement" he claims to "have heard" [303] and give voice to.
25
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political order that forces

him

or her into low-wage, temporary labor
in foreign countries,

under brutally exploitative and oppressive
conditions.
temporarily resident, and primarily tied to a
culture, that the migrant

is

is

its

country through one's family and

minority. At the least sign of trouble,
the

deported. Indeed, the threat of the canceling of a
temporary

powerful tool keeping the worker compliant, and

Under such

is

conditions, 'cultural negotiation'

but either impossible or the

-

"cultural performance"

work permit

fit

itself.

The migrant's

into a

their 'cultural performance,'

and

it

is

home

culture),

is

if,

is

men

anything but

"performative." Their cultural agency itself is consumed, their difference, even
disruptively intended (even

-

consumer economy of 'exotic

For instance, female overseas entertainers dance exotically for consuming
is

a

becomes not merely unproductive,

his or her insertion of cultural difference into host
countries

of the host country. 'Exotic dancing'

their

is

used frequently. [Yang, 1997]

means of exploitation and oppression

not a disruption but an extracted requirement
culture.'

precisely in being kept

prevented from disrupting the employing society,
from

entering into a renegotiative dynamic with

migrant

home

It is

if

for instance, they perceive themselves as true bearers of

consumed. There

is

no possibility of "performance"

Bhabha. The very conditions of their presence

in the host

country

in the sense

make any agency

of

in

cultural production actually part of the force of their oppression.

Performance

is,

here, not an assertion of non-totalizable difference, but the fitting

of the performer into a specific place

in a unified oppressive structure

—

it

transforms the

difference of culture into the sameness of domination by the "Other." Domination binds
the oppressed to the oppressor in a unified system through "difference."

Though

it

might be

politically

advantageous and comforting

to

view migrants

as

subaltern agents, the daily grind of exploitation and oppression and the endless

displacement from a stable place of enunciation

make them,

in fact,

considers central.

—

both in terms of place and status

--

marginal to any process of cultural negotiation of the form Bhabha

It is

not that

Bhabha

is

wrong about
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the attempt to absorb the migrants'

differences into a totalizing narrative, but
that he fails to recognize the
situational

of the forces supporting
well.

Recognizing

movement:
genuine

and

their ability to

that the narrated are also narrators

is

absorb "performative” excess as
only half of the necessary

also necessary to recognize the intensity
with

is

it

this process,

political

agency

is

undermined or co-opted. That

workers do not struggle and

fight heroically; but

it

is

The primary connection
does not offer
societies.

as

is

Bhabha would have us

(cultural, political,

not to say that these migrant

is

after all, essential

elements of their

is

encouraged by

home

revolt.

their

societies precisely

countries. Their remittances

home

home

keep

their

their

home

societies are not simple unities.

disavow or ignore them, or

facilely

society, but in their extension

assume

rates

is clear.

beyond

it.

Even

against the distance. In this sense, national

'unity,' the

if

their simple integration

Their difference

They

is

not

are linked into the

longer 'given' by mere circumstance of territory, language, or culture.

Though Bhabha does

home

home unemployment

nation across distance, across state borders and cultural difference. Their unity

26

are,

In other words, they are fully present in their

society, the complexity of their position

'internal to' the

Migrants

by being absent. 26

However, because of them,

into the

narrative.

[Yang, 1997], Their activities are heavily regulated and

home governments.

nationalist narratives

home and work

however imperial and

home

countries economies afloat, their families from starving, and

from triggering

through

and social) with the home country

part of a totalizing

home

—

believe.

are a product of arrangements between both,

coerced. Their migrant status itself

do these struggles

not as automatic

Migrants are truly a hybrid border between the

relief.

They

-

which any assertion of

to say that rarely

have the etfects Bhabha assumes. Socio-political change
the sheer fact of "performance"

power

It

nation as a group,

is

no

must be asserted
is

linked

not discuss states and societies outside of the industrialized, 'First World,' reflection

them yield other important types. These include the migrant 'transnational corporation
man,' the 'sex tourist,' and the 'development worker.' Rather than being blocked from the culture of the
society in which he or she goes, the First purposefully ignores it while at the same time imposing profound
economic forces on it, the second consumes it, and the third dictates changes in it. In each case, the direct
or indirect 'disruption' of the culture and society into which the migrant moves is profound. It is obviously
not resistant, however, but powerfully imperialist and oppressive.
on migrants

into
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through connections, not through
'containment'
properly be used

on

-

in a state.

not the givenness of the organic,

is

if this

homogeneous group,

term can

still

but depends

the assertion of relations across
potentially fragmenting distance.

Bhabha's concept of the (national) group
the

-

Its 'unity'

same

as Kedourie's, as discussed above.

homogeneous

set

of individuals.

-

the totality of the nation

The group

is

-

is

roughly

an organic whole or a

Of course, where Kedourie views

the nation as the

pretension to such a group (the fantasy of
such a group [totalizing narrative] that
produces
violent action to try to force reality into
correspondence with

favor of liberal individualism,

Bhabha

it)

and

rejects the nation in

sees the tension between totalizing narrative
and

the difference within the nation (as narrative
referent) as constituting the nation. Yet,
this

tension

is still

To
'unity,'

it

an intensive fragmentation.

the extent that the society in

is

which the migrant labors can be considered

likewise internally extensive.

The migrant

is

rather an extension of the society, something "added to"

a totality suggests an extensive perspective.

independently of the
the supplementarity

intensive

is

state, this

is

a

not an internal differentium, but
it.

That

does not "add up" to

this

As with Fanon's conception of the

nation

"supplementarity" comes as a revelation to Bhabha. But,

just linked extension.

Only from a perspective

in

which

the

unjustifiably privileged does the "supplemental" take on an almost mystical

or transcendent significance, [see 305

The general
'unified,' trans-state

-

306 ]

analysis applies to diasporan minorities as well.

group. For Bhabha,

all

A

diaspora

is

a

immigrants are fragments of temporally

precedent groups that had some form of perceived unity, such as living on the same
territory.

He

has no concept of what

it

means

for a

group

to be a

segment of a group

that

continues to exist despite or even through the aid of dispersion.

True diaspora inverts Bhabha's model.

It is

not merely the fracturing of a

conceptual unity (based on the assumption that most members of the nation were
point in one

common

territory,

at

some

based on assumptions of residually shared characteristics
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such as religion or language).

It is

the transformation of an
intensive unity into an

6XtemiVe ° ne WhiGh coinci dentally
transforms the very conditions and
meaning of 'unity'
itself. Unity becomes a
matter not of totalization, but rather
of connection.
’

Bhabha

rightly rejects the

that the national population
exists

presumed

"horizontality" of the nation, that

on the same narrative or

through

implication of

its

lateral relations.

'laterality,' that is,

Though he

is

right to

that his theory

expose the hierarchical relations that

is true,

way

at all.

of the nation allows for more complex

representations of cultural difference than
instance, 292]. This

complexity

full

extension of the social formation

structure the nation internally, he fails
to account for the laterality in any

Bhabha claims

the idea

social level, without hierarchy.

Yet, confined to an intensive concept
of social formations, he misses the

of the term, with

is,

is

possible in inter-totality oppositions [see, for

and his conceptual frame should be

in play

even where a

binary opposition' appears to be the better
description of social tension and oppression.

However, what he does not acknowledge

is

complexities of cultural difference emerge

many

framework,

in their continually disruptive

in

which the

form, requires in

cases a backgrounding of the main structure of power relations
and political

oppression and resistance

view of social/political
must

that adopting this

itself

To

itself.

His

own framework

reality (and not just

due

be supplemented by what exceeds
his credit,

one of Bhabha's goals

to its

does not allow a comprehensives
focus on culture and narrative), and

it.

is

to challenge the temptation to valorize

minority group liberation that leaves untouched power relations within the group,
and

which has tended

to

compromise

to

some

extent the gains of decolonization. This

is

an

important goal, and was stressed by Fanon. Rather than identifying a process of

comprehensive, substantive
of group liberation

itself.

however, Bhabha seems

liberation,

to

have avoided the issue

While Bhabha complexifies the concept of oppressed minority,

he also opens the question of for

whom

does

it
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produce

its

cultural interventions, that

is,

whom
itself,

do they function

to benefit?

Is

it

for the state in

which

it

is

located? Or,

is

it

for

either as a fragment or a diaspora?

Bhabha's answer
the society

is

dear: minoritarian cultural production

more generally - however indispensable and

minoritarian production might be.

It is

this

answer

that

part

is

of a process of

politically productive the

commits Bhabha

to the

problematic form of minoritarian politics analyzed
above. The ground of that answer

is

his reductive concept of minority.

Bhabha might counter
extension,

is

simply

my

concept of the group, with

liberal or pluralistic.

individual, such that a group

chosen or imposed.

that

My

is

to

make

it

It is

always a merely contingent, external formation

contention

essential

is

that the

group

is

to

is

essential

it

-

—

whether

-motivating the

but not given in the sense of an

and constructed. Pluralism

inessential or meaningless.

perspective

reference to

Liberalism asserts the primacy of the atomic

formation and reproduction of the links necessary
organic totality.

its

privileges difference in order

The group understood from

the extensive

not concerned with difference, but with gaps or interruptions that must be

overcome.
I

have used the term 'extensive perspective' with specific meaning.

I

am

not

claiming that the nation can be understood without reference to intensive difference.
Rather, both

moments

are present. Or, rather, the nation can be looked at with either

privileged. Privileging intensity yields a concept akin to Bhabha's, with a given totalizing

narrative (pedagogy) disrupted by an 'inconceivable' difference in the
narrative.

Privileging extension yields

my

beyond of the

concept of the migrant's nation or diaspora.

The tension between perspectives — between pedagogy and performance,
not simply antipathy:

it

is

also mutual dependence.

As

either

the conception or actuality of the nation, the nation itself

homogenizing,

totalitarian implosion, or fragmentation.

triggered as limit, to reflect the

is

you

moment becomes

will

—

is

focal in

threatened by either a

At such points, the other must be

dynamic away from an extreme.
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if

On my

account, Bhabha's analysis of the
nation, and the dynamic he describes,

become merely

a

problematic only

Bhabha seems

moment
when

it

in a

is

more comprehensive theory of the

nation.

taken as the comprehensive dynamic.

to consider his ultimate rejection

On

It is

the one hand,

of totalizing national narrative as

necessary to a theory of the nation, but on the
other, he makes clear that he

only to add to the given understanding of the
nation, and not

of it himself [320]. Taken as the

The idea of a

sexuality,

is

it is

-

attempting

produce a general theory

invaluable.

state narrative that is not a national (cultural)
narrative

case of the Kurds, above

marginalization

latter,

to

is

-

as in the

suggests a further issue. According to Bhabha,

not simply a matter of "national" difference:

and (biologically conceived)

totalizing national narratives.

What

is

racial forms.

it

also takes gender,

These differences are disruptive of

instance, culturally determined roles for

women, forms of sexuality,

etc.

which

is

for

him

for

But, they are not

simply cultural. Bhabha appears to collapse these forms of difference wholly
cultural realm,

—

more, they do have cultural components

into the

the cultural realm. For instance, he follows Kristeva's

nationalization of gender difference and issues, and indeed view of the nation "as a space
for the

emergence of feminist

political

and psychic identifications" and as

itself

reconstituted through "feminist strategies of political identification" [303

-

emphasis on the

is

is

role of these differences in the constitution of the nation

The

well-taken, as

the innovative analysis of the complexities of their interconnections. But, just as the

nation

is

not simply cultural, neither are these differences. Bhabha seems not to observe

the distinction

between something being

fully cultural,

can be perceived from within a cultural framework,
cultural realm

and

(2)

The 'bottom

its

line'

presence beyond
here

is

articulated within a conceptual
is

306],

that

this

in

and the possibility
terms of (1)

realm reduced into

its

its

its

totality

effects in the

shadow

gender issues, for instance, cannot be

framework focused on

that

in the realm.

fully

the nation (or culture).

Though

it

important to engage gender issues from within the nation, part of the tension between
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them

is

due

to the tact that they are

competing forms of conceiving

difference, and only partially commensurable.

Bhabha

social relations

and

asserts that performative

difference undercuts the pretensions of any
'social identity' (nation, gender, class,
race) to
a privileged or foundational position. But,
in doing so, he

assumes

that they are all

dissolved into the same cultural space.

An

Over-Active Imagination

Etienne Balibar follows Eric
nation. For both, the nation
reality.

is

Hobsbawm

in asserting the “ unreality”

of the

an illusion or fantasy that does not correspond to social

There are no “nations” as they are described by
For Hobsbawm, the illusion of the nation

is

nationalists.

produced against the

reality

of class-

based social structures. The illusion covers over true class structures, by posing
an
alternative analysis of social reality.

on

fantastic unifying

relations.

As

I

It is

and homogenizing

said above,

on or does not correspond

Hobsbawm

a competing concept of the social that

ideals, rather than the social facts

rejects the nation because

to class structures.

The problem

is

it

that

is

is

based

of economic

not (solely) based

he assumes without

justification that class structures are the single, foundational social reality

and context of

all relations.

My

response to

Hobsbawm’ s

critique asserted that the structures

found by

analysis of social data depended on the analyst’s pre-given conceptual frame. In other

words, one would find nations

(albeit in a traditional, limited sense) if

one assumed an

ultimately national (or cultural, linguistic, etc.) basis of social relations, while one would
find class tensions and struggles if one
that

examined

foregrounds class and economic relations.

focused conceptual frame

is

It

social data through a conceptual frame

was enough then

it

argue that a class-

no more legitimate than a nation-focused one.

Balibar’s critique functions at a level deeper than
reject

to

simply by examination of

its

Hobsbawm’s

does.

One cannot

problematic assumptions. Balibar’s critique,
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in fact.

operates by examination of the
problematic assumptions that he asserts
are

at the

core of

concepts ot the nation. While
Hobsbawm’s critique uses the standard
methods of
historiography to demonstrate that
“national histories” manipulate
historical data to

produce bad analyses of them, Balibar
locates the problematic nature
of the nation
level

of this historiography

itself.

Balibar's analysis of the nation

most sophisticated statements of this prevalent
view of the
For Balibar, two illusions are

at the

is,

in fact,

at the

one of the

nation.

core of national historiography.

The

first

“consists in believing that the generations
which succeed one another over centuries
on a

reasonably stable
to

territory,

under a reasonably univocal designation,
have handed

each other an invariant substance” [Balibar,
1991a:

see in the relative stability of a population
over

many

at

the core of the stability.

development from which we

In other words, “ nationals”

86],

generations on a specific territory

something more than the operation of specific material
essence

forces.

The second “consists

They recognize

in believing that the process

[86],

of

National historiography

selects out only data that supports the idea that the nation’s
history has
It

a national

select aspects retrospectively, so as to see
ourselves as the

culmination of that process, was the only one possible”

“destiny.”

down

been a necessary

misinterprets and misrepresents the data comprising the “history
of a

nation” as a necessary, determinate causal sequence, after excluding

all

data that suggest

alternative histories or the contingency of the process.

National historiography (1) invests a special transcendent and invisible
significance to the material events of a “national” history and
(2) imposes on the data an

unnecessarily necessary linear series of causal relations. Thus, national historiography
not just

wrong about

the data

it

examines (and does

concept of the movement and structure of history

The
approaches

first

problem with

to history are

this

formulation

is

not).

It

relies

on an untenable

itself.

that

it

assumes

that these particular

unique to national historiography. This

is

clearly not the case.

For instance, classical Marxism represents human history as a rigidly determinate past
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is

andfuture

To

-

this

accoun t Of the

socialist “destiny”

of humanity,

it

adds the project of

effecting the transition through
necessary revolutionary activity.
In this sense,

preserves the Christian eschatology.

Were

this a “better”

account of history, then

perhaps Balibar’s critique of national
historiography would hold. But

Hobsbawm showed

that

it

is

not.

The

many major

That

is

on a more general

not to say that politicized approaches
to history (that

expose those points precisely

pasts

at

which what appears

to

some -

critique that

But, at the

same

is, all

approaches)

like Balibar’s

-

seek to

have been absolutely determined

can be seen as undetermined. As Bhabha argues,

and presents.

treatment of

non-national and anti-national approaches
to history as well.

necessarily see the past as rigidly determined.
Indeed,

in the past

my

force of Balibar’s critique thus
rests not on the

specific nature of national “projects”
and “destinies,” but

applies to

it

opens up new possible

this

time, even history that avoids claims of destiny
and

project (1) selects a set of data relevant to the issue
under consideration, usually by
asserting the fundamentality of that issue, and
(2)

makes claims about

the progression of

forces and ideas that operated throughout the period in
question. That an anti-totalizing
history does not

make

totalizing claims does not

mean

that

does not depend on just as selective an accounting of data

its

—

privileged above those conforming to the totalizing narrative

case against those

who do

“exceptional” data are

-

and just as much of an

attribution of a constant force operating in the relevant history.

This

is

clear in cases of anti-national histories such as Balibar’s. Balibar does not

just point out the inevitable gaps in any nationalist presumptions about the linguistic,
cultural, etc.,

“nation”

is

homogeneity of a population; he goes

far

beyond

this,

claiming that

not even a partially correct analysis of the social relations of presumably

“national” populations. Rather than exposing the limits of nationality against

supposedly absolute claims,

it

asserts a counter-absolute that

national relations and structures

- however

its

must view any evidence of

cut and full of gaps

-

as spurious. Further,

assumes a constant, diabolic and manipulative force of “nationalism” operating
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in

it

history to cause these otherwise
indismissable data that support claims
of the existences

of nations.
This suggests a second central problem. In
the very act of condemning “national
thinking

that tinds a unifying essence at the
core of a temporally (and spatially)
diverse

population, Balibar grants himself the huge
assumption that
essentially the same, containing the

two elements he

all

critiques.

national concepts are

For him,

all

“national

histories” can be grouped into a gross category
that can be critiqued in a very general

manner.

Are

Do

all

all

national concepts the

same? Do

nationals think alike in fundamental

work of Partha Chatterjee
Colonial World:

A

all

share the

same “national illusions”?

ways? Things cannot be

this simple.

The

applies directly to such claims. In Nationalist Thought

and the

Derivative Discourse? [1993b], Chatterjee challenges prevalent

claims that anti-colonial nationalisms were simple derivations of
historically prior

European nationalisms. For Chatterjee, the very notion

European national forms

are

mere

European ones

replications of

general colonialist historiography and ideology.

that anti-colonial

It is

is

and other non-

derivative of a

more

not that strains of European-

influenced nationalism have not existed in India (the focus of Chatterjee’s study), or even
that ‘grand nationalist historicism’ has not

been present. Yet, the Indian nation and

nationalism(s) have been constituted by the tension between the imposition of a European

model of the nation 27 (assuming just one of these) and
part of a

more general anti-colonialism and

Euro-American influence and native

social

the resistance to

anti-neo-colonialism.

and ideological forms

it

that has

been

The tension between
is

necessarily present in

any assertion of independence.
Balibar mistakes the presence of some Euro-American components (quite often
the legacy of centuries of direct colonial domination) for replication of the complete

27

Through imposition of bureaucratic

interstate structures

structures related to

and organizations and what

is

European state forms, through the form of
component states and societies, through

required of

ideology, etc.
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Euro-American nation form (assuming just

one). His obliviousness to the
internal

complexity ot anti-colonial nations and
nationalisms and the powerful remnants
of
colonialism that pervade every post-colonial
society [see, for instance, Balibar,
1991b:
44] belie his surface ‘sensitivity' to anti-colonialism
[see, for instance, 41]. This

suggest that the potential oppressiveness of
the nation form

Not

derivative.

at all.

Certainly, Europeans do not have a

is

a purely

is

not to

European

monopoly on oppression, and

forms of oppression quite often correspond cross-culturally.
But, non-European
oppressiveness should not be considered

strictly derivative

Ignoring non-European forms of oppression

of European sources.

one of the strange effects of this type of

is

neo-colonialism.

This diversity

is

generalizable in two ways. First, Balibar offers no evidence
that

different “national concepts” share the

two

illusions

He merely

he claims.

a vague universalist tone. Indeed, his primary example of nationalism

even when he
or

typical

that

is

explicitly discusses the issue of whether or not

nationalism, he concludes that

typical of all nationalisms. [50

because the

still

-

it is

both, that

is,

Nazism

is

And

an “exceptional”

52] And, this does not resolve the contradiction,

present exceptionality of Nazism places

that the contradiction

is

Nazism.

has a contradictory nature

it

at

once within and outside of

the realm of “typical” nationalisms. Yet, this must be true for

means

is

asserts this in

extended to

all

all

nationalisms. This

nationalisms, which are thereby both

exceptional and typical.
Part of the reason that Balibar considers

features

concept.

is

that

he assumes

that for

all

national concepts to share essential

every presumed nation there

A range of national concepts

is

is

but one national

generally present within the complex associated

with one labeled nation, as well as across them. Within any group that
nation, there will inevitably be a

membership,

its

Even

labeled a

number of competing concepts of the nation — of its

proper “project” (or whether

‘self-determination,’ etc.

is

if

it

has one),

one or some of these
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fit

its

history,

what

it

means by

Balibar’s concept, often one or

more do

Indeed,

not.

in

most nations, national concepts

opposed by other national concepts. This

directly

Bhabha’s concept of the nation, as well as

Some

point,

fitting Balibar’s

of course,

to Chatterjee’s

is

concept are

fundamental

to

28
.

selt-described nations conceive themselves
precisely as this

complex of

different self-concepts, histories, projects,
etc. For instance, Julia Kristeva,
in Nations

Without Nationalisms argues that France
,

nationalism, but by a

commitment

is

not defined by a single concept or

to plurality that allows a range

nationalisms to co-exist in a productive tension.
States and Great Britain.

Of course,

A

similar strain exists in the United

the fact that in each state this strain

contested by ‘purist’ concepts of the relevant nation
linguistic considerations

—

-

—

large, like India or China,

or tiny, like

Armenia

and so forth

-

Even

is

hotly

usually based on racial and

tends to confirm the general point. Whether one accepts
the

pluralistic claims of the liberals of these states or not,

described nation

of self-concepts and

or Albania

—

one will find

in

almost any

self-

medium-sized, such as Vietnam or Mexico,

significantly different national concepts, nationalisms,

often in great tension with each other.

in apparently rigidly unified nations, often strong internal

and

external

forces have selected out a certain nationalism or national concept for dominance. For
instance,

one could argue

that external as well as internal forces

role in selecting out a particularly virulent and monological

Yet, even in the midst of

since

become

By

its

most extreme

unifying

lumping

deciding that

form of Serbian nationalism.

activity, counter-currents existed that

all

national concepts associated with a given “nation,” Balibar

all

is

searching for in each “super-nationalism.”

But, this

forms of German national self-conception into Nazism, and then

German “nationalism”

in

general

is fascist.

“The Germans” may have

displayed an exceptional proclivity to fascism over the past century or

20

have

significant.

inevitably finds the elements he
like

have had a significant

See especially Chatterjee, 1993a.
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so, but so

have

is

(some) Germans produced
other concepts of their
nation not necessarily
subject

to this

criticism.

Strangely, at the root of
Balibar’s error there seems a
rads, or nationalist
impulse
to

homogenize and reduce an “other.”
Balibar

sees only a

homogenous

unity of
“nationalists” where a complex
set of national self-concepts
exists. Indeed, directly
contrary to his claims that the
imposition of a national name
merely assigns a single label
to a diversity,

he

is

misled by the existence of such
labels into thinking that
only one

national concept

is

associated with each

-

that the nation fa

homogeneous

in this central

way.
Bahbar’s reduction of the nation
restricts this criticism to national
history

to historical illusion thus
(1) inaccurately

and

(2) inaccurately asserts

it as the general form
of all national concepts rather than
merely one form among many, both
within individual

nations and across the field of nations.
Yet, implicit in

Balibar
- is

s

assumption

that the constructedness

my

of nations

-

defense

is

acceptance of

to the extent that

it

is

equivalent to their being illusions. For him,
the core meaning of the nation

“ my,h[]

of national

summary

fashion as

ori « in D” [87].

Hobsbawm

Though

its

does, he goes on not to explore the

“continuing power”

Balibar

is

clear

accuracy of national

a

is

how

complex nature of the
the illusion

[87],

on the pure unreality of the nation. Not only does he

histories, but

critique the

he also argues that the very concept of nation derives

from other social categories. The nation

is

produced through the psychological

(1)

misapplication ot the idea ot kinship [lOOff.],
(2) the racialization of the notion of
“linguistic

community”

modern times”

[95],

[96ff.],

The nation

and/or (3) “a religion
is

other social forms and categories.
it is

nothing in
It is

itself,

-

if

not indeed the religion

is

a construct that,
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-

of

but defined purely by reference to

a form of religion, a

a second-degree illusion: race itself

-

Balibar does not dismiss the nation in
a

nation as a genuine social form, but rather to
determine exactly

maintains

present

myth of kinship,

when

etc.

Indeed,

applied to language,

produces a “Active ethnicity” that

is

the basis of the “ideal nation”
[96]:

category from which nation derives
(race)

To

is

even the

social

a construct.

say that nations are produced
through

human

intentionality or

agency

is

not to

prove that they are illusions or
fantasies. There are two problems
with such a claim.
First,

it

assumes

that legitimate social formations
are “all natural,” that

from the blind, mechanical, brute
operation of material
conscious activity of the

Obviously,
indirect

human

human

human

is,

constructed

social forces, without the self-

beings affected by and affecting/effecting
these forces.

beings act and material forces are
produced in part through direct and

agency. But, in Hegelian language, this
account assumes that the only

legitimate social formations are those
produced by “agents” (if this term can be used)

with

consciousness”

without

-

they think as they

self-consciousness”

act,

perhaps about what they should do

-

but

they do not explicitly reflect on and try to
affect their

:

conditions, reflect on their place in the world, the “
big picture” of the sources and effects

of their actions,

their relations with others, etc., or, if they do,
these thoughts are directly

derivative of material conditions without affecting those
29
conditions.
It is

constitutive

precisely

—

when human

intentionality

though not solely determining

—

desire

—

is

recognized as a

— component of the

nation that

it is

dismissed by Balibar and others as illusion or fantasy. For Balibar (as for
Hobsbawm),

such a social metaphysics appears a residual ot his previous pure Marxism,
even as

been tempered by post-structuralism. The post-structuralism perhaps
explicit tenets

of the

rigid material

frees

On

it.

he rejects the rigid materially determinist mentality that he claims to find
the nation, but

on

him from

determinism of classical Marxism, but has

reach deeply into the hidden metaphysical assumptions underlying

the other, he rejects the nation precisely because

it

is

it

has
the

failed to

the one hand,
at the

core of

not materially

determined.

“"Consciousness" merely responds
material, while "self-consciousness"

determined by material

to external
is

and

internal forces, without rising

above the realm of the

precisely mental intervention in the material that

forces.
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is

not strictly

One would

expect, on the contrary, that the presence
of

production ot social terms

is

a positive

-

human agency

or at least potentially positive

-

in the

thing

30
.

Certainly, oppressive and manipulative
constructions are possible, and are the
focus of

Hobsbawm

work. But,

s

at the

same

time, the absence of human conceptual
agency and

mtentionality seems inherently negative, reducing
the nation to a mechanical product
of

non-human
at least

say that

it

is

the “artificiality” of nations that

makes them

possibly worthwhile.

The

relationship between desire and the history of the
nation

one hand, desire
role

One might

forces.

of desire

a necessary

is

in the formation

component of truly human

is

social forms.

of the subject and social forms

is,

On

complex.

The

constitutive

in fact, a central

theme

of much of contemporary psychoanalytically-influenced post-structuralist
theory.
other hand,

I

stress that desire

does not operate in a vacuum.

product of desire alone, that

is,

of a history solely by desire

is illusion.

a fabrication. But this

This

is

is

A

given history

misused, or

is

is

“ into something,” that

sense. But, at the

mundane

same

is,

is

used relative

the key to post-structural

to a set

the

be the

not necessary, and the generation

an oppressive (manipulative) desire. Thus, there

that desire interacts with or

On

may

and

psychoanalytic critiques of the nation and nationalism. The crux of the critiques
desire

the

is

is

that

recognition

of facts. Desire transforms these

facts

organizes them and gives them meaning, in a neo-Kantian

time, desire

is

philosophical terms, desire

not free from facts, to construct

is

its

own. In

necessary to the recognition and production of

social forms, but not sufficient.

^Interestingly, this construction of community through historical interpretation has become a central
method of neighborhood-level community organizing. Organizers in urban low-income US neighborhoods
are now taught this technique as a key tool in developing the sense of community necessary to transcending
the limits of "interest group" local-level politics, toward construction of progressive, stable communities

equipped

to deal

with the effects of poverty, racism, and other forms of oppression.

Of course,

quite often

same people who condemn the nation or nationalism as false, coercive, oppressive, etc.
For instance, attended more than one community organizing training session at the 1996
Massachusetts Partners in Prevention "Ounce of Prevention" Conference that focused on how to write
community histories in such a way as to foster recognition of commonalities and on-going productive
these are the

I

relations.
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The
I

am

desire

I

am

writing of here

the historian or social reflector’s
desire. That

is

concerned with the production of interpretations
of raw

complete the data, though no interpretation
constructing concepts of or the ideal
well in the

moment, producing

is

acts that themselves

and transformed

linear,

determinative relationship to her/his acts

might be opaque
results

due

to the actor,

to internal

basis against

which

and not

When

raw data of history.
is,

that

much more

split or offset desire

by a different

-

not the least due to the fact that they
explicit intention

—

and

they are not a

of the historian/reflector’s desires. That opens
if partial

one factors

conceptualization of social formations

Bhabha’s

the

and external forces beyond the control of the actor

the historical/social data.

This

become

mention the gap between

to

to evaluate the results

become

Desire of course operates as

Because an immediate actor’s desires do not bear
a

up the possibility of more than one “right”

data, things

nation.

historical/social reflector, that

desire,

into history.

historical data that in fact

the one correct or necessary one,
as well as

moment of the

These are then engaged by the desiring

is,

or non-exclusive interpretation of

in that the

is itself

production of history and

also internal to production of historical

complicated.

has interesting Hegelian implications, and intersects

offset narratives of the nation.

The key

issue here

is

that desire itself does not

generate history (the vulgar post-structuralist position), while neither do the raw data of
history determine
-

it

(with or without the intercession of a perceiving, structuring subject

this is the standard empiricist or

respectively, that

and most

perhaps due

latter

assumption

to their capacity to

extreme position, without being able
critical

theorists,

sophisticated post-structuralist concepts such as Balibar’s play on both sides

of this fence, allowing the
is

by contemporary analytic philosophy and

historians).

More

This

Kantian concept of history and social formations,

as understood

is,

-

to

to

sneak

recognize

at

in

without being acknowledged.

once the implications of either

recover sufficiently from their immersion

response to dominant analytic approaches
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to history

in the

and society. The criticized

constrained concepts have long been
major buttresses of dominant, often
oppressive
histones, because they hide key
assumptions about history and society,
and exclude

discussion of their

own

biases and perspectivity, as well
as delegitimating alternative

histones based on alternative but equally
valid assumptions.

As

a reaction to these

constrained concepts, post-structural theorists
have often formulated these alternative

views of historical and social
the

facts, the role

dominant analytic ones, rather than

have often

the

same

left

no room

etc.,

as opposite to

as critical re-evaluations of the
relationship of

desire to history and social formations.
theorists

of the historian/reflector,

The

necessarily reactive posture of sophisticated

for theorization of the subtleties of
this relationship.

At

time, recognition of this subtle relationship
has required avoiding any simplistic

absolute openness or individual/desire-based relativism.
Without the theoretical

apparatus in place to do

this, a relatively

of the oppressed were considered

unsophisticated valorization of the perspectives

sufficient.

This

is

clear in Balibar’s work,

which takes

an oppresseds view of history as a ground. Unfortunately, his
determination of which
oppressed view(s) should predominate allows him

assumptions without importing others. That

how

is,

to

import certain conceptual

he selects which oppressions are key, and

they are related to each other. The impulse

is

laudable, but the result reintroduced

the constrictive approach to history reminiscent of the standard analytical
approach.
I

am

concerned here with anticipating the opposite

vulgar post-structuralist

error,

interpretations of my claims about the “openness” of history. History cannot be leveled
to the

pure product of the present that
,

cannot be leveled
occurs.

to the

Most analyses

is,

the desiring historian. At the

pure product of the past that

tend to

,

is,

time,

determined univocally as

move on only one of these

axes.

been the discovery of the axis of the present/desire. But often
still

same

The post-modern

this

it

it

turn has

discovery obscures the

important role of the other axis.

The debates between “naturalism” and “constructivism”
debate of “nature versus nurture,” which are

still
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are akin to historical

significant in social theory today.

The

latest

cycle has gone from one extreme
to the other. In the 1960s,
environment was

considered everything, while today the
focus on genetics (and perhaps
advances

in

influencing genetics) have shifted
emphasis almost solely onto the

true that

environment has been revealed

to

latter.

If

it

is

be less than fully determinative
of social behavior (for

instance, alcoholism, mental illness,
obesity, etc., are recognized often
as genetically

determined

afflictions,

acknowledge

its

while regarding such things as mental
retardation, failure to

physical reality

as problematic. After

all,

substance abuse, mental

is

problematic), the dramatic shift of recent
years

is

just

study after study has revealed the strong
link of women’s

illness,

and other problems

to

childhood sexual and physical

abuse: to pretend that these are simply genetically
determined

is

nothing more than a

convenient maneuver for preserving patriarchy.

The analogy
relationship

At some

is

to

contemporary genetic research

is fruitful.

A

dialectical

not a static tension between two forces, but rather a
dynamic interaction.

points, one force predominates, at others the other does.
For purposes of this

dissertation, a ‘synthesis” should not be considered a
resolution of the tension, but rather
their

fundamental linking

to

each other

only over the course of the process, not
conditions).

It is,

constructive

—

in

an on-going process. Indeed, “balance” exists

at individual points

within

of course, possible that for certain nations, one

dominates

in general,

it

(except as temporary

moment —

“natural” or

with the others merely a minor component. Such

a lopsided dialectic produces a lopsided nation, either essentially constructed (artificial)

or excessively materially determined (and thus imposed on
participation).

It is

the former that

is

More
nation.

than

Human

members without

truly “ illusory,” while the latter borders

ethnicity rather than nation. This lop-sidedness

and participation of both aspects

its

is

different

on

from the perpetual shifting

in a nation.

this, this dialectical shifting

continually revises the “origin ” of the

intervention in individual development reaches

such as education,

their

to revise the very

beyond external

effects,

“givenness” of genetics. Genetic engineering
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produces
such,

new

'‘givens,” rather than merely
trying to influence

makes

i,

irrelevant the debate

between nature and nurture

forces that nurture as the forces
are turned onto nature
forces determining

how genes

are manipulated

-

nature produces the

“Environment”

itself.

- comes

what has been given. As

to define

what

is

-

external

“hereditary”

itself.

Origins” themselves become
relative, not absolute. For
instance,
that there

no absolute

is

ethnicity.

I

would agree

All ethnic groups are the products
of the intermingling

(dramatic or gradual) between two or
more prior groups, which are themselves
such
products. Ethnicity

is

always relative or provisional. But,
does that make

it

illusory?

That ethnicities change and develop,
and even come into and out of existence,
does not

mean

they are illusory. For Balibar to reject
them on this ground requires rejecting all

social structures,

which perhaps he wishes

probably formed

initially

later revised

not

mean

to.

That Armenian ethnicity, for example, was

by a conquest of Hittites by Urartans
2,500 years ago, and then

through assimilation of Jews, Persians (and
Indians), and other groups does

that

however, that

Armenians
its

are not distinct

from these other groups.

It

does mean,

ultimate reality depends on a concept of Armenian
ethnicity as

the material processes that produced

it.

Armenian

ethnicity

is

now a

much

“given,” by

as

this

conceptual leap.

A

very precise link

to the nation is possible,

‘secondary instincts.” According

become
Over
but

fixed over time.

human

society itself

rigidly determined culture, ethics, etc.

the culture

and ethics
is

to this concept, cultural practices, ethics,

They become “naturalized.” But

a long period of time, a

now

ultimately arbitrary, relative to these

reflected in

them

is

this is

reworked

only the

in line

The society produces

and ethics were natural and necessary
is

through Nietzsche’s concept of

to

and the

like

first step.

with a non-absolute
its

members

as if

them. Though the particular culture

members

it

is

absolutely necessary

as a “secondary instinct,” not biologically but socially “natural.”
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-

it

Balibar, with Nietzsche, rejects this
as ultimately arbitrary, but at
the

Nietzsche recognizes an inevitability in

this process that Balibar fails
to

All social structures are “arbitrary” in
this way, that

naturalness that

is

is,

same

time,

acknowledge.

take on the appearance of

perhaps the inertia that results from their
actualization as opposed to

alternative potentials. Balibar’ s difficulties
again appear to stem from certain
Marxist

assumptions

in his

work. His implicit valorization of the “natural”
seems derivative of a

belief in material determinism. At the risk
of generalization, classical
naturalize

its

historical

is

rarely

made

is

the inevitable result of a determined social
evolution. This

today, at least explicitly, but even as Balibar gives
up this positive

side of the claim, he preserves

One might
maintain a

strict

its

foundation as a tool in critique of the nation.

argue that Balibar (and classical Marxism more generally) does
not

material determinism. Such an argument

emphasized importance of the

is

(common

It

to the clearly

requires class

interest)

among

the proletarians.

construed as recognition of the true nature of social relations, and

important

is

that

it

it is,

but what

is

must proceed through the agency of organizers who recognize and

explain this reality to those afflicted by

even

would appeal

component of Marxism.

ideal

consciousness and a recognition of solidarity
This

to

scheme. So often classical Marxists have claimed
that the

overthrow of capitalism
claim

Marxism tends

it.

While Marx,

in reversing

in this ideal or intellectual activity the driving force

just as well

acknowledge the former

accurately,

upon

Hegel, recognized

of material relations, one might

as not entirely subject to the latter

—

or,

more

rejecting strict determinism, one might recognize a greater latitude and

significance for the former, as well as an increased randomness in the latter that must be

organized by intellectual agents. To do

of all social structures. For Balibar

this,

however,

to resist this

is

to recognize the “artificiality”

conclusion would then appear to be from

the causes suggested above.

Balibar does recognize a residual reality in the illusion of the nation. That

recognizes that the illusion of the nation does have real effects.
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He views

it

is,

he

as an ideal

construct that
are nations,

- real

is

'

because

assumed

it is

and nations are referred

legal fiction, or institutionalization

to

be

People and states act as

real.

to in laws, constitutions,
etc.

of a

fiction.

It

individuals perceive history ay
if nations have been agents in
still

preserves the fundamentality of the “
illusion.”

reality

of the nation

itself,

Thus, the nation

a narrative fiction, as well

is

It is

it.

if

[96]

there
is

a

-

But, this analysis

not that Balibar recognizes the

but rather that he recognizes the
reality of the effects of the

nation as an illusion. “Nationals” are
purely the effects of the nation, not
also

its

producing agents.

As Bhabha
limits,

one can recognize these

As

reworking.
results

has shown, this one-sidedness

is

effects

have suggested, there

I

is

these

is

new

not accurate. Transcending Balibar’s

givens

an on-going

-

as themselves subject to

dialectic, a constant shifting.

a blurring of the categories of “natural” and
“artificial.”

interesting

is that,

after

extended rejections of the

split

What

is

What

particularly

between “good” and “bad”

nationalisms [see, for instance, 1991b: 47ff. Balibar himself
assumes a similarly
],

problematic

between “natural” and

split

Nietzsche

of ideology. But,
natural/artificial

second

s

it

instinct

is

often treated as a description of the ultimate

might be understood

dichotomy

itself.

artificiality are visible in a host

“artificial.”

to

mark

power

the problematic nature of the

The problems associated with claims of naturalness or

of simple examples. For instance,

why

is

an

otter using a

rock to crack a mussel open not the use of a tool and therefore “unnatural”? What

is

“natural” about “organic” crops grown according to a carefully planned and executed
cultivation procedure?

of organic crops as
that

we

Human

agency

in inorganic.

are not “natural,” that

The

we

is

just as present

and purposeful

history of philosophy

are distinct

is

in the cultivation

the history of the assertion

from animals and above them. Racism and

other forms of oppression often depend on animalizing the victims, as Balibar himself

explains [56ff.].
us

more than

Our

natural.

intelligence

is

said to

mark us off from other

living things, to

make

At the same time, material determinism (Marxist or otherwise)
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suggests that even this intelligence

our self-consciousness seives
liber”

on

this account.

in the

is

a natural derivative, such
that

flow of nature

is

itself natural.

any intervention by
Polyester

Barring a creationist view of the
fact of human existence,

not create ourselves and were not
created outside of nature. Thus,
whatever
or

become

is

To

whether

from a

shift

this point, the

this or that social

human

conscious

historical to a logical consideration

was

agents intentionally creating or altering

becomes

to distinguish

between

illusory

intentionality. But, this

agency and intervention

me

and constructed but

is

it.

But, this formulation

of the nation does not make

social formations are to

all

of natural versus

distinguished between artificiality and illusion.

I

a counter-argument against

possible to argue that

human

we produce

formation was produced without direct
intervention of self-

that the constructedness

distinction

did

question has been about ultimate origins.
The issue has been

suggests a related issue. Before,
point

we

a product of nature.

Here we
artificial.

a “natural

is

different

in the process

it

at this point.

false or unreal.

For,

it

But

this

remains possible

real social formations.

some

My

It is

certainly

extent constructed based on

from some being the

result not

of human

of concrete development, but rather of a false

perception of social reality that in fact does not contain the
product of any such process.
In other words,

it is

century through a
the purely ideal

one thing

human

to say that this or that nation has

been produced

in the past

influenced or driven process, and quite another to say that

product

it

is

of misperception of reality, thereby existing only within the

consciousness of some “nationalists.”
Or,

As

is it?

I

proposed above, “history” and “social reality” are indeterminate

not mechanically factual

thinking being

is

—

A

necessary not simply to perceive a historical development or social

structure, but to determine

formation perceived
necessary to the

and are made determinate through interpreting analysis.

-

in

it.

An

ideal

time and place.

full articulation

moment

is

One might

of reality, which
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therefore necessary to any social

say that a conceptual

itself

comes

moment

to transcend

what

is

is

purely

material and given. This, of course,

is

nothing different from saying that

human

history

and social relations involve human agency.
Three qualifications must be made.
intentionality

mean

that

is

a necessary

none can be

it

illusory.

“mechanical”

A

nation

of social

self-conscious agency of

its

a

mere “ethnicity”

members. Such

of external or “ given” (material) forces and

is

when

illusory

reality,

On

to actions or results.

- becoming

suggested above, that conscious

Illusion occurs precisely

partially consistent with the data

does not correspond

I

component of social formations such

intention are not linked to materiality.

even

First, as

as the nation does not

interpretation and

when

perception of it

when

and/or

is

the attempt to affect

the other hand, a social formation

- when

it

a formation

not

is

involves no self-reflective or
is

the on-going passive product

factors.

This allows for nations that begin more as concepts than as social
formations,
contrary to Benedict Anderson’s model. For Anderson, material social
relations and

modes of communication

create the possibility for interpretation of a group as a lingual-

national community. Fie does discuss “russification,” in which reality

conform

to a concept.

But,

extent to

which mental

activity

it

conception on others

who

is

involved with

reflects:

either

if a part

its

construction.

of its “members”

is

it

illusory:

effective.

be the internalization of the
gaining power through

it.

a question of

whose
its

have differing national conceptions or non-national

it

is

is

internally oppressive.

oppressive precisely because the forced conformity

Of course,

initially false

It is

It is

of a proto-national population imposes

senses of identity and community, then the national structure

That does not make

forced to

a mistake to link the oppressiveness of a nation with the

is

concept the nation that results

is

a feature

even of this forced conformity might

concept of the or a nation imposed by those

true that in this case the exposure

present or history obscured by the illusion

—

is

liberating.

of the truth

But, at the

same

oppressive nations are not so simply constructed; indeed, to the extent that
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—

the true

time,
all

most

nations are

internally oppressive

-

as described by

Bhabha -

this

does not eorrespond to pure

illusoriness.

Third, the relationship between
the conceptual and material
aspects of a nation is
not a simple “ Hegelian” dialectic.
1 have argued that
neither component can be reduced
to the other, but are rather
distinct.

At the same time, they are

They do

interactive.

not

contradict each other, but rather differ
from each other in a tense but also partially

complementary manner. There

is

not an ideal balance between two
distinct aspects, the

conceptual and the material. Rather, they
flow into each other
other and influenced by
takes

on aspects of the

it

-

even as each

other, in the

-

each influencing the

resists reduction to the other.

manner

that

what

is

natural

is

Indeed, each

also artificial and vice-

versa.

Balibar portrays the issue as a stark decision
between two views. Either the

nation produces nationalism (that

is,

a materially real social formation produces
concepts

of itself), or nationalism produces the nation (material

reality is forced into

conformity

with a prior idea). [1991b: 46] Though Balibar leaves
the question open for a time, he
ultimately explicitly and unambiguously commits himself
to the latter position [49ff.].
Balibar’s failure

is

two-fold. First, he opts for a strictly materialist rejection
of the nation

as an ideal concept, as

both natural and

I

have been explaining, rather than understanding the nation as
(an intentional use of given social structures and a

artificial

naturalization of constructed social formations), both material and ideal. But,
even this

type of formulation

is

inadequate. Balibar mistakenly splits the poles of this dialectical

tension.

The proper poles

essential

and producing nationalism, and vice versa. The

different causal relations

nation

is

are not the nation and nationalism, but rather the nation as
dialectic is

between two

between nation (material) and nationalisms (conceptual). The

a dialectical tension between the construction of material social structures driven

by concepts and the production of nationalisms, national concepts, and so

forth based

on

extant social structures. These aspects continually produce each other, rather than simply
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being
nation

perspectives on
is

or

aspects ot

never complete, such that these are perspectival
aspects, but rather

ot on-going construction driven

modified and developed even as
Perhaps central

to the

conceptual and material
is

not so

the complete comprehensive “nation.”

much between

-

from both aspects, such
it

is

that

continually

each aspect

a complex, internally tense disunity.

The

-

contradiction

material and conceptual aspects of the nation, as between

competing conceptions associated with

distinct nationalisms, national concepts,

These differing concepts generally cannot be reduced

forth.

is

a process

produces the other.

un-Hegelianness of the nation

is itself

each aspect

that

is

The

and so

to a single national concept,

except through the force that marks the internal oppressiveness introduced
above. The
material as well

is

not a simple structure

—

say, a set of

group linked together via shared reading materials,
nation

is

a

The material

etc.

individuals, or a
structure of the

hodgepodge and complex of complementary and contending

networks, historical trends and forces, and so

some of which undermine
It

homogeneous

would not be

forth.

social links and

These include “external”

forces,

the very notion of a nation’s unity, and others that reinforce

inconsistent with Balibar (or

Hobsbawm)

structural or material “unity” of the nation are bridged

to argue that

by conceptual

links.

it.

gaps in the

At the same

time, these links themselves are not overarching conceptions of the nation, but part of a

complex of contending concepts
the

same

land, or speaking the

(especially

where these

would otherwise be

that requires mediation

by material

same language, or even being

in the

structures.

Being on

same organizations

are traditional cultural or religious structures) links those

in direct opposition.

A

who

concept of a nation tends to link individuals

across material gaps, and so the materiality of the nation

conceptual aspect, but rather dependent upon

it.

is

not in contradiction with

Likewise, concrete relations tend

its

to

mitigate the effects of ideological or conceptual differences, making such oppositions

oppositions within a single group, rather than oppositions that create two distinct groups.

That

is

not to say that the division of a nation into multiple nations, a nation and a non-
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national group, or two or

more non-nations does not occur

conceptual gaps and tensions. But

it

to say that this result is not
necessary.

is

Individual and

To

this point,

I

is

clear:

“ ...

Group

have not clarified the subject of concepts of the
nation. What

the subject ot the concepts that comprise the

Bali bar

as a result of either material
or

it

is

is

complex associated with any given nation?

not a question of setting a collective identity
against individual

identities. All identity is individual
..

[1991a: 94]. The nation

fully contained within individual consciousnesses.

is

The individual conceives her-/himself

as belonging to this or that collectivity, and recognizes
others

belonging. The concept might vary somewhat

a concept that

is

among

who

individual

share this concept as

members, but contains

the elements of project and destiny attached to a national name.

This

is

similar to Renan’s [1990] formulation, that the nation

on-going individual will

Anderson

differ only

it

is

be a nation, to belong to a nation.

on the issue of whether or not

connection to material
historical:

to

reality.

Balibar

is

reality.

in

“imagined community” has a

this

clear that individual identity

not trans-

is

it

For Anderson [1992], on the other hand, the

structures, etc.

The concept

individuals recognize that they have a relationship

common

common

more, Balibar and

is

recognition of a material structure of communication, a shared relation to a set

of literary works, media, administrative

when

the product of an

influenced by and perhaps determined by material forces. However,

does not accurately represent social
nation

makes

What

is

with other individuals. The nation

is

to, say, a

itself is

produced

language and

the concept of this group and

relationship to the language, literature, etc. Thus,

Anderson sees a

literature

its

direct

material basis for the concept of a nation, which Balibar denies.

Yet, both share an underlying problematic assumption, which
identified:

the

members of the

nation have the

I

have already

same concept of it. On Anderson’s

account, without this shared concept, individuals would never recognize their
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commonality with other individuals within

a proto-national language group
(or

administrative unit); on Balibar’s, the
nation does not have a material basis,
and so

depends entirely on the presence of the concept

each member’s consciousness.

in

already discussed the problems with assuming
that

same concept

ot

it,

in

both the preceding section and

important contributions on

The

totality

that the subject

of the nation

conception of the nation as a closed
difference

among

subjects,

members of a nation

my

have

share the

explication of Bhabha’s

this matter.

Even Bhabha maintains
individual.

all

I

Bhabha

is

of concepts of the nation

is

purely

a quality of the object of the concept

totality.

fails to

In

making

-

the

the important contribution of the

transcend their sameness as individuals,

despite differences in the content of their narratives.

This

is

understandable: he

is

most concerned with rejecting

the nation, precisely of the type that represent
rejects this type

of concept.

of groups that are

I

it

totalizing concepts of

as a collective subject. Balibar likewise

have already discussed the general problem with concepts

strictly derivative

of individuals, in the section on liberal approaches

to

the nation in the previous chapter. That concerned group structures without
reference to

material and mental aspects.

fundamental relations
individual.

It is

It is

easy to conceive of group structures that involve

to others, relations that are part

another issue entirely to extend

of the very foundation of the

this insight to the

mental realm. Balibar,

Anderson, and even Bhabha recognize an individual concept of the nation as derivative of
(or reactive against) the social relations of the individual subject producing
true

it.

even ot Hegelian approaches, which see self-consciousness of the nation

recognition of the trans-individual concept of the nation as
history: the individual does not conceive
that has

it

it

that

is

is

as a

has been worked out in

independently, but can assimilate the concept

been worked out collectively. The nation

concept of

it

This

is

supposed

to

be the unity of a social

the product of the operation of a universal (not individual or
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particular) logic,

history

-

which

is

then recognized by individual subjects
in their analysis of

this is the project

No

and destiny Balibar

rejects.

nation can be the product of a set of
individuals sharing the same concept
of

the nation and their participation in

On

it.

the contrary, Balibar and

critiques hold, against Anderson's position.

What

is

more, Bhabha and Balibar are

correct to maintain that totalizing concepts
of the nation
there
is

is

no

no grand unity working

national subject

fictitious object

that

is

its

way through

-

a la Hegel

are untenable:

not a conceptual or legal fiction, that

is,

created as the

of a concept.

is

purely individual. In

viewed from a material perspective, and recognizing the path of
development of a

concept as part of
is

-

history as the nation. In this sense, there

Yet, this does not require that the concept of the nation
fact,

Hobsbawm’s

it,

a national concept

is

never individual

31
.

Any

concept of the nation

the product of multiple minds, operating in temporal series or
contemporaneous

interchange. This does not
that strain

is built.

- it

is

mean

that all participants in the process

of nationalism or national concept adopt the same concept

—

this or

that a consensus

Yet, the content of the consciousness of each cannot be said to be “ individual”

the product of influences and interchanges. Differences

represents individuality without

strict

individuation.

concrete, traceable connectedness in time and place
that are not reductions to unity.

neither

of developing

homogeneous

(all

The nation

members do

is

It is

-

this

that

among

of labor,” a

la

these participants

connectedness

-- this real,

grounds national connections

not an intellectual (or material) unity,

not share the same concept or objective

characteristics) nor organic (they are not parts of a mental or material
'"'division

-

Deutsch). But,

members

whole

as a

are connected to each other through

participation in the development of national concepts (as well as in material structures to

be elaborated below). Again, each individually held concept
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As an

aside, Hegelian

“Absolute Knowledge”

in

a national context

itself is the

presence of

might be an individually-held

hold that such a concept does not exist, not due to epistemological limits
perfected concept of the nation.
but a marker of the on-going activity/productivity of the nation, as investigated below.
I
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other minds within the mind of the
specific individual, while for an
individual this can be
or is a d.tterent concept. Members
are connected in this manner
formally, without
necessarily sharing the specific content
of consciousness with each other.
there are significant overlaps, which

and one’s ideas

Where

mark

the presence of others’ ideas in
one's concept

in others’ concepts.

this overlap is significant,

national concept. But, as

I

one can identify a

Hobsbawm) might argue

the nation (France, Vietnam, etc.)

This unity

is

of nationalism or

different, irreducible strains.

granted, but in cases where there are
great

differences and even direct oppositions, would
there not be

Balibar (and

strain

have suggested, there are always

The connection of great overlap can be

naming

Of course.

that here the

is all that

thus shallow and illusory, because

it

is

more than one nation?

common

referent to the label

guarantees unity across such divides.

conceived as having a

much deeper

significance than the mere sharing of a name. Whether
intentional or not, for Bhabha,
is

containment

in a state structure that provides

some ground

it

for national cohesion

despite fundamental difference within the presumably national
group.

Indeed, one might argue

that,

without an appeal

to

such a guarantor, those clearly

outside a given nation with concepts of it must be part of the nation.
Obviously, any

theory that suggests that Turkish anti-Armenianism implies the Armenianness
of
participating Turks

Any

is

completely untenable.

appeal to an ultimate guarantor of “national unity” requires a reduction of

the nation to that guarantor.

My

position

is

different.

The nation

is

a label, or a state, or a linguistic community.

Contending concepts of a given nation are not unified by

containment within a foundational

unity.

Rather, relative to different concepts, there are

bridges which overcome the gaps but are in themselves are insufficient to guarantee
unity.

For instance, language

Even where

a single language

is

never a unity

is

spoken by members of a nation and
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in itself,

contrary to Anderson’s belief.
that

language

is

unique

to the nation, the

language might not be internally uniform.
Dialects might

possibly very different ones.

What

is

more, the use of even the main dialect might
vary,

as described in Gilles Deleuze and Felix
Guattari. In Kafka:

[1986], they analyze the writings of Kafka to
to

exist,

show

Toward a Minor

Literature

even though his writing appears

that,

be perfectly standard, majoritarian German, and can
be read with understanding by any

standard

German

speaker, his distinctive sparse usage creates a
“different language”

within German, which places him

community and without
American

at

once within the greater German language

Similar arguments have been

it.

literature in English,

made regarding

most notably by Henry Louis Gates,

Monkey: A Theory ofAfrican-American Literary Criticism
majority English speakers in the United States can read

African-

Jr., in

The Signifying

[1988], These assert that

many works by

African-

American authors with understanding, but only one-dimensionally. Many

texts or

elements of them have multiple meanings that can be understood only from within the
minority culture, and so the works themselves, while apparently (or in one sense) part of
the majority literature, actually comprise a separate literature as well.

agency

relative to the use

different classes
to the

of a language, an internal

“mother tongue” -

for

some,

it

is

etc.

The former

passive in

face,

and often

its

and media do not represent

At the same time,

generally occurs. Those from

an external and inferiorizing tangle of difficult

are agents and subjects of language, while the

its

objects without a sufficient voice.

their voices, but

relative to debates

what

elites believe

The

literature

they should be saying.

and oppositions among different national

concepts and even nationalist programs, language can be common.

common

terms of

the malleable substance of their artistic and

it is

unknown words,

latter are

in

and different educational backgrounds do not have the same relationship

intellectual creations, while for others
rules,

split

Even

It is

not absolutely

or unified, but rather, relative to the gaps and tensions within the complex of

nationalisms and national concepts,
gaps. At the

same

time,

it

appears

common

and functions

where language’s own gaps and
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to bridge those

disparities occur

—

indeed,

where members of the same purported nation speak
especially in diasporan nations

organizational links,
discontinuities

-

etc.

-

-

it

different

might be conceptual

or a combination

-

languages which occurs
,

links, cultural practices,

that bridge this set

of gaps and

and even oppositions. Even where sub-national
elements might consist

of partial homogeneities or organic structures, these
themselves are joined into the nation
through

lateral links.

The powerful

insights of post-structural theory include a rejection
of claims to

group unity based on homogeneity or organic complementarity

(parts unified into a

whole). At the same time, this powerful critique has generally
been accompanied by the
implicit assumption that no other form of national group

is

My

possible.

understanding

of the nation does not depend on such group forms, but rather focuses on the
actual
relations

among members.

As

I

explained in

my

treatment of Bhabha’s work, focus on homogeneity or

organic unity does not include

members of the

to

only relations between individual

nation and the nation as a whole (individual

nation as a whole, which
partial

lateral relations, but

is

is

(relation) or the coincidence

more, the nation

is

My

assertion

is

reduced ultimately

of multiple coextensive unities (through

shared territory and language, for instance). Yet, any type of unity

and discontinuities.

either are the

merely the collection of identical members, or they are a

component of an organic whole). What

one type of unity

members

that a nation exists precisely

is

cut

by

internal gaps

where these gaps are

bridged on other levels, such that every discontinuity gives way to another aspect on

which the discontinuity
are bridged

there

is

on other

is

bridged.

levels.

No

aspect

is

foundational

-

all

way

give

But, with the nation, for every aspect with

its

to

gaps that

discontinuities,

always another level where a bridging takes place.
It is

precisely where gaps on different levels correspond that two distinct social

formations are present. These might be distinct nations, but also might be other forms as
well. That

even an existing nation might develop fractures
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that split

it

is

not a limit on

this theory, but a strength.

Similarly, efforts to produce a
nation through conceptual or

material linkages and totalizing are
by no

means guaranteed

to

succeed, and history

is

with such failed attempts. Indeed, they
most often have failed precisely
because
they have attempted or assumed a
foundational unity that proved illusory 32
filled

.

important to point out that the mere will to
belong to

It is

a conceptual link to others with concepts
of the nation.

this or that nation is not

The conceptual

link requires

being part of the development of a concept
of the nation, not merely wishing
I

cannot be Japanese merely by claiming that

concept including

me

strong material bridge

Japanese,

in the

is

I

am.

On

Japanese nation would be

necessary, such as

my

to be.

Thus,

the contrary, given that any

at

odds with most other concepts, a

habitation in the Japanese state, fluency in

etc.

Of course,
will probably

linkages.

given

my

racial difference

from the typical conception of Japanese,

always be on the social border of the nation, no matter what

It is

my

I

material

important to stress that the borders of a nation are always fuzzy
and

ambiguous, a continuum rather than a

line.

This

is

confirmed by the

fact that

many

different national concepts and nationalisms associated with a given
nation fix the

membership

in

very different ways, producing together such an ambiguous or fuzzy

border.

On

the other hand,

consider themselves

it is

also possible to conceive

members of a

It is

rigid
racial

border those

who do

not

this evolves,

whether tending toward or

the nation.

also important to point out that

membership

criteria,

many conceptions of nations

themselves appealing

to

assert rather

such things as lineages, language,

phenotypes, and even surnames. At the same time, these are generally challenged

by other
32

this

nation, but are linked through a range of non-

conceptual connections. In both types of cases

away from

on

strains, introducing

an opposition

at the

conceptual level that does not

Such instances should not be confused with those in which one strain of nationalism or national concept
to dominate an entire nation, and to force it into conformity, as in the case of Nazism.

came
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necessarily correspond to but does emphasize
tensions and discontinuities in phenotypes,
lineages, language, etc.
Finally,

it is

important to differentiate between an individual and
general

perspective on the nation.

From

a general perspective, gaps and discontinuities
in the

conceptual structure of the nation can be overcome by
material bridges. This does not

mean

that every

member of the

nation does not have

some

sort

of conceptual as well as

material linkage into the nation. At the individual level, both
must be present, though

more emphasis on one allows

less

on the

other.

This brings us back to the original material-ideal dialectic.
that

is

even

at the

general level, both are necessary, though each

not simply an individual concept, nor

same

time, different nations are

composition
territory,

is

is it

composed

It is

important to stress

may have

The nation

gaps.

simply a material social structure. At the
ways. What

in different

is

more,

this

continually shifting in time. For instance, a nation inhabiting a given

with a relatively unified language, religion, and culture, reinforced by

domination by an external power, might depend
of its nationhood.

relatively

little

in the conceptual aspect

A minimum conceptualization is necessary to

material structures. But, if these structures are upset

such that members eventually

~

partially assimilate into

if,

complement

say, the population

new

the strong
is

dispersed,

cultures and languages, the

conceptual component might become focal.

Identity

Identity carries

length with the

first

two meanings

Cambodian

what Balibar

I

have already dealt

homogeneity of members of a nation. The second

sense, as the

“ identity” of the nation through time.
the

in reference to the nation.

What

is it

that

makes

somehow some

time, such that the present iteration

is

national essence

is

is

the

precisely

maintained through

fundamentally the same as previous ones.
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is

the present iteration of, say,

nation identical to previous iterations? The usual answer

rejects, the idea that

at

Discussion of the “identity through time”
of social formations extends
lar

back as Hume, who as part of his general

what

it

was

that

was

individuals were

the

“same”

common, and even

significantly during this time.

continuing identity

is

persists through time,

Appeal

in countries

to

due

to

He

at least as

critique of identity through time,
questioned

over a period of centuries. Certainly
no

a country’s territory might have changed

concluded,

much

as Balibar, that our perception of
a

an illusory assumption of some hidden
substance that

though

it

cannot be observed.

Kant does mitigate the

effects of

Hume’s

insight, resonating with

my

previous implicit appeal to Kant in recognizing that
historical data has no necessary
organization
it

is

itself,

but

rather organized

is

by the conceptual frame of its perceiver

But,

important to see the openness suggested by Hume’s insight 34 not
as a hindrance to

arguments asserting the existence of the nation, but rather a feature of the
in

33
.

which nations

exist

and develop. In

fact,

historical space

perception of the “identity” of a nation

through time depends precisely on the openness

that

Hume

recognizes. Identity here

should be understood as persistence an active reassertion or reconstruction of the nation
,

“Because I do not hold that there is just one possible true conceptual frame universal to all sentient
perceivers, I do not follow Kant in finding Reason to be the sole determining "lawgiver" of Nature. The
possibility of contending social conceptual frames is not limitless, but rather is restricted by the history
itself.

Hume,

There are good and bad
the exact relationships

fits

of the data; the data must be accounted for comprehensively. But, with
data — or what comprises a datum or "unit of data" — is not singularly

among

determined.

“This openness is not an absolute skepticism. Hume's critique of identity through time was not a critique
of our necessary perception of it, but rather of the chance of attaining absolute certainty that our perception
-- which seems absolutely certain to us -- is absolutely true. Hume did not
intent to authorize an end of
truth, or a historical subjectivism. Rather, he showed the limits of our certainty of what seems absolutely
certain. As Robert Paul Wolff shows, the psychological mechanisms that ensure that we perceive as
certain that which cannot be absolutely proven so — in this case, identity — anticipates Kant's attribution of
organizing categories in the minds of rational perceivers. [Wolff, “ Hume’s Theory of Mental Activity” ]
As Robert Paul Wolff has further commented [Wolff, 1991], Hume and Kant's ideas on these
issues become really productive when applied to perception of social and historical reality. For, when the
categories themselves are revealed to be at most the secondary instincts described by Nietzsche, and in any
event the product of external forces on the perceiver, this critique of the certainty of our social and
historical perceptions becomes a fertile ground for posing alternative interpretations of social and historical
data.

But, even here, the critique does not authorize an infinite variety of valid interpretations. On the
contrary, the critique merely calls into question any asserted interpretation. This resonates with Bhabha's
post-structuralist approach to grand interpretations of history and society, which always give way to — not
counter-totalizations — but the recognition of data that do not fit the interpretations. This is not a wild
relativistic skepticism, but rather a

powerful critique of the production of "dominant" and "dominating"

interpretations of historical and social data.
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in time, rather than a static inertia.

Such a conception

frees the nation

on notions of a grounding substance, a
destiny, and so
This

shift

echoes

favor of recognition of

my

critique

forth.

of Bhabha’s solely intensive view of the
nation,

extension as well. Similarly, identity

its

from dependence

is

in

a replication in time

does not extend beyond a previous iteration
of the nation. Rather than being a

that

persistence in time,

change

that

marks

it

its

actually rigidifies time

passing.

It is

itself,

by stopping the development and

in conflict with time.

Persistence in time requires non-identity through time.
This seems paradoxical,

but

is

identity.

it

once the concept of contiguity

not,

It is

not that the Egyptian nation

was 150 years ago, but

rather that

past iterations of this nation.
history

-

is

(laterality in time) is substituted for strict

A

what

nation

—

exists today

and

this is

not just a cross-sectional snapshot

temporally as well as spatially extensive.

Claims by
past in the

today the same

is

why

a given

rejects,

some fundamental way

as

contiguous or deeply linked with
nations are so concerned with

moment

The concept

in time.

is

has a temporal as well as a spatial structure.

nationalists regarding the past vary;

manner Balibar

however, even the

It

at

is

in

some

assert an identity with the

while others view a continuity from the past. Often,

construed as a genealogical descendance, which suggests some

latter is

substance passed down. In any event, the perception of a national identity through time
or national essence does not necessarily represent a pure illusion, but rather might be a

misinterpretation and misrepresentation of the type of extension in time

That

this continuity or extension in

and invariant substance
identity does not apply

formations within
In a similar

it.

is

is

itself anticipated

beyond

The

time

it,

to all

reduced

I

to simplistic notions

by Hume’s

critique.

am

suggesting.

such as identity

However, the

critique of

forms of the structuring of history and the social

critique leaves

untouched the type of structure

I

am

suggesting.

way, though say much of contemporary feminist philosophy does not share

positions with Plato,

it

still

usually has a strong (if very problematic and tense)

relationship to Platonic philosophy.
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This suggests a further clarification.
Even cases where nationalists claim
that
their nation reaches

back

far into the past, into

pre-modern and even ancient times,

this is

not necessarily an illusion

-

languages, territories,

At the same time, of course, such claimed
connections are

etc.

often, there

is

some connection

to pre-national groups,

often purely illusory, uses of history for
contemporary agendas, or relatively minor

connections that do not have the significance
imparted

to

them by contemporary

nationalists.

This relationship to the past does not mean that

Bhabha
limit

rejects:

on

it

infinite).

(or,

it

is

rigidly determined in time, as

the past does not strictly produce the present,
though

viewed

alternatively, creates

its

possibilities,

which

it

is

of course a

are of course not

In other words, the temporal structure can only
be determined retroactively

from the present moment, and

deduced from the

is

valid only in that

past, but together they

moment. The present cannot be

determine the nation as

At each moment, a new determination must be made

which the open

potential of new

passing of time.

Of course,

this

it

is

extended

that accounts for the

moments have been determined (and

new

determination

is

open

to a

in time.

manner

in

interpreted) in the

range of interpretations,

as described earlier.
If

the persistence of a nation

—

its

survival

— depended on

retention of

central core substance, then substantial internal or external changes

some

would mean

the

destruction of the nation. But, assuming nations do exist (as argued above), then

nations have survived absolutely cataclysmic changes and

Armenian nation

as

it

existed prior to 1915

was

shifts.

many

For instance, the

relatively concentrated

on a

territory in

eastern Anatolia (with other long-standing settlement areas in the Caucasus and western

and southern Anatolia), was unified by a single religious
so forth.

The Armenian Genocide dramatically changed

Armenian population around

the world, with

structure, shared a language,

all

many people

and Catholicism, ultimately losing the language, and so
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and

of this, dispersing the

converting to Protestantism

forth.

Even

the dialects within

Armenian became much more pronounced.
the

Armenian

nation,

the United States

A Cold- War tension was

introduced within

between East and West, and the anti-Middle
Eastern mentality of

and Western Europe came

to influence relations

between Armenians

these areas and in the Middle East. If the
Armenian nation were guaranteed by

substance

-

perhaps a linguistic,

territorial,

complex of commonalities - then

it

is

in

some

or religious one, or something underlying
this

hard to see what

it

could be

if

it

is

supposed

to

have survived past the Genocide.

A much more plausible explanation is that the pre-1915
territorial

proximity

(at least

and formalized religious and

containment
linguistic

general dependence on

two or three contiguous empires),

in

homogeneity, and so forth gave way

major bridges, including such things as a sense of shared history

relative

to other

(particularly the

Genocide), organizational structures (global political parties, communications
networks,
etc.),

an increase in

structures.

The

political

networking and

entire basis of the

Armenian nation

been rigidly associated with those links
that destroyed these links (not to

activity,

that

mention

it

prior to

two-thirds of

World War

its

and half its global population) would undoubtedly have destroyed
This

many have

is

links

and

shifted in a very short period;

grounded

at least

and new conceptual

I,

had

it

a Genocide

Anatolian population,
it.

not to suggest that a nation will necessarily survive such a shock, and

not.

But, an appeal to strict identity does not provide an adequate account of

such a survival.

The continuity of a nation
relations

among

in

time

is

produced by a

set

of temporally extensive

temporally extensive elements, such as dependence on territory or

language, the development of a specific conceptual or nationalism

strain, etc.

The

bridges that comprise a nation’s contiguity in time are the dependence relations between
different aspects of the nation discussed above.

These must be present as

at least

potentials in order for a shift to occur under changing internal or external conditions. For
instance, the relative linguistic “unity” of pre-1915
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Armenia was not by any means

comprehensive.

It

on conceptual bridges across

relied

Eastern and Western Armenian speakers

in religious

dialects, the joining together

and

political organizations, etc.

major connective duty was performed by the language,
which defined

community

the

ot substantive relations for

most Armenians. But,

tensions were bridged by these other forms of linkage.

caused the burden
shift

to shift to these other aspects

would have been

The

its

for the

most

The

part

discontinuities and

The disruption of the Genocide

of national cohesion. Without them, no

possible.

among

links

of

the different aspects are thus the primary guarantors
of

continuity in time. Yet, not even this set of potential linkage or
pathways should be

considered identical through time. Even these change in time, as

new

focal aspects

depend on new types of bridges.
These

what

I

will, further,

have explained so

vary from nation to nation. There

far.

That

is,

there

is

is

no specific model beyond

no grand concept of the nation.

It

cannot

be reduced to “imagined community,” or “illusory concepts of destiny and project,” or a
set

of “offset narratives.” Grand concepts inevitably

that

cannot hold

members of a

Against Anderson, for instance,

in time.

it is

not enough to say that

nation have different relations to literature, the media,

difficult to believe that they are

imagining

because they assert a rigidity

fail

at all.

etc., that

“imagining” the same nation, or even

For, if this were true,

it

make

it

that all are

appears that the nation would lack the flexibility

necessary to survive. Thus, Anderson’s concept

is

caught

in a

double bind of sorts.

Historical data and social demographics conflict with his notion of a unified concept of
the nation

concept
in

among

fails.

which

nationals, so if these data

But,

if

it is

true that

and demographics are taken seriously,

members of a

nation are

his theory holds, then the resulting nation itself

is

homogeneous

etc.,

is

not rigid

-

manner

very fragile, and cannot

survive the kinds of shifts and destabilizations typical of modern history.

community”

in the

his

An “imagined

the literary canon, the content and perspectives of the media,

change over time, which means the image of the nation does as
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well.

However,

it

is

not clear

how

might go from a

it

certain inertia of the imagined

literary basis to

some

other.

community - once formed,

even though the means by which

it

rigidities the nation in a different

has been produced

the

At most, one could argue a

image

itself is sustained,

no longer active. But.

is

this

way, as the dead image already produced
and

henceforth conserved.

This

have

is

not to suggest that concepts such as those
described by Anderson do not

their role, nor that these concepts bear

their basis.

concept,

it

But, the concept
at the

component of a

is

no

relation to material conditions that are

not the total description of the nation.

most describes only a temporally and/or

As any grand

spatial partial aspect or

nation.

Anderson

s

concept

is

limited in another way. In

its initial iteration, it is

materially determined linguistically-based social form. In later
iterations,

it

a

remains a

conceptual image produced by a perception of shared experiences or a
shared range of
activity

and perception, even

Others have extended

As

I

this to

in cases

where

this is not strictly linguistic or literary.

perception of a shared place in history, and so forth.

have explained, some theorists view the nation as a purely cultural

phenomenon. Even Bhabha’s complex analysis of the nation remains imprisoned
one aspect of the

field

of relations that characterize the potential of nations. As

explained above, his concept of the nation
Breuilly, insist that the nation

is

is

in just

I

purely narrative. Other theorists, such as

not cultural at

all,

but rather purely political. Gellner

views the nation as a by product and tool of industrial society, while

Tom Nairn

[1981]

views nations as a function of uneven economic development.

Even those who consider
unitary cause. For Kedourie and

the nation an illusion reduce

Thom,

the nation

is

it

to

some

specific

the product of certain intellectual

and academic currents of 18th and 19th Century Western Europe. For Balibar,
produced out of a linguisized racism.
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and

it

is

The catalogue goes
particular aspect of

it

as the

on.

The point

key

is

that

most

theorists

to all nations, at all times.

of the nation privilege a

Out of this, they construct a

grand concept.

Even Hobsbawm, who himself catalogues such monological
approaches
defining the nation

—

Is

it

based on religion? language? territory? and so forth

maintains the notion that the nation must be based
to

show

that

category,

in

one of these, and

no one category accounts for the nation. But

some presumed

nation exists that

is

all

he does

—

them

tests

is

to

show

serially

that for

any

not accounted for by reference to the

category. Early references to Stalin’s recognition of the multi-aspected nature of
the

nation do not alter the outcome: Stalin’s model calls for the coincidence of territorial,
linguistic,

economic,

etc., unity,

an impossible demand

in the face

of Hobsbawm’s

critique.

More
the nation.

than

Each

this,

every theorist

attributes

it

to

I

have treated asserts a one-dimensional concept of

one type of social bond, one type of social

type of psychological or mental move, one type of manipulation,

member imagines

in the

same way,

the nation identically. For

form a core of the
concept

in the

if

etc.

not exactly the same thing, and

Hobsbawm,

it is

structure,

one

For Anderson, each
is

thus bound into

one type of manipulation; the manipulated

nation, while the manipulated are each

same way. For Bhabha, every nation

is

bound

to its

symbols and

ideal

explained by the tension between

majority and marginalized, as the former impose totalizing conceptions on the broad
population; every majority person
totalization.

is

For Gellner, the nation

a totalizer, and every marginal person an object of

is

a

homogeneous

cultural milieu, in

which people

with the same basic language and cultural knowledge are interchangeable; every member
exists in the

same

cultural container in the

cultural attributes), and has the

same way (through having

same “mobility” within

compromise or compulsions resolving

the tensions

it.

among

For Breuilly,

same general
it

is

the

different interest groups within

a state or proto-state; whatever the specific interest group, each
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the

members

is

linked to the

nation-as-state through his/her interests. For
is

a set ot cultural practices in

coupled with a

political

many of the

which each members

agenda

that

is

liberal philosophers, the nation

participates identically, usually

characterized as a

common

project or interest of

all

members.
In each of these cases, a

geometry, and

is

diagram ot the nation requires only simple plane

neat and uniform. But real nations

-

be captured in such simple two-dimensional diagrams,

diagrams

at all.

and between
in tense,

most of them

if in spatially

-

cannot

represented

Lines of relationship, connection, commitment, tension,

etc., exist

on

multiple levels, even as the levels themselves flow in and
out of each others,

complementary, or dualistic relationships. One cannot say, a nation consists
of

members
core.

or at least

related to each other through this

No

medium, or

related to that central mediator or

one form of relation, no one continuous structure of relations, can capture

its

reality.

This should be expected: a group as large as the nation

form of a

unlikely to take the

single, simple structure, to be captured in a sound-bite definition.

and sub-national group heterogeneity obviously increases with
into a

is

size,

genuine social formation through one means, media, or tool

-

Individual

and cannot be linked
at least not

without

significant coercion, direct force, and eliminations. Conceiving the or a nation always

involves recognizing internal variations and multiple approaches. The heterogeneity of
the nation
relations

is

not just a function of

and links

its

membership, but of the material and mental

that constitute their nationality.

Hroch’s extraordinary work traces the varied development of a number of East

European national movements, through

cultural to political to popular stages.

Chatterjee’s [1993b] brilliant history of the Indian national
transition

from a purely

Though Hroch

cultural

—

but real

—

movement exposes

form, to a political and popular form.

especially generalizes on his findings to assert a general

development, from cultural

to political,

a

model of national

he stresses the indeterminacy of the process, and
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the significant variations

among

Armenian nation suggests
well.

More

importantly,

such that the nation

at

My own analysis of the

the nations he studies.

the possibility of shifts from the
political to the cultural, as

it

stresses the offset contemporariness
of these and other aspects.

any given time cannot be reduced

to just one,

and requires many

at

least as potentials.

The

undefined

to the definition

distinguishes

it

-

is

nature ot the nation

-

perhaps what relates the nation

from the

latter.

The

to the

territory.

territorial state

Whereas

and

governed

in detail in a definitive constitution.

about definition, regulation, specification, and so

on a populace and

modern

state is fully defined as a specific territory

by a specific government, generally explained
state is

or the perpetual redefinition, or
addition

states are defined

forth.

It

The

imposes a specific form

and “constituted” by formal

descriptions and agreements (constitutions, state and international
laws, treaties, etc.) and

so are the products of definition, nations generally are marked by an on-going
process of
definition

—

or, better, articulation

and development

—

that places

any formal or informal

definitions and specifications in tension with a continuing production of new concepts,

angles, and variations.

Though documentary decrees and

nation certainly might have a role in

its

development, alone they are not sufficient

produce a nation. Wherever such things appear
there will always be the

related formal descriptions of a

to

to

account for the emergence of a nation,

shadow of significant and contended “organic” processes of

development, however coerced or manipulated by the agents of the decrees and
descriptions.

National Activity

Bhabha perhaps comes

closest to capturing the conceptual complexity of nations,

with the idea that assertions of totalizing concepts of the nation create margins that

undermine these concepts themselves. This suggests the impossibility of a
unified concept. But

it

is

totalizing,

Partha Chatterjee that unlocks the secret of the transitions in
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time and them implications. As

I

described above, he sees the capacity
to create

new

national concepts and nationalisms
as central to nations resisting
domination by European

powers.
This

is

a central point for all nations.
Anderson’s theory of the nation by and

large ignores concepts of

it,

even as

The content of non-European

common

This

is

Obviously,

initial

image

focuses on the existence of an image
of the nation.

national images begins with the idea
that a set of colonial

administrators share in a
territory.

it

colonial administration structure that
defines a specific

then disseminated to the other people
on that territory.

this is just the transformation

European colonizers

of a

territory

into an independent socio-political unit.

content, and only that which

is

that

is,

The image has almost no

derivative of the European given.

pre-existing cultural forms are grafted onto this

European nations;

and population defined by

new

Now,

structure, to give

it

it

might be

that

the depth of

that the imaginations of neo-nationals are not
satisfied with

such a bare concept of their nation, and

in conjunction

already been producing cultural artifacts and with

communications and administrative

with social structures that have

new governmental and

structures (schools, media, etc.), the

civil

image

is filled

out.

So perhaps such images approach

to

European ones. But, Anderson remains

unclear about the content of European national images. The general model seems
unaffected by the particularities of specific images (not to mention the variation within
a

given nation). They are

Anderson suggests
themselves

all at least

that the

image

in their daily lives, a

personalities to
translatability

which they

of much

is

literature,

world that

and

much

is, fit

in the

same model.

a world or land in which nationals can see
is

are accustomed.

as the obvious regionalism of

open

formally the same, that

its

familiar to them, containing situations and

Besides begging questions about the obvious

resonances with those in other cultures, as well

other literature and

the specific nature of these images.

news

papers, this account leaves

Presumably, different images are different,
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at

least

by name and

territory.

this difference that

But, at a formal level, there appears no
difference, and

seems most

crucial to national difference.

Perhaps “national difference’'
asserting

my

some fundamental

experience

that, say,

is

is

not the right expression.

It is

not a matter of

ditterence between nations or the people in them.

Japanese or Honduran friends

national connection understand

Armenians. There

is

it

my Armenian

who have

nationality

much

It

has been

a strong sense of

better than

even many

certainly a formal correspondence across nations, but this

is

more a

function of the presence of a range of different personality types and
philosophical
dispositions not derivative of nationality, but grafted on top of

Whatever
or

is

shared

among

nations

is

comes off of a modern production

another’s nation that

is

those on Anderson’s model
is

development

(as described earlier).

some interchangeable form,

line.

It is

like

what goes

into

a mutual appreciation of the specificity of

part of the ability to empathize with him/her.

In any event, the issue

nationality

not

it

is

not this one of “difference,” but rather of agency. For

who comprise

the

first

wave of European

nations, their

presented as the result of inexorable material forces, of language
in

modem

capitalism. For later waves, their efforts might have been

more

conscious, but were constrained (willingly) within an attempt to reproduce the same type

of nationality as the

first

wave

resulted

in.

Chatterjee’s [1993b] profound insight

is

to

recognize the agency of construction not just of the nation, but of the concept of the
nation.

As

I

have made

clear,

concepts of a nation are constitutive elements of it. For

Chatterjee, construction of a nation

concept that

is

—

an image of the nation

—

involves development of a

not reducible to pre-existing national forms. Self-definition runs to the

core of the nation.

That

is

not to say that the nation

concepts of a nation

at

play in

its

is

a purely ideal effect of self-definition. Yet, the

constitution can (or must) involve fundamental

revisions or extensions of any generally applicable model of the nation applicable to the

range of previously existing nations. The content of concepts of the nation generates the
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Jorm as much as

the form

is

constrained by given concepts
of the nation. The

constitution ot a nation involves as a necessary

members. This

is

the deepest

the core of national

meaning of the

moment

active self-conceptualization by

oft-stated desire for “self-determination”
at

movements. As Chatterjee recognizes,

this is

meaningless

if

interpreted in the limited sense of the right
to form a unit like other units. This

is

form of self-determination
about just
national

how

at the basis

of the American Revolution, and raises questions

national that Revolution was, at least initially.

movement of India he

the former colony both

As he and many

analyzes recognize(d), decolonization requires

than mere political separation, which

the

in a sense replication.

is

away from what

what constitutes an independent nation

it

was forced

in the

to

It

within the

much more

requires redefinition of

be by the colonizers, and from

realm of the colonizers

--

which

once

is at

implicated in colonization and also would represent a continuation of the
influence of the
colonizer.
It is

that

is

quite sympathetic to

community
nation,

of self-definition that even Anderson’s theory of the nation

this level

-

fails to

strangles the constitutive

and reduces

comes only

it

it

to a

for.

in the prison

in the conceptualization

of a

rigid,

of the

unaffected form.

form of “russification,” or a mild

dissemination of the national image. Anderson’s general model

and

one

The form of the imagined

power of agency

mere content

as a negative, in the

account

—

is

Agency

positive, in the

form of

of material (economic

cultural/linguistic) forces determining a conceptual or psychological form.

Intentionality intervenes in the former case to direct the artificial construction of the

material “forces” that will produce an imagined community. In the latter case,
intentionality drives

mere

replication

and dissemination of an already given concept or

model.
I

stress that

I

am

not suggesting the absolute uniqueness of each nation, nor their

exclusiveness. National concepts certainly overlap, and do so significantly. There

is

on-going tension between the received concepts of the nation and the agency of those
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an

enacting or “performing” a nation. This
pushes Bhabha’s model to the meta-level
of
nation-formation.

It is

not a matter of a mere plurality of meta-concepts
of the nation, but

rather the on-going production of

new concepts

cannot be assimilated into those that

For the formerly colonized and subjugated, these are
reactions

exist.

dominant concepts of what an independent

combining elements of nation and

state)

-

political structure

It is

this aspect

-

of activity

that distinguishes nations

embrace an ethnic
certain

should be (usually

[see Chatterjee, 1993b]

from ethnic groups. Ethnic groups receive
history, etc.

-

one

is

bom

their “identity”

into an ethnicity.
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In

as immigration or minoritization, one might decide whether to

identity or not

customs and

imposition of

of the production of new concepts and national forms

from outside: from ancestors, parents,

some circumstances, such

to the

reactions that are not purely reactive, and so

exceed mere negation of the imposed concepts,

—

that

-

to

leam one’s

parents’ language, to live according to

traditions, etc. Further, in the

flow of history and

human

activity,

these evolve, and respond to each generation. But, the mutations are minor and generally

seek to preserve features of ethnic

They

the context of changing external conditions.

are not active attempts to re-define or produce culture and socio-political structures.

A nation,
been describing.
as

life in

on the other hand, has a much more pronounced active aspect,
It

from the past or passively accepted
willings. This active aspect
in the

I

have

might be characterized as an on-going aspect of self-generation. This,

Bhabha emphasizes and even Renan [1990]

agency

as

is

complex process

—

admits,

is in

tension with what

is

given

again, nations are not simply shared subjective

individual, sub-national multi-individual, and national
that

produces and reproduces the conceptual and social-

structural aspects of a nation. This can involve

complementary vectors of agency

in

all

sorts

of contending and

forming the ideas and social relations that ground a

nation. Specific vectors can take the nation as their object or not; that

is,

agents can be

an ethnic group, akin to the claims of Balibar and Hobsbawm.
is not an ethnic group, but a deep departure from one.
Balibar and Hobsbawm believe that the nation is strictly derivative of a presumption of ethnicity, and so
focus much effort on disproving the reality of ethnicity.
35

It

may

But, this

be that there
is

is

no

real identity in

irrelevant, precisely

because the nation
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aware ot and even intend

activity as part

they can be unaware ot

and/or have sub- or non-national intentions

important to stress that not

It is

that not all ethnic

one

is

pretty

it

of the process of the articulation of the nation,
or

nations are ethnic groups, and even

all

groups are nations. As

I

will discuss in

part of a clear ethnic group, just as not everyone

much

all

36
.

is

more
a

detail

below, not every

member of a

people are citizens or subjects of this or that

more so

nation

-

though

(however foreign

state

it

appears to them).
It is

also important to stress that even where ethnic groups are linked to nations,

they are not necessarily coincident. This explanation allows one to differentiate not

merely non-national ethnic groups from “ ethnic nations”
correspond

fairly directly

(that

is,

with ethnicities, to the extent that they

nations which

exist),

but also national

and non-national members of a single ethnic group of which part forms a nation. In the
foregoing references to the global Armenian nation,

Armenians

are part of the

Armenian

On

nation.

I

was not

the contrary,

asserting that

many have

all

ethnic

effectively

assimilated into their host countries, retaining as markers of their ethnicity perhaps only

Armenian Church

affiliation, a taste for

“ Armenia,” typical
are not actively

Armenian physical

engaged

structure, but rather

in the

Armenian
features,

cuisine, a connection to the history of

Armenian surnames, and so

forth.

They

production of the culture or national socio-political

have merely received

their “

Armenian-ness” as a gradually

diminishing residual of their ancestors’ participation in the Armenian nation. Their lack

of activity

They

is

evident from the very fact of the diminishing intensity of the ethnic residual.

are ethnic

I

deciding

Armenians, but not members of the Armenian nation.

hesitate in presenting this analysis, because

who

Adequate

is

in

and not

in a

given nation.

I

reject attempts to tix criteria for

Any such

declarations are problematic.

“ participation” in a nation might be as simple as verbal affirmation of one’s

membership, when not strongly contradicted by “objective”
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This formulation runs directly counter

to

Thom’s,

as

I
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critiqued

it

in

factors.

Chapter

1.

This

is

not meant to

assert subjective perception of

membership, but rather
recourse.

It

to

membership alone

as the criterion for determining
actual

allow potential victims of unjustified
exclusion adequate

should be stressed

that,

although

many

sub-national groups assert definitions

ol their nations that include and exclude
different individuals based
relatively self-serving criteria

suggesting here

is

more than having

The
but rather

is

that those

it

(my

who

nation

is

always what /

am

or

we

on

different sets of

are),

what

am

I

are merely, say, ethnic Armenians, have
chosen this

chosen for them.

difficulty

of discussing issues of inclusion

is

not a weakness in

a function of the contentious realm of concepts of a
nation that

my

theory,

is at

the core

of my account.

Racism, Nationalism, Gender, and the Nation
It is

commonplace

belief that one’s

to consider

“nationalism” a form of racism. Racism

presumed “race” (however defined)

(however defined, as long as there

(however defined)

is

is

is

own

that this or that

own

“race”

“race” (however defined). “Nationalism,”

then considered by some to be racism concerning “nationalized” races:
that one’s

the

superior to other “races”

no acceptable overlap), or

inferior to one’s

is

“nation” (however defined)

is

it is

the belief

superior to other “nations” (however

defined). Usually, the second formulation of racism

whereas oppressed races might view themselves

is

not applied to nationalism:

as inferior to a “ superior” race, but

superior to an “ inferior” race, nationalists are considered to

make

absolute claims of

superiority.

Using

this formulation,

many

theorists

—

including

Bhabha and Balibar —

see

nations themselves as organized around this “nationalist” relationship to an inferior

“other.”

Most such

theorists attribute this production of

and organization against an

“other” to a basic psychological phenomenon, resulting from feelings of inadequacy,
other forms of oppression (such as economic), and so forth.
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is

Balibar extends analysis ot this relation.
a

Active ethnicity” that

is,

He

an ideal racial group

to

believes the nation to be grounded in

which members of the nation believe

themselves to belong. Though there are no true ethnic
groups
rhetoric

It is

and

institutions

producing a nation function as

this racial notion that

if there

base of nations, the

at the

were, that

is,

create one.

tempers the potential openness of the type of linguistic
or

communicative community

that

Anderson considers

the nation. Balibar’ s concept

is

a

racialized imagined community, or one that depends on a perception
of race in addition
to

communication. [Balibar, 1991a:
Balibar, however,

nationalism

is

96ff.;

1991b: 49]

careful not to adopt the easily critiqued notion that

is

form of racism, based on a nationalized concept of race. He

just a

recognizes that nationalism

At the same time, he

is

rejects

not simply coincident with racism. [Balibar, 1991b: 46ff.]

any equally simplistic notion

that nationalism is exclusive

of

racism, or that nationalisms that are undeniably racist are exceptional or abnormal forms.

Through an analysis of Nazism, he concludes

that racist nationalisms are at

and exceptional of nationalism

-

which nationalisms
between
words,
in all

“

all

are

in general [50

“good” and which

are

‘dying for one’s fatherland’” and

“

52].

It is

“bad”

not a matter of determining

all

the

there

(racist) [46]:

is

a thin line

‘killing for one’s country’” [47].

nationalisms have a racist component: “though racism

nationalisms or in

once typical

moments of their

history,

it

is

none the

In other

not equally manifest
less

always

represents a necessary tendency in their constitution” [48],
This, of course, could have been anticipated by the given relationship between

race and nation: at the core of nation formation there

What emerges

is

a

complex

relationship, in

distinct

from the

always a

which “there

determination between [nationalism] and racism
is

is

[52].

is

racial

moment

[see 48],

always a reciprocity of

This means

that,

while each form

other, nationalisms are continually appropriating extant racisms or are

the results of transmutations of racisms [52], while “racism
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is

constantly emerging out of

nationalism” [53]. Indeed, what has
emerged in the modern era
determination, in which each
It is

is

continually emerging out of the other.

a tense relationship, because there

and practices of nationalism and racism”
nationalism,” that

is,

a cycle of

is

is

a

“gap

After

[54],

races are international. At the

.

.

all,

between the representations

.

a racism

same

is

a “super-

time, nationalisms often seek to

assimilate individuals of other races (France,
Canada, the United States
are nations at

all]),

fictive ethnicity

nations,

etc.).

(Spain, most Caribbean, Latin American, and
South

The general

[59-60]

is

its

which

I

that,

where

interpret to

racial categories

-

it

its

in

last

-

focus on oppression

-

the racist oppression

is

and yet always
once

at the

— which

- which

to the extent that

it

exceeds the

its

still

core of

latter,

pushes toward international

drives the nationalism toward an

racism

is

internal to nationalism, this

nationalist.

Balibar’ s analysis of the relationship between racism and nationalism

productive for

,

for the full articulation of nationalism, while at the

terms of its scope

extreme of oppression. Of course,

to nationalism

is at

exists in conjunction with a nationalism,

mean both
and

to its constitution

project” [54]. In other words, racism

any nationalism, but does not account

American

not an ‘expression’ of nationalism, but a

of it, but always indispensable

insufficient to achieve

same time

two

relationship between racism and nationalism

supplement of nationalism or more precisely a supplement internal
in excess

the latter

or acknowledge the presence of mixed raciality
at the core of the

Balibar summarizes by saying that “racism

always

[if

is

recognition of a distinction between them as well as their

interconnection and intermingling. At the same time,

it

is

compromised by

his

own

assumptions, which determine the ultimately misleading and problematic implications of
his analysis

of the nation and nationalism. The

nationalisms are grounded

in

The second key assumption
deal with

them

first

key assumption

is

that nations

and

a racial concept of social structures, the “fictive ethnicity.”

is

that nationalism

in turn.
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is

structurally isomorphic to racism.

I

(1)
1

have already challenged

the core of national consciousness.

al

length the very need for a “
fictive ethnicity”

Assumption of a

totalized concept of the racial
ground of a nation,

nation, that with other concepts

-

is

“ fictive
ethnicity," that

competing concepts

that

what

including opposing ones

is

more, most

themselves are

in

-

itself is in a dialectical

likely a

is

complex tension among

concept might dominate other

racial

concepts and the material realm, but Balibar’s
account
configuration of elements having in general
a

itself is at

much more

(2) Balibar considers central to " theories

most a

(

universalize

)

and strategies of nationalism ... the
at

once specifies and

unique national identity against others’, and attempts
to homogenize

the national population.

boundaries of the assumed nation, while
(racial) ditterence

specific

diverse potential.

contradiction between universality and particularism,”
Nationalism

own

not necessarily a

a complex dialectic with material
structures

and forces. In some instances and
periods, a

celebrates one’s

a grand

merely one possible concept of
the

relationship with material social
structures and forces. Thus, there
racial core ot the nation, and,

is,

at

beyond

Racism pushes
at the

culture, language,

same time

the universalization past the

intensifying the absoluteness of

and minor phenotypes,

to the

deepest core of

physical and spiritual essence. [54]

The problem with

this

formulation

is

that

it

reduces nationalism to a mere

categorization and specific nations to categories. The issue for Balibar
,

universalizing

humanity

to

—

that

is,

expands a given category

determine a specific category.

It is

—

or particularizing

true that race

is

—

is

whether

it is

a

divides universal

a categorization, one that

divides humanity into sets ot supposedly fundamentally different individuals and that
unifies distinct individuals within a category

on the same grounds. This

the deepest tension within the nation or nationalism. This tension itself

is

is

not,

however,

one moment

the core tension of categorization versus community.
I

him,

it

is

have already suggested the poverty of Balibar’s notion of “community.” For
an individually held abstract construct
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in

which one perceives (imagines)

in

onesell as situated in this or that imaginary
social grouping. This, of course,
ignores the
reality

of a member of a nation's lived experience
within a

of direct and indirect

set

relations that are reflected in and structured
by one’s concept(s) of his/her nation
(as well

as non-national group, historical, and
categorical concepts).

The nation

is

forged in the

coincidence and tension between these real social
relations and conceptual constructs
of
one’s social relations, categorizations,

At the conceptual

etc.

level, there is a tension

between the nation as generated out ot one’s perception
and conceptualization of real
direct

and indirect social relations

— which

is

not necessarily exclusively “national”

and totalizing categorization of one’s nation and membership

in

it.

The

—

real relations are

nationalized through this interaction with the totalizing conceptual
categorization of the
nation.

Race, on the other hand,

is strictly

categorical. In a racialized conception of

oneself and others, the totalizing categories of the races impose themselves on
and
structure the lived direct
historical period in

and indirect

which

At the most and only

in the

racial identities coalesce, specific relations -- for instance,

competition for jobs or wealth,
distinctions

relations to others.

etc. --

become

made based on phenotypes.

racialized

But, this

is

by employment,

political, etc.,

not the generation of race out of

these tensions, but the development of racist ideologies in order to gain advantages within

such a situation. The physical differentiation of people with deeply oppressive economic,
political, etc.,

consequences

is

perhaps always available by analogy to gender. In any

event, once specifically racial ideologies
available,

it is

-

racialized views of the world

- become

these ideologies that are imposed on and structure the concrete social

relations of individuals.

or oppression. This

is

What

what

is

is

more, the relation imposed

meant by “prejudice”

(at the

is

purely one of domination

individual level)

--

individuals engage others in conformity with the dictates of racial categories. Their very

conception of others

is

determined first and foremost by these categories and the

meanings they have been given,

as well as the racist presumption of “natural”
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domination relations among them.
Racism as a

development of individuals and

social force strongly
influences the very

their relations, through
structural forces

and inculcation

ot racist consciousness (a
racialized conceptual frame
grounding prejudice).
In our racialized world,
that are at

racism

is

odds with the

that state in

it

is

never a question of balancing our
lived experiences

abstract, absolute racialized
conceptual

which the

frame with

abstract categorization has
precedence over

influences the lived experiences themselves.
Balibar believes the same

nationalism, because his implicit view
of the nation
ideal categorization

My

of one’s

own

ethnicity as

account of the nation suggests a

conceptual and material forces. What
to categorical (abstract) concepts

is

that,

whereas

racist

much more complex

of the nation, there are

that are not necessarily

my

between

level, in addition

determined solely

less not categorical abstractions.

more

One might

this type

of

universalist views that level the status of all nations.

has often been used to justified intra-national oppression and the

oppression of nations not linked to power in states

undermine

relationship

schemes are always about domination of one or more races
by a

superiorizing nationalisms and
this latter

on an

(1) concepts in large part

master race, the history of nationalisms shows a tension between

That

true of

to other ethnicities.

more, even on the conceptual

by material forces, but which are none the

and strongly

as strictly categorical, resting

opposed

determined by material forces and (2) concepts

add

is

is

this frame:

is

an serious issue, but does not

point, calling attention instead to the absolute non-absoluteness
of any

determination of nationalism as racist or not.
Further, racism depends on a categorical

schema

that includes at least

Nationalism, on the other hand, need not oppress another nation.

oppress a non-national group, or even part of the nation

itself.

It

two races.

can just as easily

What

is

more,

it

often

oppresses by denying the nationality of a self-described national group. For instance, the
present Turkish assault on

compendious

its

set ot historical

Kurds seeks

to force

and sociological
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Kurds

— who

insist,

data, that they are not in

consistent with a

any way Turkish,

up

to give

their claims

of Kurdish nationality and recognize
themselves

Turks,” a fantastic category manufactured
is

its

mean

to

be “Mountain

to

a propagandist’s dreamworld.

in

None of this

excuse the oppressiveness of an oppressive
nationalism, but rather

to highlight

potential differences from racism.
It is

this internal

complexity that accounts for the ever-present
“ambiguity” of

nations and nationalisms, and

nation

is

it

is

through

its

categorical conceptual element that
the

linked to racism. Racism “exceeds”
nationalism precisely in

its

structural

simplicity and “purity.”

My

account allows for the presence of racism within
nationalism, without

committing nationalism

at its

component of a nationalism

core exclusively to a racist moment. Racism

or strain of

the least, racism

is

mindful. But,

must be remembered,

racist.

it

The more

categorization

is

is

often a

and sometimes the basis of a nation

it,

At

itself.

present as a potential, and one of which a nationalism
must be

that the nation
racist, that

is,

is

that

even categorization

grounded

imposes

in

itself

itself is not necessarily

genuine social relations, the

on those

relations.

Racism

is

less that

not simply

categorization, but rather the domination of actual social relations by
categorization, a

categorization that itself includes an oppressive hierarchy.

To

the extent that a

nationalism (a definition or concept of a nation, and an attitude toward or program for
the
object of that definition or concept)

is

abstract, hierarchizing categorization,
exists,

and

in practice is

not the desire to order social relations based on an
it is

not racist. Again, the potential for racism

always or nearly so manifested

strain of racist nationalism within the greater

in the

form of at

least a

still

minor

complex of nationalisms associated with

a

given nation (which might exist in a specific sub-national group, or be taken up within a
range of “nationals” though not as their exclusive nationalism or national self-concept).
Balibar does not consider intra-national racisms.

He

is

concerned

to

show

that the

unity of the presumed nation depends on exclusion of an external other. But, racisms

based on skin color exist within many apparently national social structures, for instance
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in

much of North America,

correspond

to nationalism,

national unity

employed

is

the case regarding gender

argue that

Latin America, and the
Caribbean. Thus, racism does
not

though both are present. Even

in these cases the

these are not the

full

equality of

internally hierarchical whole.

universal, there are

same

racism exists within

from forming. However, by analogy
not depends on

to gender,

members, but

states,

it is

rather

possible to develop a nation that
does

makes claims

However, quite often

is

the “ us”

it

being an organic but

not by any means
nation

is

this,

self-conceptions.

has a racist core. This can be superseded, of

but

come

to exist

and ground the

of category-driven nationalization of a

comes

to

depend perpetually on the presence of

a social relation that pits one against a supposedly inferior
or less

-

to maintain the interior relations

who have

in

common

of the nation

-

a relation against the “others.”

nations are fundamentally organized around antipathy toward
that the

to

derivative of a hierarchizing categorization
that

this process

population does not accomplish

among

is

Armenian

course, to the extent that these relations themselves
actually

legitimate “other”

One might

North American over Middle Eastern Armenians.
This, of

drives construction of social relations,

—

might be

as

but in fact prevents a true
nation

Though intra-Armenian racism

the extent that a nation

the racist relation

-

or necessarily related.

course, marks the importation of “orientalism”
into

nation.

that the belief in

some North American diasporans whose concept
of the

internally racialized, with

To

one argues

obscure or legitimate intra-national
racism

to

-

if

some

social relations

Thus,

it is

not that

“ other,” but rather

weakness ot the concrete and conceptual 37 basis of a nation can be measured by

the extent to

which

it

depends on such an antipathy.

Balibar would probably reject such a formulation as a re-emergence of the

problematic
First

/

abnormal

of all, these are not the same.

nationalism

J7

normal

is

or “ good”/” bad
I

am

distinction

nationalisms.

not arguing that one form of nation or

“normal’ and the other "abnormal.” Rather,

Non-categorizing conceptual

among

basis.
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I

am making

a distinction

based on

real differences in the internal
configurations

they are the

same

in the structure

of different nationalisms. Though

of potentials abstractly grounding
them, they are

different in the determinations of these
potentials.

Some

determinations are more

liberatory or less oppressive in motive
and consequence than others.

appropriate and in fact quite important to
determinations.

It

make

It is

therefore

value judgments about different

almost replicates the racial turn to group

then to assert that no differentiating judgments
should be

all

made

nationalisms together, and
precisely because that will

introduce a differentiation into the abstract category
that must be given precedence over
the reality of those objects grouped within

judgments

in fact creates

in the violence

in.

Balibar’s insistence

on not making such

an ambivalence that cannot help but implicate

of (1) the worst forms of nationalism generally and

associated with each specific nation. Without such judgments,
one

all

worst strains

(2) the
is

nationalisms

forced to reject

nationalism generally.
Balibar claims that his analysis of nationalism over-rides the usual
distinctions

among

its

good and bad instances and

nationalisms or racisms [see 40], In

correlates.

fact,

It is

not that he denies the variety of

he offers a detailed typology of racisms

[38ff.].

But, these are unified into a coherent, singular system: different types of racism (and,

presumably, nationalism) become purely tactical variants
racism

And

[38ff.].

in

an over-all unified force of

they are not merely analogical variants, but historically linked as

well [41]. Racism differentiates itself in order (1) to

comprehensive range of societies and

situations

and

become
(2) to

accessible in a

overcome obstacles

in its path,

both those produced by anti-racist movements and independently of them.
It is

thus with nationalism:

different contexts

still

and always

that are

meant

—

even

built

on a

its

variants are merely evidence of

its

being

for different purposes, such as anti-colonial liberation
racist core.

to give a sense

When

Balibar

lists

fit

-

into

but

it

the correlates of “nationalism”

of the imprecision or slipperiness of the term, he includes

both “positive” and “negative” terms. But,

this is misleading, for the form
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is

of the

relations indicated by all terms are
of a specific form: they are either
for one’s nation
(‘’civic spirit,” “patriotism,”

“ethnicism”) or against another nation
or group

(

ethnocentrism,” “xenophobia,” “chauvinism,”
“imperialism,” “jingoism”)- which

amounts

to the

same

between “ ’dying for one’s fatherland’”
and

thing, given the thin line

killing tor one’s country’”

-

“xenophobia”). Each of these

or opposing an “internal
is

enemy” (“populism,”

a positive valuation of one’s

own

group, a negative

devaluation of another group, or purgation of
intrusive external elements that combines
both.

It is

always of the form of racism.

The meaning of “nationalism”
fact.

’

If

of course, a matter of convention as much as

such things as “national consciousness,” “national
movement,” and so forth

are included within

Balibar’s

is,

list

nationalism

- which

-

its

it,

potential

meaning

greatly expands

does echo a prevalent strain

beyond the form of racism.

in theoretical

approaches to

does not demonstrate the slippery nature of nationalism,

shifting meanings.

On

the contrary,

it

reduces and fixes

it

its

multiple and

arbitrarily, into a specific

form

relatable to racism.

Balibar does recognize a relational component of the nation

communicative

structure [Balibar, 1991a:

97],

at least as

a

Yet, he sees these as relations that must

be subordinated to the categorical structure “racial ethnicity.” This

is

clear in his

reduction ol the self-conception of the relational component to a grand myth of
“ kinship.”

He

rejects the notion that people within a national

community

are

“interrelated” as an ideological misuse of the notion of kinship, and particularly of

“extended kinship.” Rather than recognizing

that this notion

of national kinship might

be a metaphor expressing the perception of the concrete relations
rejects

it

outright, because he links

genealogy.”

More

than

this,

it

to the

among

nationals, he

“symbolic kernel of the idea of race[,]

.

.

.

he apparent lineage of at least some nations, but rejects the

idea of kinship because he claims that

it

is

a claim that “the filiation of individuals

transmits from generation to generation a substance both biological and spiritual,” which
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he considers one of the two

structuralist negative fetishization

interpretation

[

of '‘substance” requires

strict literalism in the

of perceptions of kinship, which
cannot then stand up

to

a solid critique

100 ]
It is

it

of the illusion of the nation (see
above). His post-

pillars

does.

not clear that “ kinship”

Though he pays

lip

means

many

to

“ nationalists”

what Balibar believes

service to the “extended” nature
of this concept, his literal

understanding comes from the concept of
the nuclear family. Extended
family structures
involve an internal diversity related
(1) to intermarriage with those outside the
“family”
(that is, the “naturalization”

of non-family members) and
(2) the absorption of

individuals in this manner through non-marital
means. Nuclear families are rigidly given,

and do not change

members. What

members,

in

a

is

until the children leave the

more, such families tend to suppress the individuality
of their

manner captured

The extended family tends
where

it

is

to

importantly,

sense of kinship.

I

it

quite well

by Hegel. The nuclear family

is

a social unit.

have a much more complicated internal structure

hierarchical, cannot

More

home. Such families never naturalize new

is

subsume

members

its

not clear that

all

that,

even

into a simple unity.

or even

many

know of few Armenians (whose name

nations foreground a

itself,

whether

in

literal

Armenian

Hai” from the supposed founder of the group “Haig,” or “Armenian”
from another
version of the founder, “Armen,”

is

meant

to suggest a familial origin)

who

take such

ideas literally, though they might recognize historical figures instrumental
in the

production of an ancient group with key
as well

Irom

assume

Adam

that all Jews, Christians,

and

“

ties to

present-day Armenians.

and Muslims believe

Eve” who lived on earth

while “ fundamentalism” might correspond

less than

to

such a

correlation between “nationalism” (on

my

interpretation of “national” history.

would seem,

level, rural versus

urban

sensibilities,

It

that

One might just

humanity

it is

is

more,

clear that there

is

no

broad definition) and any such

and so

forth.
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rather, to be

descended

What

10,000 years ago.

belief,

is

literalist

an issue of education

Indeed,
nations,

it

nationals.

would

is

would appear

it

common

Yet, on a

that this idea

for their to

literal

of “kinship”

be pressure for nationals

is

not strongly

to procreate

literal.

In

with other

reading of" kinship” as the core
of intra-national relation, this

directly contradict the incest taboos
that are quite prevalent in

most

societies.

Interestingly, in this sense, kinship
groups are directly contrary to races.

Again,

at

most,

I

would argue

that

any claims of “kinship” are attempts

to

conceptualize the network of concrete, lived
direct and indirect social relations
that are
the material aspect of the nation. In
an intellectual, political, and social
context quite

poor

in

concepts of social groups, which tends

to

reduce

all

perceived structures

involving more than one subject as a simple
aggregate of individuals, interest and identity

groups [groups of

like individuals,

without reference to actual relations

organic social wholes, and families, J '

it

would appear

that the

among

them],

extended family might be

the closest approximation of the nation.

Of course,

I

again stress that

the central concept of the nation.

might

feel a strong

actual

commitments they have

I

do not think

The nation

is

that “kinship” is usually

a different type of formation. That people

emotional bond to their nation might have
to

some

--

as one might to a family

upon which group one

commitments

is

-

i8
I

It is,

though

it

born or circumstances propel one

are ultimately arbitrary does not
It is

must, of course, cite Sartre as a happy exception to

mean

much

basis as

members

in the

as to a

indeed, quite reasonable to

feel a certain loyalty or

that appears natural,

one’s realm of free activity, contingent.

its

other directly connected

misplaced love for a “ sublime object of ideology.”
expect that members of a group would

invoked as

is

commitment
in fact

into.

to that

group

contingent entirely

Though one’s

that they are unreal or, relative to

thus reasonable to expect individuals to

this poverty.

However, even he

fails to

conceive of

non-homogeneous groups. His typology of groups are applicable to small groups in a limited temporal
historical context; bigger groups are not so homogeneous, as has been my basic point throughout this

or

His typology might better be related to larger groups as a description not of the groups
themselves, but rather as ( ) the types of relations that exist among group members and (2) tendencies
within the larger group that are not exclusive, such that a hybrid structure is present.
chapter.

1

It is useful to keep Sartre in mind, given that he conceives relations in ways beyond the simple
“connectivity” that seems to underlie my concept of social relations. Still, his concepts also suffer from
being somewhat abstract.
I
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perceive them as natural or necessary,
and create something of an
ideal object to justify
them. It is just as important to
recognize the fact that this
“idealization” might be
materially grounded, as described
above. That
to

the “.deal nation” might
be an attempt

is,

conceptualize the real complexity of
the object(s) of a member's
social commitments,

which are too complicated

member

is in

to be

reduced

to

a specific set of individuals
with

immediate contact, but clearly involves
those

to

whom

whom

he or she

the

is

indirectly linked.

perhaps useful

It is

nation

and

is,

how to

at this point to revisit the issue

understand

it

as a group. There

epistemological problem, to which

I

is at

of what type of group the
the base of this an

have just alluded: one approaches the
nation with a

conceptual poverty regarding notions of
social groups. Indeed,

it is

my

belief that a

genuine engagement with the nation might
make available new concepts of groups. From
the perspective of the theorist, one begins
with the type of dichotomy Hegel offers

extremes, of the individual on the one hand (the
atomic subject
discrete

from other atomic

subjects,

and prior

to

who

is

- two

fundamentally

any social relations) and the group on the

other (the group alternatively as the category or as
organic whole, as in Aristotle). The
a gg re g at e of individuals

shown
wholes

to

is

that

shown

to be as well

member of a

category

comprise the category, which

is

is

is

the essential

Whether Hegel’s

it;

at the

same

moment of the

dialectical

form

an organic unity, as the individual

-

is

a whole identical to other subjective

thus given in total with each individual.

a mere part of the whole, so the whole

incomplete without

individual

then

be a fully realized

individual

who

is

is

The

the truth of the individual subject,

time, the group exists in the individual, so the
antithesis of individual-group.

actually

is

more complex than

this or

consideration of the individual and group must employ a more complex dialectical form
is

an academic question.

I

am

concerned here only with using the tools necessary

to

produce an accurately complex concept of group structures grounding the nation.
clear that neither formulation can be correct, even as both are regularly invoked by

It is
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theorists

of the nation. As

have shown Chapter

1

2, liberal theorists

begin with the atomic

individual subject, and cannot
get beyond the group as an
aggregate of individuals.

Perhaps Carol Gould pushes

among

this analysis farthest, in
focusing

tndtviduals, but she, as other
liberals,

is

on the

social relations

trapped within the liberal
philosophical

assumption of the ultimately atomic
individual. That these individuals
are influenced by
external torces does not alter their
atomic nature.

On
from a
that

are

the other hand, a

common

liberal perspective, as

it is

d ls eussed

in

my

-

often but not necessarily

treatment of Kedourie in Chapter

a group structure that utterly erases
the individuality of

subsumed

in

an overwhelming organic

homogeneity. In either case, a
the

critique of the nation

totality (the

its

1

-

is

members. Members

Spartan model) or a rigid

totalitarian socio-political structure
reduces

and eliminates

freedom of the individual.

To

get

beyond

the nation (and

all

this limited pair

of extreme reductions that

trivialize or

demonize

other meaningful concrete relation-based social
groups), one cannot

simply invoke an alternative concept. Rather, one
must work through a conceptual
dialectic that produces such a concept.
realities

of the nation. In another

-

In one sense, this

echoing

is

driven by the complex

at the theoretical level the

material tension at the core of specific nations

—

conceptual-

the conceptual dialectic

makes

perception of the complex realities possible.
I

have elsewhere described the properly Hegelian

gross thesis-antithesis-to-synthesis model. This

is

dialectic

39

as not simply the

merely a single temporal moment

broader temporally as well as laterally structured dialectic. Each synthesis
into a

new

thesis

and

antithesis.

Again,

splits apart,

Thus, the above resolution of the individual and group

accomplished through an unstable synthesis

33

in a

-

unstable because

it

is

gross.

The

not necessary to accept this as an accurate interpretation of Hegel to recognize its accuracy
in engaging the nation. Hegel's work - in particular, the exceptional Phenomenology
of
Spirit -ight be taken simply as a departure point. Hegel's own concept of the nation, as a cultural
underpinning ot the institutional state, is uninteresting, and merely fits the nation into his overall schema,
it

is

and usefulness

-

m

as suggested in Chapter 2.
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is

complexities of material and intellectual
reality drive the dialectic to
a more complex

The new

level.

antithesis

opposing elements. The
to the other, that

synthesis

-

it

is

is,

is

between moments

initial

that

have taken on elements of the

synthesis of individual and group
attempts to reduce each

to transform

each into the other. This

the extreme negation of each of the
initial

other words, in proving the unity of the
two moments,
other.

far

overshoots a stable

moments of the

in fact forces

it

each

antithesis.

to

In

be the

But, this results in two one-sided syntheses
that are not resolved with each
other.

As soon

as one

shows

that the individual is in fact the truth

apply the same logic to the individual, which
reveals

its

of the group, one

truth to be the group.

is

forced to

To

the

casual observer, this seems to unify the two terms,
but in fact they merely switch
positions.

Or, not merely so. Through this
least to

each element

initial synthesis,

be connected to the other element: the individual

is

group, and vice-versa. Each takes on elements of the other,

elements of the other

in

each are revealed. What

this

is

revealed

at

the

fundamentally related to the
or,

means

is

more

precisely, the

not that the individual

is

the truth of the group, or the group of the individual, but that a proper
concept of the

group cannot erase the individual but depends

to

some

extent on

its

independent

existence, and vice-versa.

What

this

means,

in turn, is that the “ individual”

on which the group depends

not to be understood as the artificially abstracted or purified

group antithesis, but an individual already

in the context

moment of the

subsumes the individual and erases

well for the individual on
at the

same time

unity (that

is,

“ individual”

that

is

it.

its

it.

produced which

is

not the pure organic group

that

is

independent of it, but

Rather than the individual being revealed as a

the truth of the thus merely aggregate group), a
is

is

independence, but the group that depends as

Each depends on the other term

dependent on

individual-

of social relations. From the

other direction, the individual depends on the group, but this
that

is

new concept of

not entirely opposite of the group; and vice-versa.
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The

initial

synthesis falls apart, but not into
two

as individual and group.

concepts; the other
synthesis

The

moment

resulting

the synthesis will

still

opposed

"group” and “individual” are no longer
pure

moments

into proximity,

mark an advance. What emerges

between “individual” and “group” such
in

as extremely

has “bled into” each in the tension
of synthesis. The

necessary to bring the two

is

moments

that

is

-

each

is

failure

of

a dynamic of determination

each historically

a dialectic echoing the material-ideal
structure

such that the

initial

is

the product of the other

product and produced by

partial steps.

This might be viewed as a "happy” form of Jean
Hyppolite’s version of Hegel’s
dialectic, a perpetually unresolved dialectic.

which individual and group
on-going tension

by the

other.

itself,

are merged.

There

is

no end

But, what

is

revealed

to

it,

is

no grand synthesis

in

the productivity of the

as each term asserts itself under conditions of
on-going influence

One might even

argue that only so long as there

is

the tension,

is

there the

flexible production that ensures persistence.

The terms do
other.

is

Each term

not

carries

become each

other, but rather

one conceptually

productively forestalled. Logically, this

Deleuze and Guattari, though

determine the concepts of

partially.

In other words, this

to the other, but is not the other.

is

the

it

It is

an open-ended cycle of

important to point out that the nation does not

that individuals will then

dynamic

Identification

“mutual presupposition” conceived by

historically, this plays out as

reversing-direction determinations.
fully

become necessarily linked to each

is

impose on

though

it,

it

does

not logically determined, but open as well as

open-ended.
It is

thus possible to write of the lateral extension of the nation

organic unity, but internally diverse and
requiring that

it

at

some

points discontinuous

--

—

that

members of the

is

not an

without thereby

be an aggregate or social structure of atomic individuals.

possible to write of

it

It is

also

nations as relational, non-atomic or discrete subjects,

without this in turn meaning that they are subsumed into an organic whole or
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homogeneity. National community
constructor of

What
greater

more, a nation

" diversity "

of nations

In this sense, the nation
forces.

that, in Sartrean terms, serially

becomes

the

.

a

manner

is

and external

a grand synthesis, but rather their
perpetual

another issue, related to the issue of
self-

analysis of the relationship between
nationalism and sexism

less extensive than his treatment

He

in

internal

of that between nationalism and racism,

it

that maintains the genealogical “purity”

is still

viewed

as the foundation of the nation,

102]

This means that gender oppression

is

logically prior to the nation.

Not only

nationalism and sexism independent of each other, but sexism has
logical priority.
clear that nationalism depends

is

on “the inequality of sexual

love and child-rearing” [102]. The “reproduction” of the nation
regulation of sex and procreation by the (national)

through gender domination. Through
family

from a

literal

u

Balibar

s

this

state.

it

is

is

are
First,

roles in conjugal

seen to require

This, in turn,

is

accomplished

domination, nationalism transforms the

kinship unit, into the nation

necessarily strictly national, but

On

is

argues that nationalism uses an extant sexism to
regulate reproduction in

[see Balibar, 1991a:

Balibar

rest.

.

Though Bahbar’s

significant.

determine each by the

marker of a tension between

tension produces the nation. But, this
.

once a “unity,” a “diversity,” and
apart of a

itself at

is

Again, these are not resolved

determination

once constructed out of individuals
and the

members.

its

is

is at

itself.

Control of reproduction

is

not

necessary to a nation.

account, a close relation holds between sexism and racism as well.

Racism and sexism function together and

in particular,

racism always presupposes

sexism ” [Balibar, 1991b: 49], Racism and sexism are not two distinct

sets

of oppressive

practices and structures, at most analogous to each other. Rather, they are part of a single

system of “complementary exclusions and dominations which are mutually
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interconnected” [49], Sexism and racism
work together to select out two complementary
sets

of “objects” for oppression.
Underlying

this analysis is the

view of racism Balibar defends: racism
should be

broadly defined to contain “ all torms of exclusion
and depreciation ...
minority oppression which
just ethnic groups, but

so on” [48].

The

.

.

forms of

lead to the ‘racialization’ of various social
groups

.

women,

sexual deviants

[sic],

benefit of this broad category

mechanism of the

all

the mentally

that

is

it

ill,

all

not

subproletarians and

recognizes “the

naturalization of differences” [48]. Thus,

-

common

forms of oppression,

including caste and class, gender, ethnic/racial, heterosexism and
related oppressions,

oppression of the mentally
perceiving (that
characteristics

and

(2)

is,

ill,

and so

forth, (1) function in the

creating) differences

and giving a meaning

among

individuals based on biological or other

comprise a single system of oppression as complementary partners. At the same

(not simply as a specific form) and

racism” [see 49], In
rests

this

making nationalism derivative of racism

making “ethnic racism”

scheme, the nation

rests

racism

at

term “racism”) as an

(the specific

at least historically

rests

on racism

in the physical,

and

form we usually mean by use of the

privileged form, Balibar produces a “Unified

Oppression Theory.” Unfortunately, things are a

is

on nationalism which

of “sexual

once the general form of oppression and recognizing

something other than “ethnic racism”

realm than

itself derivative

on sexism.

By making

Theory

structurally,

to these differences that allows for hierarchization,

time, Balibar hierarchizes these elements, both

which

same way

in the physical

it

bit

is

more complicated

not at

all

in the social

clear that a Unified Field

possible. Just as, according to Balibar, nationalism and racism are often in

direct opposition [54ff.],

it

is

not clear that any of the forms of oppression listed by

Balibar are fully complementary of each other.

It is

true that, historically, in

many

instances (1) different types of oppressions align with each other (such as the semireligious, semi-ethnic/racial anti-Arabism of the West), (2)
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one type of oppression

is

accomplished

in part

through use of another form (such as the use
of racism to divert

white/citizen working class laborers’ frustration

away from

their exploiters,

and onto

their

competition for jobs, non-white or immigrant workers), and
(3) two types are
manifestations of the same oppressive impulse (as in the case
of colonized

women

exploited and abused sexually by colonizers, as brilliantly
analyzed by Marnia Lazreg
[1994]).

But

it is

also true that, in other cases, forms of oppression appear to
operate

independently of one another.
into conflict.

nationalism

is

This

As even

of course,

is,

skewed

to link

all

to

it

Balibar admits, racism and nationalism can

more

the

racism in the

range of concepts of nationalisms available,

when one

true

first

it is

place.

come

recognizes that his concept of

When

clear that these

one considers the

two terms might be not

just at cross purposes, but a nationalism might oppose racism directly.

factors in such terms as “ national consciousness,” “ national

fuller

When

one further

movement,” and so

forth

-

which are included or excluded from the meaning of “nationalism” purely by convention

—

one might recognize a deeper disjuncture between nationalism and racism.

The general problem might be

some fundamental way, how can
racist,

or

elitist anti-imperialist,

fit

“If oppressions are unified

in

there be an informed anti-racist sexist (or feminist

or nationally oppressive socialist, etc.)?”

—

answer

is

to, say,

racism, sexism, or imperialism.

that a

into a question,

dominant oppression

say, exploitation of labor

They do

—

The stock

drives the exploited

benefit from the oppression they help

perpetrate or even drive. Yet, they engage in this only because they are in a “double-

bind” or propagandized. They are in a “ double-bind”
only

way

they can afford food

is if it is

to afford clothes

wages

are so

low

produced cheaply by colonized farmers

dominated region of a colonial empire; or
low-paying for them

if their

if their

in a

information technology jobs are too

made by expensive domestic

buying clothes constructed by children getting 12 cents a day
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that the

in

labor, so they accept

“some Third World

country.”

They

are propagandized (or, self-deluded)
if they

earning enough on “those

This

is

damned immigrants

an important point, and

is

to

that

some

same

remove one from

responsibility for one’s effects

circumstances to beat his wife and/or kids, or

from these

who

acts,

on

others.

is

always an element of volition.

who needs cheap

40
It is

childcare in order to

hires an “ illegal alien” to provide
forth; or

bear as

it

at

the

The

situation

at all.

There

volition exercised

work - perhaps
a very

of his

on.

Though

be

acts, there

low wage, with no health

women

-

worker

benefits,

in the

children as possible to rebuild the group, regardless of their

The examples go

may

by a “career woman”

as a fine social

that

non-white

no benefit

is

there

to recognize the real effects

same

more

is

not compelled by his

harm done. Though

by a member of a genocided group who decides

many

instances quite

to regularly humiliate in public

just as clearly great

powerful forces driving the perpetrator not
is

is

speak with accents or cannot speak English

and there

some

non-union shops.”

time, that one experiences oppression
does not immediately

complicated. The poor, unemployed, white
redneck guy

immigrants

the fact that are not

for less, in

extent or in

accurate. Yet, at the
all

work

blame

and who
and so

group must

own

well-being.

there are genuine ’cross-oppressive’ double binds, these are

the products of the coincidence

--

perhaps orchestrated

—

of two forms of oppression; in

cases where this coincidence does not occur, the forms are not linked in a necessary way.
In practice, there

oppression.

is

They might be

not just one, necessary relationship

among forms

or forces of

intimately related or even fused, but they might also be

independent of each other. Oppressions do complement one another

in

many

instances,

but this results because (1) the immediate forces of the different oppressions have the

same

sources, (2) they happen to evolve into a symbiotic relationship, or (3) one force of

oppression takes on another as a

40
is

Though more

often the subject

a perpetrator of oppression

is

tool.

It is

not a function of the general historical or

not absolutely forced to act

who

in

an oppressive way.

Much more common

blocks his/her recognition of his/her oppression. Slavoj Zizek [1991]
[1995] have explored this form of denial. A fuller treatment of it here would go

and Robert Ackermann
beyond the scope of this work.
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logical unity of all oppression

specific cases,

Why

and

have

is

I

-

unity itself must be determined by specific
forces in

not universal.

taken the trouble to argue against a Unified
Oppression Theory,

“rescuing” nationalism appears

have been accomplished only by arguing
against the

to

reduction ot nationalism to racism, based on

structure

its

enforcement of a unitary general concept of nationalism?
opposite, rescuing

—

It

and

origin, as well as

My

concern here

is

the

nationalism” should not suggest that an anti-oppressive
nationalism

a nationalism fighting against domination of

oppressive.

when

seems

that,

its

perceived nation

once Balibar or anyone else

is

-

committed

is

generally anti-

to a Unified

Oppression Theory, he/she must argue as well for a reductive, oppressive core
of
nationalism, or be unable to explain

how

a force for another type. Again, as

have argued, recognition of oppression

I

a force against one type of oppression might be

determining participation by the oppressed

phenomenon
it

in other

itself

forms of oppression only explains

this

part-way. Only by de-linking forms of oppression and resistance to them

possible to understand the true complexities of relationships

oppression and liberation, and that there
negative relationship

among

A

them.

is

is

among forms of

no necessary configuration or positive or

liberatory nationalism

is

neither necessarily for nor

against other forms or oppression.

At the same time,

this potentially oppressive or

non-oppressive structure of

nationalism suggests a deep break with the other forms under discussion: each of them
purely and by definition oppressive. There

“reverse racism”

—

because there

is

is

no liberatory racism

a thick line

—

is

no such thing as

between fighting the oppression of one’s

group and oppressing other groups.
Balibar’s reduction of each oppression and
historical

and logical movement

oppression.
relations.

It

is

all

oppressions together to one core

a complete “totalization” (in Bhabha’s usage) of

imposes a perfected, unitary form over a complex of forms and

This simplification

itself

their inter-

can function as a tool of oppression, allowing denial

394

of the oppressiveness of exceptional or fugitive
forms. Indeed,

-

/'/^dependence of oppressions

from one another

that prevents

—

oppression. Indeed,

of oppression
It is

as

much

it is

-

one solid anti-oppressive maneuver or movement
from

as their unity

—

It is

the disunity

among and

within

that accounts for the resilience of

often disunity, not unity, that allows instances
of different forms

complement one

to

often the relative

and even different instances of the same
oppression

anything but a specific or temporary success.
oppressive forms

it is

another.

important here to distinguish between historical and logical
unity and

disunity. Again,

I

am

not arguing against the unity of forms

— their concrete

or

analogical linkage. In such cases, these links function in a manner
similar to the links
that bridge the

gaps within the aspects or levels of national structures. But, just as there

are different nations (certainly in

some

cases related to each other, but often in a reactive

or oppositional manner), there are different oppressive unities within the broad
history of

oppression.

Given the foregoing,
within

it

that a liberatory nationalism has

does not mean that these are integral

to

it

elements of oppression

as a nationalism. External forms of

oppression might be grafted onto the nationalism without a direct relation to the essence

of the nationalism

While

itself.

sexism or heterosexism

in

to control

some

employ

cases, for instance, a nationalism might

and manipulate a population,

in others the

sexism and

heterosexism might be a function of the more general context of the nationalism, and not
the nationalism
the feminist
this exists,

it

itself.

This

movement

quite often the case, say, regarding racism or elitism within

more

properly, particular strains within the

generally not a function of the feminism itself

is

rather imported

members from

or,

is

from the

social context in

which

the

-

as

is

imported with the members.

395

some argue -

feminism develops.

the upper and/or upper-middle classes, for instance,

inherent within these classes

movement. Where

If

it

but

draws on

much of the

elitism

On

the other hand,

it

does not require that distinct oppressions be
unified into a

single system or formal unity for opposition
to the distinct oppressions to be
unified.

This seems to be an assumption underlying

Oppression Theories.

Human

interest, and, for instance, a

much of the

rhetoric around Unified

beings can fight against that which

man

in a national

is

not directly in their

movement can recognize

the

oppressiveness of sexist structures within the movement and
oppose those. This might,

of course, influence specific

mark

of nationalism within a nation. But

strains

this

does not

the necessary relation of fighting national oppression and
gender oppression.

Rather, the fact that
latter are

some

strains are

gender oppressive and some fight

contingent historical formations,

made

all

the

more

it

significant

suggests that the

by the

fact that

they are not necessary.
“

Race” as a form of categorization

racist oppression.

is

seldom

It is

if

is

used almost exclusively as the basis of

every chosen by those race marks for oppression. This

not to ignore the positive valuations given to cultures and histories associated with

oppressed races.

It is,

however,

to

recognize that these positive valuations, which are

fully legitimate, are responses to oppressive devaluing

races.

Race

as a positive attribute

arguing for a
context,

liberalist,

which

is

is

of those cultures,

and

histories,

a response to race as a negative. Neither

am

I

“color-blind” approach to subjects. Within our present historical

deeply and fundamentally organized around racial consciousness,

“color-blindness” functions as a means of denying the depth of the oppressive structures
in place.

“Color-blindness” can only exist legitimately as a possible political outcome of

anti-racist activity; but,

whether

from within our presently

The

it

is

the proper ultimate

outcome cannot be determined

racist context.

positive valuation of race tends to focus on characteristically national aspects,

which suggests

that race as a category tends to be a positive social grouping as

approaches the nation form. In the United
such a racial form tending toward nation,

States,

at

it

“Black Nationalism” appears

both the political organizing and the
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to

be

community/social structural

schema

My

which “nation”

in

point

is,

levels.

is

At the same time,

I

am

not arguing for a valuation

“good community” and “race”

rather, that the polyvalent nature

is

“bad

of “nation-in-general” allows

appropriated or engaged by an anti-racist movement. In this
way,

medium through which

categorization.”

race itself can be transvalued, though

I

am

it

might

it

itself

not sure

I

be

to

be the

would argue

for this.

An

examination of the relationship between sexism and nationalism would
be

similar to that between racism and the

latter.

However,

this similarity is limited

by a

difference in the nature of gender and race. Within the vast realm of feminist
theory,
there are strong positions and traditions that perceive gender
(1) as an artificial construct

grounding oppression,

(2) as a distinction that

might have a biological foundation, but

that is irrelevant for all non-biological considerations, (3) as a biologically determined

difference that should be celebrated, which in turn requires re-valuing femininity,
(4) as a
biologically or socially determined difference, in which the feminine

detriment of men as well as

women - and

is

devalued

--

to the

should not be, but rather celebrated, (5) as an

artificial duality that regulates social roles

and sexual

complex and “disruptive” (revolutionary)

set

activity

away from

a

much more

of possibilities, (6) as a constructed

difference grounding an oppression that requires the building of alternative concepts of
the

women’s (and men’s)

gender, and so on. Questions such as, Should gender be

erased, valued, or transformed? remain open and debated.

My

point here

is

that concepts of

gender and anti-sexism sometimes see gender as

a legitimate social category, and not simply because of a presumed biological origin.

Though

theorists such as bell

potential for
carefully,

community

that

and respectfully

can be and often
categorization.

is

hooks [1984] are absolutely clear

that

gender

is at

most a

should never be assumed, but rather painstakingly,

built, there is a

foothold of community in gender. For, gender

perceived as a positive identity rather than an externally imposed

With

race, the categorization develops as a tool
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of oppression or

exclusion; with gender,

it is

possible that the categorization

appropriation by oppressive forces, or
this sense, its relationship to

its

oppression

can be the basis of oppression or

is

logically prior to an

transformation into the basis of oppression.
In

much

ambivalent,

is

not, as nation can be.

categorization, with at most a potential for
Structurally, gender

is

as

is

the nation’s.

Of course, gender

community

in the

is still

form of a valued

from both race and nation, and closer

different

Gender
a

identity.

to nation than race

is.

Yet, in terms of content
to

make them

so

—

-

that

is,

actual races and nations, and

what

is

perceived

race seems to abut and even overlap with nation in
certain

circumstances and forms. This
clearly conceptually distinct.

gender and nation? and

absolutely not true of gender and nation; they are

is

The questions

are then (1)

(2) Is the nation implicated in

Partha Chatterjee [1993:

1

16

-

What

is

the relationship of

sexism?

157] greatly extends the type of analysis

Bhabha

brings to the interior of the nation, itself an application of “Subaltern Studies.”
Chatterjee emphasizes the link between the force of colonization on India and the

“women’s

question.”

Colonialism

at

once drove and constrained the engagement of 19th

Century Indian nationalism with gender

issues.

Women were

caught between the force of

colonialism on the one hand and the counter-force that as a necessarily resistant

move

valorized “Indian cultural tradition” on the other. In Bhabha’s terminology, they were

marginalized within the emergent nation.
Chatterjee, however, departs from

Bhabha

significantly.

He

considers the

counter-totalization of anti-colonial Indian nationalism as a necessary form within the
context.

Its

ultimate betrayal of

emancipation

imposing

is

at the

women

is

necessary: “the story of nationalist

necessarily a story of betrayal. Because

same time

for the nation only

a

whole

set

of new controls,

by excluding many from

its
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fold

.

.

it

.”

it

could confer freedom only by

could define a cultural identity
[154],

At the same time, he

is

clear that this

inexcusable gender oppression, and
that this betrayal continues
to be

is

contested. His view of the situation

choose another resolution

I

first

is

to the presence of

of all the “necessity” argument. This
seems a

nationalist justifications for ignoring

There
is

explicitly “ pessimistic”

is volition, in

women’s

the fact that this sexism

is

[

155 ],

sexism within nationalism.

fatalistic

sexism

in so

many

-

is

reject

rehash of standard

issues in order to pursue the
central cause.

external to the nationalism, or
nationalism

not determined with respect to gender
issues. The force of patriarchy

national and other groups

I

-

within

all

quite sufficient to account for the strong
presence of

otherwise liberatory nationalist movements.

This independence suggests the nature of the
relationship between nation and
gender.

A

nation

is

significantly smaller than
as universal categories.

it

refers to a specific social structure that

of humanity.

all

that is part

as well as general categorizations.

which

thus always cuts across gender, considered

The nation

gender merely intersect

-

exists internal to the nation, as

dependent on the gendered relations

-

some

for

its

constitution and articulation.

extent determine these relations,

gender categories. This not to say that nation and

that a nation

categories circumscribe the nation.

is

categories

the nation and nationalisms to

in turn affects the universal

is

of what binds a nation or introduces gaps within

and tensions - among and within gender
At the same time,

It

At the same time, gender always

one type of concrete relation
it,

-

always specific

exceeds gender relations just as universal gender

They

are different social forms:

universal gender

categories depend on cultural (national and other) structures to give concrete meaning to
the categories, just as the nation depends on gender relations as building blocks. In other

words, a nation as a
the

development

its

social, political,

and cultural milieu and community structure impacts

members, including

their genderization,

and roles transcend individual nations. Gender

becoming

split

and specific

--

is at

even as gender structures

once constructed within nations

and independent of this specification, both

material forces and self-conscious social (feminist) movements.
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in

terms of

—

From

the perspective of the nation, gender

is at

once within and beyond. This

drives a double-aspected potential
relationship of nationalism to gender.
Internally,

nations influence gender relations and
categories, and so nationalisms often
actively
regulate and control genderization and
gender relations, which

is

formally sexist (and

generally sexist in content as well). Yet,
externally, gender escapes a nation
categories that the nation can only partially
influence,

its

-

it

is

abstract universality a foil to the

nation’s specificity and concreteness that resists
deadening determination by the

nationalism. Nationalisms usually recognize only
the

mistakenly ascribe the external excess of gender

to

particularly those that are hostile or oppressive to

alternative concepts of gender relations

external enemies. This
in colonialist or

is

—

first

aspect of the relationship, and

be contained in other nations,

it.

Such a nationalism

particularly feminist ones

—

rejects

as the

true to the extent that a particular feminist strain

condescending attitudes toward the nation

in question.

is

agenda of
implicated

But, at the

same

time, such concrete feminist agendas tied to oppressive groups do not
exhaust the
potential of
is

what might be called "Universal Anti-Sexism,” an abstract anti-sexism

not subject to external agendas and control. This independence

itself,

which

is

never contained fully within the

set

is

a function of gender

of all national units (even when these

are supplemented by non-national social structures to cover the entire
It is

human

population).

only through recognition of this properly dual nature of the relation can a nationalism

that seeks liberation

to

that

gender

liberation. This

movements, but
from the

from colonial or external domination
is

not a matter of accepting the

at the

same time submit

itself

power of external feminist

rather recognizing the independence of gender abstractly considered

level of national struggles entirely.

“Universal Anti-Sexism”
oppressors on the national or state

oppose gender domination

—

at

is

not, then, a representative

level.

Women

of external enemies or

within a nation

once are participants

in the nation

—

especially those that

and also

part of the

category of women universally, which links them with a potential anti-sexism that
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is

legitimately deployed against sexism
within the nation.

It is

legitimate both because

it

does not represent any agenda besides
the liberatton of women within
the nation from
sexism - that is, it is a concrete
specification of feminism - and
because sexism is not
necessary to nationalism in general
(though
this or that nationalism,

it

may

be or be perceived to be necessary
to

which thereby becomes indefensible
because

it is

unnecessarily

oppressive).
In the

Feminism
interests

same way,

itself

a nation exceeds the gender structure
or Universal Anti-Sexism.

organizes and structures liberation struggles,
and sometimes around the

of only some

women -

nationalism organized around

usually elites. Such a feminist

elite interests

nations.

In the latter case, the

At the same time, there

is like

a

within a presumed nation. The internal split

might be between upper and lower class women, or
across
difference.

movement

cultural, national, or state

feminism might be anti-national or oppressive of some
is

nothing within abstract anti-sexism that determines

this oppressiveness.

A

respectful

engagement by a nationalism with feminism, or a feminism with

(liberatory or non-oppressive) nationalism

is

gender and nation from within the other. As

not a function simply of the excess of
I

explained in critiquing Bhabha’s notions of

the effects of marginalized narratives, alone they merely
activity, but are not in

themselves that activity

itself.

mark

Thus,

it

the potential for resistant
is

not enough for a

nationalism to recognize the presence of “women’s voices” within a nation or national

movement, or
category ol

a feminism to recognize cultural and national difference within the

women

or itself as a specific anti-feminist group.

It

requires recognition of

the concrete partial independence of those voices and what they represent:
respectful sharing of political control.

Only by recognizing the

limits

it

requires a

of the nation can a

nationalism respectfully engage gender issues, and vice-versa. Gender and nation are
alternative conceptions of social reality, which cannot be resolved into one simple system

or structure.

It is

not they contradict one another, but that each
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is

incomplete.

Any

nationalism or ami-sexism
In

doing

so,

i,

is in

asserts itself

beyond

Only by recognizing

action.

between

(a)

feminism and

This account
unified under

Ann

is

par, a perspective

(a)

its

on

social reality ha, privileges
itself

legitimate oractual realm of
conceptual, za, ion and

the other perspective can
a truly liberatory relationship

nationalism exist.

certainly influenced

by a

strain in feminist theory
that

might be

Ferguson's term “aspect theory of
the self’ [Ferguson.
1991],

On

such an account, the individual has
different aspects, relating her/him
to a class position,
a race, a state citizenship, an
ethnicity, a nationality, a gender,
a sexuality, a religion, a
physical state, and/or so forth. These
different aspects of identity can

come

into conflict,

reflecting the social, economic,
and political tensions between the identity
categories and

groups more generally. Such an account
has been extended
as Gloria

Anzaldua and Maria Lugones, who recognize

might be multiplicity and tension, as for instance
forth

come

even within aspects, there

different cultural ties, sexualities,

my

de-linking of nation and gender, and thus of
nationalism

and sexism. At the same time, such an account
privilege the individual.

Though each of these

of non-oppressive community among

among people

women

is

incomplete or limited, in that

three theorists

is

across other differences, and

across difference, the perspective of this theory

rejecting the domination ot

it

tends to

focused on the building

group social structures and categorical schemes on the individual.
This

one aspect

and so

crucial to recognition of the limits of
nationality, gender, etc.,

is

in turn is crucial to

generally

work of theorists such

into conflict.

Such an account

which

that

in the

is

is

more
the register of

a crucial step in

complex individuals by groups or categories associated with

that asserts itselt as fundamental; yet,

it

also tends to transform group

participation into an individual characteristic. Indeed, the individual

is

seen to possess

her/his aspects.

This
in

itself intersects liberal

question are

critical

notions of the subject.

Though

the particular theorists

of liberalism and the assumption of the atomic individual,
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this

general model

all

too easily devolves into a
notion that individuals carry
their multiple

identities with them.

For instance, with a focus on the
individual, the nation

an individually held

attribute.

One

has nationality, and a nation

particular nationality. If this notion
of nationality

feminism (and

it is

is

is all

those

is

reduced to

who

dominant within a certain

many), then recognition of women’s
nationality

in

is

share a

strain

of

not recognition

of their nation, but rather the fracturing
of it. Because nationality involves
necessarily
social relations with other “ nationals,”

are forced to choose

it

cannot exist in this individuated form.

between gender and nation, though they and
those who compel the

choice might not be aware of the fact that
a choice
in reverse,

though

slightly differently.

Gender

is

is

being made. This, of course, works

a category, and so in

individual has this or that gender completely.
However,

nation or national

Women

movement

to believe that

gender

is

it

is

some sense an

a mistake for

members of a

simply an abstract category that

is

concretized fully by articulation within a national
framework. Recognizing the gender
issues of

women

in a nation requires recognizing their
partial

national framework, that
nation.

not

Though

mean

that

it

is,

independence from the

a commonality of situation or interest with

a gender category

is

some

outside the

not a community or set of social relations, that does

can be individually articulated. For an individual’s gender
construction

and situation

to

be fully articulated requires recognition of its excess beyond the
nation.

What

is

more,

gender, race, etc.)
it

to the extent that

internalized by a

is

into an individual possession. This

which devolves

at its

most cynical

such an individuated notion of nationality (or

member of a

the root of identity politics in

is

into

who view

best able to trade

—

it.

power of one’s claim

Identity

is

bad sense,

even among those within the same identity

for the fullest possible individual possession

on

its

an almost capitalistic competition among atomic

individuals possessing various identities

group,

nation, he/she assents to transforming

of that identity so as

commodified and takes on a value based on

to authoritative possession
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of one’s identity relative

to

(1) the

to other

be

members of the
one

is, etc.

identity

- and

group

- how much

(2) the advantages

Ethnic minorities

-

it

-

with

its

possible to gain by trading on
one’s identity.

is

especially immigrants

commodification of nationality. This
given to ethnicity

of an authority on Thai or
Brazilian cuisine

is

due to

-

are particularly susceptible
to a

(1) the

contemporary

rise in the value

cultural, linguistic, culinary, etc.,
artifacts

-

under the

general ascendance of “multiculturalism,”
especially in North America and
Western

Europe and
in

(2) the superior

which ethnic minorities

difficulty

power of the

social relations

live, relative to their

of the dominant society or

state

“national relations,” which have great

competing with the former. One might regard
“multiculturalism” as a

resolution of this tension, in favor of the
dominant society and a partial set of the

concerned minority. The minority members exchange

their nations as

complex

social

structures distinct from the dominant structure
for individual payoffs in the terms

described above. “Ethnicism” and “multiculturalism,”
which are generally considered

by minority groups as beneficial, are thereby revealed

to

be power instruments

in

and

manifestations of their dissolutions.

Thus

is

the general relationship between nationalism and
feminism, and nation

and gender. There

thrown off in

is

a certain asymmetric balance at the general level.

practice, however. Cynthia

Enloe [1994] has remarked on the

most national movements and nationalisms
even when strong
complicity

at

to

engage gender issues

internal pro-national feminist

movements

exist.

the level of academic theorists of the nation as well,

genuinely significant roles of women

The balance

in nation

complexity of their position within a national

in

of

meaningful ways,

She comments on the

who

formation and national

structure.

failure

is

fail to

life,

consider the

as well as the

Bhabha, Balibar, Chatterjee, and

Robert Ackermann are almost alone as exceptions among serious theorists of the nation.

Gender

is

not mentioned

“big three” as

it

were

at all in the theories

of Hobsbawm, Gellner, or Anderson, the

in the field.
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On

the other hand, within the vast
realm of feminism, at both the
theoretical and

practical levels, there has

been a complicated, strong, and sustained
engagement with

nationality.

obvious

focus

is

While

on gender

colonial context,

this is

work of theorists such

as

Marnia Lazreg, whose

issues within a particular national
colonial, anti-colonial, and post-

it

exists in

movements themselves,

women

in the

more general

feminist discussions of nation. Within
national

particularly anti-colonial or revolutionary
ones, the role of

has been significant and decisive in most
every struggle globally. Algerian

women, Nicaraguan women, Vietnamese women,
roles in struggles for national independence

Though
feminist

and

Indian

women,

in the process

etc.,

have played major

of nation formation. 41

there are significant strains in Universal
Anti-Sexism and particular

movements

that ignore national difference or

domination, such that

it is

even participate

in national

not possible to assert any generalization about
feminism’s

en g3gement with the nation,

it

is

clear that within

feminism these are serious issues

are the source of serious debate and tension. In national

movements and

communities, on the contrary, such serious engagement and debate

is

that

national

minimized, and

itself often labeled as a threat to the nation. 42

W

have not included particularly feminist theories of the nation in my critiques or extensively
in
chapter for two reasons. First, though there are many feminist accounts of the nation that
might

this

be labeled

or viewed as exploitative of the nation, to present such accounts would not have
general critiques significantly - while at the same time having been fodder for sexist
nationalist reductions of all of feminism to such negative positions. Second, at the risk of
being accused of
a sexist dismissal myself, most feminist approaches to the nation concern the relationship between
gender
and nation (or ethnicity, citizenship, or culture). Much of this work is, as my text suggests, highly
antinational-ist’

advanced

my

But, at the same time, it
instead to import existing concepts.

insightful.

is

not focused on producing

new concepts of the

nation, and tends

Though much of this work has quite often been respectful of nationality, it would not have
my own theorization. The reserved engagement of the nation by many feminists is not

advanced

necessarily bad, but rather manifests the respectful resistance to imposing an external perspective on the
nation. Such theorists thus avoid the trap that authors treated in Chapters
and 2 have fallen into, though
their externality is not a competing but merely distinct political form. The resistance to imposing a purely
feminist appraisal on the nation, or a generally reductive concept, itself comes from or manifests
1

recognition of the complex independence of nation from gender.
42
emphasize this in the sincere hope that this will change, because
I

many even

my own

my own

it

can change and should. Though

nation who will be angered by such a statement,
is my hope that this anger and the contention that follows will open the nation to change.
It nation and gender — or nationalism and feminism — are construed as fundamentally
oppositional, competing as it were for “scarce political resources,” then nationalisms are in some sense
justified in not engaging gender. This is true even if the presumed sexist nature of nationalism is
there are

acknowledged:

in

groups within

a necessary function of nationalism

and nationality, then there is nothing a devoted
Indeed, a respectful engagement with feminism can only come through
of one’s nation, which is a price to high to pay for many. It is interesting that Balibar’s
if

it is

nationalist or national can do.

abandonment

it
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Heterosexism

same time
is itself

in

often

even more uniformly prevalent

usually less explicit.

On

the one hand,

it

is

in nationalisms,

of nationals more generally.
While

many

at the

possible to argue that
heterosexism

this

might be

true, at least to

cases, the relative implicitness
of heterosexism suggests that

assumed rather than generated by

“threat” of non-heterosexuality

is

nationalism. That

is,

have discussed

at

some
it

is at least

imported into a nationalism. The
same general points
is

called for.

length the relationship between nation
and class in

treatment of Hobsbawm. Here

I

extent

the “ undesirability” or

apply as did for gender, only a stronger
admonition of nationalisms
I

though

a function of a nationalism's
desire to control reproduction
and control the

activities

and

is

might add

that, in

some

my

cases, particularly colonialism

or conquest, class tends to correspond
to nation, though even there
intra-national class
divisions exist.

As Hobsbawm shows, sometimes nationalisms

sometimes

Again, the model of gender tends

not.

and class are

apply here as well, though gender

partially different types of categorizations.

The Nation and

The

to

are also socialisms, and

history of the past

system of states.

It

the State

two centuries has been an era of great changes

in the global

has been marked by tumultuous waves of state formation,
out of

disintegrating old world and post-Columbian colonial empires.
In these two centuries,
the nation has been born, and nationalisms have figured
greatly in each

The general understanding of the
has been

its

wave of change.

history of the state form over these

two centuries

gradual though often violent coming into correspondence with emergent

nations. Nationalisms themselves have tended to

view control of its own

the primary ends of a nationalism, and often the guarantor of

position that nationalism

is

its

state as

other ends.

The

one of
history

necessarily linked to sexism replicates the logic of the all-too-many nationalists,

which see feminism as antithetical to the “national culture.”
Only by emphasizing that the relationship is not predetermined and that nationalist sexism or antifeminism is a choice among different equally possible options, can nationalists be held fully responsible
tor sexism.

406

IS

seen as waves of assertion by
emergent nationalisms of the claims
of their nations.

First,

though evolutions and revolutions,
certain Western European

nationalized.

states

became

For instance, the French Revolution
began the process

that would “turn
peasants into Frenchman" [Weber,
1976], Even in Britain, a complex
colonialist

nationality derived from Englishness
absorbed

Welsh, Scottish, and Protestant

some

central semi-subject groups
(the

form a core Anglo identity against the
greater

Irish), to

balance of subjugated and colonized
peoples close and

far

from home,

light

and dark of

skin.

A

second wave of “national”

state

formation began though a series of revolutions

against Britain, Spain, and Portugal
throughout the Americas. These revolutions
least established states that

were claimed

to be the container

of proto-nations that would

emerge through education and development. Another
wave overlapped,
Central and Eastern Europe and Asia Minor.
part,

claimed a national

Greece, Hungary,

etc.,

basis.

It

produced a

Germany and

States such as

at the

set

of states

Italy, as

are examples. During this period Japan,

time in

this

that, for the

most

well as Poland,

which had

resisted

colonization by Western powers, self-consciously transformed
itself into a national state

A

on the European model.
“

independence” during

though

it

number of British colonies dominated by whites

this period, including

would be some time before

Canada, Australia, and

also gained

New Zealand,

a credible “national identity” could be asserted

independently of the British Commonwealth.

Most other Asian
and those

that

structures that

were not

would

—

European

especially China

resist

was universal and strong
indirect

regions, cultural groups, and societies were already colonized,

—

were unable

to

develop modern

state

European and North American domination. The colonial grip

in Africa.

Much

of the Middle East had come under direct or

control, the latter through financial

and military domination of the

weakened Ottoman Empire. Anti-colonial movements
beginning of their domination, but only reached
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full

in

such areas had existed from the

power

in the

20th Century, and

particularly after

colonial region

World War

became

II.

In the decades after the war, colonial region
after

states.

Finally, as the so-called Soviet

groups

-

in

nations

-

asserted claims to statehood.

is

some

Empire weakened

in the

1980s, subject and client

cases, pre-Soviet nationalities, in others, constructed or
emergent

We

are

still

living in this era,

though

its

intensity

dying down.

Of course,
smooth

this

plodding nationalization of the globe has not been so linear or

as such an abstract telling might

make

“ national states” residual
internal differences

and

appear. In almost every resultant

have forced crises of varying proportions,

for most, “ national unity” requires on-going force. Separatist

haunted France and Spain, and the
for

it

more than a

Irish question has

movement have

bee central to British

home

politics

century. Since the mid- 19th Century, civil wars and revolutions were

rampant throughout the Americas. Central and Eastern Europe have been
unstable, as border disputes and

complex national and

state tensions

least

one World War. Even the yoke of Soviet authority appears

from

their violence.

particularly

have erupted

in part to

into at

have broken

In Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, internal tensions have been

similar to those in the Americas, with

necessary to stave off revolution and

complex

civil

internal

power

politics

and external forces

war, where these could be.

Nationalist or pro-nationalist readings of this instability usually attribute

incompleteness of the national movements

in question,

it

to the

and the vicissitudes of the

subsequent development of the nations. Such readings also sometimes recognize external
or non-national forces as factors, particularly such things as
interfering with the proper

have even come
nation

itself,

to

view

development of the

this

nations.

communism,

derailing or

Related readings in some states

on-going tension or plurality as part of the nature of the

as in the cases of the United States and France. Anti-national or a-national

readings view the residual tension and violence as evidence of the problematic nature of
the nation

and nationalism themselves. They are inherently disruptive and
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violent, or

attempt to impose fantastic and impossible homogeneities or unities on
necessarily
diverse populations, producing sometimes genocidal intolerance. Such readings

sometimes valorize other

social forces, such as class-based

movements

or

economic

forces (capitalism, industrialization) against the nation and nationalism. Radical readings
that call into question the very logic or desirability of the

nation and nationalism with

of the (oppressive)

state.

the nation-state

it:

They

is

modern

the perfected or

state

form associate the

most developed form

therefore reject nation and state together, in favor of a

non-national state form of political participation, including cosmopolitan “world
citizenship,” localized direct assembly, and so forth.

All these positions are unified on one underlying point:

all

view nations and/or

nationalisms claiming to represent nations as the driving force of the attempts to produce
national states. But, as Chapter

1

’s

treatment of Kedourie suggests, this

simplified representation of what has actually occurred.

do not necessarily represent merely the
relation to the status

emerged
Here,

I

in

my

wish

quo of the

state

attitudes

The tension and even violence

and actions of those most visible

system, national

movements and

nationalists.

What
state.

to generalize this tension.

a perpetual failure of the state form and global state order to

stability

in

treatment of Kedourie was a tension between (minority) nation and

A counter-reading of the history of the age of nations

and dynamic

a reductive or

is

realities

given above

is

accommodate

view

to

it

as

complex

the

of national (and other) social structures. The appearance of

during apparently stable periods

of conflicting and dynamic social

forces.

in this history

The

has obscured a bubbling cauldron

stability of a state or set of states

containing them has been provisional, and maintained only through the constant
application of state-legitimated violence and control.

As

tensions

mounted

--

as forces

participation and
increased in intensity and range, as the state order determining political

—

a crisis

With the reaching

of that

beneath
self-concepts has less and less reflected the socio-political reality
point

was reached,

for a given state, a region, or the world.
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it

point, violence, tension, revolution,
secession, etc., erupted in a massive

As

reconfiguration.

changed, they came

the state order
to reflect

was

somewhat

wave of

shifted and the internal structure
of specific states
better the forces that

had driven the change. Yet,

again, this stability itself allowed the
surfacing of new or re-emergent forces,
tensions,

and groups, widening the gap between
beneath

-

until a

On

new

a final rest-point.

Each

dynamic of nation and

state order is

because the history of the order

state

class, etc.) reality

43
.

does not tend toward

stability or

perceived to be such a rest-point, but not simply

normalized

is

nationalisms often represent their
absolute givenness of

and national (and

was reached, and so on

crisis point

this reading, the

state order

to

appear to lead ineluctably to

movement toward

a state). Rather,

it is

(as

it

an appeal

to the

1

law’

that legitimates each iteration of the state order
as an

absolute. This has been true long before nations and
nationalisms developed.

By

enshrining a given balance of power or imbalance of domination in
formal agreements,
covenants, treaties,

etc.,

it

frozen in a mysterious and mystifying “law” that

is

upon a more general reverence

for

law

(that reflects the interests

of elites and

through coercive propaganda and direct force). In contemporary terms, the
integrity” of existing states
latter

might correspond

structures

on the

is

territories in question.

Its

No

matter

“territorial

clearly contingent a given

iteration appeared/s as absolutely

is lost

to

conceptual grip.

are asserted, they generally

is,

new

how

analogical link to past “absolute” status quos

Even where convincing

“This account

imposed

better (though not in a final or complete sense) to the actual social

legitimate and necessary.
its

is

parasitic

given priority over alternative sets of borders, though the

configuration of the global state system, each

those within

is

legalistic claims

fail to

of the basic “right to self-determination”

change the ordering, and never through argument.

of course, an abstraction

that focuses

on nations and

states.

Obviously, the dynamic

It is

in

question has involved other forces and factors, particularly class movements and economic tensions. A
comprehensive history of the era of nations would have to discuss such non-national forces and structures
as well. The model as is does not explain any event or cycle of the dynamic fully. At the same time, it
does sketch the general form of any such comprehensive account, and justifiably foregrounds the nation
and nationalism, which is my particularly concern.
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here that the inertia of the
system

cousin to “precedent”
“territorial integrity ”

taken, because

in law.

the reverence for the status

For, even

what emerges

no change

the existing order.

-

is

is

where the “right

of debate changes

competing claims can resolve a tension
except by

The only changes
though power
conflict.

that result are forced

politics, the interference

Thus, the very

state

system

-

- becomes

No

all

force

is

rewarded

Powers and regional powers, or

-

it

action can be

of course a decision, and
a victory for

is

this

-

no debate about these two

implicitly reaffirming the status
quo.

on non-legal or non-philosophical

levels,

of those with specific agendas, and
military
as enshrined in international
legal principles

breeds and encourages military conflict
and the rewarding offeree. That
not to say that

apparent

to self-determination”
balances

not a decision but a stalemate.

authorized. But, this

No amount

quo

must be

intractable

even

is,

-

of course,

irrelevant to the interests of Great
in their face, to succeed.

This in turn

reinforces the global structure of domination
that has evolved out of colonialism,
as well
as encouraging great extremism

One must keep

in

mind

among

those

that the “inertia”

reproduced through mental and material force
generally. Thus, tension

movements -

or

is

the

of the

power plays by

quo

in individual states

elites currently out

myth of inertia, dependent on

skews perception

of the actual

separatism. This

is

is

actually continually

and

of power.

It is

in the

world

a product as

quo as the forces seeking

to alter

it.

much of

Again,

it

the mystification of inter- and intra-state law that

dynamics of such things as contemporary national

not to valorize separatism, or to assume

to challenge its prejudicial illegitimacy in the face

specific claims and

status

this structure.

not simply the product of disruptive self-determination

the force necessary to reproduce the status
is

who would oppose

its

moral authority, but rather

of the existing

movements can be examined on

their

own

state order, so that

merits, with a full

appreciation of the forces and possible oppressions that have produced them or legitimate

them.
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This suggests the deeper cause of this
perpetual non-correspondence. The
past

two centuries have seen dramatic population

shifts

and migrations, as well as complex

interfusions of populations within transnational
states. In

production of marginal groups has produced

political

some

nations, the

movements

at

Bhabhan

cross-purposes with

nationalisms, or even that resist certain homogenizing
nationalisms directly. For Bhabha,
particularly the former

is

the motivating force for nationalism.

These

alternative agendas produce a crisis in "traditional”
correspondences

language, and territory.

On

his read, nationalism attempts to rebuild

shifts

and

between

culture,

such

correspondences.

On my
is

understanding of the nation, however, such a “traditional”
correspondence

One must

not national.

their tension.

nation and

Most

at the

very structures of nation and state to comprehend

theorists respect a definitional or conceptual distinction

They

state.

look

are not

two aspects of the same

state is not the formalized political structure erected

socio-political

phenomenon. The

on the foundation of the nation,

the cultural and societal basis of common political participation in the state.

nation the cultural and social aspect of the formal nation
In general, states and nations refer not to the

same

between

- whether

Nor

is

as

the

actual or constructed.

socio-political formations operating

on

different conceptual planes, but rather different (types of) socio-political formations

operating on the same set of conceptual and material planes. The “nation-state” (a nation
that is also a state)

the

modern

not the ultimate actualization of the nation, nor the essential form of

state.

Stability

distinction

is

is

thus impossible because nations and states are incompatible.

between formal and informal here

is

deeper than aspectual:

recognizing two distinct social forms that compete with each other on
political levels.

moving among
state,

I

it is

The

the key to

all social

and

have sketched the nation as an on-going, non-totalizable dynamic

different aspects of the material and conceptual realms.

on the other hand,

is

The modern

essentially defined by governmental structures, constitutions,
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codes of law, and/or so

forth.

The

state is the formal organization

decision-making and regulated functioning. The

what
--

encounters within

it

itself to a

state tends to

formal order.

often driven by changes in the social actuality

formalized (often legal) means. This

is

What
it

is

in fact,

its shifts

occur through

rigid,

in constitutional or legal

only when these abstract guarantors of order are strong

informal realm out of direct control by the government allowed
to

perhaps an idealization of the

and evolutions

true of liberal concepts of the state: even
a state’s

realms of disorganization or informality are clearly
defined

ways,

—

state -- real states are

is

exist.

a disorganized or

Though

never what they are defined

informal or unofficial power operates within and despite the official
structure

dynamic of the

The
is

state is

state is

for

organize and subjugate

more,

organizes

of a population

this is

to be, as

the

always toward the subjugation of the unofficial and informal

fundamentally the on-going result of definition and organization;

dominant over independently emerging
Definition and organization
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.

this aspect

social reality.

only one component or aspect of the nation, and not

is

privileged over independent generation of raw social forces and structures prior to
definition and organization.

What

is

more, with these there

concepts and definitions operative, as well as different
networks, and so forth on the material
factor in the tension
fairly well at a

develop

in

between nation and

given point, that

new ways, ways

The

level.

distinction

—

strains, sub-cultures

Even where a nation and

and

state

-

is

further

correspond

not a guarantee that the nation will not mutate and

that the state (a rigid formal structure) cannot easily follow.
state is not, then,

social object, but rather

or

usually a multiplicity of

The mutability of the nation form

state.

between nation and

and informal aspects of a
that tends to be formal

is

is

is

merely between the formal

between a comprehensive

delineated through institutional

means —

social

(the state),

form
and a

recent spate of anti-govemmental violence in the United States registers the recognition on the
extreme right-wing fringe of the state’s inherently hegemonic nature.
Of course, where the non-governmental is the actual origin of a government and considered its
end — as in some conceptions of, say, the United States -- there is a deeper tension between the state
(government) and the powerful who operate somewhat independently of it (big business, etc.).
‘‘‘‘Thus, the
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dynamic tension between such formalization
and continually

The

nation).

tension between nation and state

is

asserted social reality (the

between two

distinct social

schemes

that

are not, at least abstractly,
resolvable into a unified socio-political
formation.

This distinction has another aspect as well.
As

have said,

I

states are part

of a

global system of states, in which political
participation depends on statehood.
Thus, one

does not

talk about this or that state as an
isolated or independent social form.

states are in part defined

by interstate agreements. This system evolved

Indeed,

at first as a

European system long before the era of nations, along
with the grand colonialism of the
past 500 years,

which saw

the world as a space to be divided

up among the powers of

Europe, precisely because they did not contain societies
and cultures that could support

modern

states

with other

on a

level with the

states, “serially

European ones. States are determined by

determined"

in Sartrean terms.

Such a system necessarily

takes the globe as a whole to be parsed into territorial states.

dynamics of a

state

Though

do sometimes function independently of external

through (1) direct or indirect power over other

their borders

the internal
forces, this

states and/or (2) the principle

is

of state

sovereignty, which itself derives from interstate agreement and law.

Balibar and
in a

many

others argue that nations are serially determined as well, if not

“world system” of nations, then

at least relative to

proximate “enemy” nations.

have argued against such a purely external view of the nation,
interior determination.

Bhabha’s pure
contained in a

This

intensity.

An

is

territorial state,

for a balancing potential of

an implication of the concept of laterality

intensive

view of the nation

and develops within

it

--

are serially determined, by reference to external others.

-

I

I

that the nation

offered against

of all

is first

derives from the view that nations
I

do not argue for a pure

laterality

or self-generation, but rather distinguish between the system of states, which are

necessarily contiguous and serially determined, with nations, which are not necessarily

contiguous, and do not form an exhaustive system such that (1) every person
nation and (2) every person

is

in

no more than one nation.
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is in

a

Resolution

is

only possible where the nation

Under some circumstances, a nation might

component becomes dominant over other

itself

take a rigidified form,

self-concepts and

general, and so not the general form of the nation.
This

produces or controls a nation
the potential to mutate

propaganda.

depends on

It

~

away from such

will tend to

becomes

the latter

that is the nation in

often the result

when

it is

when

a state

though often with

a pure product of state

to the state to the extent that its reproduction

state institutions, support, concepts, etc.

This raises an important historical point:
to

a single definitional

rigid or fossilized,

a form, even

remain subject

is

if

material complexity. But,

its

merely a specific configuration of the abstract
potential

this is

come

tends toward formalization.

be associated with each other.

explicit goal of

many

On

it

not that nations and states do not

is

the contrary, this

is

quite

common

and the

nationalisms as well as state educational and social policies. But,

such parings must be understood as driven by one or the other social form. In
other
words, a nation or nationalism produces or captures a

produces or captures a nation
is

not the “

ideal

—

full

in line

with

its.

is

its

agenda, or a state

not a partnership or a merger; and

a nation to correspond to

-

its rigidities,

actual or

in

its

own

image.

A

state

produces or captures

while a nationalism produces or captures a state

be consistent with and reinforce

its

emphasize what the nationalism does

—

particular concept of the nation.

Such a

whether diasporan participation,

plurality,

state

territoriality, linguistic purity, etc.

Much more
past

than a gradual coming into correspondence of nation and

two centuries have

states for

at

state, the

a general level been an on-going battle between nations and

domination of the

it

always dominant and privileged. Indeed, the dominant

torm produces or deforms the subordinate

will

is

of

flowering” of the prior social formation. In a “nation-state”

the nation or the state

that will

This

state as part

other.

Each has recognized

political

form (with

national

movements have recognized

the other as a major socio-

class as well entering the fray) in contention with

it.

Specific

the necessity of attaining statehood for legitimacy
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and

stability in the political realm, while
specific states

of nation and nationalism as a

tool for maintaining

As, for instance, those loyal to the
nationalization

so

many

was

the only

way

late

an exclusive popular basis for
power.

19th Century

to survive

have recognized the importance

Ottoman

and prosper

in the

state realized,

modern

subject and colonized peoples recognized,
culture and society

structures

-

tended

to survive

The beginnings

only

ot this tension

drove the linking of populations
action/war).

The old

when

state

age. Likewise, as

-

national

linked to a state.

came perhaps

in the Thirty

Years War. which

to state politics (particularly in the

form of military

system was shattered not through disruption of the old

complicated balance of power (which would re-emerge again and
again
as for instance in the prelude to

World War

I),

to

be disrupted,

but rather through the gradual involvement

of the general population of states as military actors and direct victims.
45
Populations

became

the newest

religion

had been weakened, and was anyways inappropriate

weapon

in war, but

proved

to

be less than passive. The old hold of
to the

new, worldly

activity

of state building and centralization. Over the next century and more, new forms of
sociopolitical formation

and participation emerged, chief among them the nation and

nationalism. States tapped them even as they began to challenge the state form

once serving

it

and transforming and

destabilizing

it.

Yet, arguing that the nation and state are incompatible forms

arguing that this

is

recognized from within nations and nationalisms.

assert that nationalism

onto social

reality, that

is

is

not the same as

Many

theorists

inherently irrational or attempts to force an impossible structure

of the national

state.

subjectively to the territorial state? That
the futile

itself, at

hope of achieving a

is,

Is

the nation or nationalism related

are they themselves

grounded by definition

stable national territorial state?

4S

important to observe here the distinction between the “nation” and the “people,” made by
Hobsbawm. The nation is not simply the people, taken as the general
population, with its organic social forms and relations. The nation is a specific configuration of the
population, involving concepts as well as these social forms and relations in a developmental, mutually
influencing dynamic. Nationalism is a means of linking the people to a state — the nation in some sense
opens into both the formal, definitional, organizing/ed realm of the state and the organic, informal,
unorganized realm of the “ people.”
It is

specifically by Chatterjee and
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in

Lowell Barrington has argued
specifically
related [Barrington, 1997],

He

that

both nation and nationalism
are so

defines a nation as a “collective!]
united by shared

cultural features (myths, values,
etc.) and the belief in
the right to territorial self-

determination” for that nation
[713]
territorial state is the

cultural group,

key feature

and so

supposed nation have
other

A

forth.

not) in

which
This

all

is

For Barrington,

is

problem immediately

of the nation?

part

commonly

members have

very clear

this desire that the nation

that distinguishes the nation

to share this desire, or just

members be considered

social formation that

“

some?

if just

do not

1

members of a

some

do,

how can the

it

corresponds

to

is

no

a state or

a substantive desire for political
self-determination."

Armenian nation during

in the

all

hesitate to say that there

called a nation (whether

its

from mere ethnicity,

do

arises:

have

the 20th Century.

At any given

point in the contemporary history of this
nation, a significant portion of the
national

population has not desired

territorial self-determination

—

even

strong and periodically successful nationalist
movement(s).

in the

The

presence of (a)

issue

is

not that

nationalist organizing failed to reach the entire
population, but rather that portions of the

nation deliberately chose not to take on concerns about

territorial self-determination.

For instance, during the 1915 Genocide, many surviving
Armenians
traditional

homeland

for destinations around the world.

As

part

fled their

of the psychological

consequences of genocide victimization, many survivors wanted no part
of the
subsequent Armenian

state

(1918

minority communities within

new

-

1920), instead focusing their efforts on building viable

countries,

all

connected into a global national

Diaspora. This was a yet more significant trend in second- and subsequent-generation

emigrant Aimenians.

46
I

have already treated the

Some Armenians

first part

within and outside the Soviet Union also viewed

of this definition earlier

in the chapter.

'“'Barrington distinguishes between the

on that desire (nationalism). Even

so,

mere desire for territorial self-determination (nationality) and action
the former must be an explicit and central belief for it to have the

role in defining national identity that Barrington gives

given nation share some vague preference for

would

it.

It is

meaningless to assert that members of a
Such a basis of nationality

territorial self-determination.

trivialize the nation.
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the

rump Armenia’s subsequent coerced

inclusion as a felix culpa that
supported the

survival, cohesion, and even
relative ascendance of Armenians
in the East.

Atter the independence of the
Armenian Republic in 1991, there has
been

widespread support for the Republic within
the external Diaspora. In

Armenians around
But

at the

same

the world

time,

most

have supported the idea of an independent
Armenian

in the

Diaspora have not supported

Armenians, have had no intention of direct
involvement

Armenia

-

this sense,

it

state.

for themselves. They, as

in the self-determination

of

they have had no intention of relocating
to the Republic, not because
they

have been barred from

but because they have chosen not

it,

to.

The Republic

thus has not

represented their self-determination, and their
nationality seems clearly not based on a
desire for national self-determination. At most,
they have desired self-determination for

Armenia

as an end for others or an abstract end for
the "nation."
,

Even

if

one allows an abstract or offset desire

qualify under Barrington's definition, for
desire, a

vague preference

preference
similar

—

is

is

it

on the
an

level

idle

many Armenians,

for the existence

that

would be

which these individuals do not organize

this desire has

of an independent Armenian

of a desire to win a

wish

for territorial self-determination to

lottery,

line if

it

become famous,

happened without

their lives,

and

to

been a weak

state.

Such a

or something

effort,

which they have

but around
little

attachment. Their sense of "Armenian-ness" has been quite independent of the

territorial

self-determination of Armenia. Contrary to such a desire being the defining characteristic

of their nationality,

to the extent that

it

exists,

it

is

derivative of this nationality. 48

My analysis ot Armenian "non-territorial" nationality is different from Ronald Suny's, as represented by Barrington in
Note 2 (p. 7 6, c. ), with the apparent intent ot obviating the type of criticism make. According to Barrington, Suny
means that early 20th Century Armenians had a "sense of the right to a homeland" - a homeland which they had lost bin
which they wished to regain. National consciousness was thus organized around connection to this lost homeland, to wh
Armenians felt they had a "right."
My position is different. hold that the very nature of the Armenian nation changed in the
aftermath of the Genocide. While shared territory might have mediated or grounded the network of social
relations, practices, and psychological structures at the heart of the pre-Genocide Armenian nation, with
dispersion territory was replaced by such things as language and literature, cultural and political
associations, religious institutions, and "shared history" (in the form especially of the immediately past
experience of Genocide and dispersion) as the basis of the nation.
1

1

I

I

I
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As

these points suggest, the
distinction between those

self-determination and those

who have

true

members of the

for instance, the split

desired territorial

not has not corresponded to
any other intra-ethnic

Iracture or border that could be
defended as the boundary

Armenians and

who have

nation.

In the

between merely ethnic

Armenian community

between those strongly desiring a sovereign

state

prior to 1991,

and those not

occurred within both the external Diaspora
and the Soviet Republic of Armenia.
More
than

this,

though

political affiliations in

issue, a structure that,

divide.

The very

on

my

etc.,

cases depended on one's position
on this

account, corresponds to the Armenian
nation straddled this

fact that debate

communities, churches,

some

over self-determination occurred within
families, local

suggests that people were bound together in
a national

structure across this divide: splitting the
world

Armenian population based on

for a territorial state would, in fact, require
ignoring social structures

and informal social networks, formal
the deeper

communicative and

a

meaningful entity

in a

manner

of the nation

and without which

that could be called a nation.

that necessarily fractures or destroys

Though

such as familial

and national associations and

local

relational structures

role in the constitution ot the nation

-

would be

that

institutions,

and

have an obvious

difficult to recognize

Such a division would define the nation
49
it.

a diasporan nation's independence

national consciousnesses not focused on territory

it

-

the desire

from

territory fosters alternative

among many members,

it

also fosters an

increased desire tor territory among other members. Mere diaspora does not imply
a
universal absence of the desire for territory.

Nor

is it

any

less likely for a diasporan

nation to be organized around the desire for control of the "national territory" than any
other type ot nation. Likewise, direct connection to a "national territory" does not imply
the universal presence of the desire for territorial self-determination. In territorially-

bounded groups, such
49

as proto-national colonized groups, in

mean

which members experience

a

that an ethnic nation is equivalent to its associated ethnic group. My point is merely
between ethnicity and associated nation, where these are not coincident, does not
depend on the presence or absence of a desire for territorial self-determination. Length constraints prevent
a fuller examination of this point.

This does not

that the distinction
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d,rect connection to a
territory, there

the tssue of self-determination.

due
“

is

is

is

among members

no doubt

that in

regarding

1954 a large and

population desired independence
from the French.

also no doubt that a portion
of the population remained
loyal to the French

to a colon, zed mentality
or out

common

and

politically

between those committed
to

own

of their

advantageous

deny the nationality of such people,
the

correspond

generaily also a split

For instance, there

commuted segment of the Algerian
Yet, there

is

self-interest, against the
group's.

in the

midst of an anti-colonial struggle

truth is less simple.

to self-determination

any other significant division

Though

Again, the dividing

to

line

and those not did not necessarily

that

might distinguish members of the
nation

from non-members.
Barrington would probably reject
"ethnicity" and "nation" [see 712].

ethnically

homogeneous

my

criticism

on the grounds

Are Armenians, Jews, and others

that

it

conflates

in diaspora;

territorially-bounded colonized groups; and
other presumed

ethnic nations merely ethnic groups, while
those segments that maintain a

commitment

self-determination are the national subsections
of the broader ethnic groups?

argument has already foreclosed

this:

desire self-determination and those

My

as described above, the split between
those

who do

to

who

not fails to correspond to any other intra-

ethnic fault line or constitute a general intra-ethnic
boundary that might differentiate the

nation from the larger group.

One might even

argue that definition of the nation

territorial self-determination

Though such

a desire might

that sense be laudable

committed contains

commitments

in

terms of a desire for

expresses a specifically nationalist 50 concept of the nation.

mark those with

the greatest

commitment

from a national perspective, the nation

as well those with a lesser

to other things, and/or those

to

to the nation

which they

and

are

commitment, those with competing

with interests antagonistic to the nation. That

even a staunch nationalist as part of his/her pursuit of territorial self-determination often

'

u

Though

I

in

dispute even the link of nationalism to territoriality below.
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is

forced or chooses to engage
such people suggests

how much

a par. of the nation they

are.

Barrington might then argue

and nation,
if the

I

have

that, to

entirely eliminated the
distinction

only possible distinguishing
feature

Barrington holds
the nation [712],

avoid criticism for conflating
ethnic group

this

assumption, as

My own

is

is

clear

-

true only

the desire for territorial
self-determination.

from

his treatment

account of their difference

passivity of ethnic identity (see above)

between them. This can be

-

of Yael Tamir's theory of

depending on the relative

preserves the difference without
appeal to

territorial self-determination. 51

If nations are not necessarily
linked to territorial states as achieved
or desired
links,

it

would seem more

likely that a nationalism,

Barrington, “nationalism”

is

“the pursuit

by

definition, should be.

- through argument

of rights for the self-defined members of the
nation, including,

autonomy or sovereignty”
nation and (2)

is

[714],

A

or other activity
at a

minimum,

nationalism (1) makes claims about

action on the desire for

territorial

For

who

-

of a

set

territorial

is in

a

self-determination and possibly

additional perceived political "rights."

As

I

described above, there are

which involves a

different forms

of nationalism, each of

different concept of the nation and the appropriate

formation or activity.
aspect

many

A

drive for territorial self-determination

is

agenda

for

its

only one possibility or

among many.
The frequency with which

context in which

all

it

is

the chosen form of a nationalism depends

on the

nationalisms operate. Since the American and French Revolutions,

the sovereign territorial state has been typically recognized as
the primary form of formal

group organization and popular self-determination. Indeed, within a global system
of

5I

The moment of activity

in the

formation and reproduction of the nation might involve the desire for
need not. The members of a nation might be unified around a central

territorial self-determination, but

and that desire might be tor territorial self-determination. But, neither step
might have a range of forms, and vary across the membership ot the nation. Only
desire,

a universal desire for self-determination.
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is

in

necessary. “Activity”
exceptional cases is it

territorial states political
participation

H

is

reasonable that

of the nation

-

- many

and sovereignty has depended
on statehood. Thus.

whether the modern

territorial state is the

appropriate political form

nationalisms have pursued their own.
This

is

particularly true in

cases of domination or colonization:
an end to oppression has required

at least in part the

rejection of domination within the
colonial state structure imposed
by the colonizer, and
this in turn

has required the colonized to gain their

territory free

chosen
logical
for the

in the general

if

political

state,

power. Thus, the

which

is

recognized as a

territorial state

context of constrained options, and in this
context

not ultimately productive choice. Pursuit
of a state

improvement of a nation’s

particularly

situation,

though

it is

is

is

it

has been
often a

generally the only option

by no means a necessary or

good one.

Given
all

from external formal

own

the

modem

realities

of global economics and

politics,

however,

not at

it is

clear that the state actually necessarily represents
group self-determination.

On

the

one hand, statehood can be a butter against disruptive external
domination and allow
better functioning

and development of a nation;

times

at

rigidity is itself

its

against tumultuous internal and external forces of change and
dissolution.
the level of a state's true sovereignty

power, or

is

at least its ability to project

relative to

its

an advantage

On

the other,

economic, military, and "cultural"

an image of such power. Whereas in the

past,

formal independence usually corresponded to genuine power, while weakness meant
subjugation as conquered territory or colony, in the

more and more become
right to

which

era formal independence has

a function not simply of power, but also of a perceived universal

group selt-determination. As a

abstraction,

modem

result,

formal independence alone

is

largely an

the experiences of many former colonies and small/weak states in the

present era illustrate dramatically. Indeed, mere territorial sovereignty has

dangerous seduction for smaller, weaker nations

-

one

that often hides exploitation

subordination under the veil of apparently mutual relations

422

become

among

formally equal

a

and

states.

Paradoxically, statehood itself
often depends on the
de-territorialization of a
nation.

For instance,

it is

difficult to

powerful Jewish nation, with a
States.

conceive of !srael without a
worldwide and

political

The Armenian Diaspora

and economic presence
particularly

has also been in incredtble
support to the

More importantly migrant workers,

expatriates,

and so

forth

in the

United

new Republic

from a host of states and

non-state nations (for instance, the
Philippines, India, and the
Dominican Republic, and
Tibetans, Puerto Ricans, and
Palestinians) play important roles
in the home

economies

and

in the preservation

of the home

states

and nations, respectively. The age
of migration

and diaspora does not signal the end
of the nation, but rather

from the

-

the

same

time,

it

to the extent that

functioning of states

is

might be argued

modern

that the

its

non-coincidence of states and

territorial states are inevitable

positive as well. After

end of a national movement by

all,

a state that

dominant nation (whether

within the state or has a diasporan component
as well)

minority groups
to

(racial, ethnic,

encourage their

and national, as well

full participation in the political

The disillusionment of former colonies
to find

themselves inserted

at the

organization and

new

emerged has not been

new concepts

is

not seen as the absolute

it is

more

and the independent

contained primarily

likely to be tolerant

of

religious, gendered, etc.) and, in fact,

and social

life

of the

state.

that struggled hard for independence, only

ground for the growth of new ideas about

political forms.

social

Chatterjee focuses on these. For him, what has

a supersession of nation and nationalism, but production of a
range

for each.

Nationalist" thinking

of various nationalisms and nationalism

—

thinking about the goals and meaning

more generally — has come

these experiences and the changing world context. That
the type

is

-

lowest levels of the global economic, political, and

cultural hierarchy, has been fertile

of

increased independence

territorial state.

At
nations

its

on which Barrington focuses no longer
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exist

-

is

not

to be

informed by

not to say that nationalisms of
at all.

But, beside and/or with

them, other forms and aspectsjust
as fundamental

any definition of nationalism
are

to

also present. [Chatterjee
1993a and 1993b]

A

full

concept of "self-determination" would
seem

interior of the nation,

different

and the relationships among

segments of the membership, 52

course, undeniably true that

such attention, or
territorial claims.

primary

if

many

its

to require attention to
the

individual

members and among

in addition to exterior
considerations.

It is,

of

nationalisms themselves do not give/have
not given

at least fail/have failed to

These nationalisms tend

give

it

an emphasis equal

to their attention to

to fit Barrington's definition,

which requires

not exclusive focus on territorial
self-determination. But, just as clearly,
other

self-described nationalisms at the very least
privilege/have privileged internal concerns
as

much

as external. For instance, as

much of a
130].

factor in national

Flobsbawm

movements

argues, class issues have often been as

as territorial self-determination
[1992:

The French Revolution primarily concerned

122

-

class issues, not territorial self-

determination.

Of course, one might
Barrington

s

definition,

force even these nationalisms into compliance
with

on the argument

that there

is

no "national

interior" without secure

national borders. 53 But, a reverse argument might also be
made: even in cases in which
territorial control is a focus,

internal structure

it

of the nation

might be perceived as meaningless without concern

—

and even individual participation

according to some nationalisms, pursuit of territory alone
territory without benefit to or participation

territory has not

been "nationalized,"

that

is

in the nation.

At

least

not nationalism: securing

by the general populace means

is,

for the

secured in fact and not just

that the

name by

the

"nation" concerned.
It is

true that nationalisms

to the category

52
5J

In

emphasizing

internal as well as territorial issues belong

of social movements based on nationality

terms of gender, class, religion,

that

pursue

territorial self-

etc.

An argument

frequently used by nationalists attempting to avoid dealing with internal issues,
service of sub-national interests and agendas.
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in

the

determination. However, this
categorization does not exhaust their
fundamental natures:
these social

movements

determination

category were

to

are not nationalisms only because
they pursue territorial self-

one must also make reference
contain

believe to be the case),

it

all

to the internal aspect.

would be a misleading
is

1

do not

categorization.

much more

than merely fixing the membership
of

the nation, and so not covered by
Barrington's definition.

a

if this

nationalisms that have an internal aspect
(which

This concern for the internal

membership can be

Even

On

the contrary, controlling

means of m/ra-national domination. Rather than
securing

being of members of the nation,

it

might be a

tool against

members

to

the well-

be excluded and a

threat against those included.

have already discussed the deeper

I

level

of “self-determination” isolated by

Chatterjee, in his critique of Eurocentric concepts of the
nation. For Chatterjee, genuine

self-determination requires agency in determining the form of
self-determination

Thus, a nationalism might be explicit about rejecting

territoriality,

itself.

often as a result of

recognizing the problematic role of the state system and “sovereignty”
in neocolonialism.

At

the

same

time,

I

do not mean

to suggest that non-territorial nationalisms are

merely possible for non-European nations. As
clear [see Barrington, 1997:

generally

many

I

have followed Barrington

in

making

714], associated with every actual or ideal nation there are

different nationalisms.

unconcerned with or unfocused on

Contra Barrington, some of these will be

territorial statehood.

Robert Ackermann has advanced an important position regarding the relationship

of nation
state are

to state

[Ackermann, 1995:

of this or that

a purely ideal construct,

state

He

argues that for “nationalists” the nation and

two aspects of the same socio-psychological

basis, in the reality

is

].

— which

itself

which

becomes an

territorial state

is

and

structure.

its

The

state has a material

laws and government. The nation

the perfected negation of the negative aspects of the

idealized abstraction, in
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which only the “negative”

aspects are preserved and to which other
negatives are added.

and

state are a dialectical pair.

into purely

The

More

precisely, the nation

actual and idealized aspects of a nation-state
are split

“good” and purely “bad” elements (dependent on

the preferences of the

individual or set of individuals conceiving of the
nation-state in a particular way).

good

elements are attributed to the nation, which

attributed to the state,

and frustration

—

which

is

regardless of

is

a pure ideal, while the “bad” are

the catch-all for social, political, and
its

The

economic discontent

actual relationship to the state.

Nationalists” thus use a “good”/” bad” distinction to rescue their
“nation”

against any type of criticism. Whatever

(government, laws,

etc.);

whatever

Indeed, the solution to what

etc.).

- making

to the state

As

is clear,

the state

is

is

is

good
bad

bad, oppressive,
is

due

lies in

more “national.”

due

to the state

to the nation (culture, civil society,

emphasizing the nation more

in relation

*

he bases the position on the assumptions that

against: that (1) nation and state are aspects of the
is

etc., is

same

I

have already argued

social formation

and

(2) a nation

a purely ideal psychological concept produced as a balancing response to the all-too-

concrete frailty of a given
state

state.

At the same time,

my

very de-coupling of nation and

might function as a variant form of precisely the maneuver Ackermann has

critiqued.

One might

argue that

I

have rescued the nation from charges of internal

oppressiveness, rigidity, authoritarian control, racism,
state that lends

it

more

etc.,

by presenting a concept of the

more complicated and

to these things than the

potentially anti-

oppressive nation.

My

sympathies for progressive national movements and nations have, no doubt,

been clear throughout

this

work. Yet, that

my

project has been to rescue the progressive

potential of the nation and nationalism does not
either:

I

trust that this has

been clear

amount

in the text as well.

comprehensive theory of the nation and nationalism
general evaluation as “good” or “bad”

-

that

to a general valorization

I

of

have attempted a

does not subject them

to a

or an ideologically suspect distinction between
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good or bad nations and nationalisms.

have analyzed oppressive,
anti-oppressive, and

I

non-oppressive aspects and tendencies
of each phenomenon, and presented
examples

vanous points on the continuum.

I

have stressed throughout

this chapter that nations

at

and

nationalisms are internally complex,
such that oppressive, anti-oppressive,
and non-

oppressive tendencies are present.
I

have denied

territorial state

have qualified

-

form. In doing so,

I

-

with the possibility that

this

one

I

need

it

the conceptual

tried to

Though such an

association

not:

in

some

state

-

-

enemy of the

is

more, negative tendencies or aspects
state.

is

I

a

-

not a function of its

is

especially construction or

can result in oppressive national/ist

cases, a stable political

be the result of association with a

nation.

be clear that a “bad” nation or

and legal structure might temper or

brake extremist nationalisms and complicate the structure
of the nation

way. What

modern

to the

some circumstances statehood

have also

domination of a nation or nationalism by a
it

in

deep an internal complexity

that is internally or externally oppressive

association with a state.

forms,

this

have made

relatively productive political venue.

nationalism

-

perhaps unfairly

in a nation or a

in a

productive

nationalism need not

Extremist state politics might themselves be a

function of extremist nationalisms, as in the case of Turkey since 1908
and Nazi

Germany.
In any event,

contrary,

am

I

I

do not argue for the “rescue” of the

clear that the nation

is

by the nation.

On

the

not a purely or necessarily positive socio-political

torm, and that the domination of a state by a nation
national

state

is

not a necessarily fruitful goal for a

movement.

My

concept of the

libertarian model.
that the flip-side

I

am

state

does allow for minimizing the

of the formal and rigid side of the

Hobsbawm

on the

not necessarily an advocate of such a politics, but wish to suggest
state is

power. This perhaps makes states generally tolerable
Balibar or

state itself,

-

formal and rigid restrictions on

though

attribute to nationalists to hold that in
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it

is

a greater fantasy than

even the most

liberal state

there

is

relative

not a strong streak of
governmental authority

ascendancy of clearly problematic

at least the

At
and

state.

liberal states

middle and upper class preference
the

same

time,

My reasons

I

am

-

not sure that

1

and might even explain the
over more authoritarian
forms, or

for them.

want

to

claim neutrality regarding
nation

for not doing so are quite
different

attributes to “nationalists”

-

from those Ackermann

especially in recognizing the
nitty-gritty and complicated

of nations and nationalisms, analyzing
their often oppressive forms,
and

reality

challenging nationalisms and national
movements to engage their negative aspects
directly and productively, toward a
transformation

away from them.

suspicions of states, particularly powerful
states, that
facts.

1

do see the nation as

is

1

do have serious

quite well grounded in concrete

a potentially significant alternative
form, though not to the

exclusion of other alternatives to the

territorial state:

1

am

not arguing for a world only of

nations, but rather for legitimacy of nations
within a world of alternative socio-political

forms. Not everyone

is in

a nation, or wishes to be. If

nation over the state, then that

is that.
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my position means

choosing the

CONCLUSION
In this dissertation,

way many

the

and

I

have

political agendas.

have

tried at

accomplish three things. The

first is to

examine

theories of the nation and
nationalism reflect competing
conceptual frames

They seek

form, or to transform and reduce
I

tried to

once

to

implications of them

either to delegitimate the nation
as a soctal and political
it

be specific

-

and

at the

-

to a specific type that

is

useful or safe for their
agenda.

treating particular theories,

same time

to present

and assertions

in

and

and analyze the more general

patterns and trends that link different
forms of antinational-ism, reductions
of the nation,

and/or uses of it.
It is

certainly possible to criticize

work through

my work as

too detailed, requiring the reader to

critiques of point after point for theory
after theory.

I

believe this has been

necessary to expose both the breadth and the
depth of the problems with
literature

on nations and nationalisms. Some

Breuilly [1994]

- have

criticized general

theorists

such as Anderson [1991] and

approaches to the nation for

the exception of Chatterjee [1993a and
1993b]
political

--

-

much of the

limits, but

-

with

not in the depth necessary to expose the

agendas often behind them; the often complex and multi-faceted
forms of the

ideological manipulations they

embody; or

their often devastating effects

on

nations, as

both theoretical objects and actual social formations.

A
-

surface analysis of

many

theories

-

liberal,

cosmopolitan, Marxist, or otherwise

leaves intact the impression of their objectivity and benevolence.
Only by digging

deeper do the

full

implications of such theories

become

visible.

touches on only the most blatant of problems, presumptions,
thoughtful readers anyway.
that

pose the

And, without
that consist

It is

—

general analysis often
things visible to most

the subtler tendencies and the unapparent implications

real danger, for they are

a

etc.

A

what get through the net of obvious

comprehensive but detailed analysis, the significant

criticisms.

totality

of tendencies

of a long development of subtle manipulations, barely perceptible
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deformations of the

and apparently

facts,

unimportance. The devil
It is

is

one thing

to

is

trivial

often in the details

premises, retains

- when

argue merely that a position

quite another to explain

how

it

works, what

it

guise of

its

viewed as a whole.

wrong or

is

implies, and

a perspective flawed.

why

it

exists at

position or perspective represents
or enacts an oppressive force,
this task

more

When a

all.

that

is

It

much

difficult.

A_P pst-Post-Strnctnralist Almost

My

second general goal has been

^ th „ Nntjnn

Semi-Structuralist
to describe

and develop an alternative

perspective on and account of the nation,
flowing out of the critiques and

at the

same time

extending beyond them. Whether the actual
product of this effort represents a viable
and

worthwhile concept must be the reader’s decision.
But,
the issues that

nation,

and

to

must be addressed

in

at the least,

I

hope

to

have raised

any truly comprehensive and deep theory
of the

have foreclosed reiterations of more limited and
reductive concepts.

Specifically, three points should be clear.
First,

it

is

untenable to conceive the

nation as either primarily material/concrete or
primarily mental/psychological/ideal.

Both forces or

factors are fully present in the general

form of the nation, and neither can

be isolated entirely apart from the other. This means
that the issue of whether the nation
generally

is fact

or fiction

is

ill-formed. This or that nation might be so evaluated,
but the

concept of the nation remains complex.

Second, the nation

is

a

complex

socio-intellectual structure.

Even

if

some

nations

represent reductions of the potentials of that structure, this does not
reflect on the general

form.

As

I

pointed out above, virtually every theorist of the nation asserts a one-

dimensional concept of the nation. Each attributes

it

to

one type of social bond, one type

ot social structure, one type of logical relation (including identity), one
relations

among members

medium of

(language, etc.) or center, one type of psychological or mental

move, one type of manipulation,

etc.

I

contend, on the contrary, that the nation always
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involves more than one
.•
tvDe
}P of rehtinn tv
(linguistic, conceptual,
spatial, etc.) none
of
W
" nkS
emire na ‘ ,0n
°"
*-» of connection is patfial,
and
quires (and flows into) others.
There may be tensions
among these forms, as
well as
•

.

^

.

'

complementarity.

and margin, a

What

I, is

is

between majority

more, members are not
one fixed thing in the nation
(“atomic

“parts,”

foregrounded

-

that

etc.),

is,

and change with the type
of relationship or

with the angle of
perception. There

“totality” of the nation

Again,

a tension

culture, a political
consciousness.

individuals,

Which the

never,*, an imagined
community,

this all

is

is

level that is

no one perspective from

perceptible.

should be expected: a group
as large as the nation

is unlikely to
take the form of a single,
simple structure, to be
captured in a sound-bite
definition
.

One consequence of this
limited

general complexity has been

number of examples. Besides

the

is

use of a relatively

volume of details included

Greenfeld’s claims about the
United States as a nation,

Armenia. The reason

my

my main

in

my

critique

example has been

simple: these are the only
nations with which

am

I

intimately

miliar, through extensive
reading as well as just as
extensive participation.

only nations that

“model”

I

I

know

They

have developed. Most

enough

Hobsbawm

to

are the

well enough to present in the
kind of detail necessary to the
theorists present

many, many models, with

details just

sufficient to support their reductive
assertions about the nation and
nationalism,

limited

of

and

prevent questions about these
assertions from being raised.
Even

focuses on specific details that
suggest nations to be counter-examples
to the

claims ot “nationalists”; he does not
present sufficient detail

complex analysis of the

structure of nations.

Even

Breuilly,

to

support a different, more

who

explicitly criticizes

other theorists for using details in an
opportunistic manner, and presents “full”
case
studies as a remedy, presents only those
data (though

parhamentary

political negotiations

among

many of them!)

that

sub-national interest groups.

concern proto-

It is

for this

reason that Partha Chatterjee's supremely
detailed and comprehensive (as well as

431

intellectually powerful) analyses of India as nation,
state, etc., stand as perhaps the

greatest contribution to the study ot nations and
nationalisms thus

my

Ot course,

far.

choices might be just as selective, for instance, to suggest
an

apparent diversity that masks an actual imposed homogeneity.
Against

no defense, and again recognize such charges

The posing of the nature

To

the literature.

to

this,

can offer

I

be in the jurisdiction of the reader.

as an irreducibly

complex

this point in the history ot theorization

structure

a

is

of the nation,

new

it

position in

has always been

a question either of recognizing the heterogeneity of a national population
or of treating
the nation as an actual social formation. Accepting either clause implied the falsity
of the
other.

If

I

have not accomplished

my

goal,

hope

I

at the least to

have issued a

theory of the nation that can accommodate both of these positions

at

call for a

once.

Bevond Good and Bad
I

have taken a strong

line against antinational-ism

and the conceptual use or

reductive containment of nations. These are the prevailing currents in the literature, and
strong rowing
to

Chapter

nations are

1

is

necessary to

and,

I

move

against them. But, as

hope, demonstrated

somehow

naturally good.

I

in

Chapter

have

tried

derivative and actual social formations (which

“natural” in

some

is

I

3, this is

merely

much

made

clear in the conclusion

not meant to suggest that

to establish

different

them

as non-

from claiming they are

biological or historical sense). That they should not be approached

through the frames of specific or distinct

political

agendas does not mean that they should

be approached through a nationalist framework. Though the relationship between
conceptual frames and the data perceived through them

been

to

is

always

tricky,

my

intention has

develop a conceptual frame the features of which are generated through critique

of those reductive frames treated
conceiving the nation

—

nation. Again, whether

in

Chapters

1

and

2,

and hence the identified needs of

not through a frame that inherently or explicitly valorizes the
I

have succeeded

is

a question
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I

must defer

to

my

readers.

Judgments about whether
nations
-atory or oppressive

W

"

,CT

in

whtch

“good” or“bad,”

that

(internaiiy, externa,
ly, or both) cannot be

b0 h ° r neither
‘

b ad (nor 7!
both nor neither) -

orm,

are

i,

is

'

“

^

na ' 10n "

abstract, with

is,

made

"^

-

tend to be
generaiiy
neither

compiex potential Oniy

the specific features
determined, can such a

j

-

or

good nor

in a concrete

udgment be made. Neither

are there general
features of such
determinations associated
with

"good” or “bad-

such as -civic” versus
“ethnic” forms. One must
consider the effects of
the existence of
«he nation on those
within and without i,
(whether one considers it
an agent or context of
oppression).

Though

determined a

priori,

oppressive only
!S

n °'

'

its

based solely on the abstract
form of the structure. For,

when

it

and undetermined, such

i,

f° rm iS neMral with

that its relationship is

>o oppression.

Rather,

it

is

it

abstract

merely potential.

such judgments also require
taking proper stock of the
context of a

nation, including other
relevant social structures and
forces (including states).
is

becomes

actually produces
oppression. This applies even
to neutrality:

me tHat tHe nati ° n

Of course,

structure might support
or produce oppression,
this cannot be

never a discrete unit that can be
immediately evaluated on internal
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The nation

criteria alone.
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